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This thesis examines an unexplored aspect of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency, and in particular 
his role in the development and growth of gay rights in the United States. It employs a 
qualitative approach, drawing extensively on archival and published sources, including a 
wide range of previously unpublished materials, as well as a series of targeted interviews. It 
seeks to explore what, if any, contribution Carter made to advancing the rights of 
homosexuals in the USA. 
The primary contribution of this thesis to the literature on Carter is in the area of 
historical understanding. While much has been written about Carter’s achievements (or lack 
thereof) in a range of areas, relatively little attention has been paid to the progress made in the 
area of gay rights at this time. This thesis also makes an important contribution, more 
generally speaking, in the area of the social history of the modern United States and in 
exploring the role of interest groups in determining US policy.  
Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates that Carter’s legacy in the area of gay rights is 
much more positive than is generally assumed. The careful exploration of what actually 
happened during his presidency, and a range of decisions taken and changes made by his 
administration, reveals a series of fundamental changes that tangibly improved the gay rights 
situation. The thesis argues that Carter’s legacy in this area should be re-evaluated and given 
more respect. The decisions he made and the policies he implemented contributed 
significantly to improving the lives of homosexuals; at the same time he played an important 







None of the material contained in this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree in the 
University of Durham or any other university. None of the material contained in this thesis is 
based on joint research. The content of this thesis consists of the author’s original individual 
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In the years after his presidency, polls showed that most Americans considered Carter to have 
been an unsuccessful president despite the fact that he had not led America into war, nor 
abandoned his commitment to human rights and his policies had not threatened the national 
economy or the social fabric in any way. As a result, some commentators argued that he 
would be remembered as much for what he had not done as for what he had accomplished.1  
In later years there was some attempt to revisit his legacy, and almost uniquely in the 
murky world of politics, after the foundation of the President Carter Library in 1986, 
researchers uncovered that Carter had been completely consistent during his presidency in 
terms of actually saying what he thought. In fact, he had come through on most of the pledges 
he made during his campaign,2 and had been praised for being exceptionally productive, 
especially during the earlier part of his term,3 while also bringing a positive change to how 
human rights issues were perceived both at home and abroad.4 
The copious private notes and memos he wrote during his term never deviated from 
what he was saying in public, which is an unusual trait in a politician. Whatever one thought 
of his views and actions, he had invariably been honest.5 John Dumbrell’s The Carter 
Presidency: A Re-Evaluation in 1993 was the first significant work to offer a different 
perspective on Carter’s policies and decisions. This work played a very important role in 
examining aspects of Carter’s presidency which had been unexplored and made a significant 
contribution to his legacy, especially in terms of his human rights policies. Dumbrell’s work 
triggered a series of works which examined and on some occasion re-evaluated Carter’s 
human rights policies, mostly in regard to his foreign policy. Because of these works, it is 
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2 Krukones, 1985: 143. 
3 Skowronek, 1997: 380. 
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now recognised that the Carter presidency “opened the way for the astonishing explosion of 
‘human rights’ across the American political landscape.”6 However, although several of 
Carter’s human rights policies have been examined, his gay rights policies remain until now 
unexamined and under-appreciated.  
At the same time, although the intervening decades have seen a dramatic increase in 
the quantity and quality of academic and other literature dedicated to gay rights, queer theory 
and so forth, Carter’s role in advancing gay rights has not been substantially addressed. 
Extant literature that does address the issue to a degree falls under a number of headings: 
material about interest groups, including their own correspondence and internal 
documentation; the general history of the Carter presidency; the general history of gay rights 
as an element of human rights; and highly committed, strongly ideological material produced 
by scholars, often in the area of queer studies, notably Canaday’s important book The 
Straight State  
However, still no explicit attention has been given to Carter’s contribution towards 
advancing gay rights. By and large, historians and commentators have been less than 
impressed by Carter’s contribution in this area while his efforts are very often misunderstood. 
For example, writing in 2001, Murdoch and Price comment that Carter was the very first 
presidential candidate “to have promised to issue a presidential order advancing gay rights” 
and that “he never kept that little-noticed pledge.”7 In addition, gay rights activists 
themselves, at the end of Carter’s presidency, were generally unhappy with his efforts. This 
was because progress was not being achieved as fast as they wanted, leading to the generally 
accepted view today that Carter’s efforts were limited.  
                                                          
6 Da Vinha, 2014: 100, quoting Moyn, 2010: 154. 





There are many reasons why Carter’s gay rights policies have not been thoroughly 
examined and remain underappreciated. Perhaps the most obvious is that they received little 
attention at the time and were obscured by the hostility of gay rights activists when Carter left 
office. This thesis discovered that even some prominent gay campaigners who were active in 
the late 1970s were not aware of some of Carter’s gay rights policies. This seems to have 
been due to five possible reasons or a combination of them:  
1. The Carter administration avoided giving undue publicity to its gay rights policies, 
fearing the reaction of evangelicals who were Carter’s closest allies in the 1976 elections. 
Professor Clyde Wilcox stated in a personal interview that he believes “Carter was ahead 
of his time” and that his gay rights policies were “less visible and therefore less likely to 
evoke a backlash.”8 
2. That generally Carter is rarely given credit for the impact he had may have a lot to do 
with his modesty, and a degree of personal ambivalence towards politics. Vice President 
Walter Mondale said, “Carter thought politics was sinful. The worst thing you could say 
to Carter if you wanted to do something was that it was politically the best thing to do.”9 
Surprisingly, the Carter administration resisted trumpet-blowing even when dealing with 
gay rights activists. As we will see in Chapter Eight, a letter from Carter’s office to 
activists in 1980, aimed at gaining their support in the forthcoming presidential elections, 
contained only a selection of his achievements in the gay sphere, omitting others of great 
importance.  
3. The media at the time rarely gave much coverage to the issue of gay rights. Moreover, 
Carter had failed to establish a positive relationship with the press and was not good at 
                                                          
8  Professor Clyde Wilcox in a personal interview, 4 March 2014. 





communicating his successes. He did not fit neatly into the stereotypes which journalists 
were used to and was difficult to pin down as a news story.10 
4. Carter’s administration did not see gay rights as an issue of major importance, especially 
in comparison with competing issues and policies. M.G. Abernathy, writing only four 
years after Carter’s 1980 defeat, states with regard to his record on domestic civil rights 
that, “The President’s preoccupation with several major foreign policy problems… could 
well have led him to accord his civil rights contributions less weight than they probably 
deserve. They may not have been exceptional but they were surely of greater importance 
than anything in the Nixon or Ford Administrations.”11 
5. At the time of the 1980 election, gay activists believed that Carter had not done enough. 
The fact is Carter had done much more than he promised; in fact, it was his successes 
which raised the expectations of his supporters and prompted them to keep asking for 
more. The fact that the demands which Carter did not fulfil were not fulfilled by any 
American president for the next thirty years demonstrates how unrealistic they were at the 
time. 
All the above factors played their part in keeping Carter’s gay rights policies 
underappreciated and mostly unknown. However, by using a wealth of previously 
unpublished archival material, and personal interviews with prominent gay rights activists of 
the 1970s, this thesis explores the role of Carter in advancing gay rights in the United States 
during his presidency. In the light of this material, we re-evaluate the published record where 
it touches on Carter’s input to gay rights, as well as exploring areas that have never been 
examined before.  
                                                          
10 Rozell, 1989: 13. 





This thesis argues that Carter’s contribution to wider rights for homosexual 
Americans has been overlooked and underestimated. Archival records and prominent gay 
rights campaigners who were active at the time agree that Carter did much more to advance 
gay rights than he was been credited with and that he did usher in positive changes, even if he 
was often the last to draw attention to them. When Carter could make a difference, he 
generally did, and when he could not, at least he tried, despite a hostile Congress and a 
difficult political and cultural climate of the time. In fact, a series of policies and actions with 
respect to gay rights led, among other progressive changes, to the dissatisfaction of the 
religious right, contributing substantially to Carter’s ultimate defeat in the 1980 Presidential 
election. By examining all these factors, this thesis provides a more complete picture of 
Carter’s role in this important area of human rights.  
It should be noted that although the thesis provides a completely new perspective 
about Carter’s contribution in advancing gay rights, it is not a revisionist account of his 
presidency with regard to the evangelical right or his efforts for gay rights. The thesis gives a 
far more detailed and scholarly description of them and there is a need for that, because, 
ironically, even Carter’s own administration did not effectively memorialise his 
achievements. Too often it got things wrong or allowed his successes to pass unnoticed. 
Carter’s efforts in advancing gay rights, and his relationship with the gay rights 
movement, particularly with the National Gay Task Force (NGTF), is the major focus of the 
thesis. To a secondary degree, it also examines the role of the evangelical right movement 
with regard to Carter’s gay rights policies. During Carter’s presidency, the evangelical right 
movement acted as a countermovement, attempting to preserve the status quo and prevent 
any social reforms that would advance gay rights.   
This thesis argues that Carter did considerably more to advance the cause of gay 





Carter contributed to gay rights through legislation; legitimised the gay rights movement and 
helped bring about changes in public discourse by treating gay people respectfully and equal 
members of the society; and convinced the gay community of its own strength as a social 
movement and its ability to achieve legal and political change. 
The thesis came to this conclusion by exploring a number of important issues:  
 Policy changes and decisions taken by Carter to improve gay rights.  
 The policies and decisions that damaged Carter’s relationship with both sides. 
 Carter’s relationship with the evangelical right and gay rights activists before his election, 
during his presidency and during the 1980 Presidential election campaign.  
 How groups/movements such as the evangelical right and the gay rights movement 
influenced and attempted to influence national domestic policy during Carter’s 
Presidency.  
By examining these issues, the thesis makes an original and considerable contribution 
to our knowledge and understanding of the Carter presidency in the area of gay rights. It also 
contributes to our knowledge of the influence on the Carter presidency of specific pro- and 
anti-gay rights interest groups, representing a nascent culture war; and on the emergence of 
the modern gay rights movement under the Carter presidency. 
 
METHOD AND SOURCES 
The methodology applied in this thesis in the collection and collation of the information used 
is entirely qualitative. Alexander George12 said that, “qualitative analysis of a limited number 
of crucial communications may often yield better clues to the particular intentions of a 
particular speaker at one moment in time than more standardized quantitative methods.” 
                                                          
12 George, A.L. (1995) Quantitative and Qualitative Approach to Contents Analysis. In Poll, I.S. (ed.) (1995) 





Here, I have chosen to use a qualitative method principally because I deal with the quality of 
individuals, organisations, and the processes they engaged in, rather than attempting to 
measure quantity, intensity, or frequency of interactions.  
Much of the research presented here comes from archival material. This qualitative 
approach, based on the examination of original evidence and documents, should be treated as 
a source of primary data and information, as it presents challenges in identifying, locating, 
and interpreting relevant documents. The application of the archival technique enables the 
researcher to highlight the most critical aspects of the question under investigation.13 By 
analysing the archival material as it relates to Carter, we can critically examine and evaluate 
the general issues associated with the structure and conduct of gay rights organisations and 
the evangelical right. Most importantly, we can explore Carter’s actions in response to these 
movements and his contribution to advancing gay rights. A significantly large bulk of the 
resources has been taken from a wealth of largely unpublished material housed in the Jimmy 
Carter Presidential Library (JCPL) and the archive of the National Gay Task Force at Cornell 
University (CU). Furthermore, relevant documents and resources have been consulted from 
the archives of Midge Costanza at the Midge Costanza Institute, from the Duke University 
Libraries and from Foster Gunnison, Jr. Papers at the archives of the University of 
Connecticut.  
In addition to documentary sources, both factual information and evaluation of its 
importance has been derived from open-ended, semi-structured personal interviews with 
people who were directly involved in the development of the gay rights agenda. These were 
carried out in person, by email and, in a small number of cases, by telephone. With the 
exception of two interviewees –  Louis Crew and Marilyn Haft – who had to be interviewed 
                                                          





twice, the rest were only contacted once for interviews. Furthermore, in one case I received a 
recorded video in response to interview answers that had been sent by email.  
In terms of selecting interviewees, I considered it extremely important to select a 
diverse range of people, including prominent Carter aides, gay and lesbian rights activists and 
members of the evangelical right who were active in the 1970s, as well as historians and 
other academics who are experts on the subjects under discussion. My results in achieving 
this goal were mixed. Most of the interviewees are very prominent gay and lesbian rights 
activists who were active in the 1970s. Among them, I managed to have a balanced number 
of men and women activists. Several experts in various fields, including authors, historians, 
members of the Democratic Party, Carter’s aides and academics, all with knowledge of the 
subject and the era, were also interviewed.  
However, while I also approached several evangelical leaders and activists who were 
active in the 1970s, the outcome here was less positive. Initially, most agreed to be 
interviewed and seemed happy to speak about Jimmy Carter. However, when I sent them the 
interview questions, most of which were about gay rights, they did not respond. As a result, 
only four evangelicals have been interviewed for this study, none of whom belong to the 
evangelical right.  
Depending on the expertise and activities of the interviewees, different questions were 
designed. For example, questions posed to gay and lesbian activists primarily covered issues 
relating to their evaluation of Carter’s policy and actions during the 1970s; and whether, in 
their opinion, Carter’s policies, decisions and efforts met the expectations of gays and 
lesbians at the time. It is worth noting that not only what they knew, but also what they did 
not know about Carter’s contribution provides material for this study. The process of 
interviewing gay/lesbian rights activists showed that some of them had very little knowledge 





perception of Carter’s effort and contribution was from reality. Other questions posed to this 
cohort related to their knowledge and interests in specific areas. Furthermore, one of the 
evangelical interviewees spent a long time speaking about the meeting he held with Carter in 
the White House before the 1980 elections. 
I also interviewed people who were able to contribute to issues included in my study 
that were not directly relevant to its main theme, or were of less importance. For example, in 
order to obtain information about the shape, structure and condition of the Democratic Party 
in the mid-1970s, I interviewed Professor Michael Dukakis, an active member of the 
Democratic Party at the time, and Byron Shafer, Professor of American politics and expert on 
the subject. Similarly, I interviewed several academics and historians who are experts on 
most of the issues mentioned in my thesis. In total, thirty-two people were interviewed for 
this thesis. 
 
An issue which plays a pivotal role in my study is the personal testimony of gay rights 
activists concerning events during Carter’s presidency and that needs to be emphasised here. 
This issue has also been highlighted in Lapovsky et al14 when they note that people’s 
personal recollections are “too subjective and idiosyncratic” but that, in the absence of any 
supportive documentation, it should be treated as a second-best solution to more objective 
material. The authors argue that the histories of marginalised groups are often treated as 
unimportant and, hence, are not systematically archived. According to Professor Ann 
Cvetkovich,15 Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Texas, this 
problem is primarily associated with so-called “institutional neglect” as well as the process of 
selection by dominant forces.16 Furthermore, a lack of documentation and archiving of 
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marginalised groups’ activities may also be due to the psychological effects of oppression 
and repression.17  
In particular, when individuals live with oppression, and are working hard to combat 
their oppressors, they may find very little time to record daily events and collect the 
appropriate documents in support of their activities. As Cvetkovich points out, a different 
approach is necessary for studying the past of the gay community, for what she refers to as 
“historical absence” is itself an aspect of trauma.18 She compares archives of gay and lesbian 
experience to “other archives of trauma, such as those that commemorate the Holocaust, 
slavery or war,” and states that the history of trauma “often depends on the evidence of 
memory, not just because of the absence of other forms of evidence but because of the need 
to address traumatic experience through witnessing and retelling,”19 affirming that, therefore, 
one needs to find new, different ways of theorising and memorialising these submerged 
histories.20 It is, therefore, fair to argue that the evidence of these personal testimonies should 
be treated as vitally important in the long histories of gay and lesbian communities in the 
United States of America.21 In highlighting the so-called “exclusions and invisibilities,” 
Avery Gordon, Professor of Sociology at the University of California, poses a fundamental 
question to sociologists to rethink their traditional, conventional way of approaching social 
scientific research by acknowledging the “material effects” that are produced by those 
individuals who have fought all their lives against oppression, but whose voices have been 
silenced.22   
Insofar as this study is concerned, these personal testimonies have played a key role in 
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18 Cvetkovich, 2002: 137. 
19 Cvetkovich, 2002: 110. 
20 Cvetkovich, 2003: 6. 
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developing my arguments. Therefore, transcending “conventional forms of documentation”23 
is not only useful, but necessary, when writing about the histories of marginalised 
communities such as the gay community in the 1970s, whose own records are typically lost 
through “resistance and neglect.”24 For the purpose of this thesis, I have interviewed 
seventeen prominent gay and lesbian rights activists who have described their lives, activities 
and events over forty years. Their narrated testimonies form a major part of the evidence 
relating to gay and lesbian communities’ struggle for survival, rights and recognition.  
Finally, I have also made reference to an extensive range of books, academic and 
newspaper articles and other published sources, and to relevant websites; the secondary data. 
The examination of major gay publications of the time, such as The Advocate, The Blade, the 
Gay Community News and The Lesbian Tide, is particularly important. These provide a 
glimpse into how Carter and gay rights issues were seen through gay-run national print 
media. Equally important is the examination of the major mainstream US newspapers, 
namely the New York Times and the Washington Post, as they also provide insight into how 
Carter and gay rights issues were seen by the mainstream press. 
The data gathered from interviews and archival material provides useful, reliable 
details and contemporary information for the study. The second group of secondary data has 
been carefully selected to complement the empirical investigation. The narrative and 
descriptive method employed by this thesis is similar to that used in the works of Professor 
John Dumbrell, especially The Carter Presidency: A Re-Evaluation. 
                                                          
23 Cvetkovich, 2003:7. 






OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
The thesis consists of nine chapters plus the introduction and the conclusion. Here is a brief 
overview.  
Chapter One introduces Jimmy Carter, as well as the two other main players in the 
thesis, the evangelical and the gay rights movements. Chapter Two discusses the theoretical 
context of the thesis and how it relates to the subject, as well as the thesis’s objectives. 
Chapter Three examines primarily the 1976 Presidential elections and the role of gay rights, 
but also touches on the evangelical right in the same context. Although the role of the 
evangelicals has been examined before, the same has not happened with the gay rights 
activists and this is the main focus of this chapter. Chapter Four looks at the White House 
breakthrough meeting between gay rights activists and members of Carter’s administration. 
This is a well-known and researched event, but because of its importance it could not be 
overlooked in this thesis. Further, the thesis is looking at new and unpublished primary 
sources to examine the background of the meeting and its aftermath but most importantly its 
contribution to the cause of gay rights. This chapter also examines the reaction of the 
evangelical right to the meeting. 
Chapter Five looks at the main issues for the gay rights movement during Carter’s 
term in office, Carter’s response to them and the progress that was made in these areas. With 
the use of a vast number of new and unpublished primary sources, it examines Carter’s 
policies and decisions that helped to advance gay rights. The chapter also deals with those 
things Carter failed to do in the area of gay rights and the reasons for this. It also examines 
the reaction of the evangelical right to Carter’s advances for gay rights. Chapter Six explores 
the National Women’s Conference and the White House Conference on Families which were 





and unpublished primary sources we examine the background, the actual events and the 
importance for gay rights of these two signature Conferences. Chapter Seven examines 
Carter’s relationship with gay rights activists and the evangelical right during his presidency. 
It examines the pressure he felt from both movements, how he dealt with it and what was 
their reaction. Chapter Eight considers the 1980s elections and the roles of both the gay rights 
activists and the evangelical right. As in the 1976 elections, the role of the evangelical right 
has been extensively examined, but that of gay rights organizations remains mostly 
unexamined. Chapter Nine provides a brief discussion of gay rights since 1981, from Carter’s 
defeat by Reagan up to the present. It is important to know what followed Carter’s exit in 










HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: JIMMY CARTER, GAY 
RIGHTS AND EVANGELICALS  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce and provide the backgrounds of the three main players 
in this thesis: Jimmy Carter, gay rights activists and evangelicals. It gives a concise but very 
informative summary of Jimmy Carter’s life, beliefs and political career prior to his run for 
the Presidency in 1976. It also examines the history and development of homosexual activism 
and of evangelicalism; including the creation of the two movements, and the struggle of gay 
rights activists for their rights. 
 
JIMMY CARTER 
James Earl “Jimmy” Carter was born on October 1, 1924, in Plains, Georgia, where his 
family lived and grew peanuts and cotton.25 Carter’s attitudes and behaviour towards the poor 
were moulded by his father, Earl, a charitable, caring individual.26 In 1942, Carter, then 
seventeen, went to Atlanta to begin a general engineering preparation programme at Georgia 
Institute of Technology, prior to joining the Naval Academy. In 1946, Carter was officially 
sworn into the Navy.27 In July 1945, Carter met Rosalynn Smith, two years younger than him 
and a devout Christian. The couple decided to marry shortly after his graduation.28 After the 
wedding he worked as an ensign in the Navy.29 He applied for admission into the Navy’s 
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most elite group of nuclear engineers and was accepted,30 requiring a move to New York.31 
Following the senior Carter’s death in 1953, Carter, Rosalynn and their children returned to 
Georgia to run the family farm. By the end of 1962, Carter had amassed a fortune, with 
annual gross revenue of about $2.5 million.32 He was also deeply involved in local social and 
business communities and in the church, as well as being supportive of the local Black 
community. He had also become interested in civil and human rights.33 
Georgia remained segregated even in the late 1950s, despite the Federal ruling of 
1954 on school integration. In 1955, a peaceful demonstration against integration was held by 
the local community under the leadership of the Chief of Police and the Baptist minister; 
Carter rejected their invitation to participate.34 As the civil rights movement gathered 
strength, Carter’s interest in politics was fuelled by the emergence of exciting new leaders 
like President Kennedy and Martin Luther King. He could also see the gradual changes 
taking place in the state as more Black students joined whites at university or in public 
schools.35 For Carter, the idea of a perfectly fair society went hand in hand with his faith, and 
he became fully committed to civil rights. 
When Carter ran for the Georgia Senate as an outsider, he had to face the popular 
incumbent, Senator Moore.36 Following a long struggle with the support of attorney Warren 
Forston, and a large number of Federal judges, Carter proved that there had been tampering 
with a significant number of ballot boxes. Through the write-in-vote, on 5th November, Carter 
was declared the winner with 3,012 votes to 2,182. On January 13, 1963, at a gala party in 
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31 Carter, 1975: 55. 
32 Morris, 1996: 115. 
33 Among many see: Bourne, 1997; Godbold, 2010; Goldman, 1976; Morris, 1996. 
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35 Morris, 1996: 126-8. 





Atlanta, Carter learned that he had become a State Senator once the lieutenant governor 
called him to come forward to take the oath of the office.37  
In early 1964, as chairman of the Georgia Senate’s Committee for Education, Carter 
publically condoned racial equality for the very first time. At that time he was highly 
influenced by two African Americans who worked with him: Horace Tate, executive director 
of the Black Teachers’ Association; and Leroy Johnson, the only African American senator 
from Atlanta.38 Through the Committee, Carter established an education programme for the 
poor, offering free textbooks and transportation.39 Throughout the remainder of 1964, Carter 
delivered many speeches about community, education, human rights and civil rights, helping 
him to secure his third and final term as state Senator.40  
On June 12, 1966, Carter announced his intention to run for Governor. Despite great 
effort he lost to his rival, Callaway, by a large margin.41 A week later he contacted his main 
sponsor and advisor, Hamilton Jordan, and assured him that he was ready to try again in four 
years.42 Carter’s defeat in 1966 was attributed to his lack of a clear economic policy.43 He 
was quoted as saying that “as a leader I have the responsibility to establish justice first.”44 In 
short, his politics was a reflection of his Christianity; to make life better for his fellow 
humans, he had to offer justice through government. He was genuinely convinced that sincere 
commitment to social compassion, coupled with his faith, would help social justice and 
welfare.45 
When Carter was defeated in the Georgia gubernatorial campaign of 1966, his intense 
discouragement forced him into a period of personal re-evaluation. His sister Ruth, an 
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evangelist, had told him that she had been transformed as a new Christian. Carter wanted to 
know how she had managed to overcome her serious personal problems. In a long 
conversation between Ruth and Jimmy, she asked him if he would give up all his possessions 
to be “born again” and he said that he would. When she asked him whether he would give up 
his politics, Jimmy replied, “I wouldn’t.”46 Carter pledged to take his religion more 
seriously.47 For him, this experience was that of being “born again.”48  
In the light of these fundamental commitments to universalism, Carter had realised 
that America had changed significantly and that religion alone did not have all the answers. 
The Vietnam War was still going on and the younger generation continued to experiment 
with drugs and sexual freedom, while the issue of civil rights had receded somewhat.49 By 
early 1969, Carter had learned to take advantage of the support and advice of some highly 
intelligent consultants and campaign managers. In 1970, Carter ran for Governor again; in the 
second week of September, he received nearly 49% of the vote – just short of the 50% 
required for outright victory – against 38% for Sanders. In a runoff, Carter was elected 
Governor of Georgia with 62% of the vote.50  
 
Carter’s beliefs 
Carter was both an evangelical and a Southern Baptist. By the end of the 1970s, Baptists 
represented one of the most powerful Protestant groups, with some twenty-seven million 
followers in the USA, and thirty-one million worldwide. The Southern Baptists were (and 
are) one of the largest Christian denominations in the South and the Southwest of USA. They 
have been described variously as fundamentalists, evangelicals, pietists, and sectarians.51 By 
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the late 1970s, the Southern Baptist Convention was the largest of any Baptist convention in 
the world, with up to 13 million members and 35,000 churches over 2000 district 
associations, and 33 state conventions.52 Up to the late 1960s most Southern Baptist churches, 
including Carter’s, were racially segregated.53 
Carter had seen corruption and injustice everywhere in the South, and thought that he 
could save his fellow citizens by becoming directly involved in politics. To him, politics was 
all about the maintenance of justice and nothing else, and his Christian faith was expressed in 
his commitment to Christ’s message of the rights of all.54 As Fink puts it, “Carter’s religious 
faith helped to meld a conservative mentality and a liberal social outlook into a practical 
political philosophy.55 While he was “deeply reverent”, however, Carter was not a Biblical 
literalist.56 He stated that: “… the Bible, though inspired by God, was written by fallible 
human beings who shared the knowledge and beliefs of their time. The science and 
astronomy of the Bible are inaccurate by modern standards… So it is appropriate to consider 
the times in which the Bible was written when interpreting the meaning of Scripture and its 
message for us today.”57 
Time magazine quoted Carter as saying, “I find it difficult to question Holy Scripture, 
but I admit I do have trouble with Paul sometimes, especially when he says that a woman’s 
place is with her husband, and that she should keep quiet and should cover her head in the 
church. I just can’t go along with him on that.”58 This candid remark is very revealing of 
Carter’s dilemma as a devout Christian from a Southern Baptist church who lived and worked 
with strong women whom he respected, and who also went to some effort to increase the 
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numbers of women in important government positions. Carter’s ability to live with the 
inevitable cognitive dissonance reveals how he could believe in the Bible while ignoring 
those aspects that were contrary to his strong commitment to equal rights. Just before his 
Presidential election, when he was asked if he would use the office of President to 
demonstrate his Christian convictions, Carter plainly replied: “I would try to exemplify in 
every moment of my life those attitudes and actions of Christianity that I believe in. I would 
ask God for guidance on decisions affecting our country and make those decisions after 
evaluating the alternatives the best I could.”59  However, he also said: “I don’t look on the 
presidency as a pastorate... no… Although Teddy Roosevelt said it’s a bully pulpit, no, I 
don’t look on it with religious connotations. But it gives me a chance to serve, and it also 
gives me a chance to magnify whatever influence I have, for either good or bad, and I hope it 
will be for good.”60 
Peter Bourne, Director of the Office of Drug Abuse Policy during Carter’s 
Presidency, a close personal friend of Carter, who served as his special assistant on health 
issues, told the author that “Carter's beliefs were very much rooted in his Baptist religion. As 
with all Baptists he believed that individuals made their own relationship with God and did 
not need organized religious institutions to mediate between people and God.  He was also 
very sympathetic to the Quakers who shared similar views and he once told me had he not 
been brought up a Baptist he would like to have been a Mennonite whose views most closely 
paralleled those he held as an adult. He is very knowledgeable about the history of the 
Baptists in the US and the role of early leaders like Roger Williams and John Leland who 
fought for individual rights and freedom of religion opposing the establishment of a state 
religion as in Britain.”61 
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One of the most talked about issues in Carter’s life is associated with the claim that he 
was a doubtful Christian until he became a “born again.”62 His becoming “born again” was 
based on the principles of the Bible, Baptist Church teaching, and his own self-disciplined 
attitudes to life and death. The concept of being “born again” is regarded as one associated 
with the Southern Baptism Church, referring to purity and peace within oneself.63 Carter was 
deeply religious, the perfect fit for the ideal evangelical. However some of his views were 
markedly liberal, which would impact seriously on his relationship with the evangelicals, as 
we will explore in the chapters to come. 
Carter defined the Civil Rights Act as “the best thing that ever happened to the South 
... They liberated the whites as well as the blacks.” Carter emphasized that “not only blacks 
have a right to equality, but blacks are equal.” Whilst in the Georgia State Senate, Carter 
voted for the amendment of the segregation law and particularly that relating to the test of 
literacy designed to keep blacks from voting.64 Carter had supported John F. Kennedy’s 
reforms towards integration and in 1963, having been the chairman of the Georgia Senate’s 
Committee on Educational Matters, he publically criticised racial inequality.65 During the late 
1960s, as a state Senator, he was threatened several times and his family business was 
boycotted by white supremacists because of his political support of African Americans.66 
Once elected as Governor in 1970, he supported equal rights for African Americans. Carter 
decided to use the office to make sure that racial discrimination in Georgia had ended. As 
Governor of Georgia, Carter fought continuously for civil rights for all minorities, which 
would win him much support from Black voters when he ran for President.67  
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On the issue of human rights and social justice, Martin Luther King Jr also heavily 
influenced Carter. Carter is believed to have placed a portrait of him in the Georgia state 
capitol building during his term as Governor and he said, “I would rather die than disappoint 
Andrew Young or Martin Luther King Sr. or Coleman Young.” Martin Luther King Sr. said 
about Carter, “I know what he is and what he stands for... I’m with him all the way.”68  
 
Carter’s Belief in the Separation of Church and State 
In a sense, however, Carter’s beliefs about homosexuals and homosexuality are something of 
a red herring. He had always been extremely clear about his belief in the separation of church 
and state, so whether he, as a practising Christian, believed homosexuality to be sinful or not 
was essentially irrelevant. Quite simply, his view seems to have been that if someone was 
homosexual, it was none of his business, nor was it the business of the American state. 
Furthermore, he also believed that homosexuals should have equal rights with everyone else 
and that they should not be discriminated against, harassed or abused.69 
Consistently, Carter held that a clear division between church and state was extremely 
important, and that it was in fact fundamental to the practice of his Baptist faith.70 In this 
context, what might be sinful should not necessarily be criminal as well. Dr William 
Steding,71 senior fellow at the Centre for Presidential History, describes Carter’s views in this 
area as “more accurately categorised as a check valve than a wall, which allows the flow of 
influence from church to state but disallows the flow of influence from state to church”. In a 
letter to the American Humanist Association in October 1976, Carter wrote that “an 
important tenet of the Baptist faith is complete separation of church and state. I hold this 
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view. And I have not found it to impose a strain either on my personal religious convictions 
or on my performance in public office… I've never used political office to force my religious 
convictions on someone else … So there would be no problem in my Presidency in keeping 
separate religion and government. I would be a strong defender of the First Amendment and 
interpret it very strictly.”72 
The separation of Church and State was a much talked-about issue during Carter’s 
political career and public life. Having followed his parents’ and some theologians’ (Tillich, 
Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer, and Barth) lessons and advice, Carter melded a rather activist 
existentialist approach in his Christian faith vis-à-vis church-state separation.73 Carter openly 
discussed this issue and stated that, “As a Baptist I believe very strongly in the principle of 
separation of Church and state,”74 although he also made it clear that his personal faith could 
not but influence everything he did.75 
The record also shows that despite the fact that he was a deeply religious man, and 
despite believing that the tenets of Christianity were compatible with America’s commitment 
to “freedom, democracy and the pursuit of justice,”76 Carter “did not engage in civil religion 
to the same extent that some of his predecessors had.”77 Carter also defended his religious 
beliefs, while also making clear his view that he did not wish to impose them on anyone else, 
during his infamous Playboy interview at the end of which the interviewer concluded that 
Carter was “a guy who believes in his personal God and let the rest of us believe whatever the 
hell we want.”78  
                                                          
72 Flowers, 1983: 116. 
73 Flippen, 2011: 27. 
74 Gaver, 1978: 17. 
75 Smith, 2011: 62. 
76 Berggren, 2005: 55. 
77 Smidt, 2001: 198. 





Carter’s insistence on the separation of church and state may appear at first glance to 
be a mere detail of his attitude towards and beliefs around government, but in fact it is hugely 
important to our topic. In this way, Carter could believe that certain behaviours were sinful – 
such as homosexual intercourse – while also believing, just as firmly, that consensual sexual 
encounters and loving relationships, even if sinful, were no business of the state and should 
not generally be a matter for legislation. We will revisit this issue later on.  
 
The Human Rights President 
Carter has long been recognised as the “human rights” President. Carter entered his 
Presidential term determined to make human rights the cornerstone of America’s foreign 
policy and, domestically, to make America a better, fairer place. Along with his deep-rooted 
evangelical faith, he was committed to human rights abroad and at home, and believed that 
religion and politics shared a joint purpose, which was to establish “justice in a sinful 
world.”79 
The rhetoric of human rights had become increasingly important in American politics 
in recent decades, and Carter was determined to make human rights a cornerstone of his 
presidency.80 Given the climate of the time, with growing disenchantment with the Vietnam 
War, and upset around scandals involving Nixon and the overreach of the CIA, it is likely 
that ideas about human rights were “in the air” in Washington, as Dr. Mary Stuckey wrote.81 
While other Presidents had also spoken of human rights, Carter went as far as establishing a 
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the state department.82 For many 
Americans, the very concept of “human rights” started with Carter. Professor Randall Balmer 
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told the author: “... before Carter and his presidency, ‘human rights’ was simply not a 
mainstream concern. He really introduced the term into the political lexicon.”83  
Carter spoke often about the need to restore morality to the government of the United 
States; a loaded term that may not have meant quite the same thing to him as to others. He 
spoke of Americans having been “embarrassed” by their government, and of what he saw as 
the loss of the “vision, the ideal, the commitment” of America’s Founding Fathers.84 For 
Carter, a focus on human rights was a way to make American policy more “moral”, both 
abroad and at home, and, in so doing, give America a sense of moral leadership that would 
give it gravitas in its foreign affairs. By focusing on human rights, America would hold high 
a flame illuminating what was pure and decent and right and proper and would rally our 
citizens to a cause.”85  
Carter also addressed America’s role in the international field of human rights. 
Assuming its importance to be a foregone conclusion, he declared human rights to be a US 
foreign policy objective.86 Addressing the United Nations in 1977 he said: “The United States 
has a historic birthright to be associated with this process [of working towards a global 
understanding of fundamental human rights].”87 Although a concise definition of “human 
rights” continued to be elusive, for Carter an essential aspect was that human rights “related 
to governmental respect for protection of an individual’s person, beliefs, and spiritual 
practices.”88 In this context, Carter had already shown himself to live human rights as well as 
preach them; this southern former governor had consistently been in favour of racial equality, 
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for instance.89 He had been the only white man in his hometown to refuse to join the 
segregationist local White Citizen’s Council, despite the fact that this had damaged his 
business.90 As President, he continued to demonstrate commitment in this area, including 
agreeing to double the number of people enforcing civil rights laws, and ending 
discrimination in education at all levels.91 
Although he had come from the South which, then as now, was not exactly known for 
progressivism in the area of human rights, Carter was a well-educated scientist who could 
appeal to many voters outside his own southern demographic.92 He had promised to revitalise 
the declining American family by convening a series of White House conferences on the 
issue of family in order to bring this topic back to the forefront of his government’s agenda.93 
He had also reached out to liberal, progressive groups, including gay rights activists, with 
assurances that his interest in human rights would extend to them. According to former 
Secretary of the State Madeleine Albright, Carter saw America’s sense of moral purpose as 
all-important, making it very necessary to emphasise human rights: “It wasn’t only a question 
of trying to do good; it was another way of reminding Americans of their true self-interest 
and of putting their country in a position of leadership on a matter vital to people 
everywhere.”94 
 
HOMOSEXUALITY AND GAY RIGHTS 
Homosexuality can be defined as a primary sexual and affectional interest in members of the 
same sex as oneself. Homosexuality has been viewed and experienced in a range of ways 
throughout human history: There has been substantial documentation, for example, that 
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same-sex unions existed in ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, classical Greece, pre-Christian 
Rome, indigenous South and North American cultures and African, Indian, Chinese, 
Japanese, Burmese, Vietnamese, Nepalese, Korean, Paleo-Siberian and Melanesian 
cultures.95 
However, although there had been a degree of acceptance of homosexual unions in 
ancient Greece and Rome, the history of homosexuality in the west has chiefly been one of 
persecution.96 Certainly, the history of Western Christianity was one in which at most times 
and in most place homosexuals have been severely penalised, up to and including 
execution.97 This resulted in a situation whereby most homosexual activity remained strictly 
“closeted,” inhibiting the development of any sort of coherent organisation representing the 
interests of homosexual people in the public arena. During the early modern period men 
could be prosecuted for the crime of sodomy, whereas sexual activity between women was 
not considered to be sex at all, resulting in lesbian relationships being both unrecognised and 
unpunished.98 In Britain there was an established gay underground community by the late 
nineteenth century, with similar phenomena in other European countries.99  
The debate about rights for homosexuals opened in 1864 when proposals to 
decriminalise homosexuality in the new German empire were opposed by Karl Ulrichs. 
Previously, the Napoleonic code had taken a much more lenient view. Ulrichs believed 
homosexuality a congenital disorder, and that homosexual men and women were individuals 
trapped in the wrong bodies and, therefore, expressing desires that were out of sync with their 
physical forms. Ulrichs’ was, however, a minority voice.100 
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In the USA, the medical profession regarded homosexuality as a psychiatric and 
physical disorder, developing treatments that included removal of the gonads. New 
legislation in Germany promoted the imprisonment of homosexuals, often in mental 
institutions, and banned them from professional positions.101 Whereas in other European 
nations, the bureaucracies of state had been founded in the distant past, before homosexuals 
were “discovered” by the medical professions in the nineteenth century, according to 
Professor of History Margot Canaday102 the American state was still maturing and the 
engines of bureaucracy in the US, which were still being formed, incorporated contemporary 
attitudes towards homosexuality into the very structure of state.  
The first movement founded to improve the civil rights of the gay community, the 
Order of Chaeronea, was based in Germany, and started in 1897.103 It would run until 1933 
when it was quashed under the Nazi administration. Nonetheless, it was hugely influential, 
inspiring similar groups after the Second World War.104 Prior to this, while homosexuality 
was known in cultures all over the world, there was no discrete entity specifically dedicated 
to promoting the rights and aims of a gay “community,” and indeed there was little concept 
of the same. Although all the evidence suggests that there was a thriving gay community in 
the United States, in the years before the Second World War only the medical establishment 
was seen as qualified to discuss what was considered a psychiatric and moral disorder. In the 
press, discussion of homosexuality was merely about “perversion” and its suspected link to a 
range of violent crimes.105 Lesbians were possibly seen as less dangerous, but were also 
frequently considered to be mentally ill, and many found themselves confined in 
institutions.106 There were, however, a few lone voices. In 1906 and 1907, the Scientific 
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Humanitarian Committee lectured in New York, creating links with the German movement 
referenced above and, in 1915, anarchist Emma Goldman spoke out for freedom for 
homosexuals, citing as inspiration the lesbian women she had met in prison, among others.107 
Theirs were very much minority views. 
 
The History of the Gay Rights Movement in the US  
Historically, “laws, institutional policies, the shape of social life, and the cultural 
representation of love, romance, and sexual desire all presumed heterosexuality as 
normative.”108 In 1924 the first formal gay rights group was founded in Chicago, the Society 
for Human Rights.109 The founder was Henry Gerber, a postal worker who had been based in 
Germany with US troops in the 1920s, and who had been active in the nascent German gay 
rights movement. The movement struggled from the start110 and ended when police were 
alerted by the wife of one of its directors.111 Also in the 1920s, communities of women who 
self-identified as lesbians had been established in diverse parts of the United States, including 
Salt Lake City.112 The 1920s was also the time when both male and female homosexuals 
began to refer to themselves using the word “gay.”113 
Just when homosexuals were taking their first tentative steps towards asserting 
themselves, the evangelical right had crystallised around an idea of “the cause of orthodoxy 
as primarily a masculine endeavour.” It was declared “manly” to follow Christ, the Bible was 
described as “virile literature” and Christ as “the most manly of men.”114 With each attempt 
to gain ground in the area of rights for homosexuals came a counter-attempt to quell the 
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effort. Homosexual themes in films and books were either written out or prosecuted for 
obscenity.115 Publicists and officials equated homosexuality with sexual crime, conflating 
homosexuals and predatory paedophiles. In 1943 an explicit ban on male and female 
homosexuals serving in the military was put into place. Over the years that followed, 
thousands of US army personnel were given dishonourable discharges for being homosexual, 
even if they had been decorated for heroism.116 Four gay veterans with honourable discharges 
formed the Veterans’ Benevolent Association in 1945 to fight for homosexual veterans. 117 
However, there were internal disputes over the purpose of the Association118  and it 
disbanded in 1954.119  
After the Second World War, American homosexuals faced a new threat. “Manliness” 
was seen as essential to the fight against communism, and homosexual men were not seen as 
“manly”, but as effeminate, weak, and dangerous to the integrity of the United States, and 
were associated with the “threat” of communism. According to Robert Dean, Professor of 
History at Eastern Washington University, ”elite masculinity”120 was central to the escalation 
of the Vietnam War, and views on masculinity during this period were hugely important in 
terms of American political culture and decision-making. Dean121 sees profound links 
between anti-Communism and a hatred of homosexuality during this period, pointing out that 
government officials who were accused of holding Communist views were, just like 
homosexuals, depicted as being both subversive and weak. In this context, people who might 
otherwise have opposed military actions overseas, or hard-line anti-Communism at home, 
were afraid of speaking out in case they, too, were characterised as such. The evangelical 
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right tended to posit their version of Christianity as an important bulwark against communism 
in the context of the Cold War that occupied so much of the Americans’ attention.122  
As a result, when “Congress increased efforts to police communist sympathies… it 
also amended the immigration laws [in 1952] to expressly exclude homosexuals from the 
country.”123 In 1965, the legislation, which already referred to homosexuals as “psychopathic 
personalities”, was amended to refer to them as living lives of “sexual deviation.”124 The 
same year, a poll revealed that Americans considered homosexuals the “third most dangerous 
group” in the United States, “after communists and atheists.”125 The idea that homosexuals 
were not just deviants but potentially a threat to national security was mooted.126 In this 
context, heterosexual families that observed strict gender roles were promoted as not just the 
norm but the only way to be in a red-blooded, anti-communist society. Anyone who did not 
fit the mould was considered a dangerous anti-conformist127 and some homosexual men and 
women married each other to deflect suspicion about their sexuality and prevent losing 
custody of their children.128  
Police raids on gay bars and known gay “cruising” places to arrest men and women 
for “solicitation and loitering with the intent to commit the illegal act of sodomy” were 
commonplace. Although certain sexual acts were forbidden for everyone, the relevant 
legislation was designed to control homosexual behaviour, in the “best interests” of 
society.129 Gay bars have been compared by one scholar to “churches;”130 while this might be 
stretching the point, it is fair to say that for most homosexuals in this period, and the one that 
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followed, they were much more than just places to have a drink, but also served important 
roles in the formation of a common gay identity.  
 
Gay Literature, Activism and Backlash 
There was also a growing awareness of how common homosexuality was, especially 
following the publication in 1948 of the Kinsey Report.131 Kinsey’s research indicated that 
human sexuality was best represented as a continuum of sexual feelings and behaviour, and 
that many people had had at least some sexual experience with members of the same sex, 
while a full four percent of adult males reported that they were exclusively homosexual. 
While Kinsey’s findings were challenged by some social scientists, they were still hugely 
shocking and revelatory to most American citizens.132 In 1951, The Homosexual in America 
by Donald Webster Cory was published, making the then-audacious claim that gay men and 
lesbians should be seen as a legitimate minority that deserved consideration.133 
The most important gay movement of the period following the Second World War 
was the Mattachine Society, founded in Los Angeles (as the Mattachine Foundation) in 1951 
by Harry Hay.134 The Mattachine Society, as it was known from 1953, proposed social and 
political change, challenged attacks on homosexuals,135 and pledged to bring isolated 
homosexuals together; to educate both homo- and heterosexuals in a way that promoted “an 
ethical homosexual” culture, to provide leadership, and to assist those who suffered 
victimisation and oppression.136 Its purposes were described as “to unify, to educate and to 
lead.”137 Initially, members were often terrified of exposure, but as time passed they grew 
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bolder and the organisation began to acquire a keener political focus.138 The Mattachine 
Society drew direct inspiration from the efforts of other minorities in the US, such as the 
Jews. One of the founders, Chuck Rowland, recalled how they spoke about: “Why can’t we 
do the same sort of things the Jews do? If you had five hundred thousand Jews in the 
community, they would have several Temples. They would have a symphony orchestra. They 
would have ballet. They would have several theatres. They would have a hospital. Why can’t 
we do all those kinds of things?”139 
In 1952, the American Congress had enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
which included a clause to exclude people who presented as having “a psychopathic 
personality, sexual deviation, or a mental defect”, which was generally understood to mean 
homosexuals.140 In 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower issued an executive order141 that 
barred gay men and lesbians from holding federal positions. Eisenhower’s order was in 
response to the charge that homosexual employees in the State Department were a security 
risk because they might be blackmailed, even if they were loyal.142 In fact, the principal 
security risk was to the homosexual soldiers. For instance, in one case a lesbian woman in the 
army was raped by an intelligence officer to show her that men were “better”; he was never 
punished for this.143 
In 1953 Dr. Evelyn Hooker was awarded a grant from the National Institute of Mental 
Health to study gay men. The resulting paper claimed that homosexual men were just as well 
adjusted as heterosexual men, and sometimes even more so.144 In 1955, the Daughters of 
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Bilitis, the first lesbian organisation since the war, was founded to provide education and a 
library to lesbians, to enable public discussion and advocate a way of behaving and dressing 
that would not alarm the wider society.145 Inspired in part by the Mattachine Society, the 
Daughters of Bilitis organised a monthly newsletter, meetings, and support for lesbians.146 
They immediately attracted opprobrium and suspicion, and were infiltrated by informants 
who fed information about the members to the FBI.147 
The Supreme Court awarded the Mattachine Society the right to publish One 
Magazine: The Homosexual Viewpoint in 1958;148 since 1954 it had been banned by the US 
Post Office, but the earlier ruling was found to have violated the free speech guaranteed by 
the First Amendment.149 One had a strong political focus on homosexuals’ need to be granted 
rights within the framework of America’s principles of freedom.150 
In 1961, Illinois became the first state to decriminalise homosexuality when it took 
place between consenting adults in private circumstances.151 In 1964, Franklin Kameny, 
together with Jack Nichols, founded a chapter of the Mattachine Society in Washington, D.C. 
which called for “acceptance as full equals…. basic rights and equality as citizens; our human 
dignity… our right to the pursuit of happiness… right to love whom we wish”152 and for the 
need “to secure for homosexuals the basic rights and liberties established by the world and 
the spirit of the Constitution of the United States.”153 Kameny was an academic and a 
veteran, having been fired from his military position because of his homosexuality.154 At this 
time, the US was becoming increasingly urbanised. With denser populations, it was easier for 
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gay people to find each other, and for gay communities to form.155 With the emergence of a 
collective homosexual identity came the idea that homosexuals could be treated – and often 
despised – as a group, a collective, rather than as individuals.156   
By the mid-1960s, gay rights groups in the USA were focusing on injustice, including 
the policy of issuing homosexual soldiers dishonourable discharges as a matter of course; 
aside from the stigma of the “dishonour” there were huge practical repercussions; pensions 
and other benefits were risked. The East Coast Homophile Organisation, a collective of gay 
rights groups in the East Coast, repeatedly requested the opportunity to discuss the matter 
with the relevant authorities, but were either turned down or ignored. On July 31, 1965 they 
held a protest at the Pentagon demanding equal rights for homosexual soldiers. The protest 
was extensively covered on the television network CBS157 and is widely considered to be the 
very first gay political protest to be held in public.158  
Mainstream opinion on homosexuality remained generally hostile. In 1966, an article 
in Time magazine, published on January 21, read that homosexuality: “… is a pathetic little 
second-rate substitute for reality, a pitiable flight from life. As such it deserves fairness, 
compassion, understanding when possible, treatment. But it deserves no encouragement, no 
glamorization, no rationalization, no fake status as minority martyrdom, no sophistry about 
simple differences in taste – and above all, no pretence that it is anything other than a 
pernicious sickness.”159 
In the late 1960s, police still routinely raided gay bars and one such raid took place in 
1969 at the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village in New York. The policemen’s excessive 
violence led to a riot and the ensuing attention from the media led to the event becoming a 
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potent symbol of the victimisation of homosexuals.160 Radical activists based in New York 
began organising, and a month after the incident about three hundred people gathered in 
Washington Square Park to declare a “homosexual revolution”: Identifying with the Algerian 
revolutionaries fighting the French in the early 1960s and the Vietcong then fighting 
American forces in Vietnam, they organized themselves into the Gay Liberation Front 
(GLF).161 
The first Gay Pride march was held in the anniversary of the raid.162 Rapidly, the 
number of gay organisations in the US grew from fifty to over eight hundred, with many 
thousands of men and women becoming involved.163 Gay rights organisations “initiated an 
important tactical shift” and began to devote attention less to direct action and more to the 
struggle for “access to the same polity gay rights opponents had dominated for so long.”164 
This trend has been described as “density dependence,” or the way that “at low densities” 
organised groups in a population with a particular set of interests strive to make themselves 
appear legitimate to other “political actors” with the result that the number of groups 
multiplies, leading to an increase in “density” and competition between the various groups.165 
From this period, much activism occurred within the institutional channels of the state. 
However, it has been noted that, despite the influence of the civil rights movement, gay rights 
(and women’s rights) organisations tended to be very white-dominated, with little knowledge 
of or sensitivity to the issues facing those from ethnic minorities.166 
Among the groups that existed at this time was the Gay Activist Alliance (GAA), 
which was based in New York, and which focused on direct protest actions to make the case 
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for gay rights; for instance, activists would attend public events and embarrass public 
officials with loud demands for gay rights.167 In 1971, the GAA launched a campaign to add 
“sexual orientation” to the list of protected categories in the human rights ordinance of New 
York,168 from which a splinter group left to form the Lesbian Feminist Liberation group in 
1973.169 The GAA had been founded in 1969 by people previously involved in the GLF, with 
a focus on gay rights.170 They included Jim Fouratt, one of the founders of the GLF.171 
Whereas the GLF, which had been born out of the frustration and upset following the 
Stonewall riots, had foundered over a lack of clarity about its role and aims, and because of 
the rampant sexism encountered by women activists, the GAA sought to present a united 
front and to use non-violent civil protest to further their aims.172 The GAA “lobbied for fair 
employment and housing legislation, pushed for the repeal of sodomy laws, and sought an 
end to police harassment”. The organisation also held an array of arts and cultural events, 
including “consciousness-raising” sessions. When the widely-read Harper’s Magazine 
denounced homosexuality in 1970, members of the GAA occupied the offices and held a “tea 
party.”173 
The GAA had some breakthroughs with politicians. For instance, Democratic 
Representative Ed Koch, Republican Senator Charles Goodell, and his Democratic opponent 
Richard Ottinger all offered support in 1970.174 In 1972, John Lindsay, Mayor of New York, 
“issued a directive designed to protect homosexuals against discrimination in municipal 
hiring and promotion practices and also announced he would work for passage of a wider 
antidiscrimination ordinance for New York City.”175 Ted Kennedy, then a senator, said in 
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1971 that, if he were ever elected President, he would be willing to issue an executive order, 
if that was necessary, in order to ensure homosexuals’ “basic rights.”176 By now, 
homosexuals were increasingly “out of the closet” and public displays of difference had 
become politicised.177 
By now, too, increasing numbers of publishers, large and small, had started to publish 
books and magazines aimed squarely at the gay market.178 The homosexual movement was 
steadily gaining a greater voice in the media. Following a police raid on a gay bar in Los 
Angeles in 1967, a newsletter was founded and initially distributed locally. By 1969, it was 
being distributed nationally under the name The Advocate.179 The same year, Reverend Troy 
Perry founded the Metropolitan Community Church in Los Angeles, citing a need for a 
church that welcomed homosexuals rather than condemning them. Amongst other services, 
Reverend Perry provided marriages to gay couples, stating his belief that such unions were 
legal in the eyes of God, if not in civil law.180 Perry had previously been excommunicated 
and told that God did not love him. After a suicide attempt and a religious experience, he had 
been inspired to found a church in which people could be both gay and Christian.181 
The lesbian cause overlapped considerably with the more general feminist movement, 
with women demanding equal treatment and better representation in the worlds of work and 
politics. For some women their lesbianism was as much, or even more, about making a 
political statement than any natural affectional or sexual tendencies;182 another step against 
male domination and the almost exclusively male establishment.183 While some women felt 
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that they had simply been born lesbian, for some others, their lesbianism needs to be 
understood in the context of their strong, political, feminist stance.184  
Lesbians also had particular battles to fight in the areas of family law. Lesbian women 
raising children (who had often resulted from an earlier marriage to a man) faced 
considerable legal and social discrimination in a society in which it was assumed that families 
were heterosexual by definition.185 Increasingly, lesbian and gay activists called for more 
than “just” their rights to be respected; the stance that society itself was the problem and that 
there was a need to rethink the very structure and nature of society became widespread. In 
their lesbianism, homosexual women were not just expressing their individual desires, but 
challenging the very idea of the traditional nuclear family and the society that had developed 
with this concept at its core. Professor Charlotte Bunch, an important gay rights activist at the 
time who also attended the 1977 White House meeting between Costanza and gay activists,  
wrote that, “To be Lesbian is to love oneself, Woman, in a culture that denigrates and 
despises women.”186 
 
Gay Rights Groups Organise 
Despite the fact that the early- to mid-1970s witnessed a change in the views of 
homosexuality among certain sectors of the heterosexual community, homosexuals and 
organisations dedicated to supporting them were hampered by a number of practical issues. 
One area of importance at a time when gay rights activists were becoming increasingly 
organised, and ever more involved in focussed, targeted lobbying activities187 was that of 
charitable status. Groups dedicated to supporting gay rights did not qualify for tax exemption 
status. Feeling that this was unfair, they started to petition for recognition as charities and 
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entities that should qualify. For example, on November 13, 1972, the Gay People’s Union 
approached the Internal Revenue with a request for exemption – which, of course, was not 
forthcoming. Gay rights charities and organisations would have to wait a considerable time to 
see changes in this area.188 
The National Gay Task Force (NGTF), the largest and most prominent of all the gay 
rights groups, came into being in 1973 (initially largely composed of former members of the 
Gay Activist Alliance)189 with the stated goals of creating legal and political change.190 
Members included Harold Brown, Martin Duberman, Ronald Gold, Franklin Kameny and 
Bruce Voeller.191 In 1974 they were joined by Jean O’Leary, who would go on to play an 
enormous role in the NGTF, especially with respect to its relationship with the Carter 
administration.192 The new organisation struggled with the knowledge that it was facing a 
major uphill battle.193 The NGTF was a focused, disciplined organisation that had 
considerable success in obtaining commitments from a wide range of professional bodies and 
organisations that they would not discriminate against homosexuals. These included the 
American Anthropological Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, and even a 
number of religious bodies and individuals, albeit often with the caveat that their view was 
that homosexual behaviour is sinful.194 
By 1973, the discourse about homosexuality in the areas of medicine and psychiatry 
had begun to change quite dramatically. Until now, the advice given to those who 
experienced homosexual feelings was often that they should consult a psychiatrist or 
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psychologist.195 Twenty years after Hooker’s research, it seemed that the medical professions 
were finally taking notice. Most importantly, the American Psychiatric Association removed 
homosexuality from its official list of mental disorders, giving rise to a series of jokes about 
the “instant cure”. They invited members of the NGTF, among others, to attend the press 
conference that was held to announce the decision.196 Homosexual activists, including 
O’Leary, greeted the decision of the APA by noting that the change of classification was a 
historic step, while also stating that “the APA was simply recognising what many gays have 
known all along – that gays can be as happy and healthy as anybody.”197  
In 1974, overt homosexual and activist Harvey Milk ran for the position of city 
supervisor in San Francisco. He espoused social liberalism and the separation of government 
from personal sexual issues. Although Milk finished 10th of 32 candidates, he won a lot of 
attention for his campaign and was a charismatic, sympathetic figure around whom gay 
activists rallied.198 He would get in on his next attempt. 
By this point, there were movements dedicated to gay liberation in every major city 
and on every major university campus across the United States.199 Between 1972 and 1976 
twenty-nine cities and counties, often liberal college towns, introduced legislation and 
policies intended to protect homosexuals from discrimination, frequently after a local gay 
rights organisation had approached the city council with a request.200 In 1975, a petition was 
presented to the White House under President Ford entitled “Petition for Sanity” which 
requested freedom for sexual choice and had been prepared by a number of prominent 
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women in the lesbian and feminist rights movements, including O’Leary and Gloria 
Steinem.201 
Connecticut, Colorado, Oregon, Delaware, Hawaii, North Dakota and Ohio all 
repealed their laws against sodomy between 1971 and 1974 and Massachusetts, while leaving 
a probation against “unnatural and lascivious acts” on the books, ruled that the act did not 
apply to private behaviour among consenting adults.202 However, in Colorado the same year, 
a “bitterly divisive referendum overturned a newly passed non-discrimination ordinance that 
included protection for sexual orientation.” It is worth noting that this bitterly contested 
referendum took place even without much organised political manoeuvring from the anti-gay 
lobby and attracted relatively little attention around the country.203  
In 1974, Bella Abzug,204 a member of the House of Representatives from New York, 
introduced the first gay rights bill to Congress,205 seeking an amendment to the Civil Rights 
Act to include a specific reference to homosexuals.206 Abzug was an important political 
figure, a well-known feminist,207 and a lawyer who had been involved in left wing politics 
since her student days,208 as well as the mother of a gay woman.209 The “Equality Act of 
1974” would ban discrimination based on sexual orientation, sex, and marital status. 
However, Abzug’s bill did not cover the issue of employment rights, which gay activists 
considered one of the most important and pressing areas of concern. Consequently, 
representatives of the NGTF and other gay rights activists met Abzug and asked her to 
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introduce a new bill that would include the issue of employment, as well as seeking 
sponsorship of the bill nationwide and holding a press conference to introduce it.210 
Three months after her meeting with gay rights activists, the bill included a clause 
about employment which utilised the phrase “affectional or sexual preference,” at their 
suggestion, like the Civil Rights Amendment of 1975,211 to underline the fact that 
homosexuality was not just about sexual activity. In this, Abzug was joined by four 
Congressmen; three Democrats, John Burton, Edward Koch and R.N. Nix, and a Republican, 
Pete McCloskey. Jerry Falwell, a prominent Southern Baptist pastor and televangelist, 
reacted by remarking that, “our government seems determined to legalize homosexuals as a 
legitimate ‘minority.’”212 The bill did not pass and would continue to be presented to 
Congress throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Falwell continued to posit homosexuality as not 
just a symptom but a cause of America’s decline, and suggested that, in part because of 
relaxing views on morality, “nations and terrorists” were thumbing their noses at “this once 
proud land.”213 
The NGTF commented in their own review of the first two and a half years of their 
existence that one of the welcome surprises resulting from their lobbying work in 
Washington was the fact that there were already so many homosexual people working in 
government. While there remained considerable opposition to rights for homosexual 
Americans among the general public and in Congress, the NGTF and their colleagues were 
also heartened by positive responses to their lobbying work, including some support from 
otherwise very conservative politicians.214 In 1975, the NGTF requested and received 
assurances from a range of private employers, including IBM, Proctor and Gamble, Avon, 
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McDonald’s, Honeywell, American Airlines, Eastern Airlines, Citicorp, CBS and Bank of 
America, that they did not discriminate against homosexual employees.215 Also in 1975, 
activists in Ypsilanti, Michigan, sponsored an initiative to establish a city non-discrimination 
ordinance to include sexual orientation. After a well-covered campaign in the State, this was 
defeated by a margin of 64-36.216 
Coming in the wake of the major push in the area of civil rights for blacks (by the 
mid-1970s many rights had been won but the battle was still ongoing), gay rights activists 
often explicitly compared themselves to racial minorities and, by extension, the battle for gay 
rights to the long struggle and painfully-won rights finally awarded to Black Americans. Gay 
Americans had started tending to cluster in particular parts of urban areas, forming 
“territories” and essentially mimicking the composition and structure of ethnic groups.217 
Although “homophile” organisations had been around for several decades, only now did they 
start to acquire a more sophisticated political edge, and the sense of gay people as a discrete 
community that could and should campaign for greater rights, just as Black people had 
done.218 For example, an article in the Milwaukee Journal titled “A Different Drummer” 
stated that: “… the people of the gay community have developed their own lifestyle. We have 
common friends and common goals; we share the experience of persecution by straights. We 
have our own language and our own history; like Black history it has been suppressed by 
historians unfriendly to homosexuals.”219 
The gay movement borrowed much of the language of the civil rights movement, as 
we can see in terms such as “gay is good” (which has echoes of “black is beautiful”) and “gay 
power;”220 the term was coined by Frank Kameny, an important gay rights activist who 
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sought a new way of seeing homosexuality.221 Whereas it was true that civil rights 
movements had recently secured an improvement in the civil rights status of African 
Americans, it was also true that many African Americans tended to be religiously 
conservative, and in fact part of Carter’s courtship of the evangelical vote had involved 
reaching out to African American evangelicals.222 Evangelical Blacks were no more likely 
than their White equivalents to be favourably inclined towards the gay rights movement.223 
Moreover, activist groups including feminists and gay rights organisations faced criticism for 
often being dominated by white, university-educated women and men, and therefore for a 
lack of insight into what Black and other minority Americans had to deal with,224 and many 
feminist and gay rights organisations really only started to properly think about and address 
issues associated with racial identity in the 1980s.225 
Some progress was being made. In 1975, for example, an organisation dedicated to 
providing legal support to lesbian women in domestic disputes226 was granted charitable 
status along with a host of tax benefits. This was done “on the understanding that none of 
your educational activities are designed to proselytise or influence another’s sexual 
orientation.”227 
One effect of the gay rights laws that were beginning to appear on the books around 
the country was that ordinary Americans became increasingly aware of the problems that 
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homosexuals faced – and of the prevalence of homosexuality in American society. Crimes 
that might once have been “brushed under the carpet” because of the implied shame for the 
victim concerned, and for his or her family, were now a matter of public discussion. 
Individuals who would once have entered heterosexual marriages and/or kept their sexual 
preferences secret for life were increasingly “coming out of the closet” and demanding access 
to the same basic human rights that could be taken for granted by heterosexuals. Another 
effect of the increasing visibility of the homosexual community was a rise in violence against 
its members. For example, in June 1976 four teenagers who had gone out one evening 
explicitly “to hassle gays” attacked and murdered a twenty-one-year-old gay man outside a 
bar in Tucson, Arizona. They were found guilty of manslaughter and given probation by a 
local judge, leading to public outrage and, in February 1977, the approval of a comprehensive 
non-discrimination ordinance.228  
Overt violence against homosexuals soared in the 1970s as conservative forces 
reacted to their greater visibility and levels of political organisation. In Oklahoma a KKK 
chapter was founded with the purpose of assaulting homosexuals and at the University of 
Oklahoma many students donned t-shirts with anti-gay slogans such as “Do the World a 
Favour – Shoot a Faggot”. Violence also soared in relatively liberal New York, including 
numerous episodes of arson in which bars and other establishments frequented by 
homosexuals were targeted.229 
While this fight and fight-back were ongoing, the vocabulary of human rights had 
become very much part of the gay rights struggle. In line with the increasing usage of the 
term, particularly by Carter, gay rights activists tended to posit gay rights as human rights, 
and therefore as a matter of interest and concern to anyone interested in human rights 
                                                          
228 Fejes, 2008: 56. 





generally. The words “human rights” now frequently featured in the speeches of activists 
such as San Francisco political and gay rights activist Milk.230 
 
EVANGELICAL RIGHT AND THE EVANGELICAL MOVEMENT  
There are many variations of evangelicalism, although just about all evangelicals agree that 
they are “gospel people”; that is, the New Testament of the Bible is their primary source of 
information about what to believe and how to behave.231 Evangelicals, seeking to remain 
faithful to conservative tradition, adhere to: belief in the Bible as the literal Word of God; 
belief in the divinity of Christ, and the belief that Christ’s life, death and resurrection are 
effective in the salvation of men’s souls. Oriented towards spiritual salvation, evangelicals 
consider it their duty to convert non-believers to their beliefs. An evangelical is one who “has 
had a born again conversion, accepts Jesus as his or her personal Saviour, believes the 
Scriptures are the authority for all doctrine, and feels an urgent duty to spread the faith.”232 
According to K.L. Woodward of Newsweek,233 an evangelical is one who believes his 
relationship with God is utterly personal and who attempts to follow his/her life in 
compliance with a strict moral code. Although evangelicals can belong to one of a range of 
denominations, they all believe in the Bible, God, Jesus, the Holy Spirit and the church. 
Evangelicalism also promotes the idea of embracing a personal relationship with God through 
the concept of being born again. Moreover, evangelicalism goes beyond a set of beliefs, as it 
also represents a unique social movement and an all-encompassing identity.234 One of the 
most distinguishing characteristics of evangelicalism is the promotion of individualism, 
allowing very different ways of acting on one’s faith. However, as believers in the New 
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Testament, evangelicals believe that they are also responsible for working and caring for 
society as a whole.235  
 
The History of the Evangelical Right in the US until the 1970s 
The evangelical right has often posited itself “as American as apple pie”; an accurate 
description. Although right wing American evangelism has roots in the European 
Reformation, in the United States it has taken on a unique form. Spiritually, and sometimes as 
a matter of historical fact, members of the evangelical right in America are descended from 
European Protestants who fled to the “new world” for the religious freedom they could not 
find at home. As a result, their brand of Christianity had a major impact on the development 
of American society and culture, including a belief in America as populated by “a chosen 
people” – borrowing mythological themes from the Old Testament. American nationalism 
became intertwined with faith. In the words of Marshall and Manuel: “The Pilgrims and 
Puritans had believed that God had intended America for their age, a land where He had 
called a newly chosen people to settle and provide a living example of the life to which He 
had called all men. America was to be a “city set on a hill” and a light to the rest of the world. 
Their children carried this idea of God’s call even further: America was to be an asylum for 
the oppressed and a spiritual generator that would power the spread of Christianity and 
democracy all over the globe.”236 
Most scholars researching the evangelical right have categorised it as a movement 
which “seeks to impose its religious convictions on America and to replace a secular state 
with an evangelical authoritarianism.”237 Others, including Green238 consider it to be “a social 
movement dedicated to restoring traditional values in public policy.” The evangelical right 
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has been referred to variously in the literature, and the term “Christian Right” is probably the 
most often used,239 along with “New Right”, which was coined in 1974.240  
The term I will use by default throughout this work is “evangelical right” because of 
the specifically evangelical Protestant nature of most of the right wing activists in this 
movement. Furthermore, while members of various ethnic minorities, notably African 
Americans, often also espoused evangelical beliefs, the evangelical right movement was 
predominately white.241 This cohort was exceptional in forming and maintaining a relatively 
stable, cohesive political grouping and agenda. We can also clearly identify this movement as 
right as its stated goals were (and remain) “to maintain structures of order, status, honour, or 
traditional social differences or values.”242  
Writing in 1982, Professor C.Y.H. Lo243 described this group as “contrasting itself 
with nonbelievers and sinners, such as homosexuals, feminists, and Congressional 
representatives with ‘immoral’ voting records.” Although this is a group that became an 
important lobbying force in the 1970s, its roots lie deep in American history.244 The 
evangelical right promotes a conservative social agenda based on religious values among key 
constituencies and has become one of the major influences in the US culture wars.245 The 
promotion of Judeo-Christian values in public life has traditionally been the goal of the 
evangelical right, so issues focussing on the family, abortion, gay rights, feminism, prayer at 
school, and home schooling have historically formed the centrepiece of its activism. As early 
as 1951 one observer wrote that: “There is no sign that the churches are withdrawing from the 
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ranks of political protagonists; on the contrary, their participation is increasing, and 
cautiously, but with assurance, they are learning to play new roles”.246 
While the evangelical right was not an exclusively southern, or exclusively white, 
phenomenon, it was particularly strong among white southern Protestants, who had seen their 
culture come under attack during the civil rights movement. Many were very anxious about 
the dramatic social changes they saw happening around them.247 Moves to revise housing and 
education policies, along with suspicions that “Black” values were being promoted while 
“White” values were denigrated by supposedly radical intellectuals, created what has been 
described as “terror” in this section of society.248 All of this fed into the attraction of right 
wing evangelical churches and organisations that appeared to uphold “traditional values,” as 
did the liberalisation of sexual mores, legalized abortion, the increasing use of sexuality in 
marketing and advertising, and the appearance of open homosexuality, which some sincerely 
believed to be a sign that the end of the world was nigh.249  
As well as holding specific views about religion and faith, the evangelical right was 
(and remains) characterised by very specific views about gender roles and family, specifically 
that men should be “strong” and provide for their families, that women should submit to their 
husbands and, ideally, be financially dependent on them, while children should be obedient. 
Men are typically seen as “rational” and women “emotional.” There is no room in this vision 
for figures such as the sexually liberal woman or the homosexual man. In the context of this 
worldview, homosexuality is conflated with a blurring of gender roles, and considered highly 
detrimental to society, sinful,250 and a threat to the family.251 Feminism is often conflated 
with lesbianism. Falwell stated that feminists were pro-homosexual and lesbian, and often 
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lesbian themselves,252 and many of the evangelical right were anxious about the message 
promulgated by the gay rights movement that sex for fun could be an end in itself; this 
message has implications that went beyond the gay community.253 In general, the view that 
homosexuality is a real and present danger is widely disseminated. The evangelical right also 
tends to be politicised; many studies demonstrate that fundamentalist religious beliefs and 
traditional moral values are strong predictors of support for and/or participation in Christian 
Right organizations.254  
The 19th century saw economic opportunity and prosperity which attracted large 
numbers of immigrants, most of whom did not share the conservative Protestantism of 
America’s founders. In response, organisations such as the KKK sought to reassert Protestant 
authority.255 As the 19th century progressed, some right wing Protestants fought back against 
rapid scientific and technological progress by asserting Biblical literalism and denying 
evolution and other scientific breakthroughs.256 While some Protestants broke away and 
adhered to interpretations of Christianity that were not at odds with the new discoveries, 
some embraced fundamentalism and denounced others as heretics.257 In response, some states 
passed laws that made it illegal to teach any theory that appeared to contradict the Bible, such 
as the Theory of Evolution.258  
In 1925, fundamentalists suffered a major setback with the Scopes Trial, which 
focussed on teaching evolution in school. A Tennessee court found a teacher, John Scopes, 
guilty of teaching evolution. Despite their win, the resulting media frenzy was a huge 
embarrassment for the evangelical right, forcing it to retreat from public view.259 In fact, 
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some commentators at the time predicted the end of fundamentalism.260 Nonetheless, slowly 
over the following years, in some areas the evangelical right gained ground, with growing 
numbers of private schools and colleges, newspapers and other publications. At the same 
time, there was growing activity at grassroots and organisational level, as well as infiltration 
of new, popular forms of media, such as radio.261  
In the economic upturn that followed the Second World War, city suburbs received 
increasing numbers of middle-class white Americans. Their churches took into account the 
increasing secularism of US life, offering many opportunities to socialise and affirm group 
identity as well as to worship. In the context of this proud, confident, and prosperous group, 
religion and patriotism (often expressed around anti-communist sentiments) became 
inextricably interlinked.262 By the 1950s, the Cold War was ongoing. The evangelical right 
saw this as a threat to them and to the United States generally, and tended to conflate political 
and religious views in their discussions of it. Some preachers even suggested that the Cold 
War was a precursor to the “end times,” while some devoted their time to urging Christian 
missionaries to bring their evangelical message to the rest of the world, and especially to 
communist countries. 263 
By the 1960s, the evangelical right felt under siege. In 1962, a Supreme Court ruling 
stated that praying and reading the Bible in public school flouted the separation of Church 
and State. In 1965, changes to the immigration law meant that the ethnic and religious 
composition of the United States began to change.264 In 1972, Congress proposed and 
approved the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which would prohibit sexual discrimination 
by state and federal government. Two Supreme Court decisions – the banning of public 
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school prayer in 1962 and the Roe v. Wade decision in 1973, which legalised abortion under 
certain conditions were major factors in the formation of an organised evangelical right.265 
This, together with “the duplicity of Watergate, the disgrace of America’s defeat in Vietnam, 
the waning of patriotic anticommunism, the gay rights movement…” all helped the right 
wing rally.266 They responded with a series of actions intended to defend “traditional” 
Christian values.267 
Concerned by social liberalisation and talk of rights for homosexuals, right-wing 
religious interest groups crystallised around prominent figures such as Phyllis Schlafly, who 
took a “pro-family” and strongly anti-feminist stance.268 In 1972, Schlafly had formed a 
group called Stop ERA, referring to the amendment that prohibited sexual discrimination by 
state and federal government, and that appeared to be on course towards achieving 
constitutional status.269 Schlafly claimed that, as well as removing men’s obligation to 
provide for their families, forcing women into the workforce and children into day care 
centres, on top of giving homosexual unions unwarranted recognition, “it legalized 
homosexual marriage and required government to pay for abortions”270 and it would give 
homosexual “perverts” the right to get married.271 At the same time, spontaneous social 
changes such as the drug culture, free love and gay rights272 further angered younger 
evangelicals and led to a surge of activism during the 1970s. This in turn paved the way for a 
rapid growth in the number of Christian bookstores, publications, and TV and radio shows.273  
The period immediately before Carter’s presidency was a time of rapid growth of 
interest in evangelism. During the 1950s, the number of church members in America grew 
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from 64.5 million to 114.5 million, and by 1960, more than 60% of Americans belonged to a 
church. By the 1970s, growing numbers were learning towards the right, and the evangelical 
right had begun to emerge.274 Historically, evangelicals have been good at tapping into 
prevailing moods.275  
Many more liberal Christians felt greatly hurt by the perceived hi-jacking by extreme 
right wing elements of the term “Christian.” Professor Randal Balmer, historian of American 
religion, himself a self-described “follower of Jesus,” told the author that he found the 
identification of the right wing with Christianity “deeply offensive,” adding,  “I find very 
little that I would identify as ‘Christian’ in the Religious Right.”276 While there are some 
prominent exceptions, such as Schlafly, who was a Catholic, in general terms the evangelical 
and Protestant nature of the movement is a significant element, alongside its right wing 
agenda and interest in “traditional family values.”  
 
The Evangelical Left 
A key focus of ours is on the evangelical right, which was the dominant voice against gay 
rights. However, the evangelical left was also evolving at this time and, while generally less 
vocal and politicised than the evangelical right (a “minority voice”, as it has been 
described)277 it also had much to say about the cultural shifts occurring in America at this 
time, including the growing visibility of homosexuality. Professor Randal Balmer told the 
author that it is “important to recall that, in the early and mid-1970s, there was a remarkable 
recrudescence of progressive evangelicalism (Jim Wallis, Ron Sider, John Perkins, et al.), as 
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demonstrated in the Chicago Declaration of Evangelical Social Concern. Carter, in part, rode 
this current of progressive evangelicalism to the White House.”278 
Upset by changes in society and recent events, including the Vietnam War, religious 
thinkers in this camp combined piety and theology with broadly left-wing ideas, particularly 
in the areas of civil rights (which they supported) and capital punishment (which they 
opposed), while standing against violence, including left wing violence.279 They spoke out 
against elements in the white evangelical church who appeared to be indifferent to (or even in 
favour of) economic disparity, racism, sexism, and militarism.280 Left wing evangelicals 
believed that the message of the Gospel could, if properly applied, relieve most of the 
problems facing America. Racists would learn not to be racists, and the inhabitants of Black 
ghettos would become more disciplined, helping them to ameliorate their situation.281 The 
evangelical left identified strongly with the civil rights movement, with liberal white pastors 
marching alongside important Black leaders such as Martin Luther King, and with pacifism, 
with many on the evangelical left taking a stance against the Vietnam War.282 Religious 
figures had contributed greatly to the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, and the Voting 
Rights Act in 1965.283 
By the mid-1970s, within the Evangelical Left could be found a number of pro-gay 
religious organisations, the first of which, the UCC (United Church of Christ) Gay Caucus, 
was founded in 1972. Throughout the 1970s, pro-gay religious groups focussed on supporting 
homosexuals within their denominations,284 and gay activist groups emerged among 
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denominations including the Episcopalians, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Quakers, American 
Baptists, Pentecostals, Unitarians, and members of the United Church of Christ.285  
Noteworthy members of the evangelical left include Tony Campolo, “speaker, author, 
sociologist, pastor, social activist and passionate follower of Jesus,”286 Troy Perry, founder 
pastor of the Metropolitan Community Church and, although he might not have characterised 
himself as such, Jimmy Carter.  Many of the messages espoused by the left wing evangelicals 
are similar to the views expressed by Carter, before, during and after his presidency.287 
However, Carter was often criticised by those on the evangelical left for being too bogged 
down in establishment politics and not taking sufficient action on issues including equality 
for women and poverty.288 Campolo told the author that “Carter was hardly a member of the 
left wing of the Democratic Party, and there was no such thing as an Evangelical Left in the 
1970s. At least, it was not recognized as such. The Evangelical Left came into being as a 
reaction to the emergence of the Religious Right.”289   
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This chapter explores the theoretical background to the thesis, and in particular social 
movement theory, which provides concepts that inform and enlighten the discussion about 
the gay rights movement under Carter and the evangelical right in its role as a 
countermovement. Various theoretical positions, including Public choice theory, Queer 
theory, Foucauldian discourse analysis, Decision theory, Rights theory, and Social movement 
theory were considered for this thesis. Following an examination of all these candidate 
theories, the researcher arrived at the conclusion that the theoretical approach most suitable to 
guide and inform this study was social movement theory, with elements of interest group 
theory. The researcher came to believe that the social movement approach would enlighten 
the subject better than any of the others mentioned above, as the research deals with two 
major social movements, the gay rights movement and the evangelical right. Although some 
of the above-mentioned theories are relevant to aspects of the material under discussion here, 
they fail to fully shed light on all its components. The researcher has therefore determined 
that it would be most appropriate to use a theory that is relevant to all components of the 
study, rather than to use two unrelated theories. 
 
General Approaches Towards the Study of Politics 
The principal division within political studies is between normative and empirical.290 My 
main interest is how President Carter responded to the attempts of various opposing pressure 
groups to influence his policies on gay rights; the president being a significant figurehead and 
agenda-setter, and therefore important from the point of view of making an issue (gay rights) 
into a valid political issue. Presidents are not just there to keep the status quo going: they 
sometimes create new things and they may do that because they have been prodded towards it 
by pressure groups. As this happened with Carter, what is important to my topic is not only 
                                                          





his policies and the decisions he made, but also his rhetoric; for example, his admission of the 
issue of gay rights into the political debate. This is most usefully discussed within both the 
organisational dimension and the cultural framing dimension of social movement theory. 
What I am contributing is a concrete and fully detailed account of how these organisational 
resources were deployed, what the responses were, how the cultural framing was achieved, 
and what the participants thought about that cultural framing. The importance of this 
approach is confirmed by several prominent gay rights activists, who said that Carter had 
helped with cultural framing. We will see the participants’ awareness of the cultural framing 
task and the cultural framing achievements of their activities vis-à-vis Carter, and then 
Carter’s response and his contribution. 
 
Normative Approach 
In political science, the normative approach is that which deals with how the world ought to 
be; in contrast to the empirical approach, which deals with how it actually is. The normative 
approach is about the understanding of political theory, and aims to define such ideas as 
human rights, liberty, equality, justice, democracy, and peace.291 An issue discussed in this 
thesis is human rights. However, this thesis is not about rights. It is a political dissertation 
about the political process, and is not about the ontological status of various terms in political 
theory; therefore it will begin by taking rights for granted. This is an exercise in descriptive 
political science and, as such, it will not need to answer those conceptual questions that are 
already settled a priori; therefore the issue of what rights are does not arise. Thus, I will not 
be discussing the theory of rights.292 The people who I am dealing with already have a clear 
idea about what rights are, and their idea is what I will be working with.  
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As with much of political science, my thesis is an observational, descriptive, empirical 
discussion, in common with much of political science. However it is not a purely descriptive 
thesis; there are also explanatory elements to it, relating it to an existing theoretical literature 
within analytical political science or analytical political sociology. Among the various 
analytic and theoretical frameworks that could have been adopted, a very plausible one was 
the critical theory that is built into Foucauldian discourse analysis, which deals with 
homosexuality and discourse. Foucault’s theory of discourse aims to analyse categorisations, 
ideology, relationships (personal and institutional) and politics; and to thereby learn how 
individuals see the world through looking at societal power relationships as viewed through 
both language and practices.293 In 1978, in his landmark work History of Sexuality, Foucault 
argued that sexuality is constructed through institutional discourses, or “regimes of truth”. 
Knowledge about sexuality constitutes sexuality itself rather than being a window onto it: 
sexuality is the product of the discourse about it. For example, heterosexual monogamy 
became the norm thanks to the “discursive explosion” of the Victorian era, in which sexuality 
came to be central to identity, and those who deviated from the norm began to see themselves 
as persons with distinct “natures”. Foucault called into question the very idea of a permanent 
“essence” to homosexuality, and indeed to sexuality in general; the differences between 
same-sex relationships in different historical periods may be too wide to allow for any 
continuous history in this area.294  
Foucault argued that movements based on affirmation of lesbian and gay identity 
risked merely reinforcing the existing discourse; but this suggestion has been largely ignored 
by contemporary activists.295 Foucault also argued that it is possible to contest the prevailing 
discourse of a time: discourse can undermine and expose power, as well as producing, 
transmitting and reinforcing it. Discourse constitutes reality rather than reflecting it, and the 
world contains many different discursive elements rather than there being a simple division in 
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discourse between the acceptable/dominant and the dominated/excluded. He wrote about this 
in the context of homosexuality: 
“There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth-century psychiatry, 
jurisprudence, and literature of a whole series of discourses on the species and subspecies of 
homosexuality… made possible a strong advance of social controls into this area of 
‘perversity’; but also made possible the formation of a ‘reverse’ discourse: homosexuality 
began to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or naturality be 
acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was 
medically disqualified.”296  
Although Foucault’s theory of discourse is often employed by scholars in examining 
homosexuality, it could not have been of much use for the purposes of this study. Foucault’s 
approach is an attempt to change and reconstruct discourse, or at least to open it out and make 
it more plural. However, generic concepts like heteronormativity297 – or other Foucauldian 
ideas, like episteme298 – are not methodologically relevant for my study, as its purpose is not 
critique but rather the exploration of a forgotten piece of history. Foucault himself claims to 
want to leave a space for resistance, but the whole thrust of his work is away from that. 
Although Foucault is in favour of resistance, he does not say much about it, nor does he 
narrate the process of resistance. He is really giving an explanation – even though he does not 
fully say so – of why there cannot be resistance. When he writes about prisons and clinics, or 
about the psychiatric profession, he does not devote much space to how people resist such 
things. He focuses instead on how they are subjected to them and created as subjects by 
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them.299 Thus, a Foucauldian approach is not appropriate if one seeks to find out how people 
have resisted.  
The thing the activists in my study were successfully seeking to resist was 
heteronormativity; and this has been a major topic for Foucauldian research, under the 
heading of Queer theory. This theory, which is a branch of discourse theory, came to 
prominence in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a field of critical theory that draws on 
feminism, constructionism and post-structuralism;300 it is widely used when dealing with gay 
rights and homosexuality. Queer theory is about understanding the mainstream discourse on 
homosexuality and exposing it as repressive and arbitrary in its separating out of 
homosexuality from normality. It shows how heteronormativity is created and preserved, 
with the emphasis being on how homosexuals are oppressed through discourse. Queer 
politics emerged in the early 1980s thanks to the anti-gay and lesbian movement backlash of 
that time, led by the New Right but also supported by the mainstream of the Republican 
Party. This backlash dashed hopes that the advancement of gay rights which had taken place 
under Carter marked the beginning of a new paradigm of tolerance and pluralism.301 
Stein and Plummer302 listed four main characteristics of queer theory:  
I) “A conceptualization of sexuality which sees sexual power embodied in different 
levels of social life, expressed discursively and enforced through boundaries and binary 
divides”;  
II) “the problematization of sexual and gender categories, and of identities in general. 
Identities are always on uncertain ground, entailing displacements of identification and 
knowing”;  
III) “a rejection of civil rights strategies in favour of a politics of carnival, 
transgression, and parody which leads to deconstruction, de-centring, revisionist readings, 
and an assimilationist politics”;  
IV) “a willingness to interrogate areas which normally would not be seen as the 
terrain of sexuality, and to conduct queer ‘readings’ of ostensibly heterosexual or non-
sexualized texts.” 
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While Queer theory certainly highlights the extent to which society, and by extension 
the political discourse, is heteronormative, often to the detriment of homosexuals,303 the topic 
at hand calls for a more comprehensive approach. This research is about the attempt to resist 
heteronormativity, whereas queer theory is in general a critique of all the different ways in 
which heteronormativity is established. The implication of the theory is that 
heteronormativity is more or less pervasive, irresistible, and so on;304 but my study is 
precisely about the steps that people took to successfully resist heteronormativity. For that, 
one needs a concrete, practical and historical investigation, unconstrained by any a priori 
assumptions that resistance is hopeless, as the idea of heteronormativity implies. Therefore, 
queer theory is, by definition, not very useful for this current research. What I am attempting 
to do is to give a descriptive and empirically valid account of an attempt by gay people, 
through the methods of political organisation, to change and improve their lives. This 
included gaining rights, changing public discourse about homosexuality and bringing the 
issue of gay rights into US politics; a place where they had previously been completely 
ignored, if not actively repressed. Queer theory tells us that homosexuals have got a problem 
that needs to be overcome, but my dissertation is not about analysing that problem: it is about 
analysing the concrete ways in which they solved that problem. For such a purpose, social 
movement theory is much more appropriate, because my thesis is a concrete description, 
through various different mechanisms – the most important being cultural framing and 
organisational resources – of how they did it.  
Finally, I am going to talk about legitimation, which in some way contributes to 
discourse. However, I believe there is a major difference between the two. Discourse theory 
tends to generalise about big discourses that control everybody, but in practice, legitimation, 
in political terms, is much more of a step-by- step process. Little, bitty things happen, leaving 
deposits that gradually change the discourse. Sweeping statements about what the discourse 
is do not tap into or measure that. 
Neither could I have applied discourse theory to evangelicals. There might be some 
novelty in applying discourse theory to the countermovement of evangelicals, since it has 
been typical to use discourse theory to deconstruct hegemonic discourses rather than marginal 
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ones. The discourse against which evangelicals are reacting (“secular humanism” as they call 
it305) is, like heteronormativity, a possible target for Foucauldian deconstruction. However, 
my focus here is not on how evangelicals are marginalised – if that had been the case, such a 
theory could have perhaps been used – but rather on how homosexuals de-marginalised 
themselves, with evangelicals figuring as a norm-preserving response to this effort. 
Furthermore, Foucauldian discourse analysis focuses on a different set of processes to 
the ones I am interested in. It does have some overlap with cultural framing ideas, but it 
places more emphasis on the powers that be and their role in framing discourse, whereas 
cultural framing is open to novel cultural framings. Social movement theory is also better 
suited to evangelicals, because fundamentalism was a relative novelty in the 1970s. It was not 
an expression of a long-standing theological discourse in the United States: fundamentalism 
only appeared in the early 20th century and then reappeared rather dramatically in the 1970s. 
Thus using Foucault to attempt to understand it as a heavy, long, permanent, historical weight 
of thought would be a misunderstanding of what it was actually about. It’s not just that 
fundamentalists, unlike gay people, are not a minority; it’s also that, just as with cultural 
framing by gay rights groups versus queer theory, my emphasis is on the novel cultural 
activity of the group. Therefore, it is not a Foucauldian topic. Again, it is resistance; and as 
stated earlier, Foucault does not discuss resistance. Thus, it is much better understood as 
cultural framing, where you do not have the baggage of the idea – the basis of discourse 
theory – that the discourse is somehow fixed in society, that the discourse itself is controlling 
things. With cultural framing, you have the idea that the people, or at least some people, can 
control the discourse themselves, change it, open it up a bit, and add new elements to it – 
which is far more realistic, for a start, and far more relevant to what I am doing. Finally, I am 
interested in social movement theory, which is a better alternative than Foucault, because it is 
more dynamic and it gives more scope for the initiative of grassroots forces; whereas 
Foucault pays lip service to such things, but doesn’t actually give you the theoretical 
resources to discuss them. He can explain to you why movements failed; but in this case, the 
gay rights movement did not fail. 
 
  
                                                          





Rational Choice Approaches  
As it has been stated, my approach is neither normative nor discursive, but an empirical 
discussion of a policy-making case; and as I will go on to explain shortly, the theoretical 
framework I will be using is that of Social movement theory. However, within empirical 
political science, there are other approaches. One major contender for analytical priority in 
political science is Rational choice theory, which is about how outcomes result from 
individual choices through the application of economics methods to the study of politics.306 In 
so far as it is applicable to my topic (a concrete policy-making environment), Public choice 
theory, or any theory based on Rational choice theory, is about the composition of individual 
choices in such environments. 
Public choice theory has been in existence since the early 1950s, particularly with the 
comprehensive contribution made by Anthony Downs in the area of economic theory of 
democracy.307 The pioneering work by Buchanan and Tullock308 offered, among other things, 
a number of approaches for analysing the efficiency and equity of economic and political 
institutions under the so-called calculus of consent. However, it took nearly thirty years for 
mainstream economists to appreciate the potential that the theory can offer in evaluating the 
workability and efficacy of economic and political institutions.309   
Public choice theory is about how groups of people make effective political choices; it 
deals with institutional competition and the way that diverse pressures get composed into a 
single outcome. It analyses the compositional process by which individual preferences turn 
into political decisions. The “compositional process”, means things like “is this a state-level 
decision or is it a federal-level decision”, “what’s the relationship between the two”, “how 
much are courts involved”, and “what’s the electoral system”, “is it first past the post or is it 
proportional”.310 
The two main branches of public choice, namely constitutional economics and the 
theory of political institutions, tend to approach and evaluate individuals and institutions from 
their choices that they make vis-à-vis economic rents/interest objectives.311 In short, public 
choice economists attach much greater weight to individuals’ self-interest than their 
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community spirit, hence falling short of what political scientists tend to argue for and 
promote. In the light of the above definitions and the nature of public choice theory as an 
economic tool of analysis, the researcher came to the conclusion that this theory would not 
necessarily be suitable for the analysis of gay rights; this movement being wholly based on 
winning emancipation, political freedom and rights for a group of people. 
Public choice theory would have been useful if one wanted to write a thesis about 
questions like the ones mentioned above (how much are court involved for example), or why 
some states’ gay rights policies were in advance of other states’ gay rights policies, or how 
homosexual gay rights groups were concentrated in cities; and so where there were 
significant political gains to be made in cities that had some national prominence, that could 
possibly have helped them. However, I have already defined my topic in this research as 
“presidential politics”, so it does not have much to do with public choice theory as I am not 
investigating a complex institutional structure. Nor am I investigating a kind of competition 
between gay rights groups and lots of other groups that also wanted the attention of the 
president. I am not interested in the rivalry between multiple pressure groups or the 
institutional strategies by which they choose one venue rather than another venue. These are 
all public choice theory topics; but I am focusing on one particular venue, which is 
presidential discourse, presidential rhetoric, and presidential decision making – and there’s a 
theoretical framework relevant to that, which is social movement theory. Furthermore, public 
choice theory is not relevant my thesis because there is no compositional issue here; I am not 
composing an outcome through the interaction of many political institutions. Finally, in my 
thesis, I take for granted that problems/questions exist and am not interested in finding out the 
reasons for their existence; my thesis is about the attempt by gay rights activists to overcome 
the problem they faced. Thus public choice theory would not have been helpful.   
Decision-making312 theory, which centres around the reasoning behind choices, was 
another possible option for this thesis. There are two types of decision-making theories: the 
normative and the behavioural. The first type is prescriptive, aiming to show how decisions 
should be made; the second type is descriptive, aiming to explain how decisions are actually 
made in practice, and how this process can be improved. Decision-making theories explore 
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all varieties of choices, from the trivial and short-term (e.g. an individual’s choice of what 
clothes to buy), to the life-changing (e.g. their choice of what career to pursue). As well as 
choices, decision-making theory also deals with beliefs and desires, and how these 
“preference attitudes” work with each other.313 
Decision-making research can focus on organisations as well as individuals. Whereas 
behavioural theories deal with the choices made by individuals, the choices of organisations 
can be analysed through the use of economic theories and group decision theories, for 
example game theory and agency theory.314 Chester I. Barnard argued in his landmark work 
The Functions of the Executive (1938) that decisions made by organisations should be 
analysed in a different way to those made by individuals; the latter as psychological 
activities, the former as social processes. Also, the choices of individuals usually impact only 
on the person making the choice and perhaps their closest acquaintances. However, decisions 
made by groups and institutions have wider effects; the higher the level at which the choice is 
made, the more important it becomes. It therefore follows that the decisions of organisations 
deserve greater attention than those of individuals or lower-level units. In empirical research, 
decision-making theories are generally applied through statistical and econometric methods; 
in particular through discrete choice models, estimated via maximum likelihood.315  
Both Public choice theory and Decision-making theory are based on rational choice 
approaches to these compositional questions of political decision-making; hence they contain 
various mathematical ways for dealing with these questions. These theories would have been 
suitable for studying the decisions made by the three groups of actors in this thesis (Jimmy 
Carter, gay rights activists and evangelical activists) through constructing a logical, 
mathematical system to explain how their choices were made. However, I am not interested 
in mathematically modelling the composition of political decisions and how they are taken. 
My intention is not to determine the reasoning behind each decision taken, but rather to show 
how such decisions affected the three actors in my thesis and the advance of gay rights in the 
USA. Thus, again, such theories would not have been useful for my purposes.   
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Social movement theory 
A social movement is a form of collective behaviour whereby a group unites around a shared 
goal or goals, to engage in activities to influence or pressure governments or other decision-
makers to enact policies consistent with these; the deliberate collaboration of people in a 
group towards creating some sort of change.316 Social movements arise when people feel that 
they have no way to get their issues addressed in the context of mainstream political parties, 
or perhaps because they are explicitly excluded from them. In this way, they are a 
“grassroots” response to a situation in the wider community, and in the realm of political 
decision-making. 
Collective behaviour includes activities such as revolution, riots, crowd behaviour, 
and so forth, whereas social movements are specifically organised forms of collective 
behaviour that work towards certain clear goals, last for significant periods, and are 
organised. Social movements are built on rational, goal-oriented foundations. They require 
shared beliefs and the sense of solidarity necessary to mount a campaign,317 but spring from 
common outlooks, identities, and dissatisfaction with the status quo. They also differ 
significantly from revolutionary movements, which seek to overthrow a government or state; 
social movements present sustained challenges to the status quo but do not try to topple 
governments.318 Social movements’ purpose is to make society change,319 and they involve 
“collective efforts by socially and politically subordinated people to challenge the conditions 
and assumptions of their lives.”320  
Social movements are typically composed of networks of informal interactions 
between individual people, groups and organisations, predicated on a shared identity, and 
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involved in political and/or cultural conflict. They are flexible and prone to change, with deep 
links to identity and community, and they engage in repeated public displays of collective 
behaviour outside official channels (protests, demonstrations, civil disobedience, and so 
forth).321 Generally, social movement theorists have tended to look much more at progressive 
rather than conservative social movements.322 Here, we are going to explore two social 
movements: the gay rights movement, and the evangelical right.  
The gay rights movement emerged from homosexuals’ view that they deserved 
equality, and from the emergence of gay rights, in the wake of the civil rights movement, as 
an increasingly politicised movement with a strong identity. With the advent of the gay rights 
movement, homosexuals demanded the same rights as everyone else, in the context of a 
society that generally saw homosexuality as aberrant and wrong, that had legislated against 
any expressions of homosexuality, and that often acted brutally upon that legislation. 
However, the gay rights movement did not seek to overthrow established political structures 
and replace them with a new, sympathetic government. Rather, it sought through sustained 
effort to gain recognition and support and the transformation, rather than abolition, of 
existing structures and political systems. 
The evangelical right came together as a counter movement in response to the 
liberalisation of American society. While it fought against a wide range of liberal demands, 
including demands for abortion and women’s rights, the gay rights movement was an 
important rallying point for the evangelical right, which fiercely opposed the movement from 
its emergence in its modern form in the 1970s. The gay rights movement has, similarly, 
tended to evolve in response to threats from the evangelical right. The two movements have 
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been described as “perfect enemies,” each depending to a great extent on the other for its 
identity and growth.323  
When he made his final address, Carter made an oblique reference to the fact that his 
presidency had been hampered by the special interests in a position of influence that had 
taken advantage of his fragmented power, inhibiting his ability to make decisions. While 
Carter had become president with a clearly defined, ideological view of the public good, he 
felt that his mission to work towards this was stymied by members of congress, and those in 
administrative positions who sympathised with them, who sought to protect only their own 
interests.324 With the benefit of hindsight, we can see even more clearly how profoundly 
interest groups like those referenced by Carter, and social movements like the gay rights 
movement, impacted on his presidency in a variety of ways. 
 
CLASSICAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
Over the years, scholars have explored both the rational and the emotional inputs to social 
movements, often in terms of binary oppositions.325 The study of social movements per se 
emerged as a topic for scholarship in the US in the 1960s, with a focus on organised forms of 
collective behaviour around specific goals, such as the anti-war protests of the Vietnam era. 
Most research on social movements has explored three broad areas, which can be defined as 
a) why social movements emerge, b) how they develop and are maintained after their 
emergence, and c) their impact.  In this section, we will briefly explore the trajectory of the 
development of the major models of Social Movement Theory, starting with the Classical 
model, and looking at views emerging from both US and European scholarship.  
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The classical model proposes that when social structures break apart, more people 
make demands or express dissatisfaction. It maintains that social movements are essentially 
emotional, and arise from a sort of crowd mentality.326 This draws on the idea of crowd 
theory; when enough people come together, they will do things that they would not 
individually do. This is an idea held by theorists from elite groups that did not generally 
sympathise with change-seekers or understand their point of view.327 This view was 
essentially negative, in which most scholars “saw [social movements] as dangerous mobs 
who acted irrationally, blindly following demagogues.”328 Proponents of this theory assume 
that dissatisfaction is typically short-lived and that activists were acting irrationally,329 in 
response to collective grievances arising from deprivation or a sense of social alienation.330 
Collective behaviour is described as operating outside institutional rules, and therefore 
particularly adapted to dealing with unstructured situations, “when the established 
organization ceases to afford direction and supply channels for action.”331  
Social movements’ increasingly sophisticated tactics and their members and goals 
from the 1950s onwards made scholars revisit their assumptions about collective action, in 
particular the idea that it was essentially irrational, and bound to peter out.332 Increasingly, 
scholars recognised that social movements had political aims and organisational features that 
clearly identified them as much more than just emotion-driven, irrational behaviour.333 The 
so-called Chicago School, epitomised by Hubert Blumer’s work,334 suggests that social 
movements emerge from a “shared understanding.” Again, this view maintains that social 
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movements emerge from a place of emotion and spontaneity335 and are “collective enterprises 
seeking to establish a new way of life.”336  
In 1951, Talcott Parsons published The Social System, arguing that social order rested 
upon a shared set of values and that conflicts and protests were inevitable when these were no 
longer shared. In these situations, efforts will be made to stop the disruption, by adapting to 
the new situation or by creating movements that propose returning to an era experienced as 
more stable.337 Thus, social movements can be either progressive or regressive. Again, 
Parsons’ understanding of social movements was that they were, collective in nature by 
definition, with considerable emotional components, in the form of the “shared set of values” 
referenced above. Parsons’ work contributed to the development of Neil Smelser’s theories 
on collective behaviour.  
In 1962, Smelser built on Parsons’ work when he defined collective behaviour as the 
mobilisation of individuals to remove “strain” from society (which we can understand as the 
loss of the shared values mentioned by Parsons, and the collective understanding of members 
of the group that things need to change) by changing social norms or the distribution of 
resources.338 This strain introduced an element of instability to society; one way or another, 
the strain could not persist indefinitely. While scholars such as Blumer, Parsons, and Smelser 
contributed to the development of a greater understanding of social movements, their theories 
still emphasised emotions and values as a core component of groups’ motivation, without 
exploring additional inputs. Smelser’s structural functionalist approach proposes group 
leaders emerging only after a movement has come into being.339 Parsons’ and Smelser’s work 
also resonates with that of Truman in political science, whose work on interest groups is 
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discussed briefly below. Truman’s position, that a group emerges when an interest arises in 
society, can be understood in terms of “strain” or “conflict” in a society in which views on 
important matters are no longer convergent. 
 
MATERIAL AND ORGANISATIONAL RESOURCES 
By the mid-1960s, there had been a shift in social movement theory from simply looking at 
movements in terms of collective behaviour to a new emphasis on the role of resources; 
including tangible resources (such as access to money) and organisational resources (such as 
access to power or to an organised body of activists prepared to lend support to the 
movement). In 1965, Mancur Olson,340 an economist and social scientist, made a big impact 
on the theory of social movements and political behaviour in general by raising the question 
of the collective action problem. He suggested that, while there are many occasions on which 
groups or movements could form – because there is an interest, or a strain, for example, 
frequently they do not, because each individual considers it rational to leave the job of 
organising it to someone else.341 Olson felt that any kind of collective action requires 
resources to be provided from outside, and primarily considered resources in tangible terms, 
such as money or other material goods.342  
Moving on from the idea of social movements as essentially emotion-driven mass 
movements, a focus on resources provides us with a way to explore them as rational 
responses to social inequality. Social movements involve a conversation about what needs to 
change for a better society.343 They tend to become increasingly institutionalised and 
organised over time, leading to a “repeatable process that is essentially self-sustaining… in 
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which all the relevant actors can resort to well-established and familiar routines.”344 This 
growing institutionalisation and organisation can be viewed as an organisational resource that 
is much to the benefit of the organisation.  
Doug McAdam, Professor of Sociology at Stanford University, provides us with a 
study with a strong emphasis on organisational resources. He believes that social 
organisations essentially emerge from “a combination of expanding political opportunities 
and indigenous organisation.”345 He points out that high-profile incidents tend to attract 
popular and scholarly attention, while it is easy to overlook work going on in the background. 
While the Stonewall Riot is often credited with initiating the gay rights movement,346 various 
organisations had been engaging in collective action347 to lay the foundation for the 
movement for some time.  
Resource Mobilisation theory maintains that only the power elite (for example, power 
holders and decision makers in business and government) can make the structural decisions 
necessary for change. Therefore, social movements need either the resources of the power 
elite, or enough resources to oppose them.348 When a social movement has no access to 
resources, it may enter a dormant state until some become available. Thus, Resource 
Mobilisation theory sees social movements as cyclical, and tied to external sources of 
support, as “a sustained series of interactions between a challenging group and the State.”349  
Social movements act differently depending on their access to resources. They may be 
competing with other groups for the same pot of money, for example, or they may have a 
large or a small number of donors.350 However, while money is typically an important 
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resource, factors such as a high level of organisational infrastructure, or widespread 
recognition as having a valid cause, can also be seen as resources. 
Professors of Sociology John McCarthy and Mayer Zald state that one must 
understand “the selection of incentives, cost-reducing mechanisms or structures and career 
benefits [for individuals] that lead to collective behaviour.”351 They also stress the importance 
of external support.352 Although not all the people who support the movement and its goals 
are activists, they represent an important source of crucial resources. Moreover, alliances 
with and support from elite groups with a detailed understanding of public opinion are hugely 
important.353  
According to McCarthy and Zald, “the resource mobilization approach de-emphasizes 
grievances and focuses on societal supports and constraints of movements, tactical dilemmas, 
social control, media usage, and the interplay of external supports and elites.”354 This 
approach emphasises questions that relate to the accumulation of resources, the forms and 
structures organisations take, the issues of supply and demand within movements, systems of 
cost and reward, and the recognition of the role that outsiders can play.355  
McCarthy and Zald maintain that social movements can find resources beyond the 
boundaries of the group, and point out that social movement organisations often rely on 
outside funding from individuals or bodies acting philanthropically.356 Group leaders obtain 
authority when they have access to and control over resources, while other members are 
rewarded by a sense of solidarity, or other “nonmaterial” benefits.357 Groups that appeal to 
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wealthier elements of society, and have more access to money and social capital, tend to do 
better than groups campaigning for poorer, more marginalised elements.358 
The theoretical shift towards studying organisational factors brought social movement 
theory closer to the study of interest groups. Interest group theory connects with social 
movement theory insofar as both interest groups and social movements depend on political 
bodies, including parties and interest groups, and on mobilising a broad base of supporters, 
and are vulnerable to the potential that other groups will place pressure on political parties.359 
In the 1950s, David Truman, a prominent political scientist, developed an understanding of 
interest groups as arising spontaneously when potential members are forced by circumstances 
to interact and become increasingly aware of their shared interests.360 Truman does not, 
however, discuss the role of tangible resources. Strongly motivated minorities become 
enabled through interest group activity to overcome majority views,361 while they create a 
group agenda from individuals’ concerns,362 which can be “packaged” as the interests of the 
group.363  
Interest groups engage with government as formal groups with the intention of 
influencing public policy,364 and can take the form of voluntary associations, trade 
associations, institutions (including corporations and religious denominations), think tanks, 
and more.365 There are both “insider” and “outsider” interest groups366 – respectively, those 
that have direct contacts in the government and may even be sponsored by it, and those that 
operate outside these privileged channels and also challenge them (groups that can be seen as 
having greater or lesser access to resources). They play an important role in defining 
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“national interests,” preferences, and priority during the decision-making process,367 as they 
pursue their interests within accepted procedures, work with authorities, and develop 
relationships between group leaders and the relevant officials.368 Some interest groups have 
greater material or organisation resources than others.369 The context (institutional, historical 
and ideological) within which political decisions are taken is also important. Interest groups 
whose goals mesh more readily with those of the government are more likely to succeed.370  
Frequently, interest groups formed out of groups that had started as social 
movements,371 as in the case of various entities involved in the civil rights movement, which 
shifted from attempting to pressure the government to concede their aims, to playing a role 
within the echelons of power. According to this model, policy emerges from negotiation and 
compromise,372 and the relationship between interest groups and their members consists of, 
“exchange relationships between entrepreneurs/organizers, who invest capital in a set of 
benefits, which they offer to prospective members.”373 When political parties consider a 
group’s aims unacceptable, they reject them, but if there may be a political advantage, they 
endeavour to include them.374 Movements with substantial numbers of supporters often see 
political parties becoming polarised around their issues.375 Interest groups that can engage 
with both parties in the US system are the most effective.376 Political parties tend to turn to 
interest groups to obtain votes; a system that has been described as “ideological 
patronage.”377 Interest groups need to know the “power elite” which makes the decisions that 
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really matter.378 While the gay rights movement functioned primarily as a social movement, 
the emergence of highly organised bodies such as the NGTF, with centralised resources and 
even some full-time staff, increasingly operated as an interest group, lobbying the 
government through established channels of communication. 
 
CULTURAL FRAMING 
Resource mobilisation theory has tended to overlook psychological and emotional 
motivators, simply not addressing factors such as identity and culture.379 Issues around 
matters such as identity and self-fulfilment tend to be dismissed as a “loss of strategic 
effectiveness,”380 rather than as a potential resource in themselves.381 It tends to measure 
success or failure in concrete terms only, such as the extent to which funds have been 
channelled in the direction of the movement, or its success in obtaining access to material 
possessions or resources. This overlooks how social attitudes and culture can change as a 
result of social movements, as elements of a successful outcome.382 It fails to consider the 
networks that surround social movements and provide support, and to explain how some 
groups with very limited resources have managed to create meaningful change. It is, in fact, 
crucial to understand that factors such as “respectability” and “recognition” are also 
significant resources that play an important role in obtaining a social movement’s goals. 
An important aspect of social movements and interest groups lies in their role in 
creating a public, collective sense of identity that is both a characteristic and a resource of the 
group. The main aim of this is to raise consciousness among potential members of the group 
(for example, as in our case, homosexuals), but it is also about gaining wider visibility and 
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raising consciousness among as many people as possible. An understanding of cultural 
framing helps us to appreciate the “subjective meanings people attribute to their ‘objective’ 
circumstances.”383 Thus, political and human rights issues can become aligned not just with 
an aggrieved group of people, but with anyone who finds resonance in the identity that they 
project. In this way, expressions of identity (“a search for meaning and an expression of one’s 
views”384) can be powerful motivators. Much scholarship on the subject of social movements 
in the US has explored the way “movements have used symbols, language, discourse, 
identity, and other dimensions of culture to recruit, retain, mobilize and motivate 
members.”385  
The importance of identity to these groups is illustrated by the example of abortion. 
Pro- and anti-abortion campaigning have a much keener focus, and attract much more 
attention, in the US than in most European countries.386 The reason why is the symbolic hold 
that views on abortion have on matters of identity. In general, the new social movements of 
the 1960s and 70s were identity-based to a very great degree, as activists (including gay 
rights activists) argued that they had the right for their identities and lifestyles to be 
acknowledged and respected, and factors such as social class did not, in general, predict 
involvement in a movement.387 The same identity that leads to the oppression that groups 
strive against (such as homosexuality) can be a source of power, in providing an otherwise 
very disparate group of people with a common sense of identity and purpose,388 leading to a 
feeling of solidarity, motivation, and collective action.389 In this context, “identity” acts, such 
as the open expression of affection on the part of a gay couple, or a public display of religious 
                                                          
383 McAdam, 1999: 34.  
384 Klandermans, 2004: 361. 
385 Williams, 2004: 93. 
386 Polletta and Jasper, 2002: 284.  
387 Polletta and Jasper, 2002: 286. 
388 Hunt and Benford, 2004: 446. 





faith, can be seen as a political act and a challenge to the status quo.390 Moreover, the identity 
aspect of the new social movements facilitated the growth of networking and collaboration 
between movements whose identities merged;391 for example, the feminist and the gay rights 
(especially where pertaining to lesbian rights) movements.  
Furthermore, social movement and interest groups are not merely groups in which 
people with a shared identity find a common cause, and an expression of their views, but are 
active agents of identity framing and creating, “engaged in the production and maintenance of 
meaning for protagonists, antagonists, and bystanders.”392 The gay rights movement, 
historically rooted in relatively small groups agitating for issues like the decriminalisation of 
homosexuality, came to be framed as not just a narrow interest group, but also a vanguard of 
a larger movement towards ever-greater liberalisation across society. Understanding the 
importance of the extent to which individuals can identify with the core qualities of such 
groups is essential. It has been noted that major legislative changes are not possible until a 
critical mass of the population has been won over on a level that transcends simple material 
needs.393 Rational reasons for desiring or resisting change, coupled with issues of identity, 
make for a compelling force.394 
Cultural framing is deeply relevant to any discussion of social movements that looks 
at the matter of resources. In the context of this thesis, we consider the emergence of the gay 
rights movement as a potential cultural identifier of homosexual Americans as a group with 
the right to be heard. We can also view it as a legitimate extension of the civil rights 
movement, which created such a strong paradigm for identity politics, granting the issue of 
minority rights more exposure than ever before. Carter’s many acknowledgements of the gay 
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rights movement as an important element of the American electorate represent gay activists’ 
acquisition of the potent cultural resources of respectability and recognition.  
Carter’s significant degree of engagement with the gay rights movement, including 
the iconic first meeting with gay rights activists in the White House, was a profound indicator 
of the official legitimisation of the gay rights movement at the highest levels of government 
in the United States. Carter thus helped both to frame gay rights as a valid and important civil 
rights cause – an important cultural resource in itself – and to provide the movement with 
tangible organisational resources in the form of access to decision-makers and influential 
members of government and the civil service, with the physical presence of a senior White 
House official at meetings with gay rights activists and said decision-makers. Consequently, 
the gay rights movement was both tangibly empowered, by gaining unprecedented access to 
the highest levels of government, and symbolically enriched, by being visibly granted 
legitimisation, making gay rights activism and support of the same a more attractive prospect 
to millions of American citizens. 
 
NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT (NSM) THEORY AND THE AMERICAN CASE 
The topics of culture and identity arise also in an area of theory which many see as concerned 
with a new phase of social movement activity – “new social movements.” NSM theory 
emerged in Europe in response to the rise in social movements concerned with peace and the 
environment.395 It was predicated on the assumption that, while conflicts had once been class 
based, now they were replaced by other types of conflict, and materialism by post-
materialism. It focuses on how ideology, a sense of community, and identity can mobilise 
social movements, which challenge broad societal norms by posing questions around issues 
of identity. This maintains that the movements emerging from the new post-industrial 
                                                          





economy were quantitatively different from movements in the industrial economy. NSM 
theory focussed on issues such as civil rights, gay rights, pacifism or human rights.396 Social 
changes were seen as more important than monetary wellbeing, and asserting individual and 
collective identity as valuable per se. Collective identities, “the shared definitions of a group 
that derives from members’ common interests, experiences, and solidarity,”397 form as group 
members experience and deal with problems together, developing an ideological approach 
and a collective strategy,398 introducing a “new cultural orientation.”399  
Scholars of NSM theory recognise in them the importance of “their emphasis on 
consciousness, self-actualization, and the expression of subjective feelings, desires, and 
experiences — or new collective identities — as a strategy of political change.”400 NSM 
theory tends to politicise identities that previously were not political at all – such as 
homosexuality or environmentalism – and to defend them, while members benefit from “the 
opportunity to articulate, elaborate, alter, or affirm one's moral sensibilities, principles, and 
allegiances.”401 NSM theory significantly challenges many of the most fundamental norms, 
positing a “new cultural orientation,”402 and becoming alienated from more traditional 
political groups.403 They engage in sit-ins, protests and other types of civil disobedience.404 
They tend to be predicated around relatively small groups and organised locally, emerging 
almost organically when a critical body of adherents to a certain belief system has been 
reached.405 
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Historically, the American political system has tended not to be obviously aligned 
with the class system, while voters have become less and less deferential towards politicians. 
In other words, social movement theory’s claim that it represents a complete shift towards 
identity in social movements is an overstatement in the case of America. The two factors 
mentioned above have combined to create a somewhat more open, flexible democratic 
system, and social movements with strong cultural aspects.  
It is important to note that there had long been social movements in the US that were 
not closely aligned to social class. In fact, the idea of such movements as “moral crusades” 
was already well-known in the US, so American critics of NSM theories queried whether 
such movements were new at all.406 The Euro-centric view tends to overlook a relatively long 
history of new social movements in the United States dating back to the nineteenth century, 
and to overstate the novelty of the movements that were emerging in the 1960s and 70s.407 
While the civil rights movement, for example, was the unique emergence of Black identity 
politics, it also occurred in a broad historical context that had seen a variety of social 
movements emerging from the grassroots of American society. Essentially, new social 
movements emerged in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century, when the 
country was experiencing a significant increase in ethnic and religious diversity due to high, 
and rising, levels of immigration;408 and before socialism was organised along “modern” and 
“scientific” lines.409  
NSM continued to emerge throughout the century, which was a time of rapid social 
change, with many adherents to emergent movements, including “communitarianism, 
temperance, and various dietary and lifestyle movements,” featuring “religious awakening, 
revitalization and free thinking,” as well as anti-slavery movements and campaigns for 
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popular education. However, the abundance of social movements with new ideas and 
approaches all contributed to an atmosphere of rapid social change and openness to new ideas 
that resembled in some respects that of the 1960s, over a century later. In fact, many of the 
later movements subsequently identified as “new social movements” actually have their 
historical roots in this period – modern feminism, for instance, can be traced back to both the 
work of early feminist activists and theorists and the activism of women in the anti-slavery 
and temperance movements.410 The temperance movement, in particular, was an important 
arena in which women gained experience and expertise in activism; whereas labour 
movements at the same time were often met with repression, the government of the day 
looked with favour on temperance.411  
These nineteenth century movements were “moral crusades” just as those of the 1960s 
and 70s were412 and, also like them, were “affinity groups” rather than political organisations 
per se.413 However, despite some criticism of the Eurocentric idea of the social movements of 
the 1960s and 70s as “new,” US scholarship of social movements gained a lot from this field 
of research.414 While the shift to new social movements was less marked in the United States 
than in Europe, movements including civil rights and gay rights can be viewed in this light. 
The civil rights movement of the 1960s was a hugely important one in terms of its 
mode of organisation, and the way in which it used protests and demonstrations. As well as 
achieving major breakthroughs for the cause of civil rights, it also created specific models of 
organisation and protest that were used by the gay rights and other identity movements in 
America and elsewhere.  
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The civil rights movement was particularly influential in persuading scholars that new 
social movements were not, of necessity, led by emotion and essentially irrational, but that 
they could be conceptualised according to their organised, political characteristics. The 
modern civil rights movement was a reaction to the Jim Crow laws, which had been in place 
since the end of the Civil War, and which served to ensure that Black Americans would 
remain oppressed, by excluding them from the political process, designating them as inferior 
and insisting on segregation, and maintaining them in a state of poverty and subjugation by 
keeping them in a subservient position within the economic system. The system also 
facilitated widespread violence towards the Black population.415  
While the modern civil rights movement developed from often covert movements that 
predated the end of slavery, and from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it 
really became visible to the wider public in the mid-twentieth century. This followed a 
number of decades during which Black organisations promoted direct non-violent action, 
such as the boycotting of businesses that refused to hire Black workers.416 Boycott action, 
along with sit-ins, marches, and other forms of non-violent protest which necessitated the 
mobilisation of huge numbers, proved to be the most effective weapon against the 
discriminatory Jim Crow laws. The 1964 Civil Rights Act banned a wide range of 
discriminatory practices, signalling the success of the Black civil rights movement, and 
inspiring the emergence of other social movements that used similar tactics while they 
demanded the right to greater levels of political participation:417 “… this legislation, and 
others generated by the civil rights movement, created the legal framework through which 
other groups gained the constitutional right to demand changes for their own population and 
they were to do so in the context of their movements for change.”418 
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The gay rights, Native Americans’, farmworkers’ and other organisations all learned 
from the civil rights movement that non-violent protest was a way in which even poorly 
resourced groups could influence public policy through direct action,419 while also cementing 
a strong sense of identity that, together with their grievances and special interests, brought 
their members together.420 The American civil rights movement in turn directly impacted on 
social movement activity in Europe. One example of this influence is found in the Northern 
Irish Catholic Defence Movement, which was directly modelled on the civil rights 
movement. Essentially, the situation in America prefigured new social movements there and 
elsewhere, while NSM theory can contribute a theoretical dimension to the American 
experience.   
In the case of the gay rights movement in particular, there are many points of 
relevance of the model to the evolution of the gay rights movement, which was not a class-
based movement and which challenged long-held assumptions about how society should be 




In general, scholarship of the impact of counter movements on social movements has tended 
to lag behind the study of social movements.421 We can identify this as a weakness in social 
movement theory. Historically, classical theorists disapproved of social movements, whereas 
more recent theorists generally approve of them and have reacted strongly against earlier 
templates for study. This dichotomy has led to a sort of blindness. Theories including 
resource mobilisation, cultural framing, and NSM theory react against earlier theories that 
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saw social movements in a negative light, and typically look with favour on movements 
coming from the same left wing place as most commentators. Because these commentators 
and theorists see unrest in the form of civil action as progressive and, generally, a force for 
good in society, they have tended not to explore counter movements to these left wing social 
movements in any detail. 
A counter movement, which emerges in response to another movement whose aims it 
wishes to combat, and undermine,422 can negatively impact on social movements’ ability to 
access political power, but can also inadvertently provide impetus and energy to it insofar as 
it presents a clear “enemy” and set of opposing demands to fight. Counter movements tend to 
emerge when it looks as though the group that they are opposed to is beginning to have some 
success, when the interests of the group appear to conflict with those in opposition to it, and 
when there are political allies available to help in the struggle against the group in 
question.423 Typically, counter movements are populated by people who have more resources, 
which they wish to keep, in opposition to people fighting for the resources they lack from a 
“lower” position.424 Weaver characterises this reaction as “frontlash,” which she defines as 
“the process by which losers in a conflict become the architects of a new program, 
manipulating the issue of space and altering the dimension of the conflict in an effort to 
regain their command of the agenda.”425  
According to this schema, one sees the evangelical right responding to gains in the 
area of acceptance of homosexuality by reconfiguring the argument against homosexuality to 
one about the protection of children and the integrity of the American family – shifting the 
locus of the attack. Using the example of the civil rights movement, Weaver explores how the 
first counter-reaction to it involved passing legislation to criminalise non-violent protest such 
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as sit-ins and “freedom rides,” the second was to argue that granting civil rights would 
introduce crime to white areas, and the third was to maintain that areas that had already 
granted civil rights experienced higher levels of Black crime, and therefore illustrated that 
segregation and other forms of repression were necessary and that poverty was not a 
contributing factor to crime,426 while characterising Black protest as “formless” and 
“senseless.”427 The next step was to take the position that extending civil rights to Blacks was 
tantamount to rewarding criminal behaviour.428 The counter movement to the civil rights 
movement is a clear example of a group with more resources mobilising so as to ring-fence 
its privilege.429 Counter movements are frequently consistent with McVeigh's theory of right-
wing movements, defined as working to “preserve, restore, or expand rights and 
privileges.”430 
Clarence Lo, Professor of Sociology at the University of Missouri, describes counter 
movements as social movements which aim to maintain traditional social structures, 
differences or values, and states that, “Right wing [counter] movements sometimes directly 
advocate, and usually cause, the perpetuation of economic or political inequalities...[They] 
preserve long-standing institutions.”431 Others have stated the view that counter movements 
actually both resist and press for change.432  
In the case of the evangelical right, it both advocated against gay rights, and for the 
integration of religion into the machinery of state. According to Randall Collins, Professor of 
Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania,  “Without combative issues, a movement has a 
much harder time keeping up its energy and its solidarity, not least because it needs things to 
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do which bring the members together in collective action.” 433 The presence of a strong 
counter movement, as was the case for the evangelical right movement under Carter, 
“increases movement opportunities and resources, and strengthens cultural ties and collective 
identities.”434 Over time, opposing groups can come to depend on one another for their own 
growth and further development.  
Social movements challenge society’s norms and try to change beliefs and practices. 
Counter movements strive to maintain current beliefs and practices, but when a social 
movement succeeds in creating significant change, “new” norms can even be adopted by the 
counter movement. After the success of the civil rights movement, for example, counter 
movements opposed to progressive causes such as gay rights or abortion have often borrowed 
the language and the tactics of the civil rights movement, presenting themselves as a 
beleaguered group and using strategies such as passive resistance to further their aims.435 
Movements that exist in opposition to each other can represent a significant drain on 
each other’s resources. In areas of conflict, when a group is active it is practically a foregone 
conclusion that an opposing group will enter the scene. Each group will employ resources 
simply to fight off the other, potentially reducing opportunities to fight for core ideals.436 
Resistance through voting behaviour is a common way to protest against social 
movements,437 so counter movements often take action to influence voter behaviour. They 
flourish so long as a given state enables their activities, while failing to satisfy their demands. 
Whereas most social movements per se tend to engage directly with the state, counter 
movements engage more with one another. 438 
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Typically, a social movement and a counter movement become involved in a 
combative relationship in which the counter movement challenges gains made by the social 
movement, while both gain energy and impetus from oppositional politics. Movements that 
function in opposition do not engage in direct negotiation with one another, but create a 
distinct relationship in which each side uses the other to demand concessions from the state, 
policy makers, or the public. The interactions that emerge in this relationship form the 
strategies and claims of each side, as well as how each is organised. Alongside one another, 
two opposing groups can grow and flourish, maintaining a state of conflict in which the state 
can occasionally intervene on the side of one or the other.439 The way in which they interact 
can both restrict and enable political actions taken on behalf of the organisations of the two 
opposing camps. By focusing on the aims (actual or supposed) of the groups that they are 
opposing, counter movements sometimes actually encourage more people to join a movement 
and grant it greater visibility. For example, the conflict in Dade County in 1977 (which we 
discuss later) was an important rallying call and motivator for the gay rights movement.440 
The evangelical right and gay rights activists can be seen as both interest and social 
movement groups, the former being essentially an example of “reactionary forms of 
collective action” with a basis in traditional life441 – reacting against the changes that had 
occurred, and were continuing to occur, and which threatened their cultural hegemony.442 At 
a time when the number of evangelicals was growing quickly, the atmosphere was ripe for 
focused groups to emerge. By 1976, 34% of Americans described themselves as evangelicals. 
Throughout the 1970s there was rapid growth in the areas of Christian schools, colleges, 
radio stations, and specialist reading material.443 For example, the Moral Majority headed by 
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Jerry Falwell (discussed later on) was reacting to the perception that its constituents were 
about to lose power in an increasingly secular society. The Moral Majority had a political 
agenda444 that it was determined to further.445 By the late 1970s, the government tried to 
reduce the autonomy of fundamentalist institutions, which threatened an increasingly secular 
state446 as interest groups engaged in lobbying.447  
Neither the gay rights movement nor the right wing evangelical movement can be 
exclusively described as counter movements, as each engaged actively and persistently with 
the state to further its goals: the gay rights movement to obtain increased rights for 
homosexuals, and the evangelical right to fight against the liberalisation of American society 
in general. However, both groups did also engage actively in reaction to one another, 
including direct action intended to combat the other’s aims. In particular, the well-resourced 
evangelical right was frequently successful in backing the gay rights movement into a corner, 
forcing it to engage in defensive action and deflecting it from actively pursuing its goals with 
all of its resources and energy.  
 
THE GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT, THE EVANGELICAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT THEORY 
Clearly, the gay rights movement involves the collective engagement of individuals, groups 
and organisations working together to effect social change. Identity is also key. The same can 
be said of the evangelical right groups that set up in opposition to the gay rights and other 
liberal movements. 
Whereas both the gay rights movement and the evangelical right sought to influence 
institutions and individuals in positions of power, the latter involved a set of beliefs in the 
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supernatural, as well as specific, divinely-appointed rules for life, and the gay rights 
movement did not collectively subscribe to supernatural belief or to the idea of a 
comprehensive set of rules for living – although they did develop a set of complex goals that 
included the idea that gender roles should not be assumed, and a powerful emotive discourse 
around themes of legitimacy and equality.  
Unlike the revolutionary social movements described in classical views of social 
movements, the gay rights movement did not seek to overthrow established political 
structures and replace them with a new, sympathetic government. Rather, they sought 
through sustained effort to gain recognition and support and the transformation, rather than 
abolition, of existing structures and political systems. After Stonewall (to be discussed later), 
the gay rights movement started to recruit members with approaches tried and tested by the 
civil rights and other left-wing movements,448 and informed the general public about the 
movement, aware of the need for a more supportive external environment in order to achieve 
success.449  
Working for gay rights did not necessarily have to involve any actual activism; simply 
living openly as a homosexual was enough when homosexuality itself was illegal in much of 
the United States. The gay rights social movement politicised “coming out,” which now 
became a political act per se,450 challenging the status quo, as homosexuals demanded equal 
rights. This took place in the context of a society that generally saw homosexuality as 
aberrant and wrong, that had legislated against any expressions of it, and that often acted 
brutally upon that legislation.  
We can also use NSM theory to examine the gay rights movement of the 1970s, 
which was reacting to restrictive, discriminatory policies. In this way, it was very distant 
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from established interest groups, and from the usual channels of representation of particular 
interest to the institutions which are lobbied to make change, while not primarily interested in 
economic and political power. If we look at the gay rights movement in terms of resource 
mobilisation, we can see clearly that it did not, in its early stages, have access to many 
resources, fiscal or organisational. However, it did benefit from the diversity of its members, 
as it spanned a spectrum of social and educational classes, and thus differed tangibly from 
movements predicated simply around a desire to transfer wealth from privileged to poorer 
classes. As we will see, over the course of Carter’s presidency, the gay rights movement 
gained access to more cultural resources, as they adapted to the political mainstream, gained 
legitimacy from Carter’s respectful treatment of activists and organisations, and became 
increasingly skilled and sophisticated in professional political activism.  
The evangelical right in the US was a counter movement reacting to the growing trend 
towards liberalisation, manifested in the legalisation of abortion, increased women’s rights, 
and the gay rights movement, among other factors. Clearly, the politicised evangelical right 
emerged as a counter movement in response to dramatic social change. The evangelical right 
and gay rights movement became embroiled in action and counteraction, and a complex 
relationship that has been described as “symbiotic”451 and that has persisted, substantially 
unaltered.452 In other words, each group came to exist largely in reaction to the other. 
However, the evangelical right was successful in limiting the resources of the gay rights 
movement. In positing the struggle against gay rights in terms of “protecting children” rather 
than extending rights to adults, it ensured that gay rights activists invested time and money in 
fighting accusations of child abuse rather than furthering their aims.453  
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A crucial aspect of the gay rights movement, before, during, and after Carter’s 
presidency, has been to forge the sense of a common identity and battle, bringing together a 
hugely disparate group of women and men, bridging social class, race, income and ethnicity. 
As the gay rights movement became more politically astute, and was increasingly recognised 
as a political force by mainstream politicians – starting with Carter – it gathered momentum, 
and what had once been aspirations gradually became official rights and recognition.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The gay rights movement and the evangelical right both emerged in their modern forms in the 
1970s, fighting respectively for equal rights for homosexuals and against progressive liberal 
trends in society. To succeed in their aims, both social movements and interest groups depend 
on political bodies, including parties, as well as on mobilising a broad base of supporters, and 
are vulnerable to the potential that other outside groups will place pressure on political 
parties,454 while counter movements are social movements that engage directly with one 
another and appeal to politicians and other elite groups for support.  
Early scholarship in the field tended to see social movements as emotion-driven forms 
of collective behaviour, but in the second part of the twentieth century they were increasingly 
viewed as rational collective responses to social realities. Groups of people (like gay rights 
activists), who felt that they were excluded from access to power or rights, came together in 
an organised way to petition power brokers such as government. Theorists including Blumer, 
Parsons and Smelser introduced the idea that social movements can be a pragmatic and 
rational response to inequalities in society, sometimes portrayed as social “strain.” Social 
movements are seen as a form of collective behaviour that seeks to create change within the 
established order, rather than impose it. Interest group theory, which overlaps significantly 
                                                          





with social movement theory, stresses the role of societal conflict in leading to the emergence 
of groups with specific goals in mind and also featured an analytical turn towards a focus on 
resources 
NSM Theory, which emerged from the European experience, focused on the 
emergence of new types of social group, comparing them with earlier movements that had 
tended to be class-based. In the US context, the difference between “new” and “old” social 
movements was less clearly aligned with class, but there are parallels in terms of the way 
social movements in the 1970s challenged long-accepted hierarchies, such as the idea that 
heterosexual individuals and couples were naturally more deserving of human rights.  
In the US, scholarship increasingly focused on Resource Mobilisation Theory, with 
social groups portrayed as jostling for access to resources, which could include fiscal and 
symbolic resources, with the latter including rights such as the right to be recognised and to 
legally engage in the sort of activities that most members of society take for granted.  
Interest groups are centred in a core group of individuals who work towards creating 
change by means of contact with leaders responsible for policy.455 Any association that 
attempts to influence the decisions taken by government is acting as an interest group.456 
Social movements, however, tend to arise when a portion of the electorate feels that its 
interests are not adequately represented in the party political system, as often happens in 
America’s effectively two-party system, which can be perceived as excluding many. By and 
large, social movements are excluded from the party system,457 leading to their engagement 
in political action that can be confrontational and designed to gain them recognition.458 Social 
movements imply a more radical challenge to the existing parameters and interests of politics 
than interest groups. However, elements of the activities engaged in by both the gay rights 
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movement and the evangelical right can be considered from the viewpoint of interest group 
theory, in particular in their more formal guise as organisations such as, respectively, the 
NGTF and the Moral Majority.  
In response to emerging social groups, counter movements like the evangelical right, 
which based themselves in tradition and conservatism,459 reacted against the changes that had 
occurred, and were continuing to occur, and which threatened their cultural hegemony.460 In 
this way, the evangelical right emerged as a counter group that functioned largely in response 
to the emergence of social movements demanding progressive change, epitomised by the gay 
rights movement. While both attempted to influence government, the evangelical right, in 
particular, frequently engaged in direct attacks on the gay rights movement, forcing it into a 
defensive situation in which many resources were diverted to respond to the attack.  
Social movement theory, with elements of interest group theory, sensitises us to 
important aspects of the gay rights movement under Carter, and Carter’s role, as examined 
below. We gain insights into why the gay rights movement arose, how it evolved, and the 
relationships it developed with other actors in the field, including the government and the 
evangelical right, in its role as counter movement. For example, while clearly emotions often 
ran high among gay rights activists, their activism can be understood as an entirely rational 
response to the situation they were in – obliged to conceal their identity, or to abstain from 
romantic or sexual relationships if they wished to enjoy any access to the resources available 
to heterosexuals, including (but not confined to) access to public sector employment, political 
power, and the perception of respectability. Alongside other progressive movements, such as 
the women’s liberation movement, gay rights activists challenged the traditional status quo in 
a struggle for access to more power, more recognition, and access to resources. At the same 
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time, the movement had a keen focus on the framing of gay rights, and of homosexuals 
themselves, as ordinary members of society who had the moral right to the same entitlements 
as anybody else. While the evangelical right functioned as a counter-movement to a wide 
range of progressive interests, not just gay rights, the gay rights movement was an important 
factor in bringing members of the evangelical right together in their own battle for greater 
access to resources and, indeed, in their framing of themselves as warriors against what they 
saw as the growing degeneration of society.  
In the course of the chapters that follow, we will look at ways in which the theories 
described here shed light on the course of gay rights during the presidency of Carter. We look 
at organisational structure in both the gay rights and the evangelical right movement, its 
impact on Carter’s presidency and the White House, and at the crucial role of cultural 
framing in the development and successes of each. We will explore the ways the gay rights 
and the evangelical wing developed and grew in relation to one another. In the process, we 
will gain a keener understanding of the mechanisms, organisation and social trends that 












Whereas the role of the evangelical right in the 1976 elections has been extensively examined 
in the literature, the same cannot be said of the role of the gay rights movement. Therefore, 
my main purpose in this chapter is to examine this topic. I will also briefly look at the role of 
the evangelicals, especially their response to Carter’s overtures toward the gay community. 
Firstly, however, in order to better understand the political climate and environment of the 
time, I will examine the state of the Democratic Party and of American politics in general in 
the mid-1970s. 
 
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN THE 1970s  
Carter stood for election at a difficult time for the Democratic Party and for America in 
general. During his campaign, he was actively petitioned by a range of interest groups, 
including the evangelical right and the gay rights movement. The gay rights movement was 
already looking to the Democratic Party for support,461 while the evangelical right was slowly 
becoming more politicised. America was still reeling after the disastrous Vietnam War and 
the Watergate scandal, and there was a general sense of dissatisfaction with political life and 
the broad cultural trends that then characterised American society. While the evangelical 
right yearned for a social order with clear, traditional gender roles, and firm ideas around 
patriotism and the place of religion in the home and state, a variety of progressive groups 
were striving towards ever-increased liberalism in society. 
                                                          





In order to understand the challenges facing Carter, we need to start by understanding 
the situation in which the Democratic Party found itself. The political scene in the mid-1970s 
was one of disarray. Although the Democratic Party had become involved in the broader civil 
rights movement, it also had a conflicted history because of the divisive Vietnam War. In a 
personal interview, Michael Dukakis, the Democrat nominee for the Presidency in 1988, 
former Governor of Massachusetts and, at the time of writing, Professor of Public Policy in 
UCLA, said that:  
“The Vietnam War had a profound effect on Democrats. Many of us were strongly 
opposed to it, but it was a Democratic President that was responsible for it, and Democrats 
were bitterly divided about it… When you add the social movements and the civil rights 
revolution to the mix, it was pretty volatile. Remember, too, that the South had been 
overwhelmingly Democratic, largely because of the Civil War, and it was Lyndon Johnson 
who said when he signed the Civil Rights Act in 1964, ‘there goes the South.’ He was right, 
and trying to win elections without the South was increasingly difficult. It is not an accident 
that we cracked it primarily with two southerners running for the presidency.”462 
The Democratic Party was “confused, divided, and disoriented” and “a fractious, 
quarrelsome lot, characterized by incongruous elements, conflicting goals, and a notable lack 
of discipline.”463 In embracing the civil rights movement, it had become less 
straightforwardly aligned with trade union and labour concerns. Beginning formally with the 
1968 Chicago Convention,464 the Party had experienced “the rise of an alternative coalition,” 
crystallising around core liberal interest groups, including feminist and other reform 
organisations,465 and around the need to see greater minority ethnic participation. These 
various movements and interest groups, such as civil rights and feminist began playing a 
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major role in the Democratic Party. Professor Byron E. Shafer, Hawkins Chair of Political 
Science, University of Wisconsin–Madison, told the author that the role of these groups and 
movements – “civil rights first and foremost, but also environmentalism and women’s 
rights”– had “a rather powerful general impact during the 1970s” in the shaping of the 
Democratic Party and politics in the USA. “Those movements were important both directly 
and indirectly to the Democratic Party of that era. Directly, they generated major new clusters 
of partisan activists inside the Democratic Party. Indirectly, they were part of the fuel for 
structural reforms within the party, which then facilitated these new activists.”466 
There was considerable opposition to these changes, especially at regional level,467 
and among organised labour officials, who had been very much at the heart of the Democratic 
Party.468 Now organised labour was being pushed aside to make room for issue and group 
politics. In this category, the feminist movement emerged as a particularly important factor. 
Led by influential women such as Bella Abzug, a US Representative and a prominent figure 
of the Feminist Movement, feminists were actively pursuing greater representation for 
women at all levels.469 Among Republicans, however, the environment for feminists was 
becoming more hostile, as anti-ERA campaigners such as Phyllis Schlafly gathered 
traction.470 
By the early 1970s, the press and the public became aware of the changes taking 
place.471 Blue-collar workers found themselves without an obvious choice to vote for; 
whereas the Democratic Party had traditionally represented blue-collar interests while the 
Republican Party represented white-collar interests, now both tended to reach out to various 
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white-collar interest groups,472 giving rise to a higher incidence of cross-party voting. The 
scene was set for the emergence of a much greater focus on the individual personalities and 
policies of Presidential candidates. At the same time, a small number of gay rights activists 
and their supporters had started to make some inroads into politics, most famously Harvey 
Milk, who ran for city supervisor (and lost) in San Francisco in 1973, and who was 
subsequently appointed to the Board of Permit Appeals by the mayor of the city, George 
Moscone.473  
However, gay politicians and their supporters were still seen as occupying “niche” 
territory, and had not been accepted into the mainstream. David Mack Henderson, a 
prominent gay activist and founder of Fairness Fort Worth, told the author that “awareness of 
gay activism was out there, but there was so much misinformation and scaremongering that 
the members of the general public often had just a hazy idea of what it was all about, and 
many of them were afraid of change.”474  
Professor Byron Shafer believes that without the reform process of the previous few 
years, Carter would have been a very unlikely choice.475 Afterwards, Carter was an ideal 
candidate – ideological, pleasant, and available to a wide range of interest groups. The reform 
movement had shifted power and influence from important leaders in the Democratic Party to 
the party members, with primary elections now held at state level. Previously, only some 
states had held Presidential preference primaries, which had been seen as just advisory. Now, 
more states selected delegates via primary elections, enabling “outsider” candidates.476 
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Carter, who also benefited from the growing general interest in southern culture,477 
campaigned everywhere, competing in as many states as possible.478 
Following the Watergate debacle and the short presidency of Gerald Ford, who had 
assumed office with no public mandate, Carter presented himself as a candidate who could be 
“all things to all people,”479 a goal which, according to D.F. Hahn, reflected his tendency to 
be “fuzzy” and “vague.”480 American voters were looking for someone they could trust and 
respect, and Carter’s campaign was built around suggesting that he was that man: “He 
constructed a narrative as the unblemished outsider, the hero who could rescue and restore, 
relying frequently on the stump on words, such as “integrity,” “dedication,” “courage,” 
“compassion,” “trust,” “Christian,” “highest ideals,” “trustworthy,” “honesty,” “openness,” 
“fairness,” “pure,” “personal sacrifice,” “prayer,” “purpose,” “conviction,” and so on. In one 
repeated and characteristic statement Carter proclaimed, “With the shame of Watergate still 
with us and our 200th birthday just ahead, it is time for us to reaffirm and to strengthen our 
ethical and spiritual and political beliefs.”481  
Professor Shafer told the author that “reform politics was an enabling but not a 
decisive influence on the Carter nomination. In one sense, only Watergate can explain the 
Carter ‘accidency’; I can conceive no other environment that would have produced his 
presidency. On the other hand, without the reforms, the organized party might still have 
successfully resisted the Carter surge.”482 
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THE 1976 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
During Carter’s campaign, interest groups representing both the evangelical right and gay 
rights activists were very active, while Carter had assembled an experienced campaign staff 
that engaged with all of his constituents, including those that were viewed with disfavour by 
the evangelical right.483 While gay rights groups were broadly aligned with women’s 
liberation and other causes, those against tended to be associated with religious 
demographics, in particular with the various evangelical faiths. Catholics were also interested 
in Carter’s campaign, while anxious about his views on abortion, which they opposed. Carter 
stressed his opinion that state funds should not be spent on abortions for low-income 
women.484  
Throughout his campaign, Carter sought to placate his conservative Christian 
supporters while also reaching out to the liberal left. Earlier in his political career, Carter had 
paid relatively little attention to interest groups and, even after his campaign, began his term 
with no clear plan for them or intention to engage with them.485 He came under pressure from 
both supporters and opponents of controversial issues, including abortion and the ERA 
(Carter considered the latter a fundamental cornerstone of human rights that would give the 
US the moral authority to place human rights centre stage in its foreign policy).486  
American disillusionment with administrations that had led the country into dubious 
military adventures overseas synced with Carter’s view that these had sprung from a lack of 
focus on human rights issues in US foreign policy.487 From as early as 1974, Carter had put 
human rights centre-stage in his campaign, saying at the formal announcement of his 
candidacy that he wished to “see this country return to the high standards and ideals on which 
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it was founded.”488 His administration, Carter said, would be committed to addressing human 
rights issues, including torture, religious freedom, discrimination against minorities, and the 
denial of emigration rights.489 Professor of Public Policy Mark J. Rozell told the author that 
“The 1970s represented a turning point for such groups (gay rights and evangelicals). After 
the Watergate scandal and the end of the US war in Vietnam, it appeared to many that the 
political Left was on the rise. Liberal interest groups pushed their agendas hard and gathered 
most of the attention at the time while evangelical conservatives were mobilizing at the grass 
roots and were going largely unnoticed by the mainstream culture. Carter was the beneficiary 
electorally of the convergence of political activism by civil rights and liberties groups and the 
rise of evangelical political activism. Naturally, groups on the Left aligned with the 
Democratic nominee in 1976, and so did many White southern Baptists who were proud of 
the success of an openly born-again politician.”490  
 
Carter’s Promise 
Carter’s campaign focused on the new qualities that he would bring to the White House: “… 
[it] built upon the electorate’s disenchantment towards ‘politics,’ and he offered the voters 
hope that things would be better under his leadership. His campaign theme stressed ‘a 
government as good and as honest and as decent and as competent and as compassionate and 
as filled with love as are the American people,’ and he promised to restore the trust of the 
people in their government. Along with this theme of trust and good government was his 
promise to restore leadership to a Nation that he portrayed as having been drifting aimlessly 
during the past decade.”491 
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For the Democrats, Carter represented the opportunity to gain votes among the more 
conservative, while not alienating the Party’s liberal base.492 The possibility of Carter as 
President brought with it the prospect of a renewed respect for public avowals of faith in high 
office. However, this did not reassure all Americans of faith. Catholics, many traditionally 
working class Democrat voters, were anxious about Carter. They had become increasingly 
integrated into the political mainstream, especially since the election of Irish-American 
Catholic John F Kennedy in 1960, but their position on social matters such as abortion and 
denominational education, and the lingering antipathy between Catholics and evangelicals, 
compromised the Catholic vote.493  
Carter believed that the 1960s had represented a watershed period in politics, as a 
result of which it had become essential for the people to become much more directly 
involved.494 According to Stephen Skowronek, a prominent political scientist, Carter 
endeavoured to become “a liberal to liberals, a moderate to moderates, and a conservative to 
the conservatives.”495 While he believed that the concept of human rights was rooted in 
Judeo-Christianity, he was committed to its universality, arguing that America’s own 
experience of the civil rights movements and foreign affairs demonstrated the importance of 
sound moral principles in both domestic and foreign policies.496 While Carter discussed 
human rights in his election campaign, he tended to use more cautious language than he 
would employ after the election, using what William Steding,497 has described as “relatively 
obscure terms” such as “humanitarian aspirations.”498 
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With the help of Hamilton Jordan, who had served as a staff member during Carter’s 
period as governor, Carter entered the race with a number of assumptions. He believed that 
he could do well in the primary elections (now more numerous and more important as a result 
of the reforms); that George Wallace, the other southern contender, would not do well; that 
Carter’s “outsider” image would be a strength; and that voters would respond positively to a 
candidate whose personal qualities of integrity and trustworthiness were stressed.499 Carter 
was correct on all these points.  
 
Carter’s Views on Homosexuality and Gay Rights during his Campaign 
Carter was also the only candidate in the 1976 elections to publically oppose discrimination 
against homosexuals.500 In his election campaign, Carter had been consistent in his message 
that homosexuals should not be abused or harassed, and in his view that he did not have the 
right to “cast the first stone” when it came to matters of sexual morality.501 Carter stated his 
view that all pre-marital sexual contact was sinful – by implication including homosexual 
sexual activity while also considering it “not worse” than other sexual sins – but also his view 
that it was neither desirable nor feasible to attempt to police the private sexual behaviour of 
consenting adults.502  
Perhaps his most explicit and clear-cut consideration of homosexuality is elucidated 
in his 1976 pre-election interview with Playboy magazine: “Committing adultery, according 
to the Bible – which I believe in – is a sin. For us to hate one another, for us to have sexual 
intercourse outside marriage, for us to engage in homosexual activities, for us to steal, for us 
to lie, these are all sins. But Jesus teaches us not to judge other people. We don’t assume the 
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role of a judge and say to another human being, ‘You’re condemned because you commit 
sins.’ All Christians, all of us, acknowledge that we are sinful and that judgment comes from 
God, not from another human being… The issue of homosexuality always makes me 
nervous. It is obviously one of the major issues in San Francisco. I don’t have any, you know, 
personal knowledge about homosexuality and I guess being a Baptist, that would contribute 
to a sense of being uneasy.” Eventually, goaded by the reporter, Carter added, “I can’t change 
the teachings of Christ. I believe in them and a lot of people do in this country, as well.” 
Carter also stressed his view that law enforcement should move away from what he 
considered “victimless crimes” and pointed to efforts he had made in that area as governor of 
Georgia, where alcoholism was decriminalised and the penalties attached to the use of 
marijuana liberalised. He also stated that homosexuals had attended his church and that there 
had been a degree of embarrassment but no harassment or animosity.503  
Carter set out his plainly supportive position on lesbian and gay rights on March 19, 
1976 during an interview for “The Tomorrow Show,” when he said, “I favour the end of 
harassment or abuse or discrimination against homosexuals.” However, he also sounded a 
warning, pointing out that homosexuals in sensitive positions would be particularly 
vulnerable to blackmail and that this might place America’s security in danger.504 He would 
maintain this position throughout his presidency.  
Carter was also unequivocal in his official correspondence on the matter of whether or 
not homosexual Americans merited human rights, responding (via a staff member) to one 
letter written to him prior to his election in 1976 with the clear statement, “Governor Carter is 
firmly opposed to discrimination in all forms including affectional preference. As President 
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he will work to eliminate it.”505 In a letter to Jean O’Leary, one of the Directors in the Board 
of the NGTF, another staff member stated that while “Governor Carter is not entirely 
comfortable with homosexuality for personal reasons,” he nonetheless “has strongly 
expressed his feeling that homosexuals should not be singled out for special harassment, 
abuse or discrimination.”506  Peter Bourne told the author that Carter was very comfortable 
with homosexuals and was very well aware that several members of his staff were gay and 
had no issue with that.507 By and large, Carter’s views on homosexuality seem to have 
remained consistent throughout his presidency, although his willingness to speak openly 




In a highly significant move for the gay community, Carter invited Margaret “Midge” 
Costanza (they had been friendly since his support of her unsuccessful run for Congress in 
1974), an Italian-American Catholic, feminist, avid supporter of gay rights and former vice-
mayor of Rochester, New York, to join his campaign,508 giving her great responsibility in the 
Democratic Party and his election campaign.509 Costanza had been committed to the issue of 
gay rights since 1973, when she had run for city council in New York and had attended a 
meeting with a gay student group from the University of Rochester.510 During her run, Carter 
had gone two or three times to New York to campaign for her.511 She had been an ardent 
                                                          
505 Letter from Charles Cabot to Christopher Larkin, 12 March 1976. Gay Rights: Publications, 3/75-1/78 (O/A 
5771), 03/1975 - 01/1978. JCPL. 
506 Letter from Robert B. Havely to Jean O’Brien, 4 October 1976. Gay Rights: Memos, Correspondence, 
Clippings, 5/76-8/78 (O/A 5771), 05/1976 - 08/1978, Container 4. JCPL. 
507 Peter Bourne in a personal interview, 13 March 2014. 
508 Flippen, 2011: 84. 
509 Mattingly, 2016: 64. 
510 Clendinen and Nagourney, 1999: 271. 
511 Midge Costanza interview to Ashley Boyd. 2010. Midge Costanza Archives. Midge Constanza Institute 





feminist since being voted to the Rochester City Council with the most votes. Traditionally in 
Rochester, the candidate who received the most votes was declared mayor, but on the night of 
Costanza’s election, the male councilmen called a late-night vote to change the policy as they 
did not wish to have a female mayor – hence the honorary title of “Vice Mayor.” From this 
period on, Costanza had been firmly committed to feminism, and began to forge alliances 
with feminist organisations. The same year, on learning of bias against gay business owners 
in her area, Costanza gave her support to a movement to ban discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation.512  
Costanza played a crucial role in Carter’s election campaign, by having made 
speeches in his support, having appointed people to different positions in his team, and 
accompanying Carter on his tours all over the country.513 Costanza was a raconteur who 
found it easy to approach people, and she had a lot of success in introducing the relatively 
unknown Southern politician to the electorate in the North, where it was harder for him to 
gain votes. She was particularly successful in selling him to people from the same sort of 
working-class background as herself. Carter asked Costanza to second his nomination, which 
she did by telling her own life story. Considering Costanza’s progressive views on abortion 
and gay rights, this was a strong statement on Carter’s part.514  
For Carter, one appeal of hiring Costanza was to demonstrate to liberal voters that he 
was committed to a fair America, and part of a broader strategy to build support in every 
state. Costanza must had noted Carter’s overtures to the gay community, such as his 
comments to gay rights activist and founder of the Metropolitan Community Church Troy 
Perry that intimated his willingness to ban discrimination towards homosexuals in most areas 
of public life. While there were many differences between Costanza and Carter, they 
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respected each other greatly, and she was attracted to his message of human rights for all, his 
strong pro-women stance, and the likelihood that, under a Carter presidency, the situation for 
homosexuals would improve. In appointing Costanza, who was a very vocal supporter of gay 
rights, Carter was also signalling to the wider public that being in favour of gay rights was no 
barrier to engagement in the highest levels of politics. 
 
THE 1976 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION 
The Democratic Party initially seemed very suspicious of Carter, who was hard to pin down; 
“fiscally conservative but racially liberal.”515 However, by the time of the Democratic 
Convention in 1976, he had largely won it over, and the convention “was perhaps the most 
unified for a generation.”516 Whereas the Convention often took place before candidate 
selection, Carter had been chosen several weeks before. He made his acceptance speech at the 
Convention on July 15, stressing the need to return to the “lasting and simple moral values” 
that he considered to represent the nation’s origins, and urging Americans to depend on the 
“nobility of ideas.”517 Carter had decided to run with Walter Mondale as Vice-President, 
partly because he was impressed with Mondale’s credentials in the area of human rights.518 
Carter had fielded many questions about his views on homosexuality in the period 
leading up to the Democratic National Convention. Early in 1972, Carter had made 
statements that indicated his support for gay rights, although later that year he stopped short 
of supporting a plank.519 By the time of the Convention, he was confident that he would be 
nominated and anxious that controversial issues such as homosexuality (which he viewed as a 
subset of human rights generally rather than a singular issue) should not disrupt the event.520 
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His gay supporters pressed him to put in place a platform plank that would endorse rights for 
homosexuals specifically, but Carter’s campaign resisted, presumably because they were 
aware of how this would be seen by evangelical right voters. Virginia “Ginny” Apuzzo, an 
executive director of the NGTF at the time, was also “organizing the lesbian and gay 
community around the Democratic Platform Committee Hearings taking place around the 
country to testify about the importance of including a ‘gay rights plank’ that would provide 
equal protection under civil rights law.” However, during the final drafting procedures in 
Washington, D.C., in 1976, while she was lobbying the draft committee members, she told 
the author that she was “explicitly told by Carter’s campaign leadership that we were ‘an 
embarrassment to Candidate Carter.”’521  
O’Leary protested to Costanza in person about Carter’s rejection of the gay rights 
plank, and Costanza took the protest to Stuart Eizenstat, one of Carter’s top political advisors. 
Eizenstat’s response illuminates how politicians then saw the issue of gay rights, which was 
still far from a mainstream political issue in the mid-1970s: “Midge, let’s do what we have to 
for the gay rights movement, but let’s do it after we get to the White House. For God’s sake, 
don’t let us carry this albatross going into the election. We have to win this election.”522 In 
the event, as stated above, the Convention did not adopt a platform in favour of rights for 
homosexual men and women.523  
Throughout the Convention, Carter’s evangelical identity was on display, such as 
when he and Martin Luther King Sr. took the stage together to sing “How Great Thou Art,” 
uniting civil rights and evangelical Christianity.524 While Carter was comfortable talking 
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about his personal religion, he never used it for “personal political ends,” but rather as a 
platform to show who he really was.525 Nevertheless, some commentators compared the 
Convention to a revival meeting. Carter’s campaign has been compared to that of John F. 
Kennedy. Kennedy’s election had been seen as representing America’s acceptance of its 
Catholic community and was a huge win for Irish Americans. Many hoped that Carter’s 
election would do for the evangelicals what Kennedy’s had done for Catholics.526 
Carter also made a point about racial equality and ecumenism when he attended a 
Black Presbyterian church in New York.527 Carter had striven to show his commitment to 
civil rights for Black Americans, including one event at which he appeared on stage 
alongside Coretta King, the widow of Martin Luther King Jr. and an important civil rights 
activist in her own right. In response, the NGTF made an explicit comparison between civil 
rights for Black Americans and civil rights for homosexual Americans, saying in a letter to 
Carter: “For many of us, the most moving moment of the 1976 Democratic National 
Convention was the sight of you and Coretta King, two gentlepeople from the American 
South, celebrating an end to second-class citizenship for our nation’s largest minority, 
rejoicing in the decline of an old national madness, hatred for and oppression of human 
beings because of the colour of their skin. We invite you to become champion for first-class 
citizenship for this nation’s second-largest minority. We invite you to welcome and 
encourage the decline of an even older madness, hatred for and oppression of human beings 
because they have acknowledged their capacity to love other human beings of the same 
sex.”528  
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Cleverly, the NGTF also crafted their letter in a way intended to appeal to Carter’s 
love of Scripture, saying:  
“You believe that Christianity is alive in our times because you see that its message 
contains what you are striving for in yourself: the capacity to embody goodness and love and 
to put these qualities to work in the service of an ideal. But Jesus knew that the first step in 
putting love to work is finding the truth. And Jesus knew that dogma gets in the way of an 
expanding truth. The truth is that St Paul’s injunctions against homosexuals are not more 
valid than his injunctions for slaves to stay with their masters. The truth is that gay men and 
women are no more or less likely to be truthsayers or liars, rightdoers or ‘sinners’ than any 
other human beings. The truth is that you cannot continue to see us as wayward, immoral 
people and still be committed to our full and equal rights.”529 
A women’s caucus was held every morning at the Convention, and various women’s 
organisations, as well as anti-abortion groups, held rallies to coincide with the event. Feminist 
issues emerged as the major topic, in particular demands for equal representation through 
affirmative action. Although various pledges had been made to improve women’s 
representation in the Convention, they were still considerably underrepresented. Ethnic 
minority groups, such as Latinos and Blacks, echoed their call for more equal 
representation.530  
Gay rights activist, political scientist and author, Jo Freeman, attending the 
convention, noted that women activists were impressed by Carter, who had realised that, if he 
was serious about including more women in government, he would have to look beyond the 
usual male candidates for advice and nominations.531 According to Freeman, “Carter’s 
willingness to negotiate with representatives selected by the women's caucus impressed them 
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and the other women delegates. This was the first time a Presidential candidate had seriously 
talked with them on their own terms. The outsider to the Washington establishment had made 
them feel like insiders. They began to feel that he could be trusted.”532 
Carter, who had already supported limited abortion, made commitments to making the 
ERA central to his campaign, and to passing it if elected; and to appointing women to cabinet 
posts, possibly including the Supreme Court. In response, the Democratic Women’s Caucus 
offered to “set up a talent bank of women listing their areas of expertise for consideration of 
key posts.” Carter also started to take steps to deal with discrimination at work, for women 
and other minorities.533  
Undoubtedly, the NGTF, at the time was the most prominent of the gay rights 
organisation, which adopted a coherent strategy to enlarge the gay rights movement by 
drawing both militant activists and the conservative members into the pool.534 During the 
Presidential Campaign of 1976, it had unsuccessfully attempted to include gay rights in the 
Democratic and Republican Party programmes.535 While a gay rights plank was considered, 
on the basis that Carter had said that he opposed discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation, it did not find enough support among the delegates, as only three were openly 
homosexual, and Carter eventually did not support it either.536 It must be noted here that four 
years later in the Democratic Convention of 1980, a gay rights plank would be included and 
be supported by Carter, while the number of openly homosexual delegates would rise from 
three to seventy-seven,537 clearly verifying a significant progress made with regards to gay 
rights during Carter’s presidency.   
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 Gay rights activists held a march on the Sunday of the convention, and “600 
delegates or alternates signed a declaration of support.”538 There were some suggestions of 
attempts to keep gay rights activists out of the limelight. O’Leary attending the Convention 
“had spent several frustrating days trying to get a caucus meeting room large enough to hold 
100 people. Give us a list of 100 delegates who want to attend, she was told, and we'll give 
you the room. Other caucuses did not have this demand made of them.” Ultimately, gay 
rights activists were given a room inadequate to their needs, and requiring passes to enter, 
whereas other groups could hold open conventions.539 
Despite the frustrations faced by gay right activists at the Convention, the presence of 
Costanza as Carter’s aide encouraged them and gave some visibility to their cause and needs. 
The fact that feminists were also taken seriously for the first time was also a positive sign of 
Carter’s intentions with respect to human rights and equality. Professor of Women’s Studies 
Charlotte Bunch, in a personal interview, highlighted the importance of Carter supporting 
equal rights for women, stating that it was “a hopeful sign, and people like Midge who had 
worked on his campaign led us to feel that… the human rights perspective that Carter stood 
for, which of course has been clearer in his later years, was so strong that we could… hope 
for more.”540 
Tom Hayden, the renowned anti-war activist who ran for the Democratic nomination 
for the US Senate from California, told the author that “the feminist presence (in the 
Convention) was very visible and this was due to Carter. I don’t remember anything being 
said about gay rights, but the presence of Costanza in Carter’s side, certainly created a lot of 
expectations.”541 Michael Dukakis who had also attended the Convention, emphasised in a 
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personal interview the role of gay rights and feminist activists in the Convention and the 
subsequent election, “unquestionably, all of these forces were very much a part of the 1976 
election both at the convention and in the final [elections].”542 
 
Gay Rights Activists in Carter’s Campaign  
Shortly before the Democratic Convention, thousands of advocates for gay rights marched in 
New York on a route that took them past the site of the Stonewall Riot of 1969. Amid 
considerable media attention, one journalist wrote that, “The love that dare not speak its name 
now can’t seem to keep its mouth shut.”543 Although groups like the Mattachine Society had 
made some forays into political activism, America had never before seen such a focused 
attempt on the part of gay activists to make their voices heard in the political arena.544 
Whereas earlier activists had taken a revolutionary stance, even aligning themselves 
ideologically with the Vietcong,545 now there was an effort on the part of activists to gain 
rights within the current political structure, building on earlier efforts begun by organisations 
such as the Gay Activist Alliance,546 many of whose members would go on to have important 
roles in the NGTF.547 
By the time of Carter’s campaign in 1976, there had already been some gains, such as 
the decriminalisation of homosexuality in a number of states,548 and the passage of the first 
gay rights legislation when the city council of East Lansing in Michigan (followed shortly 
after by Ann Arbor) approved an act that declared that the city should employ the best 
applicant for any vacancy regardless of a number of characteristics, including 
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homosexuality.549 In July 1972, Jim Foster was the first gay delegate to address a presidential 
nominating convention when he spoke at the Democratic National Convention. When 
candidate George McGovern endorsed gay rights the same month, he was denounced by 
prominent members of the Democratic Party.550 Clearly, general acceptance of gays, and their 
own realisation as a voting bloc, had certainly not yet come about. 
After the Democratic Convention, Carter instigated a committee dedicated to 
increasing women’s voices in his campaign, the 51.3% Committee, referring to the female 
percentage of the American population.551 Then Carter took a very important step towards a 
more inclusive approach to gay Americans by appointing three openly gay women to the 
51.3% Committee.552 They were Jean O’Leary, Josephine Daly of the San Francisco Human 
Rights Committee and that city’s first lesbian Police Commissioner, and Elaine Noble, a 
member of the Massachusetts House of Representatives. Carter’s campaign issued a press 
release pointing out that this was “the first time that a known gay person has been appointed 
to an important national advisory committee.” 553 Carter was quite clear that he felt that rights 
for homosexual Americans were very much a matter of concern for any would-be American 
President.554  
However, Carter’s announcement of the 51.3% Committee received minimal press 
coverage; it was not covered at all in the vast majority of newspapers as gay rights was not 
considered an important issue at the time. Thus it went unnoticed by most Americans.555 
Even so, the 51.3% Committee played a very active role in the Presidential campaign, 
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establishing branches in every American state and in many counties,556 and advertising in 
publications aimed at a female readership, stating that “Jimmy Carter feels it’s time your 
government did something positive to end discrimination against women.”557  
As well as working for the 51.3% Committee, O’Leary – at Costanza’s urging and 
Carter’s approval– joined Carter’s team and campaigned for him among the gay community 
in New York. This solidified the idea of the gay community as one that could use its vote to 
express unity and to work towards better representation in politics.558 O’Leary would work 
very hard on the campaign and she organised the gay community in New York for Carter.559 
She obtained many votes for Carter among the gay community by communicating to them 
that he was open to dialogue with them, and to dealing with their concerns. O’Leary and 
Costanza also became very close at this time. They agreed on a wide range of issues and were 
both highly visible gay rights activists.560 After his victory in the elections, Carter wrote to 
O’Leary thanking her for her support and intimating the great things that could now be 
achieved for women, but without mentioning gay rights.561 
Louie Crew, member of the board of directors of the NGTF at the time, said in a 
personal interview about O’Leary’s appointment: “her appointment was very important for 
us. Having an open lesbian and one of the NGTFs directors appointed by the Presidential 
nominee was of major significance for us. We felt that we could make our voices heard. Most 
importantly, it was obvious to us and to everyone that Carter was against discrimination 
against homosexuals.”562  
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On the appointments of Costanza and O’Leary and on their contributions in 
campaigning for Carter, Jeffrey Montgomery, an LGBT activist and the founding executive 
director of Triangle Foundation, a gay and civil rights organization in Michigan, told the 
author: “Yes, I believe it was a vital point because Carter proved by appointing them that he 
did not care about the people’s sexual preferences and that all were equal to his eyes. I think 
it was also a symbolic move; if the President has appointed a gay then it is OK for us to do so 
to and that kind of thing. I was quite surprised, to tell you the truth, by Carter’s actions as I 
thought he was very conservative, but it was a very pleasant surprise.”563  
On the same topic, Eddie Sandifer, a gay veteran, member of the Mattachine Society 
and founder of the Mississippi Gay Alliance, told the author that “Carter’s approach to the 
movement and the appointments of Costanza and O’Leary certainly played an important role 
in the growth of the movement. It was a major statement to us [and] to everyone in the USA 
that he was not afraid to appoint an open homosexual to his team. You know, the 1970s 
might seem like a time when a lot of people came out and things started getting better for us, 
but it was not as rosy as some people might think. There was a lot of hostility and harassment 
by prominent Americans like Anita Bryant, Pat Boone and others. Carter had a lot of courage 
to take such a stance.”564 
 
Carter Seeks the Gay Vote 
Then, Carter did something that had been unthinkable before. He advertised in gay and 
lesbian publications, apparently an unprecedented step for a Presidential candidate. Carter 
assured homosexual readers that, despite his deep religious convictions, he did not “believe in 
legislating morals”565 and assured them that he “opposed all forms of discrimination on the 
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basis of sexual orientation.”566 In this way, Carter was the first Presidential nominee to reach 
out so explicitly to the gay community, assuring them that he would not discriminate against 
them, and that he valued them as voters and as citizens. It was a daring thing to do in the face 
of rising opposition to the gay rights cause, and a powerful message to the gay community as 
a whole. This was also an important act of cultural framing in which he showed that one did 
not have to personally accept homosexual acts in order to accept homosexuals, and to accept 
their concerns as a valid matter for government. This contributed to Carter’s endorsement by 
a number of gay rights leaders. 
Eddie Sandifer said in a personal interview about Carter’s advertisements in gay 
publications: “Seeing Carter’s ads in the gay press was really quite unexpected, quite a shock 
even. This was something that was never done before, as far as I can tell. Politicians were not 
advertising themselves in such publications, not even those who were gay. It was certainly 
very important. We were all very surprised to see the US President Nominee placing 
advertisements in the gay press but it was a pleasant surprise. It must have taken President 
Carter a lot of courage to do it, considering the volatile atmosphere at the time, but it 
certainly sent out a big message.”567  Donald Hallman, a gay veteran who had been 
dishonourably discharged from the Army on grounds of his homosexuality in the 1950s and 
prominent gay rights activist, told the author that Carter’s relatively progressive stance 
encouraged gays to vote for him, and to become more politically active: “I don’t remember 
seeing any Carter’s advertisements in gay magazines, but I clearly remember everyone 
talking about Carter’s open approach to the gay community and the appointments of 
Costanza and O’Leary in his staff. These initiatives certainly convinced most of the 
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homosexuals, if not all, to vote for him... It certainly also encouraged people to become active 
with the movement.”568  
In terms of attracting gay voters, Carter may have also benefited from the apparently 
anti-gay views of one of the other Democratic candidates. Senator Henry Jackson faced 
hecklers at one of his campaign speeches and lashed out, saying, “Go on and have your own 
rally. Our people want hard work. We don’t want gay work. We don’t want gay jobs. You 
just do your own thing and stay away.”569 Carter, instead, repeatedly stated that he did an 
excellent job at keeping his personal and political views separate, and that there was no 
conflict between his private religious life and his position in politics.570 The implication was 
that, regardless of his views on homosexuality (described in a personal interview with Eric 
Marcus as a likely cause of conflict for a President who was also a conservative Christian)571 
they had no bearing on matters of state. 
During his campaign in Los Angeles, Carter was questioned by a gay minister, Troy 
Perry of the Metropolitan Community Church, a prominent gay rights activist who noted that 
while many churches were very vocal in their opposition to gay rights, many religious people 
felt otherwise.572 Perry wanted to know if he would “ban discrimination in four areas: the 
military, housing, immigration, and civilian contracts that required security clearance.”573 
Carter affirmed that he had no problem with the first three areas, and had reservations against 
the fourth only when the person in question was not openly homosexual and would therefore 
be vulnerable to blackmail, with implications for national security. Following this meeting, 
Perry made his support for Carter clear, saying, “I am strongly supporting Jimmy Carter 
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because of his commitment to civil rights for all people and because of his opposition to non-
job related employment discrimination.” 574 
Counsellors Lyon and Martin, both lesbians, also made a strong statement in Los 
Angeles in support of Carter, saying, “As lesbians and as women, we support Jimmy Carter 
for President because of his strong stand on the ERA, because he is committed to appointing 
women to key positions in his administration and because he supports gay civil rights.”575 
These comments were all repeated shortly afterwards in a press release from Carter’s 
campaign, showing his intention to reach out directly to as many homosexual voters as 
possible.576  
Encouraged by the signals coming from Carter’s Presidential campaign, a group 
known as Gays for Carter emerged. Gays for Carter felt that the only way in which change 
would happen was if gay rights activists worked within the system, and they asked that 
Carter, if he was elected, make an Executive Order that would ban anti-gay discrimination in 
every area under the President’s jurisdiction, including in the military.577 Another group, 
California Gay People for Carter-Mondale, led by lesbian activists, supported Carter on the 
basis that if the Republicans got in there would be no hope at all for progressive social 
change.578 The group focused on reassuring gay voters who were unconvinced of Carter’s 
commitment to their cause by stressing his strong belief in the separation of church and 
state579 (in other words, pointing out that Carter’s personal religious views should not impact 
his performance as President), and by deflecting interest from his strong personal religious 
beliefs and presumed private views on homosexuality. The group wrote to Carter’s campaign, 
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stating its belief that America was “ready for gay liberation” and its ability to reach out to gay 
voters, including those who were still in the closet.580  
Carter tried to extend a hand to gay activists without jeopardising support from 
evangelicals. During his father’s campaign, Carter’s son Chip toured around San Francisco 
with members of the NGTF on his behalf. Furthermore, on the anniversary of the Stonewall 
Riot, Chip attended the Great Tricycle Race in San Francisco and stated that he was there to 
“show his support for the gay peoples’ political situation.”581  Chip Carter even rode a 
tricycle during the race “to designate the acceptance of that lifestyle.”582 One assumes that 
this was a way for Carter to show tacit, if discreet, support for gay rights.  
Louie Crew in a personal interview highlighted the significance of the event and the 
excitement the gay community felt with his presence, “we were interested in the election 
brand and in the election process. Chip’s presence was very important for us. We were all 
very excited and happy about it. We thought that at last someone was paying attention to 
us.”583 Costanza addressed a group of homosexuals in San Francisco about Chip’s presence, 
stating   “I’m here to tell you Chip Carter does not go to a Gay Rights celebration without the 
approval of the president and this campaign. He didn’t just happen to show up or accidentally 
run into it, he wants your support.”584 
In a personal interview, Jeffrey Montgomery stressed that the homosexual community 
was under pressure. Carter’s campaign, and the fact that his son attended gay rights rallies, 
made a positive difference. It was a way for people to learn about the gay rights community 
other than the extremely negative campaigning of the evangelical right: “It was a difficult 
period for us. A lot of people in the USA, like Anita Bryant, were talking about us in 
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demonic ways, and a lot of them were seeing us as abnormal and even dangerous. Having the 
son of the Presidential candidate attending our meetings and talking to us probably made a lot 
of these people reconsider their opinion about us. It certainly though created a positive 
visibility of our community.”585 
Carter’s strong statement of opposition to discrimination against homosexuals was 
quoted repeatedly in communications from gay rights activists as, for example, in a letter 
written by Robert Osborn to Thomas Hastings, the New York Chief of Police, on August 24, 
1976, referring to a meeting that had been held with Hastings and the need for police officers 
to receive training and instruction on how to deal with the gay community and, in particular, 
the need for the police not to harass homosexuals and transvestites. Osborn’s letter quotes the 
American Civil Liberties Union’s statement on the right of homosexuals not to be harassed, 
using wording almost identical to Carter’s.586 As well as pressing Carter to make a 
commitment to gay rights prior to the election, the NGTF pressed his running partner, 
Mondale. Mondale parroted Carter’s line that, while he was opposed to “irrational” 
discrimination against homosexuals, he felt that there could be security issues around 
homosexuals in sensitive positions, and that it was necessary to maintain discriminatory laws 
in certain areas.587  
Although they had reservations about how much he would do for them, many 
homosexual voters realised, having closely observed the appointments of Costanza and 
O’Leary, that Carter was the candidate most likely to help their cause, despite his often-
discussed religious faith, and that he had taken a very significant step in appointing 
supporters of gay activism, as well as openly gay individuals, to his campaign. Professor 
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Charlotte Bunch remembered in a personal interview: “I think in the beginning most of us 
were suspicious of Carter because he came from a Southern Christian background… but once 
he was chosen [as Presidential candidate] there were people like Midge Costanza, who had 
worked for him, and Jean O’Leary, who was part of the NGTF, who really convinced us that 
he was committed to human rights and that there was some way to work with him. There was 
no question, we would vote for him. But I think there was some question about how much he 
would really do at that point… there was a sense that he was the best of a bad lot and… some 
hope that there were some people in his campaign who were open to gay rights and there was 
certainly a sense that, that it was our turn, it was our time to get on the agenda.”588 Donald 
Hallman said in a personal interview about the importance of Carter’s approach to the gay 
community during his 1976 campaign that: “Carter demonstrated that he recognized our 
existence and was not afraid to seek our vote. That was a brave thing to do at the time. It does 
not sound very important today when things are so different, but back then it was major 
…”589  
 
The Role of the Evangelicals   
In the 1970s, evangelical discourse and the evangelical vocabulary were then considered 
quite strange and exotic in a political context: “while evangelicals in the mid-1970s had 
begun to focus on a set of key issues, they had not yet linked those issues to the success of a 
particular political party. When Baptist school teacher Jimmy Carter campaigned for the 
presidency in 1976, a Newsweek cover story entitled “Born Again!” indicated that the 
increasingly important evangelical vote was still up for grabs,590 although generally 
evangelicals tended to vote for right-wing Republicans.591   
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The Georgia governor was challenging incumbent Gerald Ford, also an evangelical 
Christian. When reporters on the campaign trail asked Carter about religion, he responded 
using typical evangelical language, explaining that he had a “personal relationship” with 
Jesus Christ. To the press, this sounded bizarre. The New York Times recalled that “many 
reporters reacted to Jimmy Carter’s unabashed espousal of ‘born again’ Christianity with 
about as much befuddlement as if Mr. Carter had said he had ridden in a flying saucer.”592 
Carter often referenced his and his family’s strong evangelical faith at a time when the 
membership of the evangelical churches was growing sharply at the expense of more liberal 
mainstream religions. This gave him an advantage among the generally intensely nationalist 
evangelicals.593 The idea that the state should be prepared to intervene in matters of morality 
was gaining credence. The growing power of the evangelicals at this time, “forged a symbolic 
link between their own identity and that of the larger society, giving them a sense of political 
entitlement which made it more conceivable to speak out on moral issues,” and they, 
“perceived themselves as having a special message to bring to the American people.” They 
expressed a sense of responsibility to bring this message into the public forum, and presented 
themselves as “custodians of the values of our civilisation,” (it is worth noting that the 
evangelical right was overwhelmingly white)594 who had a responsibility to participate in 
public policy “whenever political and spiritual concerns overlap.”595 
At the 1976 Southern Baptist Convention in Norfolk, Virginia, Bailey Smith, pastor 
of the First Baptist Church in Del City, Oklahoma, endorsed Carter’s candidacy, stating that 
the US needed “a born-again man in the White House. And his initials are the same as our 
Lord’s!”596 Realising that his faith might help his campaign, Carter started to refer to it more 
                                                          
592 Sutton, 2013: 19. 
593 Marshall and Manuel, 1986: 368; Steding, 2014: 18-9. 
594 Alumkal, 2004: 196. 
595 Wuthnow, 1983, 177-8. 





often, although he made a particular effort to assure everyone, especially within his own 
party, that his faith was something personal and would not influence the way he made 
decisions.597 In comparison to Ford, Carter appeared warm, friendly, approachable, and 
comfortable with religion. According to Kenneth J. Kollins, Professor of Historical Theology 
and Wesley Studies at Asbury Theological Seminary, “The language of born-again 
Christianity flowed from his [Carter’s] southern Baptist lips… and quickly became part of the 
national vocabulary.”598  
Carter’s overt faith and public prayer helped to stall the flow of evangelicals towards 
the Republican Party.599 Ford managed to assemble a group of evangelical leaders who were 
prepared to publicly lend their support to him and posit him as the candidate who was the 
closest to God.600 Ford, an Episcopalian, even described himself as “born-again.”601 He also 
dragged his son, a divinity student, into the campaign.602  
Many evangelicals were very excited about the prospect of Carter because, “they were 
proud of the new respectability that Carter’s candidacy gave born-again Christianity.”603 
Carter’s easy relationship with his faith indicated to them that they had collectively been 
accepted and had a right to make their voices heard in the mainstream political arena. On 
October 25, 1976, the influential Time magazine proclaimed 1976 “The Year of the 
Evangelical.”604 The same year, 34% of all Americans claimed to have had a “born again”605  
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experience.606 Ronald Reagan, then governor of California, also said that he had had a sort of 
born-again experience during his governorship.607 Evangelicals’ excitement at this time has 
been compared to the “coming out” experience of long-closeted homosexuals; finally, they 
felt that they were free to be open about who they really were.608 
Powerful evangelicals were quick to offer support. One evangelical publisher “issued 
a book titled The Miracle of Jimmy Carter609 and an evangelical organisation, Citizens for 
Carter, paid to place an advertisement in Christianity Today highlighting the spiritual 
experiences about which Carter had been so open.”610 The advertisement read, in part: “… in 
this post-Watergate era, people throughout the country are disillusioned with the moral 
corruption and incompetent leadership they see in the political arena. Citizens for Carter 
believes that a return to decency and integrity in government can begin this election year. As 
an evangelical you can play an important part in this restoration of confidence… America’s 
problems are the result of a spiritual crisis at its heart… Citizens for Carter supports Jimmy 
Carter because he stands for a return to open government, competence, honesty and an 
abiding sense of the importance of morality in our national life.”611 
Carter also actively courted interest from conservatives such as the evangelical 
preachers Billy Graham (who would go on to give Carter advice on the Middle East)612 and 
Pat Robertson.613 In an interview on the Christian Broadcast Network in Virginia Beach, 
Robertson asked Carter if he intended to appoint any evangelicals to office and whether he 
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would listen to suggestions from Robertson.614 When he said “Yeah”615 to both questions, 
Robertson pledged his support, provided there were evangelicals in the administration.616  
An important part in the mobilization of evangelical support for Carter should also be 
attributed to his sister, Ruth Carter Stapleton, who was an evangelical preacher with a large 
number of followers across the South. Peter Bourne told the author that “her role in getting 
her congregations behind Carter, especially in places like Oklahoma was decisive in the 
primaries and to a lesser extent in the general election. There was also a strong element of 
regional chauvinism with Carter being the first potential president from the Deep South since 
Reconstruction.”617 
Many evangelicals were anxious about Carter’s views on gay rights, as well as steps 
he might take to compromise the “traditional American family” (such as favouring feminists 
and gays and liberalising the law around abortion). Carter still hoped to win the vote of the 
more liberal activists, including gay rights activists, so while he needed support from 
conservative evangelicals, he could not appear to have too close an alliance with them. 
Bourne told the author that “in the campaign for president Carter wanted to avoid offending 
fundamentalist Christians and Catholics, so he had to modify his position without 
antagonizing the leaders of the women's movement. This came to a head in the Iowa 
caucuses. He had to walk a very narrow line. He and Rosalynn were already out spoken 
advocates of the Equal Rights Amendment which gave them some cover with women 
activists.”618 
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During his campaign, Carter received the support of most religious voters, despite the 
fact that no “Christians for Carter” groups had been created.619 However, Carter had shocked 
some conservative evangelicals by giving an interview to Playboy, stating that, “His Christian 
faith required him to maintain a non-judgemental attitude towards hedonists and sexual 
libertines,” he had lusted after women other than his wife and he said, “Christ says, don’t 
consider yourself better than someone else because one guy screws a whole bunch of women 
while the other guy is loyal to his wife… for us to hate one another, for us to have sexual 
intercourse outside marriage, to engage in homosexual activities, for us to lie, for us to 
steal… all these are sins. But Jesus teaches us not to judge other people. We don’t assume the 
role of Judge…”620 
In response to the interview, Carter was publicly criticised by many powerful 
evangelicals, including the increasingly influential televangelist Rev. Jerry Falwell, head of 
the 17,000-member Thomas Road Baptist Church in Lynchburg, Va. Falwell was the 
presenter of the hugely popular nationally televised “Old-Time Gospel Hour,” with an 
audience estimated by his aides at eighteen million a week. His broadcasts went out from 379 
television and 400 radio stations in the USA and 69 TV stations abroad and his weekly pleas 
for contributions brought in $56 million. He also taped a half-hour of Bible study for daily 
broadcasts on 300 radio stations.621 He was startled when Jody Powell, Carter’s special 
assistant, telephoned his office and told him to “back off.”622 Republicans were delighted 
with Carter’s mistake, “the kind of serious blunder for which the Ford strategists had 
hoped.”623 Carter apologised, saying, “If I should ever decide in future to discuss my deep 
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Christian beliefs and condemnation and sinfulness I’ll use another forum besides Playboy.”624 
He pointed out that outgoing President Ford’s own secretary of the treasury, Mr Buckley, had 
given an interview to Playboy himself.625  
Carter’s interview, comments and the language he used seriously damaged his 
standing among the evangelical right, who were left “disillusioned and confused.” Reverend 
Lindsell said, “Our Lord Jesus Christ would never use the medium of Playboy to make a 
statement about his life and conduct. Jesus Christ would never use scatological language; 
words you have never heard from this pulpit.”626 “Screw is just not a good Baptist word,” 
said pastor Baily Smith who had previously urged evangelicals to vote for Carter.627 Dr. Jerry 
Vines, another prominent pastor, expressed his doubts about Carter, “A lot of us are not 
convinced that Mr. Carter is truly in the evangelical Christian camp, and this tends to indicate 
to us that he isn’t.”628 Several other pastors, including Carter’s own pastor at the Southern 
Baptist Church in Plains, were unhappy with the interview and Carter’s language.629  
 Ford benefited from the Playboy debacle, and in a commercial featuring the right 
wing Southern Baptist pastor, Criswell, the pastor was quoted as endorsing Ford: “On 
Thursday, of a week ago, along with other men of faith, I was invited to visit the President in 
the White House. And in our conversation with him, we asked him, ‘Mr. President, if 
Playboy magazine were to ask you for an interview, what would you do?’ And the President 
replied, ‘I was asked by Playboy magazine for an interview, and I replied with an emphatic, 
“No.”’ And I like that!”630 
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Ultimately, the Playboy article cost Carter many evangelical votes and forced him 
into an awkward apology.631 Falwell discussed the interview in a sermon entitled “Seven 
Things Capturing America.” The remarks were picked up by the Washington Post and CBS 
news. Carter’s team immediately contacted networks that aired televangelists’ material and 
threatened them with legal action should they air programmes made by Falwell and critical of 
Carter. In response, a group of fundamentalist preachers, including Falwell, called a press 
conference at the National Press Club in Washington, where Falwell stated that, “I resent 
anybody in Washington, or anybody trying to go to Washington, silencing and muzzling a 
preacher of the Gospel from preaching his moral convictions.” Right wing evangelical 
leaders started to move decisively away from Carter, and Falwell began to take a decidedly 
more political stance.632  
A group of conservative leaders including Howard Phillips, Paul Weyrich, and 
Richard Viguerie approached Falwell with the suggestion that he create an organisation that 
would mobilise fundamentalists and evangelicals as voters. For the time being, Falwell was 
not interested.633 At the same time, the Playboy article was significant in terms of signalling 
Carter’s view of homosexuality as on a par with activities such as heterosexual sex before 
marriage – sinful in the eyes of God, in his view, but not a matter for government, and not 
something that should automatically prevent homosexuals from a full and active participation 
in American society. In this way, Carter was engaging in one of many actions that helped to 
frame homosexuality as an ordinary aspect of life.  In a personal interview, Louie Crew said: 
“We all knew that Carter didn’t really approve of homosexuality, but at least he recognised 
that we had equal rights like everyone else. For us, this was the most important thing. In those 
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days, anti-gay rhetoric and feelings were so widespread, that a public figure who recognised 
us as equal members of society was an ally by definition.”634 
Presaging the problems that would arise when Carter’s progressive approach to 
human rights clashed with his identity as a Southern Baptist, during his campaign the 
Southern Baptist Convention asserted that homosexuality was “contrary to Biblical truth” and 
insisted that active homosexuals should not be ordained or hired. Increasingly, hard line right 
wing evangelicals identified homosexuality, along with abortion (still considered broadly a 
“Catholic” matter), as an issue on which they would find little to agree with Carter. Horrified 
by Carter’s promise to sign Abzug’s gay rights bill (discussed in the previous chapter),635 
conservative columnist William Willoughby wrote that, “The question over homosexuality 
for most evangelicals, if grass-roots samplings are any indication, is as politically damaging 
to Carter in their eyes as the Democratic stand on abortion is to the Catholic voters.”636 Anti-
gay voters who might otherwise have been interested in Carter switched to Ford, while 
members of both gay rights and the evangelical right interest groups became increasingly 
focused on their approach to the forthcoming election. One former campaign worker recalled, 
eighteen years later, that there was a massive disconnect between the prudishness of the 
evangelical right and the permissiveness of so many young people in that era, including the 
many young workers on Carter’s campaign.637 
Subsequently, evangelical approval of Carter waned as his campaign progressed. The 
fact that he failed to take a conservative line on abortion, courted the gay vote, his support for 
liberal theologians, and his disastrous Playboy interview cost him a large number of voters.638 
Nonetheless, despite his relatively liberal views on issues such as gay rights, he still managed 
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to secure considerable evangelical support on the day of the election. Tony Campolo, Pastor 
and one of the leaders of the Evangelical Left, confirmed in a personal interview that many 
evangelicals voted for Carter on election day, largely because “he had been the one who had 
introduced the idea of being ‘born again’ to American politics.”639  
Dr. Morris Sheats, Senior Pastor and founder of the Trinity Church, told the author 
that “many of the people who voted for Carter felt that he would help to restore their faith in 
the political system.”640 Peter Bourne also told the author that most evangelicals still voted 
for Carter because “they saw him as one of them and at that stage were willing to overlook 
some of his more liberal views.641 D. Michael Lindsay, President of Gordon College and 
author of Faith in the Halls of Power, stated in a personal interview that “some of the 
evangelical voting bloc still supported President Carter personally and felt that he represented 
their values, even as the leadership segment of American evangelicalism did not.”642 
One outcome of the campaign was that evangelicals had become increasingly adept at 
mobilising their grass roots through a range of media. Noteworthy was their use of simple 
techniques such as the “phone tree”, which could be used simply and effectively by, for 
example, mothers based in the home, to contact huge numbers of potential voters.643 All of 
these would be used in their activism against gay rights. 
 
Carter Wins 
Carter won the election with 50.1% of the vote against Ford’s 48.0%. Many attributed his 
victory to his deep religious faith, despite evangelical reservations about him, the Playboy 
interview,644 his framing of homosexuals as equal members of American society, and the fact 
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that he was technically the least qualified candidate.645 Carter had outpolled Ford among 
white Baptists by 56 per cent to 43 per cent. Political scientist John Green calculated that 
Carter had obtained 48% of the evangelical vote, with a slight majority going to his opponent; 
more than usually voted for a Democrat candidate646 (very different to the previous election, 
when Nixon had obtained 80% of the evangelical vote).647  
Evangelicals gave Carter his margin of victory not only in the South (where he also 
was helped by regional pride)648 but also in key northern states like Pennsylvania and Ohio 
with large rural populations that usually voted Republican. Carter owed his election largely to 
the evangelicals (though also, of course, to Blacks, Jews, and other minority groups that 
favoured him by wide margins).649 For example Carter won more than 90% of the black vote, 
which made the difference in several northern industrial states.650 The shift in the voting 
patterns of white Protestants, a group that incorporated the evangelical right, was noteworthy; 
a 14 point gain on the numbers who had voted for Democrat McGovern in the 1972 
elections.651 Michael Dukakis told the author that “the fact that Jimmy Carter was a 
southerner played a hugely important role. A lot of us thought that his roots were a big plus 
for him, and I don’t think there is any question that they played a big role in his victory even 
though he only won barely.”652 
Ultimately, Carter prevailed by persuading very diverse demographics to vote for 
him, obtaining votes in the South and industrial areas of the Northeast, among trade union 
members, ethnic minorities, and liberals.653 Black voters in the South were also a decisive 
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element,654 having observed that Carter was the only candidate who looked comfortable 
worshipping in a Black church, while many Black evangelicals found that Carter’s Baptist 
faith resonated with theirs.655 The Democratic Party as a whole had been condemned by the 
highest-ranking Catholic prelate in America and many individual Catholics did not vote for 
him,656 although he did obtain 57% of the Catholic vote.657 Gay voters generally voted for 
Carter, along with other liberals. In general, large numbers of registered Democrats had voted 
for Carter, whereas many had voted for the Republican candidate in the previous election.658  
Many Conservative Christians welcomed Carter’s election, even though most of them 
felt that he was more liberal than they were,659 and there was a general understanding of how 
much he owed to their vote. America’s Catholics remained anxious about Carter because of 
his stance on abortion.660 When Carter took his oath as the new President, he used two Bibles; 
one that had been used by Washington, and one that had been a gift from his mother. They 
were open at a verse stressing the importance of humility, and Carter referenced America as a 
country that defined itself both in terms of spirituality and human liberty.661  
While Carter certainly did not directly reference homosexuality in any way, it was 
already clear from his campaign behaviour and from what he publicly said that he considered 
gays as having equal rights to liberty. In his deeply religious inaugural speech, Carter 
introduced the concept of human rights as a pathway to redemption and proposed that an 
adherence to policies that promoted human rights offered an opportunity for America to 
renew itself; essentially to be “born again” as he had been, through his faith.662 
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After the election, both gay and evangelical right voters were hopeful about what 
Carter would do for them. Falwell said, “… he will have my respect and support. I will pray 
for him daily. But I will oppose him when he violates moral codes which in my opinion are in 
opposition to Scripture.”663 Evangelical activist Bill Bright wrote to Carter shortly after his 
election expressing his delight and stating, “I believe that God has raised you up for this 
dramatic moment in history to help give spiritual leadership in this world in crisis.”664  
Other evangelicals who were close to Carter and had helped him during his campaign, 
such as Phil Strickland, who was also Carter’s religious expert during the campaign, and 
Reverend Robert Maddox, also intimated to Carter that they expected him to retain contact 
with the evangelical voters who had entrusted him with so much.665 Gay rights groups, 
similarly, were hopeful that Carter would make significant legal changes to improve their 
situation. Louie Crew told the author that “Carter seemed to be sincere when he talked about 
human rights, so we were hopeful that he would be able to set aside his personal religious 
views, and make a positive difference for us.”666  
According to Costanza, Carter was able to appeal at the time to both evangelicals and 
homosexuals “because the issue of Gay Rights never rose to the level of acknowledgment as 
it does today in campaigns. It didn’t rise to the level of priority or importance as it does today 
[2010]. And how is that measured? By the number of people who send letters and who 
become the proponents or opponents of a particular way of thinking. And at the time, they did 
not have enough people marching in the streets, that made them important to an elected 
official. I mean, go figure.”667  
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Carter jeopardised his election and the support of his closest and biggest allies, the 
evangelicals, by courting the gay voters. As Costanza said, at the time, the gay voters formed 
a very small part of the electoral pool, while the evangelicals and the conservative Christians 
represented the biggest. Therefore, Carter had much more to lose by courting the gay voters 
at the expense of the evangelicals. Carter must have been either very ill advised for courting 
the gay vote, especially in such an open and public way (advertising in gay publications, 
hiring O’Leary and Costanza to his team, sending his son Chip to campaing for him in public 
gay celebrations in San Francisco etc.), or he really had an interest in advancing gay rights as 
parts of his human rights policies.  
It may well be argued that Carter sailed close to the wind by doing all the above as 
they could have very easily cost him the election by losing the support of the conservative 
Christians and the evangelicals. It seems that Carter, apart from the obvious fact that he 
wanted their vote, really had concerns about the issue and was willing to help and advance 
gay rights. In support of this argument, as it will be demonstrated in the forthcoming 
chapters, immediately after moving into White House, Carter began taking steps to improve 
the lives of homosexual Americans and proved that his promises were not just words.  
 
Carter’s Contribution to Gay Rights During the Election Campaign 
The 1976 elections represented a pivotal moment for the gay rights movement. During his 
campaign, Carter recognised and engaged with the gay rights community as a legitimate 
social movement, and as a legitimate interest group (as the NGTF). Carter’s asking gay voters 
for their support, his advertising in gay publications, his public support for gay rights, and the 
presence of prominent gay rights activists and open lesbians in his campaign team, all clearly 
played important roles in legitimising both the gay rights movement and homosexuality itself 





actual changes made to legislation at this time (all of which will be discussed) were a 
watershed moment for the movement as it shifted from a niche position, on the fringes of 
society, to centre stage. While many still opposed gay rights, at least the topic had become 
part of the national conversation.  
Donald Hallman said in a personal interview about Carter’s openness to the gay 
community in the 1976 elections, “suddenly, we realised our voice could be heard and we 
could gain access to the political system of our own country. For us, this was massive.”668 
Eddie Sandifer told the author that Carter: “… definitely offered legitimacy to our movement. 
In the 1950s and maybe even in the 1960s it would have been unheard for a President 
nominee to speak publicly like this about homosexuals or to seek our vote. Carter was not 
afraid to talk publicly about homosexuals and he brought the subject to the American 
media.”669 Also in a personal interview, Jeffrey Montgomery stated that “the 1976 elections 
were very important for our movement and for all homosexuals in the USA and this was 
because of Carter’s approach towards us. I was very young at the time and not much involved 
with the movement, but I think during the [1976] elections Americans realized that we are 
people and we have rights like any one of them. I remember President Carter talking 
positively about us in the media and this was a very positive step for us, being recognized as 
equal members of society.”670 
 
CONCLUSION 
Carter’s actions in the 1976 elections undoubtedly granted the gay rights movement 
legitimacy in the eyes of the American public – an important symbolic good in itself, and a 
major resource for activists. In the context of the fierce battle the gay rights movement fought 
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with the evangelical right, this legitimacy signalled to activists and their supporters that it was 
time to take action. America as a whole underwent an (often painful) cultural shift, in which 
matters of homosexuality and gay rights ceased to be the sole affair of a fringe element in 
society, and became an integral element of liberal politics. The term “cultural framing” is 
used to describe the ways in which individuals and societies make sense of their world. Prior 
to the emergence of the modern gay rights movement, which in the US came of age during 
the Carter presidency, the general view was that gay rights were not a matter for most people 
to consider, and that homosexuality was shameful (or, at best, tragic).  
Carter also endeavoured to reach out to the evangelicals, a more obvious constituency 
for him than the gay rights movement. Despite his relatively liberal position on various social 
issues, many evangelicals saw him as “one of them” and supported him for this reason, even 
though some prominent evangelicals publicly criticised his positions and did not vote for him. 
Still, evangelical support was significant in his win. 
The 1976 election was important for Carter, and also for both the gay rights 
movement and the evangelical right. For each, this was the first time that they made their 
appearance as major social movements that played an important role in the elections. It was 
the first time that both the gay rights and the evangelical right movements mobilised as 
coherent political forces to support a candidate most likely to represent their interests in 
office. The mutual exclusivity of these interests, and Carter’s attempts to represent both, 
would be one of the major tensions that he would face as President. Throughout Carter’s 
term, the two movements grew progressively stronger. They both continued to do so after his 
term in office, and they both continue to play a major role in American politics even today. 
For the gay rights movement in particular, this was the first time it mobilised behind a 
presidential nominee. In this context, the gay rights movement was inspired by the structural 





badly treated in America for years, and as they coalesced as a political force, they had had 
enough. Increasingly, as per the vision propounded by Resource Mobilisation theorists, they 
were simply responding rationally and in a political way to the situation in which they found 
themselves, in which few resources (both material and symbolic) were allocated to them. 
Their goal was, simply, the removal of the formal structures of inequality that impacted 
negatively on them in a range of ways.  
Although the evangelical movement in the 1976 elections was polarised for its 
support of its favourite candidate, as we will see, it soon underwent a transformation, 
emerging as a countermovement. This was largely in response to the advances won by gay 
rights activists, and the increasing visibility and influence of the gay rights movement in 
American politics. The 1976 Presidential election was the place where these two completely 
opposed movements started their political adventure and a mutual struggle that remains very 
lively today. For the first and last time, a Presidential candidate could count on considerable 
(if not complete) support from two opposing social movements. After the election, writers 
and commentators were quick to attempt to interpret what everyone agreed was an important 
point in history.671 
The gay rights movement’s newfound legitimacy was a tangible resource that gave 
them greater clout in the political arena, from the local level all the way to the White House. 
While a whole generation would pass before the gay rights movement was considered 
“acceptable” by a wide section of American society, this was an important first step. In terms 
of its contribution to a major cultural shift in American society, it communicated to the wider 
American public that there was nothing wrong with being homosexual, or with discussing 
homosexuality and the broader issue of gay rights. Topics that had once been seen as 
shameful or embarrassing were now integrated into mainstream public discourse.  
                                                          





All in all, Carter legitimised the gay rights movement and gave a clear message to the 
public that he was ready to listen to and to work with it. It was perfectly evident that it was 
Carter’s view that gays were as much a part of American society as anyone else, and that they 
had every right to be listened to. While gay rights activists had been campaigning for their 
rights for years, this was the first time that a Presidential candidate had broached the issue 
with such openness, and the first time that gay rights activists could think with justification 







GAY RIGHTS ACTIVISTS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 
 
INTRODUCTION  
This chapter examines two main issues of Carter’s efforts with regards to gay rights. First, it 
examines an aspect of Carter’s contribution to gay rights that has not been examined before. 
This is the appointment of several openly homosexual individuals to his administration and to 
public positions. Secondly, this chapter also examines the breakthrough meeting in the White 
House with gay rights activists, the first encounter of its kind in American history. The 
meeting is the best-known fact concerning Carter and gay rights and it has been discussed by 
scholars and academics. However, although the meeting itself and its background have been 
examined, what is lacking is a scholarly and detailed account of how the meeting affected the 
gay rights movement and its impact in changing public and governmental discourse regarding 
gay rights in the USA. This chapter offers a detailed and thorough examination of these 
unexplored aspects of the meeting, based on archival records and interviews with several 
prominent gay rights workers who were active at the time. Therefore, it adds a substantial and 
important amount of new and different information to what is already known.  
 
HOMOSEXUALS IN CARTER’S ADMINISTRATION 
A bold and important contribution by Carter to gay rights was his appointment of several 
openly homosexual persons to his administration and to Federal agencies, the first time any 
American president had taken such a step.672 This was in line with “his policy of appointing 
qualified individuals without discrimination based on race, colour, sex, religion, national 
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origin or sexual orientation,” to which he remained committed  until the end of his 
presidency,673  although it had a negative effect on his relationship with conservative and 
evangelical Christians. The first and most important of such appointees was Jean O’Leary, a 
co-director of the NGTF and leading gay rights activist. Carter appointed her to three 
different positions: to his 51.3% Committee during his presidential campaign in 1976, to his 
election team in 1976, and most importantly as a member of the President’s National 
Women’s Advisory Committee in 1977. She was the first openly homosexual person ever to 
be appointed to a public position by a president of the United States.674  
On Costanza’s recommendation, Carter also appointed to the Women’s Advisory 
Committee, another acknowledged lesbian, Ruth Abram, co-executive director of the 
Women's Action Alliance and a board member of NGTF. As we will see in Chapter Six, 
O’Leary and Abram would be instrumental in the inclusion and acceptance of a sexual 
preference plank at the Women’s Conference in Houston in 1977.675  
Another important appointment was that of Jill Schropp in July 1979 to the newly 
reorganized President’s National Advisory Committee on Women. Schropp, a private real 
estate investor, was campaign manager of Citizens to Retain Fair Employment, a group 
which successfully fought off repeal of Seattle’s gay rights law in 1978.676 The NGTF 
applauded her appointment and said, “We consider it a most positive sign that President 
Carter has again appointed a member of America's lesbian community to his Advisory 
Committee on Women, and we are particularly pleased that Jill Schropp was his chosen 
appointee.”677 
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In addition, shortly before the presidential elections of 1980, and though already 
under serious pressure from right-wing evangelicals over his moves for gay rights, Carter 
appointed Virginia Apuzzo, a lesbian community activist, to his party's platform committee 
for the Democratic Convention of 1980. She would go on to co-author the first gay rights 
plank at a convention of either of the two major U.S. parties.678 
According to gay activists, as well as people close to Carter who spoke to this study, 
Carter’s administration was a comfortable and welcoming workplace for gay employees. 
Peter Bourne told the author that “there were several gay and bisexual staff members at a 
high level in the White House, and Carter was both aware and accepting. He had four 
children in their teenage years or twenties who were quite aligned with the gay rights 
movement and I think Carter himself shared their views. Compared to his two predecessors 
and his two followers, he was much more open personally than they were.”679 Eric Marcus, 
author and gay rights activist, told the author that during Carter’s presidency he had been in a 
relationship with a (male) aide. “I don’t know if Carter knew he was gay,” Marcus said, “But 
my boyfriend found it a very comfortable place to work, and wasn’t fearful of anyone finding 
out that he was gay.”680  
Nancy Higgins made a similar comment to the author about a friend: “I had met 
someone who was working at the White House. She did not have many dealings with him 
(Carter), but she spoke very highly of him. She thought he was a very sweet man. I don’t 
know if he knew that she was lesbian, but all her colleagues knew and she was very open 
about it. She would take part in a demonstration outside the White House and then would just 
go back in, wearing the same clothes, not being bothered at all. She said there were several 
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gays and lesbians in the White House and most people were comfortable with it; Carter 
certainly was.”681 
In addition to men and women employees who were openly gay, Professor Doreen 
Mattingly told the author that there were also some closeted gay man and women in the 
Carter administration. She said these people “helped to keep things going (for gay rights) 
behind the scenes. I think there was probably a lot more at play behind the scenes that made 
the administration accomplish what it did.”682 The impact of all these appointments will be 
seen in the following chapters. 
 
Margaret (Midge) Costanza – Gay Rights Activists’ Ally in the White House 
While Carter and his administration got settled into office, Phil Strickland (mentioned in 
Chapter Three), suggested that the new director of the White House’s Office of Public 
Liaison (OPL) should be someone “religious enough to understand religious mind-sets and 
political enough to understand issues.”683 To the disappointment of Strickland and the 
evangelicals,684 Carter instead chose to appoint Midge Costanza,685 an ardent feminist and 
known by those close to her to be a lesbian, as director of OPL.686 
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Carter and Costanza had become close during his presidential campaign, when he had 
appointed her to work as his assistant for public liaison. She called him “Jimmy” and was 
given the office next to his; a decision of considerable symbolic importance. Costanza shared 
with Carter a deep commitment to human rights and to ideals of social justice. She was often 
quoted as saying: “When anybody’s rights are threatened, no one’s rights are secure.”687 As 
President, Carter told her that he wanted her “to be the window to the nation”688 and he 
appeared to hope that she would mastermind changes in difficult areas, such as securing 
progress on gay rights, without upsetting evangelicals, while at the same time deflecting 
attention from his own role.689  
As officer for Public Liaison, communicating with religious bodies was part of 
Costanza’s remit, and religious leaders were not happy about this. Strickland, although he 
never came to work at the White House, did become involved in some aspects of liaising with 
religious bodies. It was an awkward arrangement that did not please anybody and seems to 
have resulted from the fact that Carter and his team felt that he was already in good standing 
with evangelicals, and that there was no need to devote a lot of special attention to them.690 
Carter hoped that the OPL would show that the White House was open to everyone, 
and that his government would be both honest and responsive to the public. A White House 
directive explained that: “… the OPL in the past served as a political arm of the President 
working closely with the Republican National Committee and - in the case of the Nixon years 
- with the Committee to Re-elect the President. In keeping with the President’s directives and 
Costanza’s personal approach to the office, the work of the Office of Public Liaison should 
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become... less partisan.”691 In other words, the OPL was not intended to push Carter’s 
policies or agenda, but to serve as a way in which ordinary Americans, represented by 
interest groups and other bodies, could gain access to the White House and have their 
concerns heard and communicated to the relevant authorities.692  
However, Costanza, with her long history of liberal activism and outreach, was 
viewed as an alienating choice by some groups, notably fundamentalists and evangelicals, 
because she seemed to support groups such as feminists and homosexuals, whom they 
deplored.693 On the other hand, her appointment delighted gay rights activists. The NGTF 
hailed it as “very gratifying and reassuring to us.”694  
Louie Crew told the author that Costanza’s appointment “was a strong indication of 
Carter’s intention to attend to gay rights.”695 In a personal interview, Jeffrey Montgomery 
said that “not everyone, and probably not even all the gay rights people themselves, 
recognised immediately what a big deal Midge’s appointment was. You’ve got to realise that 
this was someone who had a long history of feminism, someone who had often spoken out in 
favour of gay rights. And there she was, a friend of the President, on first name terms with 
him, with a big job in the White House. She gave us reason to hope that things were finally 
going to get better for us.”696  
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GAY RIGHTS ACTIVISTS AT THE WHITE HOUSE 
Background 
Early in his presidency, Carter met with guarded approval from gay rights groups who hoped 
that he would act on the supportive words he had spoken during the campaign, and that he 
would not forget their role in helping him to get elected. As soon as Carter was elected, the 
NGTF wrote to Governor Milton Sharp of Pennsylvania, who had made pioneering efforts to 
improve legislation with respect to homosexual rights, asking him to communicate directly 
with Carter “outlining the action you have taken via executive order, and the positive effects 
of that action, and suggesting to him that similar action might be taken by his administration 
with similar results on a national scale.”697 As publicity mounted around their cause and the 
increasingly polarised stand-off around issues of gay rights, the NGTF requested a meeting 
with members of the White House staff.698  
Costanza and her assistant, Marilyn Haft, Associate Director of the Office of Public 
Liaison, who had served in the board of the Gay Rights National Lobby, began working 
towards organising such a meeting with the NGTF in the White House. On February 8, 1977, 
Costanza held informal and unofficial talks at the White House with Bruce Voller and Jean 
O’Leary, co-directors of the NGTF. They were asked by Costanza to make “a full, formal 
presentation of the needs of gays in the federal area to her and her staff on Saturday, March 
26, at the White House.” Subsequently, the NGTF characterised that encounter in a press 
release as “very successful and promising,” while it described the forthcoming official 
meeting as “the biggest opportunity in our movement’s history.”699 It would address issues of 
discrimination in areas including housing, the military, jails and employment. 
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Costanza and Haft and the NGTF immediately began making their respective 
preparations for the meeting, which was clearly going to attract huge attention from the 
media. For her efforts, Costanza was hailed by the NGTF as a “friend in the White House.”700 
Haft701 recalled in a personal interview that there was no pressure from gay rights activists to 
organise such a meeting so early in Carter’s presidency, and that “the meeting was strictly my 
and Midge’s idea - me because I had done all the litigation for gay rights and the ACLU [the 
American Civil Liberties Union] and Midge because she was gay.”702  
Lisa Keen, a Blade journalist at the time, told the author that “Costanza later said 
Carter may have felt some concern about her meeting with the group when he told her he was 
afraid her time was ‘being spread too thin’ and that she should ‘concentrate in the areas of 
domestic human rights and women’s issues.’ He did not explicitly tell her to avoid LGBT 
issues, but she said there was ‘all this controversy swirling’ around her because of the 
meeting, so that’s how she interpreted his remark.”703 
Naturally, evangelicals and other conservative Christians were not pleased. However, 
Costanza appears to have been unmoved by the pressure being brought to bear from that 
quarter. She wrote warmly to the NGTF shortly before the meeting, confirming the issues to 
be discussed and stating: “I… wish to explore more fully the role my office and I can play; 
specifically in facilitating meetings with those persons who will be most helping for you in 
the areas we have reviewed.”704 
Excitement was very high in the NGTF prior to the meeting and officials ensured 
there was a precise gender balance within its ten-person delegation to the White House – five 
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lesbians and five gay men.705 They had a slot of more than an hour and a half, which would 
be filled with fourteen short presentations and a little time to field questions and debate. 
O’Leary and Voeller stressed to participants that they should focus on discrimination and be 
prepared to back up their evidence with facts and figures The NGTF had resolved to 
contribute to the meeting in a spirit of non-confrontation.706   
Members of the NGTF attended the meetings dressed in formal business suits, 
implying that they were no different from other ordinary American citizens. They wanted to 
demonstrate that they were respectable business people and some with academic backgrounds 
who had every right to be listened to and treated with consideration. The approach taken by 
NGTF was described by Lucia Valeska, their executive director, as an action representing “a 
certain amount of moderation, compromise and mellowing of goals that automatically takes 
place when you are in that arena. You dress like them, think like them, you sound 
reasonable... You give them the impression that they can’t possibly disagree with you.”707 
 
The meeting 
The much-anticipated meeting took place as planned, on Saturday, March 26, 1977. Carter 
was at Camp David at the time and hence could not attend this meeting. Apart from Costanza 
and Haft, Cooki Lutkefedder, civil-rights specialist with the Office of Domestic 
Affairs of the Democratic National Committee,  also attended as an observer.708 
Eventually, instead of ten, fourteen gay rights activists participated.709  
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The meeting lasted ninety minutes and opened with Costanza’s welcoming words: “It 
is a pleasure to meet you. I’m sorry that it has taken so long for you to come into a house that 
belongs to you as much as it does to anyone in this country.”710 Following Costanza’s 
welcome, representatives from the NGTF made a series of representations and demands. The 
main focus of the discussion was on government agencies that the NGTF felt had a 
discrimination policy. These were the Department of Defence, the Department of Health, the 
Department of Education and Welfare, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
the Department of Immigration and Naturalization, the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, the US Commission on Civil Rights, the State Department and the US 
Civil Service Commission.711  
The NGTF requested the White House’s assistance for a series of meetings with these 
agencies.712 Costanza and Haft agreed to organise such meetings and also arranged with the 
NGTF to meet again in September 1977 to discuss the progress from the meetings,713 while 
both parties agreed to keep in touch and hold any additional emergency meeting.714 
The activists also asked Carter to take immediate action on two areas:  
 Order that immigration policy be administered fairly and equitably so that gay 
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women and men who are unknown or of moderate means are admitted to this 
country under the same flexible policy that is currently applied to rich or 
famous gay visitors.  
 Immediately upgrade the less-than-honourable discharge of an estimated 
75,000 persons discharged from the Armed Services for homosexuality since 
World War II, so these persons  may not be deprived of jobs, unemployment 
compensation and veterans’ benefits.715 
The agenda issued by the NGTF to participants at the meeting shows that their 
earnest, heart-felt presentations were the result of a great deal of hard work and planning, and 
that they were carefully designed to focus on verifiable flaws in the way in which US laws 
were administered while also tugging at the heartstrings. For example, NGTF focused on the 
fact that some of the many Americans given dishonourable discharges from the army had also 
been in receipt of medals for extreme bravery.716 As will be explained in the next 
chapter, Carter and his administration would immediately and successfully act on 
both issues on which the NGTF required immediate action, while they would also 
organize the meetings with the Federal agencies and address any other issue raised 
in the White House meeting. 
 
Aftermath  
A few days after the meeting, Costanza sent Carter a memo about the details of what was 
discussed.717 According to Costanza, Carter did not respond to any kind of explicit way to the 
meeting. She said that there was “no special reaction … he didn’t say gee, that was awful, 
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why did you do it. Or gee, that was great, I'm glad you did it.”718 Professor Mattingly told the 
author that Carter never complained to Costanza about the meeting or anything else 
generally.719  
Immediately after the meeting, Costanza told CBS Television, “I just wish that the 
citizens of this nation could have joined me in that room to listen to the examples of 
oppression I heard today. Perhaps the issue of homosexuality would be better understood and 
perhaps more widely accepted in this country if they could have heard what I did.” Robert 
Malsom, told NGTF representatives that they had made a “brilliant and very moving” 
presentation. Lutkefedder, who had attended many such White House sessions, found this to 
be “the most professional job I’ve seen.”720 
Professor Bunch remembered in a personal interview that “it was an amazing 
meeting, I mean absolutely the, the excitement, the expectation, the sense that we were 
making history as the first openly gay meeting in the White House with… a representative of 
the President, was very exciting and there was a sense that Midge really did have an inroad, 
she was personal friends with the President and that we really had someone whose voice 
would be heard. [After the meeting] Oh, we felt great. Yeah, I felt great, I think most of us 
felt good. I think we didn’t know what would come of it, I don’t think that we were promised 
anything except an open door but that was the first open door, so at least my memory of it 
was feeling very happy that we had gotten that far. It was a huge symbolic moment and I 
think those moments are really important [even if] they're not always so concrete in terms of 
“this then happened.”721 
                                                          
718 Midge Costanza interviews to Dudley Clendinen, 1994-1995. Midge Costanza Archives. MCI. 
719 Professor Doreen Mattingly in a personal interview, 3 March 2017. 
720  News from the NGTF, 31 March 1977, “NGTF-Federal Agency Meetings Set Second White House 
Conference in September.” NGTF records, Box 36, Folder 11. CU. 





The following day, The Washington Post reported members of the NGTF as saying 
that it represented “a happy milestone on the way to full equality for gay men and women,” 
and Elaine Noble, gay rights activist and state representative from Massachusetts, as saying 
that she was “surprised the Carter administration made as many commitments as it did, to 
open doors for us,” comparing the situation favourably to that during the Kennedy 
administration, when all of their requests for a meeting had been ignored.722  
Costanza spoke movingly about the testimony she had heard about discrimination, 
and affirmed that the Carter administration viewed the situation facing homosexuals as an 
important human rights issue.723 The NGTF’s great hope had been to find a friend in the 
White House in President Carter. They had certainly found a friend in Costanza. In a 
newspaper interview, shortly after the meeting, Costanza pointed out that, while she did not 
agree with everything Carter had said about homosexuals, he had the most positive track 
record of any American President to date, especially in saying that he did not see 
homosexuality as a threat. She stressed his proven record in the area of human rights, and the 
fact that he had not capitulated to the demands of anti-gay rights activists. Of the direct 
impact of the meeting on the homosexual community in America and its relationship with the 
White House, Costanza said: “At the outset you have to admit that simply the symbolic 
gesture of holding the meeting has brought about a great deal of activity. There has been a 
rising of consciousness and new organization in the gay community. Gays had not been 
welcome or invited ever before to the White House. Concretely? There are meetings being 
held with the Justice Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development and other agencies. Gays are getting this 
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and that’s concrete. There is a commitment from me and from these agencies to continue the 
dialogue with the gay community.”724 
At a NGTF press conference only a few hours after the meeting, O’Leary stated that 
this was “the first time in the history of this country that a President has seen fit to 
acknowledge the rights and needs of some 20 million Americans. This meeting was a happy 
milestone on the road to full equality under law for gay women and men, and we are highly 
optimistic that it will soon lead to complete fulfilment of President Carter’s pledge to end all 
forms of Federal discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.”725  
A press release that followed declared this as a triumphant note, announcing that a 
follow-up meeting would be held in September 1977; that Costanza would recommend a 
meeting with Carter himself; that various crucial issues had been discussed, including those 
involving prisons, immigration and naturalisation, and announcing future meetings between 
the NGTF and a range of government officials to discuss their concerns. The press release 
also stated: “Ms. Costanza also promised to relay several special requests to the President, 
who was asked to “champion the cause” of human rights for gay Americans the way he has 
done for oppressed minorities around the world.”726 
The newsletter also contained a series of self-congratulatory remarks about how well 
the presentation had gone, and how moved and impressed attendees had been. Overall, the 
NGTF had many very good reasons to feel optimistic.727 Brydon said about it, “In political 
terms, the White House project is the most important NGTF undertaking in terms of practical 
results benefitting lesbians and gay men.”728 
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Less than a month later, The Advocate, the national newspaper of the gay rights 
movement, provided a lengthy and positive review of the meeting under the title “Concrete 
Results Soon?” O’Leary was quoted as saying: “In the next two or three years we will see 
federal agencies one by one reverse their policies, once they see that it is not just us, but 20 
million people supporting us. [Gay people can expect] a couple of victories and a lot of 
attitude change because of the publicity.”729 Recalling the meeting from the distance of 1993, 
O’Leary said: “I think this meeting meant a lot to the whole community. It meant that we had 
been recognised by the highest institutional establishment in our country. And for gay people 
who were looking for signs, for symbols, for recognition, for anything along those lines that 
would make their lives valid, it was a wonderful breakthrough.”730 
 
C.I.A. homosexual employers 
An illustration of the immediate effect of the White House meeting is the issue of 
homosexual employers of the C.I.A., an issue that has never been examined before. At the 
end of Carter’s staff meeting that followed immediately after Costanza’s and Haft’s meeting 
with the gay rights activists, Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of the C.I.A., asked 
Costanza whether Carter had approved the meeting. Costanza replied, “No, but he didn’t 
disapprove either, what’s the problem?” Turner replied that he had “discovered some gays in 
the CIA” and that he had to “dispose of them,” so he needed to know “what is the policy on 
gays from the Oval Office.” Costanza then said “Listen, I’m going to tell you right now that 
Jimmy Carter has stated over and over again, that he does not support discrimination against 
anybody. Now, I want to call and find out who you’re talking about here.” Turner replied that 
this was a policy he had “nothing to do with” and that he wanted “to do this in an acceptable 
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way to the White House” and suggested offering them (“gays in the CIA”) “a chance to 
resign” or he would have “to put something in their files.” Costanza was aware of the 
situation with the gay CIA agents as some of them had written to her and to the NGTF trying 
to find out what they should do, while she had also spoken to one of them. Costanza feared 
that putting something in the agents’ file could jeopardise their futures and felt that 
resignation was the best way out. She considered an offer to resign was “better than anyone 
else had ever done” in such a situation.731  
This study is not in a position to know what happened to these agents. We should 
remember, however, that Carter opposed anti-homosexual discrimination in any federal 
sector apart from the security services, including the CIA, where he felt homosexuals were 
vulnerable to blackmail. Carter’s Civil Service Reform Act protected 95% of the 
homosexuals in the federal sector, apart from the security services. However by 1980, 
conditions for homosexuals in the security services would improve significantly. 
 
Reaction to the White House meeting 
The meeting received extensive coverage in the mainstream press. Carter and Costanza 
“received an enormous amount of criticism and abuse.”732 It rallied anti-gay activists, and 
even ordinary, not especially politicised Americans, to express their horror that homosexuals 
had been in the White House, even though Carter and his family were not actually there at the 
time.733 Of course, the meeting could not have gone ahead without Carter’s nod of approval. 
He was known to be a micromanager and, as Eric Marcus told the author “if Carter had not 
wanted Costanza to meet with the NGTF, I am sure that she would not have. Clearly he was 
playing some kind of balancing act.”734  
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The White House received several letters from irate citizens complaining about the 
meeting, such as one woman, identified as “Inquirer Reader” [sic] who wrote in response to 
an article about gay rights in the National Enquirer. She reflected anti-gay rights 
campaigners’ assertion that homosexuality was a moral and not a political matter, and that 
therefore people campaigning for homosexual rights should not attend meetings in the White 
House. The Enquirer had also included a poll, in which readers could vote as to whether or 
not they approved of the NGTF attending a meeting at the White House. 79.9% of the 
respondents (the Enquirer’s readership was typically very conservative) reportedly believed 
that White House staff should not have met members of the NGTF to discuss their 
concerns.735 Responding to “Inquirer Reader” Costanza wrote, “This presidency… belongs to 
all people. We cannot allow one or two people in this nation to decide who participates with 
their government and who doesn’t.” In an intensely personal response, Costanza went on to 
say, “The issue is not whether you accept homosexuality or not. The issue is whether any 
citizen of this nation should be discriminated against and harassed.”736 Costanza’s tone was 
curt, but her message was consistent with Carter’s; while not wishing to offend evangelicals, 
throughout his campaign he had insisted that human rights were for everybody. 
In a series of communications to the White House, the Christian Anti-Defamation 
League denounced the administration’s admission of the NGTF for talks, and demanded the 
right to a meeting to discuss various matters, including ways in which homosexuals could be 
identified and, assuming that homosexuality was often an illness, effectively treated.737 
Catholic Americans had already expressed their horror before the meeting. The front page of 
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the National Catholic Register proclaimed that “One of President Carter’s top assistants will 
meet with ten members of a sexual deviate organisation…” and quoted one Gary Potter, 
executive director of Catholics for Christian Political Action, as saying: “Catholics and other 
Christians, especially family people, should write letters to the President and send copies to 
their senators and representatives expressing their strong belief that as taxpayers they are 
opposed to the public employment of anyone who acknowledges himself or herself as a 
practicing homosexual. Potter also stated his opposition to any actions that would confer 
“respectability or social acceptance on the practice of homosexuality.”738 
Also criticising the meeting was a group of clergy from New York, who accused 
Carter of ignoring the Bible’s teachings and of “lending respectability to the breakdown of 
moral values.”739 A conservative newsletter, The Voice of Florida, described the meeting as 
“a delegation of sodomites who wanted to talk about their rights,” and stated that it “certainly 
has raised very strong doubts whether President Carter is really a born-again Southern Baptist 
as he claims.”740 Other conservative voices also railed against homosexuality and its 
supposed pernicious impact on society. Podhoretz, editor of the conservative magazine 
Commentary, wrote of “the male self-hatred pervading the gay rights campaign” and 
described homosexuality as a “plague” attacking “the vital organs of the entire species, 
preventing men from fathering children and women from mothering them.” He also attributed 
pacifism in both England and America (which he clearly considered a bad thing) to the 
influence of homosexuals in public life.741 
Evangelicals were also utterly unhappy with Carter and the meeting and despite the 
fact that he did not attend it, it was a turning point in his relationship with them. Several 
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prominent leaders denounced Carter for allowing it to happen. For example, Anita Bryant 
said: “Behind the high sounding appeal against discrimination in jobs and housing – which is 
not a problem to the closet homosexual – they are really asking to be blessed in their 
abnormal lifestyle by the office of the President of the United States.”742 Several prominent 
evangelicals also wrote to Carter expressing their clear disappointment with him for allowing 
such a meeting to take place. For example, James Blackwood, of the Blackwood Brothers, an 
American southern gospel quartet and pioneers of the Christian music, wrote “… I want to 
object to the action of Midge Costanza, a member of your staff, in meeting with a group of 
homosexuals in the White House and her public stand against Anita Bryant in the Miami, 
Florida homosexual issue… I submit that we are fast becoming another Sodom and 
Gomorrah unless we take a stand and cause a turnaround in the moral and spiritual conduct of 
our nation.”743 
Costanza also received her share of several critical and often very aggressive letters. 
For example, one by G.P. Schwartzkopf who wrote, “In an administration noted for its 
obnoxious pestle [sic] (on top of being the most incompetent in American history) you 
certainly rank at the top… Trying to get across the message that queers are just like other 
people is simple and pure nonsense as well as being so incredibly stupid as to boggle the 
mind. Also please tell me exactly what “human rights” are being denied to queers? Your 
major contribution to our country is to maintain a low profile, keep your mouth shut on issues 
you know nothing about and prepare for leaving Washington no later than the 1980 
elections.”744 
Within the White House, not everyone was impressed with Costanza’s firm approach 
to gay rights and other social issues. One of them was Hamilton Jordan who asked her 
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immediately after the meeting “did the queers leave?”745 He later criticised Costanza in a 
memo to Carter labelling her as “a conduit to outside groups and organizations, the 
perception here is that she listens to persons espousing liberal positions and causes and not to 
others.”746 Eight months after the meeting, Newsweek reported that “one of the President’s 
men,” described her as “an embarrassment” and that “Everyone wishes she would 
disappear.”747  
For many, the issue of gay rights seems to have been considered trivial; for others, 
homosexuality was simply wrong. All of the staff must have been aware of the threat that 
attention to gay rights posed to Carter’s relationship with the evangelical right. Carter may 
have underestimated what a milestone the meeting in the White House would be, both for gay 
rights activists involved and for their opponents. While he was unwavering in his 
commitment to human rights, including gay rights to a large extent, he also felt that 
homosexuals’ concerns were not a central issue, but a subset of human rights. In a difficult 
economic climate, he may have resented being distracted by it. Of Costanza and her fervent 
attachment to the cause, he wrote in his diary: “I’ve been concerned by her involvement in 
the abortion and gay rights business, but she takes a tremendous burden off me by seeing 
groups that would insist on seeing me if they couldn’t see her.”748 
On the other hand, not all gay rights activists were happy with either the NGTF’s 
efforts or Carter’s response, as they seemed to want more actions and faster. Gary van 
Ooteghem, a prominent gay rights activist and former NGTF board member, sent an angry 
letter to Haft in 1977, “You and Costanza, both should also realize that many of us out here 
are witnessing the erosion of our own access to the president” because of the “preferential 
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treatment” given to co-directors of the NGTF Voeller and O’Leary. “It is absolutely mad to 
believe that only those two can and will represent all of us.”749 
 
MORE MEETINGS WITH THE NGTF 
Costanza and Haft obliged and arranged for the NGTF to meet with all the agencies that the 
organization requested. For example, in September 1977 the NGTF met with representatives 
from the Public Health Service (PHS)750 and a few months later with Norman Carlson, 
Director of the Bureau of Prisons.751 As requested and agreed, Costanza and Haft also met 
again with the NGTF in a series of meetings at the end of April 1977,752 and another one held 
by the NGTF and the Commission for Civil Rights in October 1977.753  
As we will see in the next chapter, Costanza and Haft would arrange several other 
meetings between the NGTF and Governmental Agencies. Haft told the author that there was 
“no pressure from any groups or individuals” to have such meetings and that “this was done 
solely because Midge and I thought it was a good thing to do, me for professional reasons and 
Midge for personal reasons.”754 
That there was support for these meetings from at least some members of Congress is 
evident in a letter sent to Costanza by Congressman Paul McCloskey, expressing his 
admiration for President Carter’s “courageous political initiative” 755 and similar missives 
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from Charles Rangel, 756 Henry Waxman, 757 John Burton, 758 and Edward Koch.759 The 
breakthrough meeting also garnered enthusiastic support from the Alice B. Toklas Memorial 
Club, the first registered Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender club in the US, which had 
been formed in San Francisco two years after the Stonewall riots.760 The Club wrote to Carter 
praising him for taking a stand on the issue of gay rights; something, they said, that no other 
world leader had done.761 The Women’s Action Alliance wrote a warm letter to O’Leary and 
Voeller, reminding them that support for the aims of the NGTF extended far beyond the gay 
community.762 Support for the meeting was also expressed by representatives from the City 
of Madison, Wisconsin.763  
 
Impact of the Meetings between Gay Rights Activists and Carter’s Administration 
Apart from the quest for equal rights and an end to sexual discrimination, the other equally 
important aim of the gay rights activists in the 1970s was for the visibility and legitimacy of 
their movement. They longed for the normality that such an acknowledgment would 
represent. In the following chapters, we will see the lengths gay rights activists went to in 
search of these attributes. The White House meeting and the subsequent contacts extended to 
their movement the visibility and legitimacy they wanted so badly.  
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In the mid-1970s, the NGTF and the gay rights movement generally were modest in 
size and without any notable successes to show for their efforts. Neither the White House nor 
the federal agencies were prepared to dialogue with them and the lack of any substantial 
advance was the main reason for the inactivity of many would-be activists. Eddie Sandifer 
told the author that many gay men were reluctant to organise because they did not want to 
expose themselves, but importantly because they saw no point in it. Their view was, “Why 
bother joining a group that cannot really achieve something?” Sandifer said, “Most of the 
groups at the time were limited to talks among their members and they were more like social 
clubs than interest groups.”764 However, this changed during Carter’s presidency. 
The breakthrough meeting and the subsequent meetings that followed between 
Costanza, Haft and gay rights activists were as much a milestone in the modern gay rights 
movement as the Stonewall Riot. The New York riot had galvanised gay rights activists by 
providing a focus for their anger, but the White House meeting had multiple effects. First, it 
showed homosexuals that President Carter was listening to them, and that their voices could 
make a difference. Equally important, the meeting meant that the gay rights movement and 
the gay community were recognised by the highest authority in the country, thereby offering 
what they had been seeking for so many years, namely respect, visibility and legitimacy. Just 
two days after the meeting, the New York Post confirmed this in an article entitled “From 
Closet to Street to Respect.”765  
Ron Gold, a long-time civil rights activist and a member of the NGTF, said shortly 
after the meeting that it “will have an important psychological effect. It was on television and 
people saw all these pariahs entering the temple.”766 About a year later, Costanza said that the 
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White House meeting “was regarded by those who attended as a major breakthrough for gay 
rights, the long history of abuses finally received recognition in the highest offices of this 
country. The gay movement was finally legitimized.”767  
Carter’s attitude towards gay rights thus played a major, if largely unrecognised, role 
in the expansion of the movement. Many more people joined the gay rights movement as a 
result of seeing that, collectively, they could make a difference – they would be heard, and 
their efforts would result in tangible outcomes. It is essential to remember that, in the mid-
1970s, gays were seen by the majority as outcasts in society, and most were utterly 
marginalised. Carter’s attitude towards gays – very progressive at the time for a mainstream 
politician – showed America that they were legitimate members of society who deserved to 
air their concerns, and who were respected by the highest office in the land. From this point 
on, gay rights activists were increasingly visible across a broad spectrum of society. It 
became more difficult for their detractors to portray them as a fringe group of sexual deviants 
as it became increasingly evident that not only were most just ordinary citizens who were 
unfairly discriminated against on the grounds of sexual identity, but that they could articulate 
their demands for recognition and inclusion clearly, and be listened to by the highest 
authority of all.  
The newfound legitimacy that the meetings lent the gay rights movement can be seen 
as a major resource that activists were able to capitalise upon in the years that followed, along 
with the greatly enhanced diplomatic and negotiating skills that leading activists had 
developed in the process. The NGTF modelled to gay rights activists all over the country the 
sort of behaviours and approaches that had the capacity to grant them access to leaders with 
the power to make dramatic changes in the area of gay rights.  
                                                          





Louie Crew told the author that while he did not go to the meeting himself, he is 
“aware that it raised consciousness. And it also raised consciousness of LGBT people, about 
the possibilities of political action.” Crew also commented that the women of the NGTF, 
“were by and large the most outspoken and the most articulate because they’d learned all 
their politics already through the women’s movement.”768 In a personal interview, Jeffrey 
Montgomery stated: “With Carter we realised that we could make a real difference by getting 
organised, by which I mean going beyond the marches and the protests. At the time, we were 
amazed to be invited to the White House. Something that seemed literally unthinkable was 
actually going to happen! I don’t think that any of us actually expected it to happen when we 
started our struggle. Yes, I would certainly agree that these meetings and Carter’s attitude 
were instrumental in legitimising our movement in the eyes of Americans and helping it to 
grow… I would certainly agree that when President Carter accepted us into the White House, 
he was indicating this respect for us and our movement.”769  
Eddie Sandifer told the author that “it’s hard to explain to younger people what a big 
deal the meeting at the White House was. To people who have grown up with a much great 
degree of acceptance of gays, it probably doesn’t seem like such a big thing. But at the time, 
when most of society thought that we were monsters, or mentally ill, or both, it was huge. 
You have to remember how many gay people were basically disowned by their families in 
those days. And then here was Carter, the president, a sort of father to the whole nation, 
saying essentially, “Ok, maybe I don’t understand the whole thing, but come to the White 
House, and we’ll talk.”770  
Donald Hallman stated in a personal interview that “these meetings and Carter 
certainly played an important role in our movement getting stronger and bigger. It created a 
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lot of promise and expectations. Now, unfortunately, most of those were quickly shattered by 
Reagan. But I think, overall, our movement, or at least those who are aware of what he did, is 
very grateful to President Carter for opening his doors for us and listening to us. It had a 
profound effect on us directly and on American society in general. After that, we were on our 
way to being seen as equals with the same rights that all the other Americans enjoyed and 
took for granted, rather than outcasts.”771  
David Mack Henderson told the author that “up until that meeting, gay rights protests 
were often angry and flamboyant… in retrospect, one can see that it was maybe hard for the 
average American to empathise with or understand the concerns of men and women who 
seemed to portray themselves as radically different from them in every way. At the meeting, 
and in the years that followed, increasingly gay rights activists showed America that they 
were just the same as everyone else in most respects. It really helped to drag gay people out 
of the pariah class and into the mainstream.”772 
What the first White House meeting gave the gay community, apart from legitimacy 
and an aura of respectability, was access to areas of government which led to a number of 
practical gains. Carter helped activists engage directly with federal agencies about issues that 
concerned them. These meetings often resulted in significant advances for the movement, 
none of which would have been possible without the intervention of Carter’s administration. 
The results of these meetings and their outcome will be examined in the next chapter.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Shortly after taking office, Carter gave a top White House job to an ardent feminist and 
outspoken gay rights activist, appointed acknowledged homosexuals to his cabinet and to 
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public positions, and agreed to a ground-breaking meeting in the White House with gay rights 
activists. This was followed by working meetings between members of his administration and 
the NGTF. It was the first time gay rights activists had ever been invited to the White House 
and certainly the first time a dialogue took place with the President of the United States. By 
meeting, speaking and listening to them, Carter officially acknowledged the existence of 
homosexuals and normalised relations between activists and the government. Such a 
scenario, even a year earlier, would have seemed impossible. As we will see in the next 
chapter, the White House meeting led to the facilitation by Carter’s administration of a series 
of meetings between gay rights activists and Federal agencies, which led to several important 
practical gains for homosexual Americans.    
Carter took gays and lesbians out of shadows not only by appointing openly 
homosexual men and women to his cabinet and to federal positions but by meeting with 
activists right there in the White House. This was unprecedented visibility and legitimisation 
for the gay community, making its members equal to their fellow Americans. Costanza 
herself, along with the symbolism implicit in appointing a radical feminist, and a gay rights 
activist, to an important liaison role in the White House, can be seen as an important resource 
to the gay rights movement of the 1970s. Costanza was not just an ally in the White House; 
she was also an indicator of the fact that Carter saw gay rights as a legitimate endeavour, and 
respected gay rights activists. The presence of Costanza, along with other openly homosexual 
aides in the White House, contributed substantially to the legitimacy of the gay rights 
movement in the eyes of a growing number of Americans, helping to establish them as a 
mainstream aspect of the progressive movement in general.  
The fact that a culturally significant official body – namely the presidency – endorses 
and takes the homosexual community seriously for the first time, thereby officially 





legitimisation” is also a resource for gay rights activists, in the sense that organisations get 
access to the White House and to Federal agencies. Therefore, Carter here makes 
simultaneously a contribution to cultural framing and to the creation of organisational 
resources, both extremely important for gay rights activists. 
Resource mobilisation theory gives us a way to understand the profound impact of 
Costanza’s invitation of the NGTF to the White House. First of all, it helps to understand that 
gay rights activists were, by definition, responding to the ways in which the institution of 
government was built in such a way as to discriminate against them and limit their access to 
crucial resources. At the same time, counter movements, notably the evangelical right, were 
agitating to maintain control of, or gain more access to, resources.  
Understanding access to the White House as a crucial resource,773 we can see that 
Carter’s presidency was a time when both groups were galvanised to work towards the goal 
of greater access to him. Only Carter and his senior advisors were in a position to make the 
decisions necessary for change to occur, or to make the decisions necessary to prevent 
changes from taking place, and convincing this elite cohort that a particular movement was 
worthwhile was essential. Both the gay rights movement and the evangelical right were 
extremely conscious of this. For this reason, both movements battled for access to decision 
makers; for the cultural capital that they would gain from being able to demonstrate that the 
elite was on their side, for the social capital implicit in having direct connections to people in 
positions of authority and influence, and for the symbolic capital that they would gain from 
visibly engaging with those people. In the process of gaining this capital, they were also able 
to bolster their support from the general population – essential if a real break-though was to 
take place–, and increase the number of people prepared to get involved in activism. 
                                                          





Importantly, the White House meetings made gay rights activists aware of their power 
and persuaded them that they could bring about policy changes by getting organised since 
now they had people in high places that they could talk to. In this way, they could enter 
mainstream politics as interest groups, and have their voices heard, even engage in dialogue 
with the President and his representatives in the White House. This had a massive effect on 
the growth of the gay rights movement as homosexuals realised that it was worth joining. The 
symbolic and practical importance of these historic events should not be underestimated. As 
Noble, quoted above, pointed out, the gay rights movement was surprised that Carter’s 






CARTER’S RESPONSES TO THE EMERGING GAY RIGHTS AGENDA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to examine Carter’s policies and decisions in regard to gay rights 
and the positive results they achieved for homosexual Americans. Using a wide range of 
archival documents, interviews, contemporary newspaper articles and other sources, the 
chapter explores issues which confronted Carter during his tenure and the decisions he made 
which improved the circumstances of homosexuals at the time. Some of these policies and 
decisions are under-examined, some have been completely ignored and some are entirely 
forgotten. In addition, this chapter also examines in some cases the impact of Carter’s gay 
rights policies, as well as the reaction to these policies by both the evangelical right and the 
gay rights activists.  
The issues, and Carter’s responses, are addressed one by one: 
 
ACCESS TO FEDERAL AGENCIES 
A major problem for the gay community at this time was access to federal agencies. Officials 
largely ignored correspondence and requests for meetings from activists. “It was very 
difficult, no-one was even willing to meet us,” Louie Crew of the NGTF told the author.774 
And Eddie Sandifer of the Mattachine Society, also in a personal interview, said, “Even 
corresponding with them was difficult since most of the times our letters were ignored.”775 
In the breakthrough White House meeting in March 1977, gay rights activists raised 
the issue of homosexuals working in some federal agencies and government departments and 
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their belief that a discrimination policy operated against them. In question were the 
Department of Defence, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Immigration and 
Naturalization, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the US Commission on Civil Rights, the State 
Department and the US Civil Service Commission.776 Knowing that it could not reach these 
areas on its own, the NGTF asked the White House to assist by arranging meetings.777  
 
Carter’s response 
The White House response was swift. On March 28, only two days after the big White House 
meeting, Costanza briefed Carter about the problem of the NGTF’s access to parts of 
government and set out a plan of action, which Carter immediately endorsed. Costanza stated 
that, “In the coming weeks I will arrange meetings with agencies and departments mentioned 
above so that officials involved can directly learn of NGTF positions, and so legitimate 
problems can be addressed and corrected. It is my feeling that this direct kind of 
communication between the government and NGTF will be to the advantage of everyone 
involved.”778 Securing Carter’s consent, Costanza and her deputy Marilyn Haft went to work 
on their plan.779  
After consulting with Jean O’Leary, Haft proposed that the meetings of the NGTF and 
the federal agencies would be three weeks apart and that the first meeting should not take 
place before April 28, 1977, to allow time for preparation.780 The first meeting duly took 
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place on April 28, 1977, a month after the White House meeting, and brought together the 
NGTF and officials from the Justice Department, with Costanza and Haft also attending.781 
There followed meetings between the NGTF and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the Public Health Service, the Department of Defence, 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare, and the Department of State, thus all the agencies the NGTF had wanted to 
meet.782 The outcome of some of these meetings will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Costanza believed these meetings to be a major contribution by the Carter presidency 
towards gay rights. She noted that meetings requested by the gay community had also taken 
place with Norman Carlson, Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons; Leonel J. Castillo, 
Commissioner of the Immigration, and Naturalization Service; and Julius Richmond, the 
Surgeon General.783 The White House continued arranging meetings between the NGTF and 
government departments and agencies until the end of Carter’s presidency. 
Costanza and Haft not only arranged the meetings but attended them, thereby 
demonstrating the importance which the White House attached to issues of concern to 
homosexuals. Government was left in no doubt that Carter cared about the issues discussed. 
The presence of presidential aides at the meetings continued even after Costanza and Haft 
were gone, emphasising the continuing interest of the administration in gay issues.  
Shortly before the 1980 elections, Carter’s Presidential Committee highlighted the 
meetings as a significant accomplishment of his presidency, saying in a letter to the NGTF, 
“For too long, the doors of the federal government were closed to too many Americans. 
Jimmy Carter has opened those doors and he intends to see that they remain open … in the 
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area of public policy decisions, gay concerns now have an equal opportunity to be heard and 
have been made part of the public process, with demonstrable results.”784 
In addition to arranging and attending the departmental/agency meetings, archival 
records show that Costanza and Haft worked for the advancement of gay rights in other 
forums. For instance, a memorandum from Haft to Costanza on June 7, 1977, stated, “My 
week was spent working on issues concerning the arts, gay and civil rights, international 
human rights …” Other reports from Haft to Costanza would contain references to “gay 
rights” as among the issues she had worked on during a particular week.785 Periodically, Haft 
would meet NGTF members in the White House without Costanza, to discuss each side’s 
progress and address unresolved issues.786 
In a personal interview, Marilyn Haft stated that Carter was aware of the White House 
discussions and of the meetings which she and Costanza set up between the Federal agencies 
and the NGTF. She said there was “no pressure from any groups or individuals” to arrange 
such meetings and that “it was done solely because Midge and I thought it was a good thing 
to do, me for professional reasons and Midge for personal reasons.”787 Eric Marcus said in a 
personal interview, “I am sure that Costanza would not have arranged any of these meetings 
and would not have taken such initiatives if Carter did not approve.”788 Eddie Sandifer told 
the author, “It is funny how things changed for us when Costanza became Carter’s assistant. 
Everyone opened their doors for us. Of course it was not that she was Costanza, but because 
she was the President’s assistant…”789  
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Costanza’s influence and the power given to her by her position as Carter’s assistant 
will be clearly demonstrated later in this chapter. The role of the White House in arranging 
these meetings and securing positive results for the gay community is indisputable. It would 
have been almost impossible for the NGTF to meet all these government officials without the 
intervention of Carter’s administration. Louie Crew, a member of the Board of Directors of 
the NGTF at the time, told this author that it would have been “exceedingly unlikely” that the 
NGTF could get to meet such bodies without the intervention of Carter’s aide, Costanza.790  
David Mack Henderson told the author that “No-one would have listened to Costanza 
if she was not the President’s assistant, that’s for sure. She would not have had the power to 
arrange anything …” 791 Eddie Sandifer said in a personal interview, “I think that most 
changes that occurred during Carter’s time were due to Costanza’s endless efforts. But of 
course Costanza was Carter’s assistant and Carter should get the credit, too... I don’t think 
Costanza would have done all this without Carter knowing about it or approving and certainly 
the fact that she was his assistant was enough for people to open their doors to her and hear 
what she had to say.”792  
Apart from the practical gains of this programme, it had a significant impact on the 
gay rights discourse, which was probably even more important. Gay activists were now, for 
the first time, involved in direct dialogue with Federal agencies with the help and 
encouragement of the White House itself. This was of major significance for the gay 
community as its leaders were now taken seriously by the government and treated with 
respect. The change legitimised the gay rights movement in the eyes of both the State and the 
people, offering the NGTF credibility, respect and visibility. It also showed to the gay 
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community that by getting organized, they could find people in high places to listen to them 
and achieve policy change.   
The importance of the White House’s role in promoting contacts between gay leaders 
and the government is demonstrated by comparison with what happened when Carter left 
office. A letter to NGTF members from the board’s co-chairs in December 1981, just twelve 
months after Reagan became President, said, “We have been shunned by the White House … 
our contacts at the numerous agencies of the federal government have been cut off or 
severely restricted.”793  
   
THE ISSUE OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES  
Homosexuals were still vulnerable to being fired from government jobs well into the 
1970s.794 Before his election in 1976, Carter had said that nobody should discriminate against 
homosexuals at work or elsewhere, with the sole exception of homosexual individuals who 
worked in the military or in highly very sensitive government positions.795 Gay rights 
activists were anxious to ensure that homosexuals would not be treated any differently in 
employment than heterosexuals. Before Carter, the Civil Service Commission had viewed 
homosexuality in and of itself as a factor that disqualified anyone from serving in federal 
employment. However, heterosexuals who engaged in “sodomy” and “fornication” were not 
similarly penalised.796   
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Carter’s response: the Civil Service Reform Act 
The NGTF and other activist groups quietly kept up their work and the White House under 
Carter did go some way towards meeting their demands regarding the Federal Employees 
issue. The Civil Service Commission held a meeting with the NGTF on October 12, 1977. 
The meeting was also attended by Costanza, who wrote to Commissioner Fleming on 
October 19 thanking him for permitting her to attend (which had required him to reorganise 
his schedule) and affirming that their respective offices had many interests in common.797 
Afterwards, the NGTF summarised the outcome of the meeting as follows: “The Commission 
has agreed to include anti-gay discrimination under its jurisdiction in a single area, ‘the 
administration of justice’ and it has followed this up by soliciting information from us on 
discriminatory police practices, as part of a current study in this area. It will also hear from 
gay witnesses in this area. It has also included gay leaders in a survey of national leaders’ 
views on the major civil rights concerns of the future decade.”798 
By late October 1977, the Civil Service Commission had agreed to include gays in its 
jurisdiction, and to consider issues that included police brutality and refusal to protect 
homosexuals, differential treatment in prison, the enforcement of sodomy laws with 
homosexuals when the same behaviour in heterosexuals was ignored and issues around 
homosexuals in the military and in other positions of employment.799 
Pressures increased on Carter to outlaw anti-gay discrimination in employment and a 
range of other areas. In November 1977, the National Women’s Conference meeting in 
Houston, Texas (discussed in the next chapter) called on Congress, State and local 
legislatures to create laws that would ban discrimination based on sexual preference. A 
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resolution said that areas affected should include, but not be limited to, housing, public 
accommodation and facilities, the military, credit and public funding. 800 In February 1978, 
Carter came under further pressure from gay rights activists to issue an executive order 
banning such discrimination.801 At first, Carter considered issuing an executive order, but on 
consideration, he decided to include a clause outlawing anti-gay discrimination in federal 
employment in the forthcoming Civil Service Reform Act. However, he intended to do so in 
a way that would not agitate the evangelical right any more than necessary.802 
In a memorandum to Carter, Costanza commented that current legislation did, in fact, 
protect the gay community, but that they were likely to be annoyed by the lack of language 
that specifically addressed homosexual concerns. The proposed legislation prohibited 
discrimination on the grounds of “political affiliation, race, colour, religion, national origin, 
sex, marital status, age or handicapping condition.” It did not specifically mention sexual 
orientation. Costanza outlined the pros and cons of including a specific reference to 
homosexuality in the bill. She pointed out that its inclusion would be consistent with Carter’s 
stance on human rights and supportive of up to twenty million gay Americans’ struggle for 
civil rights.803  
However, Costanza cautioned that including such a reference would expose the 
President to huge abuse from politically astute anti-gay activists and even risk rejection of the 
bill by Congress. In any case, she argued, gay workers should be protected by a landmark 
District Court decision in California in 1975 which prohibited discrimination against 
homosexuals. Just five days later, Costanza forwarded a second memorandum. In this, she 
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reiterated the pros and cons of including specific wording to address gay concerns in the 
legislation.804 
Carter’s Civil Service Reform Act, the first large-scale revision of Civil Service laws 
in more than a century, was enacted by Congress on October 13, 1978. It outlawed 
discrimination in federal government employment on various grounds, including sexual 
orientation. In all, 95% of positions were made available to homosexual men or women, 
although some restrictions continued to apply in the military, the secret service and other 
areas considered to be “sensitive” to the national security. By 1980, “immoral sexual 
conduct” (often interpreted as homosexual behaviour) had been removed as a criterion for 
disqualifying a person from a position.805 In the final year of his presidency, debate about the 
rights and wrongs of these restrictions continued. 
 
Aftermath and reaction  
Despite the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act, the NGTF and other gay rights activists 
were unhappy because federal security agencies such as the FBI and the CIA were exempted 
from rules prohibiting anti-gay discrimination.806 However, it should be noted here that 
during the 1976 elections, Carter had made it very clear in a televised interview on the 
Tomorrow Show on NBC, that he wanted to end sexual discrimination in the federal sector, 
apart from security agencies such as the secret service, because he believed homosexuals 
employed there could be vulnerable to blackmail and this might endanger America’s 
security.807 Therefore, Carter had not backtracked on his pre-election promise.  
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On October 14, 1979, some 25,000 homosexuals and supporters marched from the 
Capitol to the Washington Monument demanding more gay rights legislation. Conservative 
church-goers were unhappy about the Civil Service Reform Act but also because of the 
continuing visibility of the gay rights issue and advances made under Carter. A spokesman of 
the conservative Christian Voice announced, “We are declaring war on homosexuals.” Ten 
days later, Rev. Richard Zone, executive director of Christian Voice, presented to the White 
House a petition signed by 40,000 church ministers across the country asking Carter “to resist 
efforts to legitimize homosexuality by giving special consideration under law to those who 
practice such acts.” Another Christian Voice initiative was launched by Georgian Democrat 
Larry McDonald, a member of the organisation’s advisory board. He announced plans for a 
bill that would exempt private religious schools from extending employment rights to 
teachers of a homosexual orientation.808 
Carter received a large amount of correspondence from angry and “worried” 
conservative Christians expressing outrage that homosexuals were now allowed by law to 
work in a federal agencies.809 A letter to Carter from Congressman Bill Nichols is typical. He 
wrote that he had “been contacted by many constituents over the past several months relative 
to your considering the issuance of an Executive Order eliminating discrimination against 
homosexuals in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. I would like to take this 
opportunity to voice my opposition to the issuance of such an order and would hope that you 
might carefully reconsider such action.”810   
On November 9, 1979, the NGTF wrote to Anne Wexler, Carter’s assistant, who 
occupied the position once filled by Costanza, to let her know that they had already gathered 
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70,000 signatures in favour of their aims, which were to bar discrimination against 
homosexuals in all federal positions, including in the military and other “sensitive” areas.811 
On December 18, 1979 the NGTF in the person of Charles Brydon, amongst twelve other 
luminaries of the gay rights movement,812 presented Wexler with a petition asking Carter to 
sign an Executive Order banning discrimination against homosexuals in all areas in federal 
employment.813  
The text accompanying the petition, which had the support of liberal Governor Brown 
of California814 again explicitly compared the struggle of the gay rights movement with that 
of the civil rights movement, and stated: “As was the case when President Truman acted to 
end institutionalized segregation within the armed services by executive order, so must 
President Carter act to reverse the government discrimination that places lesbians and gay 
men in the position of second class citizens.”815 Carter also received correspondence from the 
Mayor of New York, Ed Koch, stating his support of the petition’s goals and his feeling that 
Carter’s often-stated position on the importance of human rights could only be enhanced by 
his endorsement of the petition and its demands.816  
First responses by the White House to the NGTF petition were lukewarm, but gay 
representatives were careful not to apply inordinate pressure. In an early meeting with 
presidential aides, representatives of gay groups were told that Carter had not made a 
decision but was continuing to explore the question of an executive order. Kay Whitlock, co-
chair of the NGTF board, expressed warm appreciation for the attention being given to the 
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issue by the administration and for Carter’s moves in other areas. Specifically, she referred to 
the Civil Service Reform Act and to a new sensitivity about gay issues such as the ending of 
discrimination in the Peace Corps, as well as the appointment of known lesbians to certain 
presidential commissions. However, Whitlock said that what particularly concerned the gay 
community were “institutional government attitudes” which led to the State Department 
refusing visas to foreign gays and prompted the dismissal of a young clerk in the FBI because 
he happened to be gay. Her bottom line was a request for meetings with White House staff to 
draft the executive order in question. The NGTF co-executive director, Charles Brydon, 
anxious to put a good face on the meeting, avoided criticism of the White House’s less than 
enthusiastic response, indicating that he was keen to keep avenues of communication open. 
He said a wide range of issues had been covered, including access by gay prisoners to gay 
publications and religious services. On this matter, he said, the White House had promised to 
“actively intervene.”817  
Two days later, Carter’s media liaison at the White House issued a press release 
concerning the petition which the NGTF had presented to the President, making the public 
aware of it.818 Subsequently, evangelicals and fundamentalists rallied to denounce the 
petition. Bob Jones, a prominent evangelical and founder of the Bob Jones University in 
South Carolina, accused Carter of having a “soft attitude” towards homosexuals and stated 
that he was not “acting very ‘Born again.’” Jones compared homosexuals unfavourably to 
murderers, stating that a murderer could come to Jesus if he repented, because he would not 
murder again, whereas a homosexual could not.819  
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In March 1980, Jones turned from verbal denunciation to action when he led a 
delegation of fundamentalist ministers to the White House. There he presented petitions he 
said had been signed by 70,000 people opposing the extension of the Civil Rights Act to 
homosexuals. The petitions urged Carter not to give into pressures for an executive order in 
favour of employment of homosexuals. “Homosexuality must not become a protected way of 
life,” Jones declared. The White House ignored Jones’s’ petitions.820 
As for the NGTF petition of December 18, 1979, in some ways, it back-fired. The 
organization had added the names and addresses of signatories to their mailing lists, to the 
dismay of many closeted gays and heterosexuals who did not wish to receive mail from the 
organisation and had signed the petition on the understanding that they would not receive any 
such literature. The NGTF received correspondence protesting against their apparent misuse 
of the data.821 The defensive way in which the NGTF responded to these letters822 suggests 
tiredness and disappointment.  
Eventually, the petition was unsuccessful. Despite suggestions that the White House 
would “mull over” the request for an Executive Order, the desired changes were not 
delivered.823 However, in 1980, in the run-up to the forthcoming elections and after the White 
House’s intervention, Alan Campbell of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management issued a 
memorandum which declared that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation was 
now a prohibited personnel practice.824 And the first sign of relaxation in the so-called 
“sensitive” areas came in December of 1980. It was discovered that a mid-level worker with 
the National Security Agency was homosexual. An in-depth investigation took place, 
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probably the first of its kind in the intelligence community, with the result that the employee 
was allowed to keep both his job and his government security clearance.825 
Progress in the employment area was one of Carter’s greatest achievements in the 
area of gay rights; in particular, the Civil Service Reform Act was a major piece of legislation 
that dramatically changed the status quo. In March 1980, the NGTF received a detailed letter 
from the White House. The letter highlighted Carter’s achievements in the area of gay rights 
and stressed the fact that his administration was determined to press ahead with its anti-
discrimination policy. It pointed out that, under Carter, legislation now protected 95% of 
federal employees from discrimination if they were homosexuals.826 The NGTF seems to 
have accepted this assessment of Carter’s presidency. Shortly afterwards, they acknowledged 
that the Carter administration had done more to advance gay rights than any other. They 
issued a press release that enouranged/urged gay voters to consider Carter for re-election in 
the 1980 Presidential elections.827  
Craig Howell, prominent gay rights activist and member of the Gay and Lesbian 
Activists Alliance said in a personal interview about Carter and the Civil Service Reform Act: 
“While what became the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 was being debated, 
nobody explicitly discussed the fact that it would effectively codify the various court rulings 
earlier in the 1970s that had overturned the Civil Service Commission’s ban on hiring openly 
gay men or women in the federal civil service. So when Carter’s people raised that point in 
the 1980 race against Senator Kennedy, I was very much surprised. Although the 
term ‘sexual orientation’ does not appear anywhere in the legislation, the new law did 
incorporate the so-called Nexus Standard the courts had used to say that gays could only be 
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excluded from employment if the government could demonstrate there was a nexus, or 
connection, between sexual orientation and the ability to carry out the duties of a government 
job. The head of the Office of Personnel Management (successor to the old CSC), Scotty 
Campbell, wrote a vital memo in May 1980 explicitly saying that the new law effectively 
prohibited discrimination in federal civilian employment on the basis of sexual 
orientation. We referred to the Campbell memo several times during subsequent Republican 
Administrations that tried to ignore that non-discrimination policy. All this counts very much 
in favour of President Carter's Administration.”828  
Jeffrey Montgomery admitted in a personal interview that, “the fact that federal 
employees who happened to be gay were now protected by law was a huge deal at the 
time.”829 David Mack Henderson told the author that “it was a great relief for countless 
thousands of gay employees when Carter made it possible for them to go to work and be 
themselves without having to worry about getting fired.”830  
 
IMMIGRATION 
Immigration was a very important issue for gay right activists. The NGTF suggested that 
Carter’s “action on this issue is considered by many gay leaders as the real test of his 
intentions concerning the gay community and the sincerity of the Administration’s human 
rights policies.”831According to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, “aliens affected 
with psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation, or a mental defect” were “ineligible to 
receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States.”832 While many 
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homosexuals had been excluded from the United States under this discriminatory law, it was 
often overlooked, 833 especially when it came to the entry of celebrities.834  
In fact, the immigration issue was complex. The law stated that “aliens afflicted with 
psychopathic personality” could not enter America, and under law the Public Health Service 
(PHS) was required to inspect any new arrivals to ascertain whether or not this applied to 
them. From the 1950s, “sexual deviancy” had been explicitly included as a psychopathy, but 
in 1973, the American Psychiatric Association had removed homosexuality from its list of 
mental disorders, leading to Julius Richmond, Carter’s Surgeon General, stating in 1978 that 
the PHS would no longer investigate it. This situation left the Immigration and Naturalization 
service in a legal quandary, and it issued a temporary directive that fudged the matter, saying 
that while it would no longer exclude homosexuals, they could be “pardoned” into the 
country, after which their cases would be given a final legal resolution.835  
The United States was presented with a petition for “remedial legislation” from the 
Dutch government, which had been signed by an overwhelming majority of Dutch politicians 
and which pointed out the glaring inconsistency between the United States’ position as a 
signatory of the Helsinki Agreement and its refusal to address the issue of homosexual 
immigrants.836 Given that America had frequently cited “human rights” as a motivating factor 
in its military adventures overseas, this represented considerable grounds for embarrassment, 
especially as, during the pre-election debates, Carter himself had charged Republican 
candidate Ford with failing to enforce the Helsinki Agreement.837 
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A number of test-cases pushed the discriminatory policy to its limits during Carter’s 
presidency. For example, in Hill v. Richmond (1979), Gay Rights advocates challenged the 
right of the Public Health Service to carry out psychiatric examinations of “visiting aliens”, 
with a view to diagnosing those who presented as homosexual as having “psychopathic 
personalities.” Carl Hill, a British photographer, had been detained at San Francisco 
International Airport on suspicion of homosexuality because he was wearing a badge that 
read “Gay Pride.”838 Hill explained that he was going to attend the San Francisco Gay Pride 
parade as a journalist, but he was detained nonetheless. Following the legal case, on August 
2, 1979 the United States Surgeon General issued a directive forbidding certification of this 
sort, on the grounds that homosexuality “is not a mental defect or disease.” The very next 
day, two Mexican men were detained at San Francisco International Airport as suspected 
homosexuals because of their jewellery.839 Overseas, however, American embassies 
continued to deny entrance visas to applicants suspected of being homosexual.840 This was 
following a directive from the Secretary of State that visas should be denied to applicants 
when the consular officer had reason to believe that they might be homosexuals.841 
 
Carter’s Response 
Carter’s administration had from the beginning supported and insisted on a waiver of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) policy excluding homosexuals from entering 
the United States. Haft arranged a meeting on July 12, 1977 between representatives of the 
INS and the NGTF and another meeting in September 1977 between the NGTF and the 
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PHS.842 Despite this assistance, not everyone in Carter’s administration was as supportive of 
the gay rights movement as Haft and Costanza. For example, Leonel Castillo, the newly 
appointed commissioner of the INS, and David Crosland, general counsel for the INS, were 
both at the White House meeting, but did not respond in favour of the lobbyists. While 
Costanza maintained that the meeting with Castillo and Crosland had “prompted changes in 
Immigration procedures,”843 NGFT representatives did not agree with this analysis. In fact, 
Crosland had explained that they were simply “following the lead” of the PHS in their 
classification of homosexuals as sexual deviants.844  
In response to this, the NGTF asked Julius Richmond, Surgeon General and head of 
the U.S. Public Health Service, to change the designation. A meeting with the NGTF, 
representatives from the APA, and Richmond was held on April 4, 1978. It was the third 
meeting in a year, arranged by Costanza, who also attended this and all the other meetings, 
and it led to a memo from Surgeon General Richmond to Costanza stating: “It is our feeling 
that the PHS should no longer be administratively responsible for certifying to the United 
States Visa Consular posts abroad, as well as the INS, aliens who are homosexuals without 
other mental abnormalities relating to their sexual orientation for exclusion under 8 U.S.C. 
1182, Section 212 (a) (4).”845 This was a huge breakthrough. The NGTF warned the INS that 
if it did not cease its discriminatory practices, they would seek an injunction against them. 
NGTF co-Executive Directors O’Leary and Voeller said after the meeting, “We believe that 
this far-reaching policy change will go a long way toward ending this country's exclusion of 
gay visitors and immigrants. We are also hopeful that any remaining problems can be 
resolved, since INS General Counsel David Crosland has agreed to personally serve as liaison 
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between his agency and NGTF, and has encouraged us to bring any complaints by gay aliens 
or prospective immigrants directly to his attention.”846 
The NGTF actively petitioned Carter on this issue throughout his presidency and so 
did conservative groups, including the United States Catholic Conference, at one with the 
right wing evangelicals on this issue. In 1978, the Catholic Conference wrote to Carter 
expressing their concern about possible liberalisation of the issue, receiving in response 
merely a form letter acknowledging their missive and stating that it would be brought to the 
attention of the relevant authorities.847  
Meanwhile, the NGTF continued to push for movement, supported by bodies 
including Washington’s Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. A letter from the 
Bureau signed by Associate Attorney General John Shenefield reminded Carter that the 
United States had signed up to the Helsinki Final Act. This obliged the signatories to permit 
the free movement of people, institutions and organisations. However, by prohibiting the 
entry of homosexuals, the US was not living up to its pledge, despite criticising other nations 
when they ignored theirs. Attempting to put pressure on Carter, the NGTF asked him to “take 
charge of this situation” and to instruct the INS to “take a permanent and formal position that 
lesbians and gays are no longer excludable.”848  
The Carter administration held many meetings with the NGTF to discuss this matter, 
and believed that the process was working well.849 On August 2, 1979, Carter announced that 
his government’s new policy would no longer exclude homosexuals from entering the United 
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States on grounds that homosexuality was “a disease or mental defect.”850 The decision 
followed an announcement by the U.S. Surgeon General, Julius B. Richmond, that the Public 
Health Service, in line with widespread current thinking, did not consider homosexuality to 
be a mental disease or defect, and further did not believe that it could be determined by 
medical diagnosis.851 
Addressing remaining issues, the Attorney General Alan A. Parker wrote to Senator 
Alan Cranston to clarify the views of the Department of Justice. These were that, from a legal 
standpoint, either the law should be rewritten to reflect the language of the American 
Psychiatric Association, which did not believe homosexuality to be a disorder, or to make it 
clear that the relevant clause explicitly referred to the desire to exclude homosexuals from 
entering the United States on the grounds of sexuality.852  
While Carter’s administration was against excluding travellers or migrants on the 
grounds of their sexuality, in practice, immigration officials were often markedly less 
inclined to view homosexual immigrants kindly. In fact, as late as August 1979, people were 
still being turned away for being suspected homosexuals and lesbians. On November 22, 
1979, Ulrike Delling, a German, wrote a letter of complaint to Norman Alt of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, complaining that she had been stopped and harassed 
on attempting to enter the US at the Canadian border to attend a music festival. She had been 
asked detailed questions about her sexual preferences and threatened with jail pending a trial 
should she insist on entering the United States. In the event, she turned back.853 
In December 1979, the Justice Department torpedoed Carter’s “no exclusion” order 
by declaring that the ban on foreign homosexuals was enacted by Congress in 1952 and 
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upheld by the Supreme Court in 1967. The Department sent a memo to the INS stating that it 
was “statutorily required” to enforce the ban. Carter responded by setting up a Select 
Committee to review immigration laws. The committee held hearings in Boston, to which 
NGTF members were invited, to discuss topics such as the effects of a ban on foreign 
homosexuals seeking to enter the United States. Carter assured the committee that its 
proposed recommendations would be reviewed by him and by Congress.854 At the same time, 
at the behest of the White House, regular meetings took place involving the Justice 
Department, the INS and NGTF to discuss immigration policies and enforcement 
procedures.”855  
Moreover, problems arose in regard to would-be refugees who were fleeing a regime 
considered by the US to be abusive (such as Cuba and other Communist states) and who 
happened to be homosexual. For example, between April 15, 1980 and October 31, 1980, 
many Cuban refugees, including some homosexuals, had been allowed by Cuba to flee to the 
United States. This was known as the Mariel boatlift, named for Mariel Harbour in Cuba 
from which the fleet departed.856 This created tension in the United States and led to 
situations whereby some gay refugees were badly treated, both in Florida and by other 
refugees. Though homosexuality was not illegal per se in Cuba, it was considered shameful. 
Bill Traugh, director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, said that even among 
the refugees of the Mariel boatlift, “the homosexual group is shunned by the general 
population. Many of the Cuban men are very macho and don’t take too kindly to the 
homosexuals.”857 
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 On May 2, 1980, the Sentinel reported that the Carter administration had given 
special waivers, on humanitarian grounds, to Cuban refugees of the Mariel boatlift, to ensure 
their safe entry to the United States.858 This was despite the fact that some of the refugees 
were homosexuals. The government ruling stated that the Refugee Act did not permit the so-
called Marielitos to be considered refugees, but that each case would be considered on its 
own merits. With his administration under considerable pressure to allow the refugees into 
the USA, Carter publicly welcomed them. On June 20, Cubans (and Haitians) who had come 
to the US during the period of the Mariel boatlift were given a special classification that 
granted them entry.859 The Gay Community News reported that the Mariel boatlift offered 
grounds for a federal exception.860 
In late June, Carter’s government stated that it would support a bill put forward by 
Senator Cranston that would allow homosexual foreigners to enter the United States without 
restriction. Cranston referred to a list of conditions under the present 25-year-old law which 
barred persons from entering the United States. He said his legislation would remove the 
words “sexual deviation” from the list. 861    
Wexler commented in a letter dated June 18, 1980 to several gay groups involved in 
the immigration issue, that the reversal of position stemmed from “the President's human 
rights policies and the nation’s responsibilities to be consistent with our immigration 
expectation of other countries.”862 Wexler’s letter was accompanied by a copy of another 
letter by Assistant Attorney General Parker, who offered several technical changes in the bill 
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but stated, “The Department of Justice supports the objective of S. 2210 (the Cranston 
bill).”863 Cranston's bill was not strongly supported, and failed not long afterwards.864  
Because of the delay caused by Cranston’s bill and unable to do anything else, Carter, 
in August 1980, issued another directive concerning immigration policy. A new questionnaire 
given to immigrants did not contain a question about whether they were homosexual and the 
directive stated that officials were not allowed to question immigrants about their sexual 
preferences or to infer the same from their appearance or other factors.  Homosexuals 
continued to be classed officially as undesirables and could technically still be excluded, but 
Carter’s directive meant that they could only be questioned about their homosexuality if they 
made a voluntary, unambiguous statement about it.865 
On September 9, 1980, the Justice Department stated that it was legally obliged to 
prevent homosexuals from entering the United States, but that it would do so only if the alien 
stated that he or she was homosexual, practically accepting Carter’s new directive.866 
Therefore, with Carter’s approval, the Department instructed the INS not to ask about 
homosexuality. The new policy would only ban homosexuals if they had made an 
unambiguous statement about their sexuality, orally or in writing. Authorities could no longer 
draw inferences from mannerisms, style of dress, or possession of items such as a gay pride 
badge or literature about gay rights. If a third party stated that a particular individual was 
homosexual, however, the INS would have a warrant to ask them if this was the case.867 The 
INS noted that, “the likelihood of a third-party stating that an alien is homosexual is 
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remote.”868 However, the NGTF was not entirely happy, mostly because of the delays with 
Cranston’s bill, so in the beginning of October, 1980, it wrote in its Newsletter that “we had 
anticipated that the matter would have been resolved by this date…” and offered its 
assistance in “expediting the formulation of Justice Department Policy.”869 
Carter’s efforts to end the exclusion of homosexuals from entering the United States 
cannot be disputed. His administration met several times with the NGTF over the issue while 
also facilitating many meetings with the relevant Federal agencies. Knowing that it would 
have been impossible for Congress to pass legislation to remove this exclusion, as was also 
the case with Cranston’s bill, Carter issued a directive which effectively removed the 
exclusion of homosexuals from entering the USA. Although legally, homosexuals were still 
not allowed in the USA, the new directive prohibited the immigration authorities from 
questioning visitors about their sexuality or even making assumptions about it. David Mack 
Henderson told the author, “frankly, the ban on homosexuals entering America was an 
embarrassment. It was not something that other developed Western nations generally did. 
Especially the idea that the authorities could look at someone and decide he could enter 
because they thought he looked gay or whatever. Aside from the flagrant breaching of gay 
rights, it made America look ridiculous. We were all relieved when Carter took steps to deal 
with this situation.”870  
 
THE MILITARY 
The treatment of homosexuals by the US military was deeply discriminatory and one of the 
major issues for gay activists in the 1970s. Because homosexuals were not considered fit for 
military service, anyone in the military who was discovered to be homosexual received a 
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dishonourable discharge. As well as the insult implicit in the terminology used, there were 
serious repercussions for their future employment and financial stability, pension rights, and 
so forth. Clearly, there were many practical reasons for gay rights organisations to wish to 
support homosexuals serving in the military.  
Another important reason why the military issue mattered so much to the gay rights 
movement lies in its huge symbolic role as a factor of US identity. The United States military 
was popularly seen as a force for good in the world, and a symbol of American masculinity at 
its best. In this context, the rejection of homosexuals from its ranks was not just an 
infringement of their personal rights, but a rejection of the very idea that a homosexual could 
even be a “true” American, capable of serving his country with honour. Thus, for both 
practical and symbolic reasons, the plight of gays in the military was an important issue for 
gay rights activists both during and after Carter’s presidency. Louie Crew, member of the 
board of directors of the NGTF at the time, confirmed in an interview that the military 
situation was “one of the most important issues” for the NGTF at the time.871 
Carter was initially confronted with the issue of homosexuals in the military during 
his presidential campaign in 1976 when he was interviewed by Tom Snyder for “The 
Tomorrow Show.” He said that he supported an end to harassment, abuse and discrimination 
against homosexuals, a stance that was consistent with his view on the right of homosexuals 
not to be harassed in general. Snyder asked specifically about Leonard Matlovich, an army 
sergeant who had been “drummed out” of the military with a dishonourable discharge in 1975 
because he was homosexual, despite having an exemplary record. Carter expressed personal 
sympathy for Matlovich. However, he stated his opinion that homosexuals in sensitive 
positions would be liable to blackmail, and that even overt homosexuals could implicate a 
sexual partner whose sexual orientation might not be public knowledge. When Snyder 
                                                          





commented that the same could apply to unsanctioned heterosexual behaviour, Carter agreed, 
but reiterated his stance that homosexuals would be more vulnerable in this regard.872 
Matlovich appealed his dismissal in 1976 and his case became a rallying point for the gay 
rights movement. After a series of legal battles, he would eventually win his appeal in the 
U.S. District Court in 1980 with the Judge ordering that Matlovich be “promptly 
reinstated.”873 
Bob Martin, who had graduated from university in 1970, and who had been the 
founder of the Student Homophile League in Columbia University, joined the navy and 
served for one year as a radioman on a NATO base in Italy. He was given a dishonourable 
discharge because he was a homosexual. Whereas most soldiers discharged dishonourably for 
this reason stayed quiet, Martin fought back and demanded a court martial, arguing that his 
constitutional rights were being flouted and that men who “passed” as heterosexual, but 
actually were homosexuals, were left alone.874  
Martin applied for an Honourable Discharge and gay rights activists Frank Kameny 
and Foster Gunnison took up his cause.875 They set up a fund, and started advising Martin on 
how to reach out for political support.876 Martin sent press releases to the TV networks, and 
to a wide range of newspapers and magazines, and was given public declarations of support 
from a range of bodies, including the American Psychiatric Association, Tom Hayden and six 
US Congressional Representatives, including Ed Koch and Bella Abzug. Abzug referred to 
the case as a “witch hunt” and demanded that the Secretary of the Navy, John Chafee, 
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In March 1977, just three months after moving into the White House, Carter announced the 
establishment of the President’s Special Discharge Review Program to review all 
dishonourable discharges, including those of homosexuals, signalling his intention to 
intervene when an injustice was thought to have had taken place. Carter’s administration 
specifically confirmed that homosexuals who were discharged from the Armed Forces since 
1958 because of their homosexuality would qualify for an “upgrade” in those discharges. 
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army Paul Phillips said that “individuals separated from the 
Armed Forces on the basis of their homosexuality may qualify for upgrading within the 
President’s Special Discharge Review Program.”879  
Carter’s program reviewed about 400,000 less-than-honourable discharges, including 
many extended to homosexuals, who were consequently disqualified from G.I. benefits and 
often discriminated against in the job market. However the process was slow and by the end 
of his Presidency, fewer than 14,000 discharges were upgraded.880  
One of them was Bob Martin’s, which was upgraded from “dishonourable” to 
“honourable.”881 This was the first time that the discharge of a homosexual soldier had been 
upgraded, and a historic breakthrough for gay rights in the United States. The gay rights 
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movement hailed it as a “useful precedent.”882 The official letter Martin received on April 7, 
1977 highlighted the practical implications of the honourable discharge for him when it 
pointed out that he could use this new discharge in applying for any benefits that related to 
his time in the service.883 However, the symbolic import of the move was considerably 
greater than any difference the upgraded discharge would make to Martin’s pension rights.  
Martin was quoted as saying: “What an honourable discharge means to me is that it is 
the nation’s way of saying that it is proud of gay veterans and by extension that it is proud of 
millions of gay veterans and current service people. We’ve come a long way … if my service 
to the Navy and the country can now be characterized as Honourable, then there is no 
rationale for the services to deny Honourable Discharges to men and women being 
discharged today for ‘homosexual involvement.’ Ultimately, of course, the whole discharge 
policy will have to be revoked. I hope that the Carter people in the White House will see to it 
that this is done soon, but I suspect Anita [Bryant] is on their minds.”884 
Gay rights activists rallied in an effort to make Martin’s case the precedent they hoped 
it could be, especially since gay discharges were included in Carter’s special review 
programme at White House insistence.885 Martin’s case led to the reversal of several 
dishonourable discharges and, indeed, set a precedent for future discharges.886 It was 
therefore a matter of great importance to homosexuals. Tom Hayden, who had actively 
supported Bob Martin, told the author that Carter “deserves credit” for the review 
programme, which he described as “a marker” in the evolution of gay rights.887 
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Donald Hallman, who was dishonourably discharged from the Army in the 1950s for 
being gay, said about Carter’s efforts in a personal interview, “the US army is very important 
in the minds of most Americans, and that soldiers and veterans might be gay was not 
something that was ever publicly discussed. Society did not believe, or did not want to 
believe, that there were gay soldiers in the Army. What Carter did was to render visible a 
body of Americans who hitherto were unseen and ignored.” Hallman said that was a very 
brave thing to do. “Carter’s ground-breaking initiatives on behalf of gays in the military were 
massively important, not only in according respect to such servicemen and women, but in 
changing the attitude of the wider public.”888  
Eddie Sandifer told the author, “during my service, a dishonourable discharge 
threatened every gay solder; it was something all feared. The military issue would run and 
run for years, but the changes that came under Carter did make a huge difference to people, 
preventing God knows how many gay veterans from living in poverty. Symbolically, the 
difference was huge. A dishonourable discharge is a disgrace. It’s no exaggeration to say that 
removing this penalty probably saved the lives of hundreds of gay veterans who might 
otherwise have been tempted to commit suicide. We have moved on since then and Carter 
deserves much of the credit. Although it might be forgotten today, I think every gay solider at 
the time was very grateful to President Carter for his efforts.”889  
The significance of Bob Martin’s case, and its outcome, was not necessarily registered 
by the public at large.  This was possibly Carter’s preferred result, as at the time he was 
continuing to juggle the competing demands of progressive groups such as gay rights 
activists, and the extreme right wing, represented above all by the evangelical right. In this 
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context, drawing attention to a decision that would have been seen as deeply controversial 
would not have been wise.  
 
Carter’s Other Contributions to the Military Issue  
As a result of Carter’s interventions, the Department of Defence ceased declaring gay bars 
near military bases to be off-limits and stopped giving homosexual soldiers dishonourable 
discharges.890 Then, three months before the 1980 presidential elections, and at a time when 
Carter was under increasing pressure from the evangelical right, the Gay Activists Alliance 
asked the military authorities to allow homosexual veterans to take part in an official wreath-
laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Initially, the request was refused, but 
then the White House intervened and it was granted,891 much to the horror of evangelical 
Christians.892  
Kameny was the man responsible for securing the reversal and ensuring that for the 
first time in history gay people placed a wreath at the Tomb. Several dozen gay activists took 
their place there alongside three high-ranking military officers. Kameny later explained that 
when he first heard that the Gay Activists Alliance’s request had been refused, a decision he 
described as “an obscenity,” he was so angry he was willing to be arrested or shot by a sentry 
in order to lay a wreath. On consideration, he called the White House liaison officer, Allison 
Thomas, who called the responsible Army person “to make sure the gay group’s rights were 
being upheld,” and the request was immediately upheld.893  
 
Evangelical Reaction to Carter’s Military Policies 
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The evangelical right and other conservative Christians were already upset with Carter’s 
military policy because they thought it weakened national defence.894 The Special Discharge 
Review Program and the decision to allow gays to lay a wreath were seen as a desecration of 
something held in the highest esteem by Americans, the US Army. Rev. W.A. Criswell, 
pastor of the 20,000-member First Baptist Church of Dallas, said, “When a woman who is 
accused of lesbianism is given an honourable discharge (from the Navy), something should 
be said. In days when teachers look and smell worse than those they are teaching, something 
should be said. When we are told it’s time to get rid of unemployment and then they double 
it, something should be said.”895 Falwell used his huge direct mailing list to warn that, “we 
are losing the war against homosexuals,” saying “… gays were recently given permission to 
lay a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington Cemetery to honour any 
sexual deviants who served in the military. That’s right – the gays were allowed to turn our 
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier into THE TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SODOMITE!”896 In 
addition, Carter received numerous complaints passed on by several conservative 
congressmen about the same issue.897 
 
The Sequel 
The battle for gay rights in the military continued for years after Carter’s presidency and even 
the most liberal presidents who succeeded him struggled to reconcile the competing views of 
gay rights activists and other liberals, and of the evangelical right and other right wing 
activists. This struggle is epitomised by Clinton’s “Don’t ask, don’t tell,” approach, which 
satisfied nobody and did nothing to further the cause of gay rights. In this light, the decision 
under Carter to permit the honourable discharges of homosexual soldiers, and to allow a 
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group of homosexual soldiers to engage in a public act of memorialisation in an important 
civic space, should be seen as important steps towards the acceptance of homosexuality in the 
military.  
Denny Meyer, Public Affairs Officer for the American Veterans for Equal Rights, 
said of Carter’s efforts in a personal interview, that “all of these early actions were extremely 
important in setting the stage for our rights, for awareness, for the fact that Gay Lives Matter, 
just as recent tragedies have demonstrated.”898 David Mack Henderson also told the author 
that the reversal of Martin’s discharge and Carter’s review programme with regard to 
discharges were “extremely important for the gay soldiers.”899  
It is important to mention that some gay leaders active at the time told the author that 
they were not then aware of any actions by Carter in support of gay veterans and expressed 
surprise when told about them.900 Even stranger perhaps is that Carter’s own administration 
did not include his efforts in a letter to the NGTF in early 1980 regarding his achievements in 
the area of gay rights (this issue is discussed in chapter Eight).901 
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HOMOSEXUAL PRISONERS  
Another major issue for gay rights activists at a time of growing mobilisation around all 
issues relating to civil rights was that of homosexual prisoners. One of the issues that 
apparently muddied the waters in terms of how homosexual prisoners were viewed within the 
prison system was the fact that assaults against them, up to and including rape, were often 
reported as “homosexual rape” – giving the impression that the assailant, rather than the 
victim, was homosexual when in fact in general assailants were identified as primarily 
heterosexuals.902 
A series of letters about a prisoner named Jon Wildes, who was serving time at 
McNeil Island Federal Penitentiary, Washington State, highlight the fact that concerns about 
the situation facing gay prisoners were based on very real issues. On November 29, 1976, 
Philip Crane of the House of Representatives wrote to Charles Williams from Illinois, who 
was petitioning for Wilde’s transfer to an institution where he would be safer. He responded 
that a Warden of McNeil Prison named Putnam felt that “the situation has been taken care of 
and there is no need for any further special measures... the officials are doing all they can to 
assist Mr Wildes and will continue to do so. They are not aware of any immediate danger or 
personal safety issues.”903  
By February 4, of the following year, Crane was addressing Williams as “Charlie” 
and writing in a more casual tone, albeit still with bad news. He pointed out that 
Congressional correspondence was often construed by government agencies as “interfering” 
and was supportive of Williams’s decision to secure legal counsel, while also determining 
that his own involvement with the case was over as “further efforts would prove futile.” 
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Crane even voiced his concern that his interventions might have been detrimental to the case 
of Wildes.904  
As of February 22, 1977, Wildes had had to be placed in solitary confinement for his 
own protection,905 and four weeks later the NGTF, which had been contacted by Williams in 
a desperate plea for their intervention with Wildes’ case,906 wrote to Richard Lindsey, 
Warden Putnam’s assistant, to state that, “we are deeply concerned for the welfare of Jon 
Wildes if he is taken out of segregation pending his appeal… on the basis of information we 
have been given we fear such action could be tantamount to murder.”907 Williams and the 
NGTF had reason to be concerned; Williams had received correspondence from Wildes 
claiming that the prison staff were setting him up to be killed and that they were trying to 
coerce him into writing a note stating that he wished to be returned to the general population 
so that they would not be responsible for his eventual death.908 
Shortly after this flurry of correspondence, one of Wildes’s fellow inmates, Tom 
Colvin, was stabbed in the prison auditorium, dying three hours later. It was the second 
murder of a homosexual in the prison, the first victim being Glenn Levine, and in each case 
the prison authorities had known about the death threats that had been made against them. 
Their response had been to coerce the two men into signing a “release of responsibility” 
statement. “In effect,” wrote Sheldon Haight of the Board of Institutional Ministry, “this 
released the prison authorities from being responsible for whatever happened to the prisoners, 
who were in their legal custody. It did not ensure [their] safety, nor it did afford them any 
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guaranteed protective measures, but merely allowed [them] to sign their own death 
certificates in advance.”909 
Johnny Gibbs, another homosexual prisoner, provided a picture of the situation facing 
gay prisoners in the DC Times in May 1977. Together with a number of other prisoners, 
Gibbs had founded the National Gay Prisoners’ Coalition in 1972 to rally support for gay 
prisoners, who regularly suffered harassment from both prison employees and other 
detainees.910 Gay prisoners’ lives were at direct risk from people with an anti-gay agenda, and 
there had already been cases of prisoners who had died because of their sexual orientation. In 
one, a homosexual prisoner was attacked by a fellow detainee, and subsequently, “The prison 
guards were conspicuously absent, and they responded with an intentional slowness that 
resulted in Valenzuela’s death.” Violence, including the sexual assault of homosexual 
prisoners, was rife, with the suggestion that “rape seems to be used as a maintenance tool by 
the system against those who get out of line.”911  
Less dramatic infringements of rights included the fact that, while heterosexual 
prisoners were allowed to access a wide range of publications, including erotica, gay 
prisoners were routinely denied the right to read gay magazines of any kind, including 
political publications with no sexual content, because prison directors believed them to be 
“detrimental to the safety, security, and orderly running of an institution.”912 Correspondence 
between a homosexual prisoner in Leavenworth, Kansas, Calvin Keach, and Clair Cripe, 
reveals the situation facing homosexual prisoners. Responding to Keach’s request for access 
to publications covering homosexual themes, following the rejection of his application to 
receive them by the prison warden, C.L Benson, Cripe explains that “possession of such 
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publications identifies one as a homosexual, thus subjecting him to the sexual advances of 
other inmates.”913  
This official position blamed sexual assault within prisons on the victim rather than 
the assailant. The implication is that the homosexual prisoner would be at fault for revealing 
his preferences rather than remaining quietly “in the closet.” Keach’s request to receive a 
visit from a minister of the Metropolitan Community Church was also rejected on the 
grounds that Keach and the minister in question had never actually met, while there were 
already full-time chaplains in the prison who could easily attend to his spiritual needs 
(notwithstanding the likelihood that many of these chaplains would consider homosexuality 
to be a sin and would be unsympathetic or even hostile to homosexual prisoners). In short, 
there was no concept of homosexual prisoners as a minority that warranted any special 
attention. 
The Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches wrote to the NGTF 
on February 9, 1977, stating their support for the NGTF’s campaign to grant prisoners access 
to gay literature.914 On March 17, 1977, Calvin Keach of the Fellowship wrote to Bruce 
Voeller about a meeting they had scheduled at the White House to discuss the issue of 
allowing gay prisoners access to materials written for a gay readership. Keach stressed the 
importance of the literature in assisting gay prisoners in identifying with their community, 
and wished Voeller luck in the meeting.915 
Another matter of concern was that gay prisoners were denied access to ministers 
from the gay-friendly Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches, while 
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other prisoners had access to spiritual counsel and support. Prison authorities cited as an 
argument against access to gay literature and to a supportive ministry “that it would tend to 
identify and open to attack the homosexual prisoner, and cause disruption in the prison 
procedures.”916 When members of Troy Perry’s Metropolitan Community Church started 
visiting gay inmates imprisoned in California the prison officials banned them on the grounds 
that their visits identified homosexuals and made them vulnerable to violence. The Church 
quickly filed suit again, and the authority’s lawyers defended the prison on the basis that the 
prisoners were covered under the eighth amendment, which stated that they should be free of 
“cruel and unusual punishment,” and that sexual assault fell into this category.917 
Things for homosexual women detainees were no better. They faced similar dangers 
from other prisoners, although to a lesser extent, and were also denied access to homosexual 
publications and to gay-friendly clerics. There was also concerned that some of them in LA 




The situation facing gay prisoners improved considerably under the Carter regime, mostly 
because of Costanza’s efforts. In May 1977, a homosexual prisoner, four publishers and the 
NGTF sued Norman A. Carlson, director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, because he 
forbade inmates from accessing gay publications. The lawsuit coincided with the launch of 
the NGTF's prison project.919 Carlson defended his position, claiming in the U.S. District 
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Court that “publications which call attention to or identify inmates who accept homosexuality 
can, in our opinion, be detrimental to their safety as well as to the safety of others.”920 
In April 1978, Costanza, Voeller and O’Leary met with Carlson, and explained their 
position.921 As a result of this meeting, Carlson changed his attitude and became very 
cooperative and helpful. On April 10, 1978, he wrote to the NGTF, thanking them for 
meeting with him and stated that he “looked forward” to having a positive relationship with 
them. He enclosed a policy document that stated that prison staff should refer to incidents of 
assault and rape without prefixing them with the term “homosexual”922 In other actions, 
Carlson nominated his assistant, Peggy Frandsen, as the federal prison liaison link with the 
gay community. He also organised sensitivity sessions for prison staff on gay issues.923 
Moreover, with the White House’s intervention the Bureau of Prisons began permitting non-
pornographic material of particular interest to homosexuals to be distributed to prisoners,924 
while gay ministers were allowed to visit prisons and provide pastoral care to homosexual 
prisoners.925 As result of all this, the NGTF established a Prison Project to evaluate and deal 
with the progress with the Bureau of Prisons and address further issues of homosexual 
prisoners.926  
As for the power and influence held by Costanza as Assistant to the President for 
Public Liaison and her contribution to the changes for gay prisoners, this is demonstrated by 
the following incident: Before one meeting of the Bureau of Prisons to discuss the issue of 
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homosexual prisoners, Norman Carlson informed Haft that he would not attend. Costanza 
informed him that she would be there, whereupon Carlson changed his plans. Recalling the 
episode in 1980, Costanza said “He would not have been in that room if I had not personally 
said that I was going to be there… You understand that in almost every single instance, as 




A major practical issue for gay rights organisations was that of tax exemption. According to 
US tax law, certain organisations – such as churches and charitable groups – were exempt 
from a range of taxes, granting them considerable access to funds. In the 1970s, the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) had a contentious relationship with a range of faith organisations, 
having threatened to revoke the tax exemption of private schools unless they met state-
mandated standards for racial integration928 set following the 1964 Civil Rights Act pushed 
through Congress by Lyndon B. Johnson.929 This meant that right wing evangelicals, who 
tended to send their children to such schools, along with other faith groups including 
Catholics and Jews, were primed to feel resentful and attack any suggestion that organisations 
they considered immoral, such as gay rights groups, should benefit from tax exemption.  
At first, gay rights organisations were not considered eligible, but then the Internal 
Revenue started to grant tax exempt status to some gay rights groups, such as the Pride 
Foundation, which was granted exemption in 1975, the second time it applied.930 However 
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this was done only for organizations who declared that homosexuality is “a sickness, 
disturbance, or diseased pathology.”931  
In addition, many of the approximately 1,700 such organisations did not apply,932 
presumably because they were so used to operating on the margins of society they did not 
think they would be considered. If that is what they assumed, they had a point; those that did 
apply, and were granted exemption, typically reported substantial delays with their cases, and 
they all had the general perception that the IRS had little interest in following them up. 
William Kelley (long-term gay rights activist and successful lobbyist for change in anti-gay 
legislation in Illinois) also claimed that applications were often marred by errors on the part 
of the IRS and that “the policy seems to be that homosexuality is against public policy, and 
its advocacy even on a par with homosexuality, as well as activities which allegedly foster it, 
are disqualifying in the Service’s view.”933 For example, in 1975, the Lambda Service 
Bureau, a gay rights organisation, had been informed that it was having its exemption status 
revoked because it had stated that it would advocate that homosexuality was “normal” and 
that this attitude “carries a serious risk of encouraging or fostering homosexual attitudes and 
propensities among minors and other impressionable members of society.”934 By August 
1976, the Lambda Service Bureau was writing to the IRS with a palpable sense of frustration, 
claiming that the IRS was singling it out for harassment.935 
Prior to the meeting between the NGTF and Costanza in March 1977, the NGTF 
received letters from a number of gay rights organisations about their tax situation, including 
one from Jaime Green of the Gay Community Services Centre in Los Angeles, in which he 
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asked them to raise the matter of gay rights organisations being asked by the IRS to drop the 
word “gay” from their title in order to qualify for exemption status.936 With tax exemption, 
gay rights organisations would have considerably more funds and the option of hiring 
professional staff to carry out the work previously done by volunteers. However, even those 
organisations that were granted this status (as in the case of the group dedicated to the legal 
defence of lesbian mothers, mentioned above), were generally instructed not to engage in any 
activities that could be construed as “promoting” homosexuality; there were numerous 
incidences when groups that had been granted the exemption were threatened with having it 
removed, because it was thought that they were promoting homosexuality to vulnerable 
demographics, such as minors.937 
A press release by the NGTF in February 9, 1977, is indicative of the saturation that 
the gay rights organization were facing with the IRS. It stated, “if we succeed in obtaining a 
meeting with the Director of the Internal Revenue Service to discuss refusal of the IRS to 
give qualified gay organizations tax exempt status, we must have the best attorneys and other 
professional advisers accompany us.”938 
 
Carter’s Response 
The tax issue was one of the issues raised at the White House meeting in March 1977. The 
NGTF asked Costanza to arrange a meeting with representatives of the IRS.  Although the 
IRS was an independent agency and not under Carter’s control, Costanza had 
pledged on behalf of the administration to help and that “sensitivity to the rights of 
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gay people will be very seriously considered in considering nominees for vacancies 
on these commissions.”939 
A few months after the request was made at the White House meeting, Costanza 
arranged for the NGTF to meet with representatives of the IRS. In August 1977, five months 
after the breakthrough White House meeting, the gay rights organisations were granted tax-
exemption. The NGTF commented that “this important ruling is a major reversal of IRS 
policy, which routinely refused to grant such tax-deductible status unless the applying 
organization stated that homosexuality is ‘a sickness, disturbance, or diseased pathology.’ 
This policy has kept gay organizations from receiving the important tax-deductible 
contributions which are necessary to fund the major educational projects on the role of gay 
persons in society.”940 However, the NGTF was not entirely satisfied with that and believed 
that gay families should have the right to file joint tax returns to declare each other 
as dependants.941 Nevertheless, in 1980, the co-directors of the NGTF, Brydon and Valeska, 
publicly acknowledged Carter’s contribution to the decision to grant tax exemption status to 
gay rights organisations.942  
The tax exemption hugely affected the resources of gay rights organisations. It meant 
that organisations which promoted the interests of homosexuals now had considerably more 
funds and, in some cases, could afford to hire and pay professionals rather than rely on 
volunteers. They also had more money to spend on advertising, enabling them to reach out to 
the dispersed homosexual community and grow their membership. Overall, having a larger 
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budget at their disposal meant that gay rights organisations could become better organised, 
bigger, stronger and more influential.  
As well as providing the substantial financial benefits discussed above, there were 
further major, and far-reaching, consequences to the new ruling: firstly, it clearly offered 
legitimisation and respect to gay rights groups. It meant that these organizations were now 
officially recognised by the State, not just as interest groups but as legitimate and respected 
charitable organizations attempting to help people and bring reforms to society. The changes 
to the law created a sense of legitimacy and official recognition to gay rights organisations, 
thus they contributed further in changing public discourse about gay rights and to a new 
cultural framing. Finally, they also signalled to gays that the person occupying the highest 
office in the land, not only recognised their existence, but also their right to continue their 
struggle. 
 Craig Howell told the author about the tax-exemption status, “I do not know how 
much of a role Carter personally played in getting the IRS to finally grant tax-exempt status 
to gay organizations; I have always credited Costanza of his staff with getting that done. It’s 
certainly reasonable to think that Carter knew what she was doing with the IRS, so he 
obviously deserves ultimate credit for the reversal. And yes, this was a major breakthrough, 
since so many of our community’s non-profit groups had been getting nowhere with the IRS 
homophobes.”943  
Jeffrey Montgomery told the author, “the tax relief changes were amazing for us. For 
one thing, it meant less scrabbling for enough money to do this. Before, we couldn’t afford to 
pay anyone, so whatever we were able to achieve depended heavily on volunteers. As we all 
had regular jobs and rent to pay, that restricted what we were able to achieve. But aside from 
the immediate relief in terms of having more money, Carter’s decision to grant us tax-exempt 
                                                          





status had a huge symbolic importance for us. It meant that we were being recognised as 
playing a valid role in American political life. A lot of us found him a little conservative, but 
this was a big thing.”944 
Eddie Sandifer said in a personal interview that “with the tax relief, we were able to 
do more mailouts and reach many people. Remember there was no Internet in those days. 
Gays in rural areas and smaller cities and towns were often very isolated and not politically 
involved. Having more money made it easier to reach people like them and get them involved 
in the cause. It really helped us to solidify our movement and start making it a truly national 
one.”945  
David Mack Henderson told the author, “obviously having more money made a huge 
difference, but being treated with more respect was even more important. I mean, now we 
had the same tax status as churches. That was one in the eye to the many, many evangelicals 
– I know it wasn’t all of them but it was most – who hated us and thought we were just 
irredeemable sinners.”946 
 
The Reaction of the Evangelical Right  
It was galling for the evangelical right to see gay-friendly organisations receiving tax breaks. 
What made it worse was that during this period, the majority of private Christian schools lost 
their tax-exempt status. This was partly because many of them were de facto segregated by 
race, with “faith” standing in as a proxy, while most of the others failed to meet their 
commitment to enrol a minimum quota of minority students.947 Seeing some of their 
privileges stripped away while benefits were extended to gay rights organisations was seen 
by religious conservatives as a slap in the face and increased their dissatisfaction with Carter. 
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Furthermore, it also provided them with a unique focus for joint action. Paul Weyrich, co-
founder of the Moral Majority, said that key to the evangelicals’ stance was “Jimmy Carter's 
intervention against the Christian schools, trying to deny them tax-exempt status on 
the basis of so-called de facto segregation.”948 Professor Randall Balmer told the author that 
“that politically conservative evangelicals mobilized politically to defend the tax-exempt 
status of so-called segregation academies and, specifically, Bob Jones University.”949 
Christian schools advocate Robert Billings founded the National Christian Action Coalition 
to fight the IRS policy change, and declared that the official who approved it did more to 
bring Christians together “than any man since the Apostle Paul.”950 
 
MEDIA AND BROADCASTING 
In 1976, broadcasters were required to represent minorities, but they were not obliged to 
present the views of homosexuals. Typically, when homosexuals were represented at all, 
including in films, they were presented in a negative light. For example, a newspaper 
headline might say “homosexual robs bank,” but the sexuality of a heterosexual burglar 
would not be mentioned. This trend both spread and perpetuated discrimination towards 
homosexuals, as being homosexual was portrayed as relevant to a person’s criminality. In a 
press release issued in March, 1978, the NGTF highlighted this issue, stating, “we are all hurt 
when the news media refer to criminals as ‘homosexual’ even though the sexual orientation 
of the person involved is irrelevant. Reports about a ‘homosexual hijacker’ or a ‘homosexual 
murderer’ tend to fix in the public’s mind a wholly unjustified link between homosexuality 
and criminality.”951   
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On February 8, 1977, the NGTF issued an alert to the gay media outlining the fact that 
community broadcasting authorities were not required to interview homosexuals.952 Given 
the huge battles taking place at both local and federal levels – and the apparent ease with 
which religious right wing activists such as Anita Bryant gained access to the airwaves of 
America – this was clearly a matter of considerable concern. If media outlets did not 
interview the very minority that was arousing so much ire among right-wing evangelicals, 
they ran the risk of not having their voices heard at all.  
On February 11, 1977, Carol Jennings of the Media Access Project (MAP) wrote to 
Ronald Gold, the publicist of the NGTF since its foundation in 1973, outlining the efforts 
MAP had made in the area of working to have the gay community specifically included in the 
list of the minorities that were not adequately represented in the media. To achieve their aims, 
she said, they would need to demonstrate that homosexuality was not just about sexual 
preference “in the bedroom” but that gays were a distinct group, that gayness was a way of 
life as well as a sexual orientation, and that they faced discrimination, including having 
historically been rendered invisible by television.953 Broadcasters were, however, reluctant to 
list homosexuals as a discrete group. In a letter, also sent on February 11, 1977, the Chief of 
the Broadcast Bureau, Wallace Johnson, wrote to Congressman Henry Waxman explaining 
that they had decided not to include homosexuals specifically, but that these could, at a 
broadcaster’s discretion, be included under a category broadly defined as “other.”954 
After noting that Anita Bryant and her husband Bob Green had been given six hours 
of television time to air their anti-homosexual views, San Francisco gay activists moved to 
seek equal access. In June 1977, along with the Council of Religion and the Homosexual, 
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Inc., they petitioned the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to extend the broadcast 
fairness doctrine so that homosexuals could answer criticism on television. The petition 
charged that the station KVOF refused to let gay people have their say. It asked that a 
Glendale, California station be required to air programming in response to the Bryant 
exposure.955  
The FCC refused the requests, but the controversy continued, leading to a new and 
bigger effort in November 1978 by the NGTF and 142 other gay groups. This time gay rights 
activists asked that broadcasters should be required to interview all local community leaders, 
including gays on relevant issues. This time, the FCC set out guidelines that required TV and 
radio stations to seek input from gay leaders on community topics. The NGTF welcomed the 
decision as “a major step” for homosexuals, but the religious right reacted angrily, with 
Falwell and Bryant charging the Commission with “giving queers a voice.” So serious was 
the opposition that the NGTF feared the new dispensation was in danger and urged its 
members to submit “a large number of letters” to the FCC in support of its new regulation.956 
 
Carter’s Response 
The issue of the FCC was discussed in the March 1977 White House meeting at which the 
NGTF requested Costanza’s assistance in this matter. The FCC, like the IRS, was an 
independent agency and not under Administration control. However, as in the campaign for 
the IRS policy change, Costanza promised to help, assuring the NGTF that “sensitivity to the 
rights of gay people will be very seriously considered in considering nominees for vacancies 
on these commissions.”957 Eventually, the White House suggested to the FCC that it 
should draft legislation which would require broadcasters to assess community 
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groups, including gay organisations, and thus determine community broadcast 
needs.958  
By March 13, 1980, the FCC had ordered radio and television broadcasters to listen to 
the concerns of homosexuals and other minorities (such as the deaf) and to ensure that they 
were adequately and accurately represented. This apparently occurred in response to a 
petition drawn up by the NGTF and other gay rights groups. The FCC had ruled that while 
the broadcasters were not under obligation actively to seek out such groups, when the latter 
identified themselves and showed that “they are a significant element in the community,” the 
broadcasters were then obliged to contact representatives of the community to find out if their 
needs were being met.959 Further progress in this area was seen in the treatment of a TV 
show, James Robinson Presents, in which Robinson declared that the murder of Harvey Milk 
“showed how God felt about gays.” Dallas TV station WFAA cancelled the show in 1979 and 
it was ruled by the FCC to have acted correctly in doing so.960 Finally, ABC’s hit comedy 
series Soap included two key homosexual characters.961 
Naturally, fundamental evangelicals were not happy with the changes in the television 
world. On December 1980, shortly after Reagan’s victory in the elections, Falwell released a 
press statement declaring that his Moral Majority, together with other “organizations and 
individuals,” religious and non-religious, would pressure the TV industry to reverse the 
“trend toward sexual permissiveness, situational ethics and even outright obscenity” in 
network TV shows. “The trend has never been so obvious as it is this season,” Falwell 
said.962 
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DADE COUNTY GAY RIGHTS ORDINANCE 
Shortly before the 1976 election, Miami’s Dade County voted to enact a law initially mooted 
by Dade County Commissioner Ruth Shack which banned discrimination in areas of housing, 
employment, and public accommodation based on sexual orientation.963 In the summer of 
1976, the Dade County Coalition for the Humanistic Rights of Gays had been formed to 
support gay-friendly politicians. They supported Shack, and she had introduced the 
amendment at their urging. Commissioners in favour of the change and prominent local 
businessmen had stated their support.964   
Right wing evangelical Anita Bryant launched a campaign to have the ordinance 
overturned.965 Her organisation, Save Our Children, the first organized opposition to the gay 
rights movement, with widespread evangelical support, claimed that the new law would force 
private and religious, as well as state, schools to hire homosexuals. She implied that 
homosexual men were paedophiles, and mobilised huge numbers of voters.966 She took out an 
advertisement in the Miami Herald that trumpeted, “The Civil Rights of Parents: to Save their 
Children from Homosexual Influence,” and referred to heterosexuals as “the Normal 
Majority.”967 Bryant declared homosexuals “human garbage” and was supported by Falwell, 
who said that “so-called gay folks would kill you as soon as look at you.”968 Largely in 
response to her efforts, the membership of the NGTF increased dramatically.969  
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Carter avoided taking a public position on the issue, claiming he was “too busy” to do so.970 
However, gay rights activists in Miami told the White House that “support for gays is needed 
in Miami and someone from the White House” should go there. Frank Kemeny thought it 
would be better if a “male be sent from the White House.”971 Costanza expressed her 
willingness to go to Miami, but Hamilton Jordan sought to stop her, arguing that it would 
look as if Carter was taking a position on a local issue.972 Costanza did go to Dade where she 
campaigned for support for Shack’s ordinance.  
The result was that Bryant and other conservative Christians took the position that 
Jordan had predicted. Bryant, who had supported Carter in the presidential elections, 
denounced him in an interview in Playboy in May 1978 for allowing a “close associate” to 
act as Costanza had. She said, “I looked at Carter as a hero, as one who had caught the eye 
and the heartbeat of the grassroots in America. I really had great expectations of him … he 
allows Midge Costanza to go down to Dade Country on a local issue and campaign for 
homosexuality… she has an open door to the President of the United States, who claims to be 
a born-again Christian, when homosexuality is at the very core of what God is against.”973 
George Hansen, a Member of Congress, wrote to Carter to complain, “My concern is that 
what began as a local fight is now being billed as a national battle where the gays have the 
support of the President, members of the Cabinet, of the Congress and other high officials of 
government.”974 
On June 7, 1977, Bryant and her supporters prevailed.975 59% of the local electorate 
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had voted for Carter, indicating the great trouble he would continue to have in balancing the 
demands of Christian conservatives with human rights and in particular gay rights activists.976 
The Advocate, the gay rights newspaper, referred to Bryant and the anti-gay movement as 
“the forces of evil” and said: “It is the day after the Battle of Dade County. Like most of you, 
I’m licking my wounds. I’m depressed, angry and frustrated. Our first task must be to get 
through these emotions, taking care not to overreact. Then from the ashes of defeat, we must 
resume the war, seize the initiative from our enemies and proceed to win our rights despite 
Anita Bryant.”977 
The defeat in Dade County proved to be a rallying call to gay rights activists. One 
person who was not downhearted was Jean O’Leary. She pointed out that the anti-gay 
campaign had resulted in the NGTF’s budget and membership being doubled while 
individual gay groups had found a new sense of solidarity and common cause. In a sense, she 
said, Anita Bryant had benefited the movement and even characterised her as “the best thing 
that ever happened to us.”978 An unnamed New Jersey activist stated: “there will be more 
people fighting mad today than there have been in the last couple of years. As American 
citizens and taxpayers, we won’t stand by and let our constitutional rights be tromped [sic] 
on.”979 
 
CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION 6 (The Briggs Initiative on Homosexuality in the 
Teaching Profession) 
In 1977, the Southern Baptist General Convention of California moved to declare certain 
employment areas off limits to homosexuals. The Convention passed a resolution asserting 
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that homosexuality was sinful and that gays should not be employed in a range of jobs, 
including public education.980 The same year, also in California, State Senator John Briggs 
filed a petition with the requisite 500,000 signatures that qualified it for the general election 
ballot in May 1978. If passed, homosexual teachers, or those who discussed homosexuality in 
a way that “condoned” it, would be dismissed. The proposal was known as Proposition 6, and 
launched in San Francisco, which Briggs described as “ground zero… of homosexuality in 
the United States.”981  
Briggs argued that homosexual teachers and those allied with them were conspiring to 
use the school system in order to impose “non-morality” on children. He had support from a 
wide range of evangelical leaders, including Tim LaHaye, whose book The Unhappy Gays 
had just been published. LaHaye stated: “You can expect homosexual teachers single-
handedly to double the homosexual community within ten years, not by recruiting, but by 
preparing youngsters mentally for the recruiters.”982 Robert Grant, 42, an independent Baptist 
minister and Wheaton College graduate, created the anti-gay rights organisation, American 
Christian Cause, to campaign for the Briggs Initiative in 1978.983 This group was essentially 




Both pro- and anti-gay rights activists rallied, each demanding to know Carter’s position. 
Initially, Carter stated, “I know that there are homosexuals who teach and the children don’t 
suffer, but this is a subject I don’t particularly want to involve myself in. I’ve got enough 
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problems without taking on another. I don’t see the need to change laws to permit 
homosexuals to marry. I don’t see homosexuality is the desire of homosexuals for the rest of 
society to approve and to add its acceptance of homosexuality as a normal sexual 
relationship. I don’t feel that it’s a normal interrelationship. But, at the same time, I don’t feel 
that society, through its laws, ought to abuse or harass the homosexual. I think it’s one of 
those things that is not accepted by most Americans as a normal sexual relationship. In my 
mind it’s certainly not a substitute for the family life that I described to you.”985 
The gay community was disappointed as it had hoped for a clear statement of 
opposition to Briggs’ initiative. In the autumn of 1978, Carter endorsed the re-election of 
Governor Jerry Brown in California and appeared in San Francisco to support him. Brown, an 
opponent of the Briggs initiative, was popular among liberals in California, including the 
state’s homosexual population. While in San Francisco, Carter publicly took a stand on the 
issue and expressed his clear opposition to Briggs’s Proposition 6. However, again some felt 
he did not state his position as strongly as he should have.986  
Lisa Keen told the author, “It wasn’t a forceful statement and came after his 
challenger for re-election (Ronald Reagan) had already spoken against it.”987 James Fallows, 
Carter’s speechwriter at the time, recalled in a personal interview that Carter “opposed it, 
while on a trip to San Francisco” and that “in general” his approach to life was that of a 
“tolerant Christian.” He said, “his faith was (and is) important to him, but in an inclusive 
rather than exclusive way.”988  
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Carter’s position on Proposition 6 made him the first sitting president of the United 
States to make a public pronouncement that supported gay rights.989 For this, he received a 
formal but warmly-worded letter from the NGTF shortly afterwards, thanking him for his 
support.990 Right wing evangelicals were unhappy. One said that Carter’s actions had “cast 
grave doubt over the credibility of his confession of being born again by associating himself 
on the side of moral perversion and homosexual wickedness.”991 
Costanza appeared at a fundraiser to support the campaign to defeat Proposition 6 and 
at a “luncheon” for the gay community and its supporters.992 She also sent a mailgram to the 
NGTF saying: “I wish that I could stand with you personally as you gather to demonstrate in 
California. The employment right and right of free speech of all our citizens, gay and non-
gay, are under severe attack. Proposition 6 is a threat to the principles which have been basic 
to our American way of life. We must use all our efforts to prevent this sort of discrimination 
from becoming law.”993 
Carter’s opposition to the Briggs initiative inspired Harvey Milk and other gay rights 
activists to push for greater concessions from his administration. He sent Mike Chanin, 
deputy presidential assistant, to a fundraiser attended on by Jerry Brown on November 27. 
Chanin read out a statement about the Carter administration’s opposition to discrimination on 
the grounds of race, sex or sexual orientation, and was heckled by the crowd.994  
On July 30, 1978, Costanza wrote a warm, personal note to Milk, stating her view that 
the battle against the Briggs Initiative was very important, and extending an offer to help.995 
Later that year, the Briggs Initiative was defeated by 3.9 million to 2.8 million votes, which 
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was seen as a major win for gay rights activists, as well as those interested in civil liberties in 
general. Briggs, who had expected to win, responded by calling San Francisco the “moral 
garbage dump of homosexuality in this country.”996 Nancy Higgins praised in a personal 
interview the input of both Carter and Costanza in its defeat, “Midge was much more vocally 
supportive than he (Carter) was, of course, but he did come out in support of a 'No' vote, and 
this was all that mattered to us. It was actually more than enough and yes, it certainly played 
an important role in defeating Proposition 6.”997 
This was not a simple victory for gay rights. The Briggs Initiative was also defeated 
because of opposition from teachers’ unions and Ronald Reagan, who was no friend to gay 
activists in general, but whose libertarianism was offended by the Initiative.998 It is also 
important to note that, while the defeat of the Briggs Initiative was a major win for gay rights 
activists, it also left them no better off than before.999 Moreover, it had proven to be a great 
resource for the mobilisation of the evangelicals, who increasingly discussed American 
society in terms of a battle.1000 Gay rights activists agreed with the concept of the struggle as 
a “battle”, and as the debate about homosexuals in public sector jobs progressed, gay people 
became increasingly willing to test their cases in court, as in the case of a challenge from one 
individual to the Dallas Police Force, which had a blanket ban against homosexuals 
serving.1001 
 
Evangelical Reaction to Carter’s Opposition to Proposition 6 
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Carter’s opposition to Proposition 6 outraged many evangelicals, even the Southern Baptists. 
William Hann, President of the Southern Baptist General Convention of California, wrote to 
Carter that his opposition to Briggs’ proposition “hurt” Southern Baptists who had “worked 
hard to pass Proposition 6,” leaving them “wondering why Southern Baptists are not together 
on moral issues.” Hann also sent Carter some examples of gay literature and told him, “I feel 
you would not want your daughter exposed to this any more than we do.”1002  
Carter did not answer the letter in person, but the White House issued a form letter 
that stated, “We have noted your comments and assure you that the President appreciates 
your interest in this legislation.”1003 Shortly afterwards, Robert Hughes, of the same 
Convention, wrote to Carter to express the churches’ “grave disappointment” over Carter’s 
“public opposition to an issue so strongly supported by his fellow Christians and Baptists. We 
furthermore encourage him to reconsider his stand and to give his unreserved support to 
future efforts to oppose the acceptance of homosexuality as a normal, if not privileged, 
lifestyle.”1004 
Among the fiercest opponents of the gay cause was Robert Grant, who claimed to 
know that homosexuals were present in significant numbers - “rampant” was the word he 
used - in schools and government, even churches. He stepped up his attack by broadening the 
American Christian Cause movement, which he had founded, into a much larger conservative 
organisation, Christian Voice.1005 Despite his deeply-held faith, Carter’s disconnect from the 
feelings of the evangelical right are typified by comments he made to a group of Southern 
Baptist men in 1978: “you can’t divorce religious belief from public service… at the same 
time, of course, in public office you cannot impose your religious beliefs on others.”1006 
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OTHER POSITIVE POLICIES AND DECISIONS BY CARTER REGARDING GAY 
RIGHTS 
In addition to the major aforementioned changes, a range of minor breakthroughs under 
Carter, in their various ways, made a meaningful and positive contribution to the lives of gays 
and emboldened public discourse as to gay rights and homosexuality.  
 For a start, under the Carter administration attention was paid to anachronisms such as the 
inclusion of a description that arsonists are frequently homosexuals in a manual used to 
train fire-fighters. Allison Thomas, staff assistant to Wexler, personally contacted Gordon 
Vickery of the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration to see if this 
unsubstantiated claim could be excised from training manuals.1007 Brydon and Valeska’s 
letter, dated February 22, 1980 (referenced above), points out that opposition to gay rights 
frequently emanated from “uniformed public safety organisations such as municipal fire 
departments,” making this an important issue that went far beyond presenting matter of 
archaic material in a training manual.1008  
 Carter created a new Task Force on Sex Discrimination and reported he was “ordering” 
the heads of departments “to take the personal responsibility to examine their own 
attitudes, policies, and directives.”1009 
 Homosexuals were no longer barred from working with the Peace Corps or the Agency 
for International Development.1010  
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 In January 1977, the Civil Service Commission had refused to accept that it had any 
responsibility in the area of sexual orientation, “unless and until the Congress specifically 
authorizes it and provides funds for it.”1011  By August 1977, through Carter’s efforts, the 
Civil Service Commission agreed “for the first time to consider harassment cases against 
gays as within their jurisdiction.”1012 
 Carter gave playwright Tennessee Williams, an open homosexual, the Medal of Freedom, 
indicating not just his respect for the man, but the growing acceptance of gay individuals 
in American society, witnessed –in a very public forum.1013 The ceremony took place in 
the White House on June 9, 1980, with a member of the Marine honour guard assisting. 
In his remarks honouring Williams, Carter said: “His work is truly remarkable, the 
enjoyment that people have derived during his own lifetime and I’m sure for many 
decades and centuries in the future, will indeed be a reminder of what America is in its 
challenge, in its failures, in its dreams, its hopes for the future… Tennessee Williams 
shows us that the truly heroic in life or art is human compassion.”1014 
 Carter officially proclaimed August 26, 1977—the anniversary of woman suffrage—to be 
Women’s Equality Day, and used it to reaffirm his support for the Equal Rights 
Amendment. He said, “Strong action is needed to guarantee women total equality in the 
areas of politics and government, employment and related benefits, health care, housing 
and justice.... This is a crucial point in the struggle to achieve full equality for women 
under the law.”1015  
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The second half of the 1970s saw a notable strengthening of gay rights organisations. Under 
Carter, gay people and the issues of concern to them entered the public domain to an extent 
never seen before, but the cultural environment was fundamentally hostile to their cause and 
Carter had little space to manoeuvre and introduce sympathetic new laws. What he did, 
wherever possible, Carter used the power of his office to secure positive change in the field 
of gay rights. Overall, his presidency notched up many practical gains for homosexuals as 
Carter contributed to major improvements in the areas of federal employment, immigration, 
the rights of gay war veterans, the rights of gay prisoners, the tax-exempt status of gay rights 
organisations, and more. Some of these significant innovations received relatively little 
attention at the time, and some have received little attention ever since. 
By opening the doors of the White House and Federal agencies to gay rights activists, 
by addressing their issues and by making tax-exempt status available to gay rights 
organizations, Carter offered further legitimisation and visibility to the gay community. 
Homosexuals were now increasingly seen in direct dialogue with federal agencies with the 
unequivocal support of the president himself, who was not only listening to their concerns, 
but actively attempting to address them. These were important acts in cultural framing and 
changing public discourse about homosexuality and gay rights; from being marginalised 
people on the fringes of society, homosexual men and women took their place in society as 
regular Americans, entitled to the same rights as everyone else. At the same time, the White 
House, by facilitating meetings between the NGTF and Federal agencies, turns out to be the 
most important resource for the gay rights activists. Thus, Carter here again makes 
simultaneously a contribution to cultural framing and need to create organisational resources, 





Carter’s policies powerfully affected conservative Christians and evangelicals, who 
saw the increasing visibility of homosexuals in public life as a threat to the family and to the 
American way of life. That these changes were effected by Carter, considered by many to be 
“one of us” and the man for whom they had voted, added salt to their wounds. Angered, 
outraged and believing they had been betrayed, the evangelical right attempted to stop what 
Carter had started. As we will see in Chapter Seven, Carter’s gay rights policies were one of 
the main reasons for the formation of a new movement which came to be known as the “New 
Right.” This new movement acted clearly as a counter-movement to the gay rights 
movement, attempting to halt the advances towards gay rights and the increasing visibility 
and assimilation of homosexuals in American public life.   
An illustration of the progress of gay rights and the change of public discourse about 
homosexuality during his presidency is the following statement by Robert Malson, Carter’s 
associate director of the White House domestic policy staff. In May 1980, Malson claimed 
with justification that, “Gay people are being drawn into the everyday routine decisions of 
staff and are being accepted as part of the political community. At the White House gay 
issues are an active part of the responsibilities of staff people. On both the Domestic Policy 
staff and the Public Liaison office staff people are specifically assigned to monitor gay and 
lesbian concerns.”1016 Carter, above all, presided over a White House that showed in a myriad 
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THE NATIONAL WOMEN’S CONFERENCE AND THE WHITE HOUSE 
CONFERENCE ON FAMILIES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we examine two events, which were of major importance to the campaign for 
gay rights during Carter’s presidency; the National Women’s Conference (NWC) and the 
White House Conference on Families (WHCF). The NWC, the first Conference specifically 
on women’s rights in the USA, was seen by lesbian rights activists as an excellent 
opportunity to raise their profile, legitimise their cause and make their voices heard. The 
WHCF, an event conceived by Carter with the aim of strengthening the American family, 
was seen by gay rights activists as a chance to achieve the same goals as their lesbian 
counterparts hoped to achieve via the Women’s Conference. Both groups of activists ended 
up achieving even more they had hoped for, and now these conferences are considered to be 
landmarks in the history and development of gay and lesbian rights. However, Carter’s role in 
turning these events into such major successes for homosexual activists has never been 
examined, and so remains underappreciated.  
As we will see, Carter’s decisions were catalysts not only in the build-up to and the 
organization of both events, but also in their outcomes with regards to gay and lesbian rights. 
This chapter will show that both events would have turned out very differently without 
Carter’s personal contribution. Both events were also of significance to the evangelical right 
and conservative Christians and we will examine their reactions, too. The chapter focusses 
not so much on the conferences themselves as on their background, their impact and most 






THE NATIONAL WOMENS CONFERENCE  
Background 
In 1973, four years before Carter became President, the United Nations announced that 1975 
would be International Women’s Year. Subsequently, US President Gerald Ford created a 
National Committee tasked to “promote equality between men and women,” which one year 
later produced a report, To Form a More Perfect Union … Justice for American Women. The 
report contained 115 recommendations for the improvement of women’s lives through 
government action. Congress directed the Committee to convene a National Women’s 
Conference, preceded by state and regional meetings, and preparatory work began without 
delay. The Committee sent state co-ordinating bodies a list of sixteen topics to consider while 
preparing recommendations for a final plan of action.1017Arriving in office two years after the 
announced International Women’s Year, Carter moved swiftly to get the conference off the 
ground. He appointed a new National Committee, which put the state and regional meetings 
into motion, for a national conference in Houston in November 1977.     
The main concern for feminists at the time was the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).  
Peter Bourne told the author that Carter openly supported the ERA and women’s rights. He 
said that “once in the White House, he hired Sarah Weddington, a lawyer in Roe v. Wade, as 
the key staff member on women's issues, and put many more women in high appointed 
positions than any previous president.”1018 In addition, he appointed Judy Carter, his 
daughter-in-law, as his personal representative on the ERA. She travelled across the country, 
speaking and raising funds for the amendment,1019 becoming the “First Family’s most vocal 
promoter” of the ERA.1020 Professor Randall Balmer told the author that Carter confided to 
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him in later life that “one of the deep disappointments of his presidency was his failure to 
shepherd the Equal Rights Amendment to ratification.”1021 
Only three months into his presidency, Carter had appointed more women to his 
cabinet than any president in US history, but some feminists were not happy. In March 1977, 
Costanza told him that the National Women’s Political Caucus felt he could have done even 
more and that they were disappointed by the “calibre of women named to top positions within 
the government.”1022 How far and how fast he was moving was a constant refrain in Carter’s 
relations with both the women’s movement and the gay rights campaigners. His efforts were 
more generous and more swiftly expedited than those of any of his predecessors, but they 
were never quite enough for the activists. In a personal interview, Peter Bourne commented 
that “throughout his (Carter’s) presidency, the women's movement was always lobbying for 
more, despite what he had done for them.”1023 
 
Before the Conference 
Costanza clearly realised that the NWC would provide an excellent opportunity to promote 
many of her favoured causes, such as the ERA, access to abortion and gay rights. She was 
one of the most influential forces behind the organization of the Conference, working 
endlessly to ensure that the “right people,” that is, people with the same views as herself, 
would be in the right places. Her aim was to make the national committee appointed by 
Carter more diverse and progressive than the committee Ford had set up. This was to be 
achieved by replacing conservative members with more progressive ones.  
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One of the first things Costanza did was to recommend Bella Abzug as chair of the 
Committee and Carter accepted this.1024 Even so, the appointment was not due solely to 
Costanza because senior members of the Carter’s administration, like Eizenstat, Powell and 
Wexler, also backed Abzug. They told Carter that she could be “a strong card” in the 1980 
Presidential election because she represented several groups.1025 Nevertheless, as far as 
lesbian rights and the feminist movement were concerned, she was the one who held things 
together. Professor Doreen Mattingly told the author that her appointment “was important 
because she understood the tensions in 1977 within the women’s movement over 
homophobia and racism and classism.” She also said the women’s movement in 1977 was 
“really torn up” by these factors. “She understood that for gay rights, for lesbian rights, for 
there not to be a sexual preference plank would be a continuation of a problem within the 
women’s movement.”1026  
However, Abzug’s support for the ERA and for gay rights made her a red rag for the 
religious right and her appointment enraged many evangelical leaders. Pat Robertson, who 
had initially supported Carter, denounced him after her appointment and said, “I wouldn’t let 
Bella Abzug scrub the floors of any organisation I was head of. But Carter put her in charge 
of all the women of America.”1027  
Costanza convinced Carter to remove practically all the conservative members of the 
Committee appointed by Ford and replace them with feminists such as Gloria Steinem.1028 A 
very important appointment for lesbian rights was that of Ruth Abram, an open lesbian, co-
executive director of the Women's Action Alliance and a board member of the NGTF.1029 
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However, the most important appointment of all for lesbian rights was that of Jean 
O’Leary. Her appointment in Carter’s Committee meant that she was the first openly 
homosexual person to be appointed to a Government post and even more importantly, she 
was appointed by the President of the USA himself.1030 This was obviously a clear statement 
by Carter of his belief that everyone was equal under the law and there should be no 
discrimination against homosexuals. Costanza’s role in the preparations for the Conference 
was not limited to recommending appointees to the Women’s Committee. Professor Charlotte 
Bunch told the author that Costanza also “did a lot to help keep Rosalynn Carter and the other 
women in the administration sort of positive about the gay rights agenda as part of the 
Houston conference.”1031 
Predictably, evangelicals and other conservative Christians were outraged. One of 
them wrote, “Pres. Carter’s recent appointment of an admitted militant feminist homosexual 
to a high federal position, the first in history, proves that this country is becoming sicker all 
the time. Her appointment to a top federal position is a slap in the face to every God-loving 
American, whether father, mother or single person, who believes in decent living and normal 
relationship as naturally intended.”1032  
Preparations for the November, 1977 Houston conference were massive, involving 
preliminary conferences in states and territories before July, 1977. More than 150,000 women 
voted to elect delegates to the NWC, with gay rights and conservative activists fighting neck 
and neck to get as many delegates as they could get.1033 When the National Committee held 
its first meeting on April 11 and 12, 1977, O’Leary recommended that the agendas of the 
state conferences should include the question of lesbian rights as well as other issues 
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excluded by the Ford Committee.1034 O’Leary and Abram managed to convince the 
Committee to add a “sexual or affectional preference” resolution to the list of the 
Committee’s issues recommended for workshops at the state conferences.1035     
Particularly relevant to the preparations were O’Leary’s activities within the NGTF, 
where she had developed a Women’s Caucus, described as “a formally constituted body of 
lesbians and lesbian-feminists” whose aim was to facilitate “a lesbian presence in all 
women’s issues, projects, and organizations throughout the country” and to “reflect our 
commitment to feminist principles and to the integration of the battles against both sexism 
and heterosexism.”1036  In O’Leary’s view, full lesbian participation at the National 
Conference would upgrade lesbian rights from “a minority concern” to a “core issue.”1037    
Passage of the resolution was followed by a flurry of mailings from the NGTF urging 
lesbians and non-lesbian feminists to turn up in full strength at the state conferences since 
lesbian rights was now a “legitimate” women’s issue.1038 A NGTF press release said, “An 
active lesbian presence in these state conferences is crucial...because resolutions emerging 
from them will have a great influence on shaping the legislative goals of the women's 
movement.”1039 O’Leary expressed fears that “without a strong lesbian-feminist presence . . . 
our issues and our needs will consciously or unconsciously be overlooked” and asked 
lesbians to “spread the word and encourage lesbians to join the fight for full participation in 
the goals of International Women’s Year.”1040  
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A helping hand for the lesbian cause came in August of 1977 with the formation of 
the Women’s Conference Network. This brought together something like forty organisations, 
ranging from the American Jewish Committee and Church Women United to the League of 
Women Voters and the National Educational Association.1041 
O’Leary’s energetic and well-planned campaign met with great success. So, too, did 
that of her leading opponent, Phyllis Schlafly, founder of the conservative, pro-family Eagle 
Forum. Homophobic and anti-feminist backers of Schlafly saw the women’s movement as 
socially radical and destructive of the traditional family and expressed their opinions in angry 
and uninhibited rhetoric.1042  Schlafly warned that the state conferences would be full of 
“Libs and Lesbians, Frauds and Follies,” who would seek to promote witchcraft, among other 
things.1043 
Lesbian activists realised what sort of opposition they would face in Houston when 
anti-feminists mobilised their forces at several of the state conferences. In a personal 
interview, Professor Charlotte Bunch recalled that conservatives and anti-feminists far 
outnumbered the lesbian community in some big city areas and activist leaders sent 
emergency calls to their rank and file to get to the conferences and neutralise the numerical 
advantage enjoyed by their opponents. Professor Bunch considered the state conferences to 
be very important in the “solidification of the right wing, because this was a state-by-state 
conference where there were delegations elected in every state and it's the only time that the 
US Congress allocated money for a national women’s conference as opposed to just 
independent civil society, you know NGOs doing their own thing. And it became a 
battleground with the right wing in every state. We had delegations and the lesbian feminists 
which I was helping to organize with O’Leary, it's really when we solidified our support from 
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the feminist movement as a whole, the more mainstream women's organizations, very much 
in response to the right wing attack.”1044  
Because of the conflicts at the state conferences, it became clear to the White House 
that the Conference in Houston was likely to be a contentious affair. As a result, presidential 
staff introduced measures to put some distance between the White House and the Conference, 
including limiting the number of presidential aides who would attend, and turning down 
requests that Carter speak at the meeting, although his wife Rosalynn would be present.1045  
 When all the state conferences were concluded, the NGTF conducted a survey to 
identify the lesbian delegates elected by the conferences to participate in Houston, and 
requested assistance to finance its preparations.1046 At the same time, the National Women’s 
Committee set out its aims for Houston in a report entitled A Plan for Action. The ERA was 
the lodestar but the Plan included a four-point gay rights plank which demanded legislative 
changes of a boldly radical nature. The programme called for:  
 Legislation to ban discrimination in employment.  
 The repeal of laws touching on private sexual behaviour between consenting adults.  
 The passage of a law that would make sexual preference irrelevant in the area of child 
custody. 
 Improved lesbian visibility in the media.1047  
The House of Representatives subsequently approved the report for the conference by 
a simple majority. 1048 The effort required from Costanza to get this plank through was 
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immense but her success was evident in the facts. Professor Charlotte Bunch wrote in 1977, 
the Ford Committee “offered little hope” and it “clearly did not intend to include lesbianism 
in its deliberations.” In addition, no open lesbians were involved in pre-conference planning 
at either state or national level.1049  However, when the Conference took place eleven months 
later, the Plan for Action included a resolution for sexual preferences which had been 
supported by no fewer than thirty states. Furthermore, at least 120 delegates were openly 
lesbian while state delegations came with scores of closeted lesbians and gay rights 
supporters.1050  
This tremendous turnaround should clearly be credited to Costanza, who was the 
driving force behind the organization of the Conference, but also to Carter, who accepted all 
her recommendations. It was Costanza who recommended Abzug, Abram, O’Leary and all 
the other members of the National Committee to Carter, effectively asking him to install them 
in place of Ford’s appointees, and this is what he had done. Obviously none of this would 
have happened if Carter had not replaced Ford’s Committee with progressive women. 
 
THE CONFERENCE 
The Conference took place at a time of increasing mobilisation of feminist activists in the US 
and elsewhere, but their opponents ensured that they and their message would also be seen. A 
day before the Conference opened, a large number of anti-feminists demonstrated in the city. 
The same day an advertisement in a Houston newspaper, paid for by Christian conservatives, 
showed a small, fair girl with a bouquet of flowers, primly asking, “Mommy, when I grow 
up, can I be a lesbian?” 1051 On November 17, on the eve of the conference, the Washington 
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Post carried an editorial declaring, “What is at stake in Houston is the perception of political 
power. Everyone agrees that the conference will be a symbol, a message, a test of clout.”1052   
The NWC duly opened on November 18, 1977 and ended on November 21. It was 
chaired by Bella Abzug, who was described by the Washington Post as “the mother of this 
convention.”1053 Some 20,000 women attended the Conference along with more than 2,000 
commissioners, elected delegates, alternates, and volunteers, plus some 18,000 observers.1054 
At least 120 delegates were lesbians while 320 were conservatives and many more were 
unidentified attendees from both sides.1055 Three organised lesbian groups were the 
Lesberadas, a Houston lesbian collective, the California IWY Support Coalition, and the 
NGTF.1056 
That the women’s movement was now a mainstream feature of American life was 
demonstrated by the massive media coverage the Conference received and by the status of 
many attending. Hundreds of television cameramen and newspaper reporters gave minute-by-
minute accounts of the proceedings, highlighting the prestigious presence not only of First 
Lady Rosalynn Carter, but also of two other First Ladies, Betty Ford and Lady Bird 
Johnson.1057 Reflecting an increasing polarisation on women’s and family issues, the 
Conference was largely divided between “pro-family” women who opposed gay rights and 
other liberal ideals, and feminists who included a cadre of gay rights activists.  Very soon, 
proceedings began to look like two conferences taking place rather than one. Feminist 
speakers would address a feminist audience in one hall while anti-feminists would address 
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their supporters in another hall, often right next door. Sometimes both sides would turn up in 
the same room, arguing about who had the right to use it. Once, there was a physical 
confrontation between lesbian activists and a group known as the Christian Defence League, 
turning the conference from a rhetorical to a physical battleground.1058 
 The situation was vividly described by Schlafly in her opening speech when she said, 
“There are many differences between this meeting and the one in the other hall today. We 
started out by offering a prayer and I think you should know that at that other meeting they 
did not have a prayer, they just started out with a moment of silence for fear they will offend 
many other members who were present. I am very proud that they excluded me from that 
convention and I am here, where we are not ashamed and not afraid to ask God’s blessing on 
this crowd assembled here today.” She then denounced the Conference as a costly mistake at 
the expense of the tax-payer and characterised the state conferences which preceded it as 
“phoney.” The whole thing, she said, was a charade “in order to pass resolutions that were 
pre-written and pre-packaged a year and half ago.”1059   
   Already primed to be outraged by any apparent advance by homosexuals in the area 
of equal rights, religious right wing activists were horrified by the ebullient display of gay 
rights. They feared that the Conference would lead to lesbians becoming full members of 
society which they perceived as destructive of the American way of life.1060 In general they 
were also aghast that public money was being spent on the Conference, which they saw as 
representing a left-wing agenda to destroy all that was good about the United States.1061 
Schlafly called the Conference the “Federal Financing of a Foolish Festival for Frustrated 
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Feminists,” and boldly stated that feminism was on the way out, and not relevant to the lives 
of most women.1062 For women right wing evangelicals anything other than the most 
traditional gender and family roles – man as provider and woman as homemaker and nurturer 
– was abhorrent and flying in the face of what God wanted for humanity. Schlafly accused 
the organisers of getting up to dirty tricks to ensure that she and women like her were not 
represented at the conference.1063 
Professor Charlotte Bunch, who attended the Conference, told the author that the right 
wing had more supporters and “they created a very menacing atmosphere… what was 
menacing was we were elected delegates to this conference and there were what were called 
at that time the three hot-button issues: abortion, the ERA and gay rights, and they gathered 
two or three times as many women across town in Houston to rally against essentially those 
three issues. There were twenty-six issues on the platform of the NWC in Houston, but these 
were the three issues that they were galvanised against and I think it was much more 
politically menacing. It wasn’t yet, I don’t think any of us felt personally a threat to our lives, 
but they did demonstrate outside the conference and they had some delegates in the 
conference because there were states like Mississippi, Utah and others where the right wing 
had successfully organised and won the delegates…  On the floor of the conference we were 
literally fighting with them to get to the microphone all the time, so it was that kind of sense 
of the political menace of really the strength of their organizing women for this event.”  
According to Professor Bunch, that was when the gay rights movement realised the strength 
of the right wing. Until then, they “didn’t have a sense that they were going to be that 
strong.”1064  
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The Sexual Preference Plank 
The chief aim of the lesbian activists was passage of the sexual preference plank, which the 
New York Times described as “the emotional focal point of the conference,” and the most 
striking among the general public.1065 As set out by O’Leary, the plank had three main 
objectives:  
 That “Congress, State, and local legislatures should enact legislation to eliminate 
discrimination on the basis of sexual and affectional preference in areas including, but not 
limited to, employment, housing, public accommodations, credit, public facilities, 
government funding, and the military.”  
 That “State legislatures should reform their penal codes or repeal State laws that restrict 
private sexual behaviour between consenting adults. Removal of sodomy laws from state 
penal codes.”  
 That “State legislatures should enact legislation that would prohibit consideration of 
sexual or affectional orientation as a factor in any judicial determination of child custody 
or visitation rights. Rather, child custody cases should be evaluated solely on the merits of 
which party is the better parent, without regard to that person's sexual and affectional 
orientation.”1066 
 As the time to vote neared, the balance of opinion began to swing towards the lesbian 
activists. The persistent attacks by the right-wingers helped to convince many feminists that 
they could not reject gay rights and they moved to support their lesbian sisters against the 
common enemy.1067 O’Leary said, “I think, that Anita Bryant and the whole right-wing thing 
has pushed us over the top. It has made lesbianism a viable issue. It has made us a household 
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word.  What happened at the convention will have a ripple effect.  We've got to take the 
stigma off the word ‘lesbianism.”’1068 
Before the voting, the three lesbian rights organizations which had been working 
together since the beginning of the conference had managed to convince the feminist 
delegates of the rightness of their cause and most of them supported it. Therefore, despite the 
presence of many very right-wing women, a majority of attendees supported the plank and 
endorsed equal rights for gays. A move by conservatives to separate out the lesbian “mother” 
segment and vote it down was easily defeated and the overall result was a massive win for the 
gay rights activists. When the resolution eventually passed, lesbians in the galleries roared 
their approval: “Thank you, sisters!” Pink and yellow helium-filled balloons were released 
with the message, “WE ARE EVERYWHERE.”1069  
 
The evangelical reaction 
Passage of the sexual preference resolution outraged right-wingers and conservative 
Christians. Members of the all-white, all-Klan Mississippi delegation, which included six 
men, turned their backs on the podium and refused to be seated for a considerable period,1070 
while many state delegations brandished their yellow “Majority” ribbons.1071 In their anger, 
some defeated delegates shouted and waved American flags and Bibles and scrawled 
messages on placards for the TV cameras, saying, “God is a Family Man,” “Keep Lesbians 
Out of Schools” and “I Was a Fetus Once.” 1072 Among the angriest of the defeated delegates, 
Schlafly denounced the ERA and IWY as intended to destroy the family, and she organised a 
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counter-convention across town. At the Astro-Arena, she addressed some 10,000 supporters 
who had been bussed in from across the nation by church and anti-abortion and stop-ERA 
groups.1073 She told her audience, “We reject the antifamily goal of the ERA and the IWY. 
The American women do not want ERA, abortion, lesbian rights, and they do not want child 
care in the hands of government...1074 the ERA will only benefit homosexuals. We reject the 
ERA.”1075 
The participants also watched a video address by Anita Bryant and listened to 
speakers who cited patriotism, the importance of traditional gender roles, and their belief that 
homosexuality was sinful and that “God Made Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve.” After 
hearing Bryant’s taped message, the crowd passed a resolution to support her.1076 Robert 
Dornan, a right-wing Congressman from California, told the crowd that he had gone to the 
NWC as an observer and “what I saw shocked me more than anything I have ever seen. I 
watched three First Ladies, dressed according to White House protocol, approving a sexual 
perversion and the murder of unborn babies.  What a disgrace… if George Washington could 
see those First Ladies nodding for abortion and perversion. Let’s tell the President his wife 
was at the wrong rally . . .  If you think the homosexuals, lesbians, abortionists are ready to 
give up you don’t know about evil...”1077 One conservative woman, Bunny Chambers, later 
reported that to recruit women to the religious right wing cause after the Conference, all she 
had to do was read them the resolutions that were passed.1078 
For many on the evangelical right, feminists’ embrace of the gay rights movement and 
acceptance of lesbians within their organisations was the final straw. Whereas many 
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conservatives had remained largely quiet on the issue of feminism earlier, “the feminist 
decision to ally their cause with the gay rights movement all but nixed whatever support 
evangelicals had for the women’s liberation movement.”1079 In fact, in retrospect, the 
feminists’ ideological embrace of the lesbian movement was a tactical error on their part in 
some ways; social conservatives would now always consider lesbianism and feminism to go 
hand in hand.1080  
 
After the Conference 
Over four days, delegates to the NWC debated and voted on twenty-six separate issues 
ranging over a wide expanse of causes. Not only were there the hot-button issues of the ERA, 
sexual preference and abortion rights, but matters of insurance, health, home-making, child 
care, and rights of minority women, elderly women and the disabled were tabled for decision.  
The resulting official report, The Spirit of Houston, contained the Committee’s 
recommendations from the resolutions passed at the Conference, including that “Congress, 
State and Local Legislatures should enact legislation to eliminate discrimination on the basis 
of sexual and affectional preference.” It also “called for feminist education in the schools,” 
including books and curricula that would “restore to women their history and their 
achievements and give them knowledge and methods to reinterpret their life experiences.”1081 
In March of 1978, the report was presented “To the President, the Congress, and the 
People of the United States of America.” A month later the National Advisory Committee for 
Women was established and in July 1978, Carter submitted his own recommendations based 
on the Committee’s recommendations to Congress.1082 One result of this was Carter’s Civil 
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Service Reform Act, which was passed in October 1978 and was discussed in the previous 
chapter. It offered homosexuals protection from discrimination in 95% of the public sector, 
effectively making the sexual preference plank which was passed at the Houston Conference 
the law of the land. 
 
Impact of the NWC  
That the NWC was a victory for the lesbian cause goes without saying. Passage of the sexual 
preference plank was a huge victory but what prompted greater rejoicing was the visibility 
which the event gave to lesbian-feminism. The activists now had an acknowledged position 
from which they could press their demands and respond to their conservative opponents. 
They developed a radical rhetoric to challenge what they saw as a heterosexual mind-set 
affecting the entire political scene. The White House had been sensitised to the lesbian cause 
and gay issues were now front-page media material. Vicki Gabriner, one of the lesbian 
delegates, stated after the Conference: “There is no doubt that we won a victory.”1083 Nancy 
Higgins, one of the lesbian rights activists who participated in the Conference, told the 
author, “It was the first time ever that lesbian rights were discussed at a national level and the 
most amazing thing was that the whole country was watching!”1084  
The lesbian victory was particularly significant since it was achieved against a 
formidable and numerically greater opposition by conservative women. Jeanne Cordova, a 
prominent lesbian rights activist, declared, “For lesbians, the significance of what happened 
in Houston stretches far beyond a report that goes to Congress and the President and may or 
may not get acted upon piecemeal over the next century. Houston did what Bryant, the Gay 
Movement and the Women’s Movement couldn’t do for lesbians. It said the word lesbian 
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loud and clear over the front pages of most major newspapers in this country.”1085 Lucia 
Valeska, NGTF’s co-executive director, said about the NWC, “I saw the Women's Caucus of 
NGTF pull off the sexual preference resolution and make it happen in what was, previous to 
this, a hostile environment, and I was impressed. I saw lesbian feminists now doing the basic 
groundwork — not radical but necessary work — that has to be done for the success of the 
lesbian feminist movement.”1086 
Professor Doreen Mattingly told the author that apart from lesbian visibility and the 
passage of the gay rights plank, the NWC threw light on lesbianism and its activists within 
the feminist movement itself, which at that point was divided over the issue. She said the 
Conference offered visibility “for Jean O’Leary and for a lot of people there, visibility within 
the movement… I think a lot of lesbian feminists saw it as a coming of age of lesbian rights, 
and as a fundamental feminist issue, which certainly there had been debate about before.”1087 
A major lesson which the lesbian activists learned from the NWC concerned the 
importance of mobilisation and coalition-building. The Conference showed that by getting 
organised, lesbian women could command a strong voice which could be heard even at the 
national level, giving more power to the movement. Just a few months later, in March 1978 
in Los Angeles, lesbian activists decided to form the National Lesbian Feminist 
Organization.1088 It was at the NWC that three gay rights organizations co-operated for the 
first time in search of a common goal. Of equal importance was the co-operation between 
lesbian activists and feminist activists. It was this link that got the sexual preferences plank 
through, despite conservative delegates outnumbering lesbians by two to one.  
Vicky Gabriner highlighted the success achieved by coalition-building among diverse 
ranks of women, namely removal of the invisibility that had covered lesbians in society and 
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in women’s movements alike. She said, “For the first time, a diverse coalition of women, not 
all of whom define themselves as women’s liberationists, resoundingly affirmed the rights of 
lesbians and recognized it as a feminist issue.” The effect, she concluded, was to take 
“several steps out of the closet.”1089 In the view of the Washington Post, the Conference 
produced two significant results: the establishment of a place for women in mainstream 
politics and the positioning of lesbian and gay rights front and centre of American society.1090 
In terms of American political life, the NWC proved to be something of a flashpoint 
between conservatism and progressivism, with many on the right wing seeing social 
movements such as feminism and gay rights activism as part of the same general tendency 
towards the destabilisation of what they believed to be the true American family and the 
bedrock of American civilisation. In retrospect, it can be recognised as a pivotal moment in 
America’s “culture wars” and see that it very much set the scene for the WHCF, which 
followed it.  
Reflecting on the NWC, a prominent member of the evangelical right, James Dobson, 
said: “we can thank President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, for turning that 
government-sponsored event over to the likes of Abzug, Gloria Steinem, Jane Fonda, and 
Betty Friedan. Watching them on television as they ripped into everything I believed actually 
motivated me to join the pro-family movement. When President Carter announced his follow-
up WHCF two years later, I said to myself, ‘Not this time, sir. Not this time!’”1091  
 
Carter’s Role and Contribution 
Although Carter deliberately avoided participating in the NWC, his role in enhancing the 
lesbian presence, visibility and goals is indisputable. It was he who appointed Bella Abzug as 
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Chair of the Committee of the Conference upon Costanza’s recommendation, a move which 
caused much dismay among conservative Christians. He appointed Jean O’Leary to the 
Committee, too, another highly significant appointment, since she was a well-known feminist 
and one of the best-known directors of the NGTF. Indeed, Carter accepted all of Costanza’s 
Committee recommendations, including that of Ruth Abram, another feminist and board 
member of the NGTF. The new slate was significantly more diverse and progressive than its 
predecessor appointed by President Ford. It is in the highest degree unlikely that the newly 
enhanced lesbian presence and the passage of the sexual preference plank would have been 
achieved without Carter’s appointees in place. There can be little doubt that a more 
conservative Committee would have rejected the new lesbian visibility and activists’ 
demands at a state-funded Conference.  
Professor Bunch highlighted the huge difference between Ford’s and Carter’s 
committees and the role that Carter’s appointments played in a NGTF newsletter: “the first 
IWY national commission appointed by President Ford offered us little hope. While a few 
individuals were responsive to our concerns, the commission clearly did not intend to include 
lesbianism in its deliberations. The appointment of a new commission by President Carter in 
March 1977 brought some important changes. The Carter Commission, with Bella Abzug as 
chair, had a stronger feminist presence, including women such as Gloria Steinem, Ellie 
Smeal, Millie Jeffries, Ruth Abram, Koryne Horbal... Jean O’Leary.”1092  
The NGTF also acknowledged Carter’s contribution, stating, “Thanks in considerable 
measure to President Carter’s appointment of Jean (O’Leary) as one of the select group of 
commissioners of IWY, the high point of the past months was undoubtedly the major role 
played by NGTF in so successfully mobilizing lesbian visibility and passage of the ‘lesbian’ 
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resolution at the IWY convocation at Houston. The press visibility to the issue, for lesbians 
(and thence the gay movement), and the rallying of a huge majority of non-gay women to our 
cause, indeed even Betty Friedan, marks the changeover from just feminist leadership support 
for the gay cause to a solid grassroots backing.”1093 
Nancy Higgins told the author, “There is no doubt that without Abzug’s and 
O’Leary’s presence and a lesbian-friendly (Women’s) Committee, things would have been 
very different. Can you imagine what would have happened if the chair and the Committee 
were conservative women? We would not even have been allowed in the Conference hall, as 
had happened to other events before! Certainly, Carter deserves credit for making 
appointments which were friendly and supportive to our cause.”1094  
Professor Mattingly, in a personal interview, also highlighted the importance of 
Carter’s appointments, arguing that the sexual preference plank would “certainly not (have 
passed) without Jean O’Leary. Her inclusion was vital, but also, I think what would have 
happened if there were any weaker leaders, any less feminist leaders, the Conference would 
have been derailed by the conservative anti-feminist women, many of whom were elected 
delegates in states like Utah, and who were also protesting outside the conference.”1095 
 
THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON FAMILIES 
During his 1976 Presidential campaign, Carter had promised that, were he elected, he would 
convene a “White House Conference on the American Family” in order “to help stimulate a 
national discussion of the state of American families.” Its purpose would be to unite people 
from diverse backgrounds, including “government leaders, representatives of family-related 
professions, and ordinary citizens and parents” so that they could discuss how families could 
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be supported and strengthened, and “restore the public-private partnership in social services 
that has been so hampered by Republican neglect.”1096 He had stated his view that the 
government currently had no real policy on the family at all, that the level of family 
breakdown in American had reached “dangerous proportions” and that it was the role of 
government to do everything it could to “support and strengthen the American family.”1097 
Carter had made it more than clear that he held the “American family” in huge 
esteem, saying that “the entire history of the human race teaches us that the family unit is the 
best way to raise children, and the only solid foundation on which to build a strong nation.” 
Carter also hoped to use his family-friendly message to appeal to non-evangelical Christians 
and in August 1976 had appointed as a special advisor on family matters Joseph Califano, a 
well-known Roman Catholic.1098 Carter stated his view that the government should adopt a 
strategy that would keep “government programming to a minimum” while restoring trust and 
confidence to the families of America.1099  
Carter had promised to hold the Conference shortly after his election but, in the event, 
more immediately pressing issues, including job creation, ongoing problems in the Middle 
East and inflation, stood in the way.  However, he held seven issues, including importantly 
“family,” as priorities. The others were peace, a strong national defence, human rights, 
inflation, bureaucracy and partnership.1100  He eventually announced in January 1978 that the 
WHCF would be held in December, 1979, towards the end of his Presidential term. In his 
statement, announcing the conference, Carter said: “the main purpose of this White House 
Conference will be to examine the strengths of American families, the difficulties they face, 
and the ways in which family life is affected by public policies. The Conference will examine 
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the important effects that the world of work, the mass media, the court system, private 
institutions, and other major facets of our society have on American families. This 
Conference will clearly recognize the pluralism of family life in America. The widely 
differing regional, religious, cultural, and ethnic heritages of our country affect family life 
and contribute to its diversity and strength. Families also differ in age and composition. There 
are families in which several generations live together, families with two parents or one, and 
families with or without children. The Conference will respect this diversity.”1101 
 However, December 1979 in Washington came and went with no sign of the 
promised conference. Patsy Fleming, a divorcee, was named as executive director and this 
prompted widespread criticism from Catholics. Then the chairman, Wilbur J. Cohen resigned, 
claiming ill-health, and Fleming, too, stood down rather than take a co-chairman. There were 
fears in the White House that a December 1979 conference would provoke pre-election 
conflicts about abortion and homosexuality and possibly prompt calls for more public aid for 
parochial schools. Facing additional organisational problems, the conference was postponed. 
Fears that this actually meant cancellation were allayed when a new format was announced. 
Instead of a single, 1,500-person gathering, there would be three or four regional meetings in 
the summer of 1980. Such a formula would hopefully dilute the effects of a conflict 
concentrated in a single arena. There was also a belief by some that any possibly 
embarrassing recommendation by a particular conference would not be absolute.1102 Carter 
then appointed Jim Guy Tucker, a former Congressman from Arkansas, as Chair of the 
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Conference, and John Carr as the Executive Director. Although Tucker’s wife was herself a 
divorcee, their nuclear family unit was more acceptable to religious conservatives.1103 
Carr felt strongly that the Conference should be “decentralised” so rather than having 
it in one central venue, three venues – Baltimore, Minneapolis and Los Angeles – were 
selected to facilitate those who had to travel to attend. Despite fears among some elements of 
the religious right wing, considerable effort went into ensuring that the conference 
represented Americans from all walks of life and political persuasions, with open process for 
selection, including public balloting and selection at random. Ultimately, 500 state forums 
were held, and 125,000 people voted for 2,000 delegates, who would attend the three major 
regional meetings. They were represented as follows: 60% women, 14% African Americans 
and 7.3% Hispanics.1104  Of the 2,000 delegates, some 250 were theologically conservative 
Christians.1105 
The expressed goals of the conference were various, including examining the impact 
of the economic situation on families, to encourage pro-family activities at grassroots level 
and to recommend public policies that would be good for families. A National Advisory 
Committee was set up, with “21 men and 19 women, ages 18 to 66, while there was no 
specific mention of families containing homosexuals, representing diverse racial, ethnic and 
political backgrounds.”1106 One of the conference themes proposed by the National Advisory 
Committee on the WHCF can easily be read as a veiled allusion to families with homosexuals 
and other minority family types: “American families are pluralistic in nature. Our discussion 
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of issues will reflect an understanding and respect of cultural, ethnic and regional differences 
as well as differences in structure and lifestyles.”1107 
A wide range of bodies was quick to jump on board the train; every demographic 
represented in the US seemed to have a stake in the WHCF. For instance, a joint memo of the 
American Association of Marriage and Family Counsellors, the American Home Economics 
Association, the Family Service Association of America and the National Council of Family 
Relations, mentioned the need of protection for “paperless” families, which they identified as 
primarily heterosexual, to be recognised in public family policy, although it mentioned the 
WHCF only briefly.1108 
The NGTF quickly identified the WHCF as an important opportunity to make their 
voices heard. As early as 1978, they had started working on how they could be involved, 
beginning by drafting a definition of family that would include the many American families 
in which at least one member was homosexual: 
It seems to us that the notion of family includes two basic human needs:  
 “The need of each individual to share love and caring with other human beings and to 
take responsibility in other people’s lives and 
 The need for children to depend on adults in their formative years, not only for their 
safety and survival, but for the experience, love and caring that will enable them to make 
rewarding relationships with other human beings as independent adults. We believe that a 
working definition of “family” is any constellation of two or more individuals which 
meets one or both of these basic family needs.”1109 
Having started with this attempt to posit a broad definition of the family, the NGTF 
got relatively quickly to the meat of the matter: “From our perspective, one essential policy 
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direction must be to end prejudice and discrimination against lesbians and gay men in every 
area of our society, and recognition that neither is representing ‘a threat to family life,’ we are 
part of the American family, no matter how it is defined.”1110  
The NGTF argued that the only way to truly support the American family in toto 
would be to also support American homosexuals without any form of prejudice. This was not 
a message that everyone would be prepared to take on board. The NGTF went on to make a 
direct appeal to President Carter, asking him to make the legislative changes that they felt 
would make a tangible improvement to their situation: “President Carter has stated his 
intention to eliminate all forms of Federal discrimination based on sexual orientation [an 
earlier version of the text used the word “preference” here, hinting at a nature versus nurture 
debate that was still ongoing within the ranks of the gay rights movement], but if our families 
are to be supported and strengthened, we believe that Federal policy must be directed toward 
elimination of discrimination all along the line. This includes passage of Federal civil-rights 
legislation, removal of directly discriminatory policies as the recent exclusion of gay families 
from federally subsidized housing, equal access of gay couples to credit and insurance, 
adjustment of the tax structure so that we may declare members of our families as 
dependents, and the affirmation of such basic human rights as the right to visit our loved ones 
in hospitals when they are ill.”1111 
 
Controversy from the Start 
The idea of having a Conference on the American family had probably seemed like a 
relatively uncontroversial idea when it was first mooted – after all, who wasn’t in favour of 
the American family? – but it was quickly evident that it was likely to be a highly contentious 
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conference and a flashpoint for the culture war that was steadily heating up. Carter had hoped 
that the conference would help to cement support for him among evangelical Christians, who 
were perennially concerned about the state of the family, and who were outraged when it 
became apparent that Carter did not intend to take measures that would exclude homosexuals 
from the event.  
There was some talk of postponing the final session of the WHCF until late 1980, but 
in November 1979, Stuart Eizenstat, while conceding a “flawed beginning,” expressed the 
belief that it was then turning out to be a success.1112 What’s more, the conference would be a 
plus for Carter in an election year while postponement would be expensive. Carter had 
already expressed his personal support by promising that the WHCF would not end up as a 
quickly forgotten government report.1113 While planning for the conference was still in a 
relatively early stage, the White House commissioned Gallup to carry out a survey into the 
status of American families.1114  
In January 1980, the New York Times was already able to run an article headlined 
“White House Conference on Families: A Schism Develops.” The article discussed the 
increasingly organised efforts of the religious right to be well represented and the fact that 
one hundred and fifty organisations, including the Moral Majority, had come together to fight 
their corner.1115 Dobson who had been so horrified by the Women’s Conference, was invited 
to attend the WHCF after the White House received about 80,000 letters from his supporters, 
insisting that he take part. Tucker invited Dobson to address a pre-conference event on the 
subject of child development.1116 Part of the right-wing pressure was a demand that gay 
couples be banned from the conference. D. Michael Lindsay told the author that “a number of 
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prominent evangelical leaders did visit the President in advance of the conference urging him 
not to allow gay couples to be a part of the conference.”1117 
As early as January, the Coalition for the WHCF had received a letter warning that 
certain religious right wing groups had the potential to completely derail the event. The letter 
said, in part: “The tactics and militancy of ‘new religious right’ groups in recent months is a 
threat to the original interest and ultimate success of the WHCF… some groups have seen the 
Conference as an opportunity to launch an all-out attack on government social welfare 
programs. This tactic and militancy on the state level has succeeded in almost capturing of 
[sic] two delegates in two of these states that have held preliminary state conferences and 
threaten other state conferences.”1118 
The evangelical right believed very sincerely that the Conference was, in fact, to be 
rigged against them, with a selection process1119 that explicitly favoured liberals. From their 
point of view, all they were doing was trying to even the score – and they felt that this was 
hugely important as most of them tended to agree with the fundamentalist Beverly LaHaye of 
Concerned Women of America, who had said that the WHCF intended to change the 
definition of the family, “to legitimate divorce, out-of-wedlock births, and 
homosexuality.”1120  
Schlafly arranged for her husband to file a lawsuit against the National Committee for 
the conference, claiming that it was going to use federal funds to lobby for interest groups.1121 
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From the Moral Majority came a call for a state boycott of the Conference on grounds that it 
was “stacked against family life.” The organisation set out what it believed would be targeted 
at the conference, namely the right of parents to spank their children, and the Moral 
Majority’s opposition to the drafting of women and to the provision of welfare to those who 
would not work.1122 The Southern Baptist Church passed a resolution stating that the 
conference represented “an undermining of the biblical concept of family.”1123 Dobson 
proposed a write-in campaign by his followers to secure him a place on the Conference 
Advisory Board. The idea failed when fewer than thirty letters arrived at the White House.1124    
Hackles were raised in various quarters at the apparent attempt by elements of the 
religious right wing to hijack the Conference and use it for their own ends. For instance, the 
National Council of Jewish Women (NCJW), a largely liberal group, warned its members 
that the “new right” was attempting to “take over” and oppose measures including the 
ERA.1125 The NCJW also pointed out that, as of January 1980 the religious right wing had 
already managed to dominate the Conference in Virginia and Oklahoma and urged members 
of the NCJW to do what they could to counter them.1126 In fact, in Virginia delegates from 
the religious right had managed to elect twenty-two of the total of twenty-four of the state’s 
representatives.1127 The organisation also contacted Carter directly to warn him that the 
Conference was in danger of being taken over by the religious right wing, which had already 
gained considerable ground in a growing number of states.1128 
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Gay rights activists were determined to be part of the conference, and mobilised 
efforts to ensure that they would be well represented. This was an important occasion to 
present themselves as part of the mainstream of the melting pot of American society, and not 
just a fringe group that was very much apart. On May 29, 1979, the American Civil Liberties 
Union wrote to Tucker stressing the need for “at least one person representing same sex 
families” and stating the plight of homosexual parents as follows: “there is substantial 
prejudice against gay parents. We at the American Civil Liberties Union have been involved 
in more than a few cases in recent years where custody of children was being contested in 
court solely on the grounds that a homosexual parent was intrinsically unfit.”1129 
 On August 22, 1979, Lucia Velaska and Charles Brydon of the NGTF wrote to 
members of their organisation with an interest in the WHCF urging them to contact 
conference coordinators in their state to ensure that homosexuals were properly 
represented.1130 The same day, they wrote to the delegates of the coalition for the WHCF and 
pointed out that they were not being treated the same way as other would-be participants in 
the conference process, but were being singled out and asked to jump through additional 
hoops in order to justify their presence: “We have asked to make a presentation to the state-
conference directors on the need for gay-family participation, and we’ve been told it wouldn’t 
be right to ‘single us out.’ Our response has been that we are presently being singled out for 
exclusion and that such a presentation is necessary if gay delegates are to be included at a 
state level.”1131 
Also the same day, Velaska and Brydon wrote to all their state contacts with an 
interest in the WHCF, urging them to make it very clear to state coordinators that they 
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expected them to arrange for gay delegates to participate.1132 Again on the same day, Velaska 
and Brydon wrote to members of the advisory committee, reminding them of their first 
meeting at which they had discussed the need to include poor families, as well as members of 
various other groups that often did not get the chance to engage with government. 
Apparently, despite the fact that one delegate had proposed the inclusion of homosexuals, the 
committee had managed to slide away from the topic and ultimately did not include gay 
families, despite having been petitioned by numerous organisations to do so. Clearly 
frustrated by the ongoing exclusion of homosexuals from the proceedings, they wrote (and 
underlined the text for the sake of emphasis): “we do not intend to remain invisible. We will 
demand the right to open participation in deliberations that affect our lives. We will seek 
representation, according to our numbers in this society, at the state and regional family 
conferences.”1133  
Carter went to great effort to ensure that the conference would represent the huge 
diversity of America in the 1970s, overlooking the fact that for many of the religious right 
wing there really was very little to debate at all. In fact, the very word “diversity” was a red 
rag to the conservatives, who felt that it was a code word for homosexuals.1134 For 
conservative, “pro-family” delegates, the conference was an important opportunity to voice 
their objection to “the ERA, abortion, gay rights, pornography, limiting government 
involvement with the family.”1135 
An early campaigner on the side of the right wing evangelicals was Connie Marshner, 
a conservative activist and director of the Family Policy Division of the Free Congress 
Foundation, who had already had considerable success in coordinating grassroots movements 
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of conservatives, largely composed of “little clusters of evangelical and fundamentalist 
Moms’ groups.” Marshner had sent out a newsletter, the Family Protection Report, which she 
used to reach out to this increasingly politicised constituency. When the WHCF was 
announced, she and her associates urged the members of their network to get involved.1136 
Together with other conservatives, including Paul Weyrich of the Free Congress Foundation, 
Onalee McGraw of the Heritage Foundation, and Bob Billings of the Moral Majority, she was 
involved in trying to bring the various strands of the evangelical right together to form a 
coherent group.1137 Marshner and her network worked hard to acquire as many spots for the 
evangelical right as possible and were initially very successful.1138  
Prior to the major conferences, each state chose delegates at pre-arranged hearings, 
some 70 per cent being appointed by governors and a national advisory committee, with the 
remaining 30 per cent elected at state meetings. Efforts were made to ensure a broad 
representation of society, thus delegates included people from poor families, ethnic 
minorities, the handicapped and single parents.1139 In response to the success of the religious 
right in rallying delegates, several state governors took measures to include greater numbers 
of progressives, leading many conservatives to complain that the deck was being stacked 
against them.1140  
Right wing evangelicals were clear that, among the forces they were opposing was 
Carter himself, who had already made it clear that his view of “family” went far beyond that 
of just the traditional white model. In 1979, at the start of National Family Week, Carter had 
said: “we are a nation of families. All families are important, but the extended family, the 
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foster family, and the adoptive family play a special role by relieving the isolation of those 
who lack the comfort of a loving nuclear family.”1141 
Economic issues rather than gay concerns topped the agenda at most state 
conventions, with the spotlight turned on areas such as job creation, assistance for the 
workless, flexitime and the problem of violence in the home.1142 Because they concentrated 
on such workaday issues, along with the ERA, White House staffers were unprepared when 
many of the conferences became contentious and argumentative.1143 In Atlanta, Georgia, for 
example, a conference was held, after which delegates were chosen. The conference had not 
even been advertised to potential liberal participants, some of whom were only made aware 
of it by the NGTF. In this exceptionally hostile environment, the few gay rights issues that 
were raised were met with heckles and booing.1144 It was nonetheless resolved in November 
1979 that homosexuals should be included within the definition of the family, but when the 
proceedings of the conference were released on May 5, 1980, this definition was 
excluded.1145 
It turned out that the definition had been excluded by the Governor of the state 
because homosexuality remained illegal in Georgia.1146 In response to a letter written by 
Dianne Stephenson, Executive Director of Atlanta Gay Centre, the Governor replied, tersely, 
that: “Sodomy and homosexual marriages are illegal in Georgia. A recommendation of this 
nature is unacceptable and I will not allow it to be included in our recommendations. It was 
my decision not to include any reference to homosexuality in our recommendations solely 
because of the reasons I have just stated. Until such time as homosexuality and sodomy are 
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recognized legally as acceptable behaviours, Georgia will not condone these practices. In 
making the 25 appointments of delegates… I have tried to select people who are respected in 
their communities and who would represent our State and the families in our State in the most 
respectable fashion possible in Baltimore this summer.”1147 
It seems surprising that the idea that homosexuals could be included within the 
definition of family was ever mooted, as eyewitness reports of the conference describe a very 
organised religious right wing contingent that was extremely hostile to a wide range of liberal 
issues, and it had even been suggested by one delegate that science should not be taught in 
schools, “because so much science is anti-religion.”1148 Even in liberal New York the 
literature published ahead of the state conference at which delegates would be chosen made 
no explicit reference to homosexuals in the context of family, mentioning only the fact that 
there had been a change in “non-traditional family patterns,” such as “unmarried couples 
living together” and “group or communal living arrangements.”1149  
Even before the conference started, everyone involved had run into an extremely 
fundamental dilemma: there was no consensus on what the word “family” meant, a problem 
that had not even occurred to Carter as a possibility. Furthermore, this lack of consensus was 
experienced by many, especially on the religious right, as an attack on values that they held 
very dear personally and that they sincerely believed were hugely important for the well-
being of the American nation.  
In an interview given on Father’s Day in 1977 Carter stated in a straightforward 
manner that “I don’t see homosexuality as a threat to the family.” However, the context of his 
comment offers some less encouraging insight. He said: “I don’t see homosexuality as a 
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threat to the family… I don’t feel that it is a normal interrelationship, but at the same time I 
don’t think that society, through its laws, ought to abuse or harass the homosexual. I think it 
is one of those things that is not accepted by most Americans as a normal sexual relationship. 
In my mind it is certainly not a substitute for the family life that I described to you… I don’t 
see the need to change the laws to permit homosexuals to marry. I know that there are 
homosexuals who teach and the children don’t suffer…”1150 
Making matters worse, Carter apparently intended to refer to “unconventional” 
families, presumably meaning those with homosexual parents, during a speech at the White 
House reception of the WHCF on July 20, 1979, when he said: “We often feel nostalgic about 
a past that seems to be simpler and sometimes seems to be better, and we can learn from the 
past, but we must not limit our vision of what a good family is just to what a family was in 
the past. Instead, we must find meaning in today’s challenges, and today’s realities, which we 
cannot change, honestly, creatively, with courage and with compassion… Families, as you 
well know, are more than just households. They are a network of relationships rooted not just 
in kinship based on blood, but a kinship based on shared experiences, shared joys and 
sorrows, and I think most of all, in shared love that crosses vast distances and also crosses 
very easily the barrier of generations.”1151 
In a personal interview, Tony Campolo recalled that at the state conferences “the 
primary problem was that there was no clear definition of what a family was or is, and such 
questions were raised as, ‘Is a single mother raising children that were born out of wedlock a 
family?’ There was a time when that was not considered a family. Were gay couples who 
were committed to one another and living with each other, along with any children within the 
household, to be considered a family? There were radical feminists at that gathering who 
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raised the question as to whether or not traditional family structures were oppressive 
institutions in which women were oppressed and had their identities crushed. It could be said 
that at that conference, instead of revitalizing traditional families, they came under severe 
attack.”1152 
 Ahead of the first conference, controversy arose over whether Carter should deliver 
the keynote speech. Tucker asked Carter to do so,1153  but many of his associates disagreed. 
They did not want to risk Carter being caught up in the acrimonious disputes between 
conservative and liberal Christians over such issues as abortion and gay rights. Against this, 
Stuart Eizenstat argued that a non-appearance would suggest cowardice on Carter’s part, 
while his presence would signal his support for a strong family life. Moreover, this was a 
gathering which he had himself proposed. What Eizenstat got wrong, basing his view on the 
small turnout of pickets on pro-life/pro-choice and gay rights issues, was his belief that the 
state conventions would concentrate on economic issues.1154     
Three days before the opening of the Conference, Carter declared that he would 
participate.1155 The announcement came on the same day that a Gallup poll, commissioned by 
the White House, was released, revealing a downbeat perception of family life in America. 
Nearly half of the respondents expressed the belief that family life had deteriorated in the past 
fifteen years.1156 The causes suggested ranged from increased divorce rates, lack of jobs for 
young people leading to their involvement in crime and violence, abuse of spouses and 
children, alcoholism and drug addiction.1157 Publication of the poll made the Conference 
more significant than ever.  
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The depth of hostility to Carter among right-wing evangelicals was demonstrated just 
before the opening of the Conference at a press conference held jointly by Weyrich and 
Marshner. Both described Carter’s record on family issues as “abysmal,” while Weyrich 
accused Carter of having “the worst record for family issues of any president in history.”1158 
They accused him of stacking the conference in his favour and claimed Tucker had 
manipulated delegate selection to ensure that policies which Weyrich favoured would be 
excluded. For the record, he outlined these as barring abortion, supporting prayer in schools, 
opposing employment of homosexuals in public positions and defining the family as persons 
who are related (thus excluding homosexuals). The Weyrich-Marshner alliance announced 
that it would hold its own conference, the American Family Forum, in Washington, June 30-
July 2.1159  
In reaction to the Weyrich/Marshner alliance, yet another group, the Coalition for the 
White House Conference on Families was founded. It was an umbrella organisation for 
middle-of-the-road and liberal opinion, and participant members included the US Catholic 
Conference, the American Public Welfare Association, the National Urban League, the 
National Council of Jewish Women and other church and welfare bodies. At their press 
conference, they made clear that they would oppose the Weyrich/Marshner proposals.1160               
 
THE CONFERENCES TAKE PLACE 
Baltimore (5-7 June 1980) 
The first Conference opened as scheduled on June 5, 1980 in Baltimore and lasted three days. 
Taking part were 671 delegates.1161 Carter opened proceedings with a deftly crafted speech 
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designed to appeal to all sides, but ran into trouble when he sought to widen the definition of 
the family. Starting jokily, he said, “I am very pleased to see that there is no violence in the 
audience or on the outside of the assembly area.”1162 He then lauded the diversity and 
solidarity to be found among families, including his own, noted the progress made in the 
battle for racial and gender equality, and applauded single parents struggling to manage. 
Seeking to embrace both conservatives and progressives, he portrayed the family as the 
product of thousands of years of human experience and as an institution supported by 
traditions, including the Judaeo-Christian tradition. However, opposition arose when he 
suggested that family ties were “based on more than blood kinship,” that government should 
stay out of family life, including the bedroom, and that there was no such thing as a standard 
perfect family.1163  
Hard-line evangelicals interpreted these remarks as a sop to homosexuals and accused 
him of organising the conferences with the aim of improving his chances of re-election. All 
the grandstanding by the evangelical right at the Baltimore conference was a significant 
rallying call for gay rights activists. The NGTF had requested a spot on the National 
Advisory Committee and, while this had not been granted, the organization was represented 
at the Conference, and as in Houston, its presence was highly visible. Although only seven of 
671 delegates were openly gay at the beginning of the conference,1164 as many as thirty 
“came out” during the course of the conference.1165 They received the support of various 
participating organisations, including the National Organization for Women, the Black 
Caucus, and various other groups not specifically aligned with their cause.1166 The NGTF 
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immediately made its position known by submitting a recommendation to end discrimination 
on the basis of sexual preference.1167  
The conference debated hundreds of proposals and on many, such as ways to combat 
drink and drug abuse and means to care for the elderly in their homes, there was wide 
agreement. Joseph Giordano of the Coalition for the White House Conference on Families 
urged delegates to keep issues such as gay rights and abortion in perspective. However, his 
advice went by the board when provocative topics such as alternative family structures came 
up for debate.1168       
As in Houston, tempers flared and neither the progressive activists, including gay 
rights proponents, nor the religious right wing activists behaved particularly well.1169 
Marshner and her allies attempted to raise the issues of abortion and homosexuality in every 
workshop, regardless of how relevant the topics were. Workshop leaders, prepared for this, 
had been instructed to act strongly to limit discussion to the matters at hand, infuriating the 
Marshner crowd.1170 After just one day of meetings, Marshner complained about the way the 
Conference was being run and reaffirmed her view that: “Families consist of people related 
by heterosexual marriage, blood, and adoption. Families are not religious cults, families are 
not Manson families [referring to the infamous commune led by Charles Manson in the late 
1960s], families are not heterosexual or homosexual liaisons outside marriage.”1171   
Early work at the conference saw the drafting of one pro-gay proposal after another 
followed by the rejection of one pro-gay proposal after another. Nevertheless, in the long run, 
it was the conservatives who lost most heavily, prompting walkouts and charges of 
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manipulation. In Proposal 49, the sexual preference recommendation, gay rights activists set 
out five clauses they described as legal and human rights. The main demand was for the 
elimination of discrimination, and encouragement of respect, for differences based on various 
criteria, including, importantly, sexual preference. It also expressed support for the ERA and 
the right to abortion. Proposal 57 stated that community institutions should provide services 
which took into account individual preferences and differences in the make-up of families. 
Both proposals found support from workshop members and efforts were made in the 
“Challenges and Responsibilities” workshop to include a general non-discrimination clause. 
It did not pass and efforts to include “gay families” in a statement which listed types of 
families lost 64 to 57.1172  
Returning to the conference on day two, gay rights advocates sought to craft a 
definition of family that would include homosexuals, but lost 20-18. However, an attempt by 
conservatives to state that only heterosexual families should be considered true families was 
also defeated, 22-15. The result was that the final recommendations did not contain a precise 
definition of the family.1173           
However many losses gay rights advocates sustained, the conservatives came off 
worse, being voted down time after time when policy was debated in sub-committee. Their 
position against abortion received a serious setback when one subcommittee came out 
overwhelmingly in favour of the right to abortion for low-income women. The same 
subcommittee, in endorsing the ERA, referred to persons with “special preferences” and 
argued that there should be no discrimination against them. “Special preferences” was clearly 
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code for homosexual households. The language in favour of the ERA and against 
discrimination for sexual preference was included in the 73-to-24 vote.1174   
Although all of the gay rights advocates’ successful recommendations were liable to 
withdrawal or failure in voting on the final day, many conservatives walked out of the 
conference, claiming it was rigged against them. In a dramatic scene on the platform, 
Virginia Republican Congressman Lawrence Pratt seized the microphone from Tucker and 
declared, “We have decided this delegation is stacked and we should walk out.”1175  Pratt 
then led a contingent of about fifty conservatives out of the room. James Bopp of Terre 
Haute, Ind., legal counsel for the National Right to Life Committee, declared, “It's obvious 
this conference was manipulated to come up with a predetermined outcome.” Bopp was one 
of several pro-life delegates appointed by the National Advisory Committee to ensure a 
balanced group.1176  
Among those who walked out was Marshner who said that she wanted to demonstrate 
that the conference had lost its “credibility.” She said, “they are pro-ERA, pro-abortion, pro-
sexual preference, pro-a guaranteed annual income, and pro-national health insurance. We 
have become a pitiful minority and we’re walking out on principle… Our delegates told us 
that in some workshops ideas like freedom of sexual preference were approved. This is 
equivalent to an endorsement of homosexuality. We wanted to be fair but only the point of 
view of the conference staff could be heard.”1177 In a later press release, Marshner said that 
“the WHCF had totally destroyed its credibility and should be exposed as a fraud.”1178 John 
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Carr described the walk-out as a publicity stunt and urged the protestors to return, without 
success.1179 The walk out proved to be an act of self-destruction by the conservatives.  
The final day was crucial for both sides, but particularly for gay rights advocates 
because the recommendation to end discrimination on the basis of sexual preference 
(Proposal 49), was up for the vote. Talking to the media beforehand, Tucker said he 
personally would not vote for it and that he had urged some delegates to follow his 
example.1180 In the event, the recommendation was passed, extraordinarily, by a single vote, 
292 to 291.1181 If Marshner, Pratt, Bopp and the other about fifty conservative Christians had 
remained at the conference, they would have won the vote easily. Tucker said that the walk-
out was directly responsible for the defeat. “Their decision to leave was directly responsible 
for the loss. They might otherwise have won by a comfortable margin.”1182 
However tiny the margin, for gay rights advocates, a victory was a victory. The 
NGTF highlighted the importance of the recommendation in itself and the fact that it was 
endorsed “in the face of right-wing pressure.”1183 Reporting on the conference proceedings, 
the gay rights newspaper, GCN (Gay Community News), said that openly gay and lesbian 
delegates were “absolutely delighted” by the passage of the recommendation. It quoted Eric 
Rofes, a gay activist, as saying the success was particularly impressive since only seven of 
the 671 delegates were openly gay or lesbian.1184 “I think the conference has produced a 
series of recommendations that address the concerns that all families face and that certainly 
includes lesbian and gay families,” said Rofes, who throughout the Conference, wore a “Gay” 
button.1185 By the end of proceedings, the conference had voted on fifty-seven 
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recommendations, including controversial ones like the right to abortion, sexual preference 
and the ERA, which got through largely due to the conservatives’ walk-out.1186  
 
  
                                                          





Minneapolis (19-21 June 1980) 
The Minneapolis conference was opened on June 19, 1980, by Anne Wexler, with the 
participation of 600 delegates.1187 The opening and subsequent debates were generally quieter 
than in Baltimore, but when conservative and pro-family delegates, including Marshner, 
failed to get their platform included in conference recommendations, they walked out, citing 
the same reasons they used in Baltimore.1188 Schlafly was not a delegate but held a press 
conference at which she denounced the Conference as “a media event to promote alternative 
life.”1189 The conservative Christians seemed more concerned about abortion than gay rights 
but despite strenuous efforts, their anti-abortion amendment was rejected.1190 
In the end, the Conference endorsed almost identical recommendations to those of 
Baltimore, including abortion rights and the ERA. Fifty recommendations were approved out 
of 55 proposed, among them, by a narrow margin, a recommendation opposing the 
imposition of a secular, humanist philosophy in public institutions.1191 However, the 
Conference proved significant as the only venue of the three to agree on a definition of the 
family. Two recommendations were narrowly approved to define the family as “two or more 
persons related by blood, heterosexual marriage, adoption or extended families.” The vote 
was 297 to 259.1192 The exclusion of homosexuals from the definition was a setback for the 
gay cause and was attributed to conservatives and right-wingers outnumbering progressives 
and supporters of gay rights. 
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Los Angeles (10-12 July 1980) 
Interest in the last conference at Los Angeles was heightened by the staging in Washington a 
few days earlier of the American Family Forum, the gathering promised by Marshner and 
Weyrich as a response to the conference in Baltimore. A thousand people attended and 
conservative pundit James Kilpatrick said it was “as one-sidedly conservative as the 
Baltimore affair was one-sidedly liberal.” The speakers, representing the evangelical right, 
included Schlafly, Dobson, Beverly LeHaye and Falwell, who described the gathering as “an 
across-the-board rebuttal of the WHCF.”1193 
When the Los Angeles conference started on July 10, it brought together 613 
delegates. 1194 Two topics dominated the opening session: a definition of the family and the 
role of government in personal affairs. Ann W. Peralta from Oklahoma called for 
endorsement of the family as “persons related by blood, marriage or adoption.” But she 
acknowledged that “unfortunately, getting this definition adopted will be difficult because 
states like ours did not follow the procedure of electing all the delegates, which would have 
brought more traditionalists to the conference.”1195 Other topics generated heated debate, 
including the ERA, legalized abortion, and teen-age access to contraception.1196 
Meanwhile, conservatives organised another extramural protest meeting, a pro-family 
gathering which attracted a crowd of 7,000, at Long Beach, California. Arch-conservative 
Tim LaHaye was the principal organiser and Schlafly was among the speakers. The meeting 
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passed resolutions supporting an anti-abortion amendment and for prayer in public schools. It 
also called for a Senate investigation of the delegate selection to the WHCF.1197 
Back in Los Angeles, conservative Christians once again, but not unexpectedly, 
staged a walk-out, protesting against what they saw as an absence of moral issues on the 
agenda. The walk-out was led by delegate Janie Triggs of Nevada who, like Schlafly and 
Bopp, charged that “the entire conference from its inception has manipulated and contributed 
to provide for a pre-determined outcome. To accept the pre-determined recommendations 
would be to drive more nails into the federally funded coffin of the American family.” 




After the conference, the White House brought out a “summary” of the major conclusions 
and findings, which stressed the conference’s pluralist nature and the open spirit with which 
Carter had called the conference in the first place. However, the summary largely contained a 
series of what must be deliberately vague statements about exploring change and the 
“tensions and opportunities of time and situation.”1199 Homosexuality was not listed explicitly 
in the summary, but may have been intended to be considered as one of the “difficult issues” 
mentioned alongside abortion.1200 The recommendations in the summary managed to call for 
an end to discrimination in the workplace and provide a long list of categories of people who 
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might be discriminated against without explicitly mentioning homosexuals.1201 Buried at the 
end of the summary, in a section entitled “Minority Report Concerns,” it stated “Three 
reports urged an end to discrimination against homosexuals.”1202  In October 9, 1980, less 
than a month before the 1980 Presidential elections, Carter received the official report on the 
WHCF from the National Advisory Committee (it included homosexuals among the list of 
possible families).1203 
 
Impact and Consequences of the WHCF 
Carter may have hoped that a conference on the American family would please the right-wing 
evangelicals who had voted for him in 1976. However, it did anything but. When the various 
conferences ended, he went on record as saying that he considered them “a great success,” 
being “vigorous, well-debated, and sometimes controversial, as can be expected.”1204 He 
stressed that, were he to remain President following the election, he would be best placed to 
make changes based on the recommendations from the conferences.1205 However, the reality 
was that the conferences had become more of a battleground for activists on two opposing 
sides than a forum for the positive and healthy exchange of views. 
The impact of the WHCF on the evangelical right and the gay rights movement alike 
was tremendous, both being deeply affected by the results. Carter attended only the first 
conference, but his decisions played an extremely important role in the outcome and the 
aftermath. If Carter had hoped that the WHCF would help to unite Americans in working 
towards a set of common goals, he must have been terribly disappointed. Instead, it seems to 
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have served largely to highlight the vast and growing differences between two major 
subcultures within the United States. An article in Newsweek called it “the biggest political 
battleground between conservatives and liberals since the National Women’s Conference in 
Houston in 1977.”1206 
 
On Gay Rights 
As with the Women’s Conference, the WHCF proved hugely important for gay rights and 
contributed to changing public discourse on the topic. Carter had allowed homosexual 
activists to participate and express their views publicly in a State-funded event of his own 
creation, thus bringing gay rights to the attention of every American. This alone offered the 
gay community increasing visibility, legitimacy and a sense of acceptance. The community 
was now recognised by the Government, and the President’s personal involvement signalled 
and validated the changes that were happening for it.  
Equally important was that the conferences were about families and Carter had 
effectively admitted that homosexual families could exist. That the National Advisory 
Committee of the Conferences included homosexual couples among the list of possible 
families was a huge victory for gay rights. At a time when the gay community was still 
marginalised, this was another major step towards respect, credibility, recognition and 
legitimacy. That Carter did not exclude homosexuals from the list of possible families, and 
the fact that he allowed gay rights activists to participate in the Conference played an 
undoubted role in the Committee coming to the conclusion that it did.  
A big win for gay rights activists was approval of the recommendation that there 
should be an end to discrimination on the basis of sexual preference. As in Houston, 
Baltimore had passed a similar recommendation despite strong opposition from 
                                                          





conservatives. This was another indication that things in US politics were changing fast and 
that gay rights groups now had the power to influence public decisions and put pressure on 
the government for social reforms. More and more homosexuals became convinced that 
things could change and they could influence political decisions by getting organised.   
Of major significance in the outcome of the conferences was Carter’s refusal to 
surrender to demands by the evangelical right that homosexuals should be excluded from the 
Conferences. Had Carter given in to such pressures, none of the advances achieved for the 
gay community would have happened. What made Carter’s decision more important, and for 
many thinking Americans more honourable, was that the Conferences took place during an 
election year, with the risks involved to his campaign. Carter accepted the political dangers 
and still allowed homosexuals to participate.  
Finally, it must be noted that a number of gay delegates “came out” during the 
conference, signalling that the climate was becoming increasingly accepting of the gay 
community. Eddie Sandifer told the author that “certainly people would not have come out in 
the Conference if the environment was not welcoming. And I know that it was (welcoming) 
despite the attacks against us. But I think people did not care about them. For us, the 
important thing was that we had the acceptance of the President himself. He was the one who 
had allowed us to express our views and concerns at a Conference organised by him. The 
important thing was not to talk and convince people about our rights; the important thing was 
to change a president’s mind about us and Carter showed with his stance in the Conference 
and generally that he recognised us and accepted us. Since he did that, then it was a matter of 
time until most of the nation did.”1207 
                                                          






On the Evangelical Right 
As for the evangelical right, the Conference had a particular impact on its relationship with 
Carter. Carter had made no specific reference to homosexuals in his opening speech at 
Baltimore and remained circumspect on the topic of homosexuality. However, there appears 
to have been no doubt in the minds of the evangelical right that the WHCF had been an 
attempt to widen the definition of the word “family” to include homosexuals. 
Evangelicals believed the President had stacked the conference with members who 
“… refused to privilege heterosexual families.”1208 Writing not long after the conference 
Falwell raged against homosexuality and the “fractured family” and stated: “with a 
skyrocketing divorce rate, the American family may well be on the verge of extinction in the 
next twenty years. Even the recent WHCF has called for an emphasis on diverse family 
forums (common-law, communal, homosexual and transsexual “marriages”). The Bible 
pattern of the family has been virtually discarded by modern American society.”1209 
Falwell’s Moral Majority referred to the conference as “the Anti-Family Conference.” 
Fob James, the Governor of Alabama, said that he would not send any delegate from his state 
because “it appeared that the conference was in opposition to Judeo-Christian values.”1210 
Dan Richey, a state senator from Louisiana, said that, “This entire WHCF has been stacked 
and rigged from the very start to promote Jimmy Carter’s views on gay rights, abortion, and 
more federal government in our lives.”1211 The Southern Baptist Convention, to which Carter 
belonged, denounced the conference as representing “a general undermining of the biblical 
concept of family.”1212 
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Schlafly denounced the very idea of the WHCF as “stupid” and said that “it was 
travesty to call it a family conference when those in attendance were in favour of calling 
homosexuals a family.” For Schlafly and her followers, families were “defined by 
heterosexual marriage, blood relationships, and the legality of adoption” and all of their 
members should perform clear roles that were largely dictated by gender.1213 Beverly LeHaye 
claimed that Carter had “falsely used his born-again image to hoodwink people into thinking 
he is one of us.”1214  
In response to what they saw as the excessively liberal agenda at the WHCF, the 
religious right wing hastily organised their own American Family Forum, which was held 
between June 30 and July 2, 1980. It featured mostly religious right-wing stalwarts such as 
Schlafly, Dobson, Falwell, Marshner, and Weyrich. The topics under discussion were focused 
on Christianity and the family, and included panels that dealt with what delegates saw as the 
attack on them from homosexuals and liberals such as one entitled “The Problem of 
Homosexuality versus the Family.” Weyrich described as “garbage” the idea that a “couple of 
fornicators” or “couple of lesbians” could bring up a child and describe themselves as a 
family.1215 Finally, in 1980, the Southern Baptist Convention “passed resolutions denouncing 
pornography, homosexuality, human evolution and the WHCF …” With these resolutions, 
the Southern Baptist Convention was now at odds with almost all of Carter’s views on 
important social issues.1216  
The WHCF was an ambitious initiative by Carter, who believed that it would help the 
American family while hoping it would improve his standing among right wing evangelicals. 
In the event, it was an enormous own goal with regards to his relationship with evangelicals. 
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The WHCF and the NWC had been posited as an opportunity for Americans to come together 
and find shared interests and goals. Instead, they served primarily as a display case for the 
two camps forming in America which appeared doomed to remain in diametric opposition. 
The conferences impacted significantly on the issue of gay rights, but also on the evangelical 
right. In many ways, the effects of the debates are still being felt today. 
For gay and lesbian activists, both events played an important role in advancing their 
cause, especially with regard to public discourse. For the first time, gay activists were given a 
public platform from which they could discourse on who they were, what were their needs 
and what they hoped to achieve. Importantly, this took place at State-funded events with the 
active approval of the President. The Conferences gave gay activists unprecedented visibility 
and legitimacy on a national scale to make known their presence and problems to a largely 
unaware American public. The fact that homosexuals were included in the list of families in 
an event organized by the President was an immense boost for gay activists’ morale.  
The conferences also brought home to the NGTF and other gay rights activists that if 
they organised seriously, their voices could be heard and could bring influence where it was 
needed, thus strengthening the movement. Both the families and women’s conferences voted 
against discrimination over sexual preference, which gay rights activists saw as further proof 
that they could influence social policy by getting organised. They realised that such 
organisation called not only for the formation of alliances among gay groups, but for the 
building of coalitions with non-gay but like-minded lobbyists. For instance, some feminists 
had different aims, but the same opponents: the conservative Christians. 
None of the above would have happened if Carter had not appointed progressive 
people to key positions or if he had given in to pressure from the evangelical right to exclude 





Carter’s decision to replace the conservative members of the Women’s Committee appointed 
by President Ford with people recommended by Costanza. This decision played a massively 
important role not only in the organization but in the outcome of the Women’s Conference. 
Carter’s refusal to ban gays from the WHCF was also of major importance; it played a hugely 
important role in the Conference’s recommendations and the walk-outs from each 
Conference by evangelicals.  
Although the evangelical right lost a number of key battles to gay activists, the two 
events had a marked effect on the movement. Mobilising its supporters to an extent never 
seen before, the evangelical right became active rather than passively defensive in its 
campaign to protect traditional society against what it saw as societal corruption and 
especially the decadence of the new “American family.” One result was the creation of 
several evangelical, right-wing interest groups that played an important role in the 1980 
elections and are still active and powerful today. The right wing evangelicals, too, came to 
understand the value of coalition politics, binding themselves into groups and alliances to 
combat the increasing strength and influence of the gay rights movement. 
Both events had a profound effect on Carter. They certainly strengthened his position 
with gays, but dealt a serious blow to his relations with the evangelical right, a relationship 
that never recovered. From a public relations perspective, the WHCF in particular proved to 
be a massive debacle, especially coming so close to the 1980 elections. For the gay 
community, however, it contributed uniquely to changing public discourse on gay rights in 
the United States. As Tony Campolo told the author, “The chaotic WHCF was what brought 
the homosexual issue to the fore in American political discussion.”1217 
 
  
                                                          






THE EVANGELICAL RIGHT AND GAY RIGHTS ACTIVISTS VS. 
CARTER DURING HIS PRESIDENCY: PRESSURE AND DISSATISFACTION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
We have already examined the principal issues of concern to gay rights activists and how 
Carter responded to them, as well as the evangelical right’s reaction to Carter’s decisions and 
policies in this area. In this chapter, we will explore the additional pressures which Carter 
faced from both sides in their attempts to influence his policies. We will also consider some 
of Carter’s decisions which led to dissatisfaction in both of these movements, and most 
importantly, we will examine how Christian conservatives moved to organise their ranks in 
response to what they saw as Carter’s liberal policies. 
Having courted both evangelical Christians and gay rights activists prior to the 
election, Carter found himself in a delicate situation when he moved into the White House. 
Somehow, he would have to continue to show those on the evangelical right that his faith was 
not just for the election campaign, and that he was an upright and moral person, while also 
honouring commitments he had made to act against discrimination and in favour of human 
rights for everyone. At the same time, he needed to observe the division of church and state 
that he had referenced as being so important to him.  
Both liberals and activists among the right wing evangelicals, and other right wing 
groups, had long to-do lists for the new President, who had relied on each end of the 
spectrum for support. He was lobbied to meet their requests to initiate specific policies, to 
make high-level appointments from their ranks and to meet their officials and discuss their 
agendas. Among the liberals was the increasingly organised and politically astute gay rights 





elected. Gay activists hoped that Carter would engage with substantial legislative reform that 
would strengthen their position and remove discrimination against them across a range of 
areas. On the other hand, members of the evangelical right hoped that the new President, a 
born-again Christian, would return faith to the heart of American democracy, including 
taking a hard line against what they saw as perversion in the form of any homosexual activity 
or activism.  
Carter never wavered from his belief that a clear separation between church and state, 
as discussed earlier, was hugely important. In fact, he found justification for this view in his 
Baptist faith; the Baptist church had long held this tenet. Throughout his presidency, Carter 
had managed to juggle his public faith with his view that the government had no role in 
legislating over moral issues and that a separation between church and state was essential. 
Carter was entirely honest when he said that he considered homosexuality to be a sin, but he 
was equally honest in believing that homosexuals should not be harassed and should have the 
same rights as everyone else. Marilyn Haft remembered in a personal interview that, “His 
point of view… when he was President was that what he believed as a religious person [who 
had personal and religious issues with homosexuality] should not and would not influence 
what was his duty to do, which was to protect people under the US Constitution with equal 
rights…”1218 The task of juggling these views was going to prove increasingly difficult as his 
presidency progressed and he continued to be petitioned by two social forces that agreed on 
practically nothing. 
 
PRESSURE AND DISSATISFACTION FROM THE EVANGELICAL RIGHT 
The Carter team made use of the interregnum between the election and the inauguration to 
discuss how best to relate with the various special interest groups which had supported the 
                                                          





president-to-be. Central to these discussions was Phil Strickland, Carter’s religious expert 
during the campaign. Strickland suggested that there should be a permanent White House 
liaison to the believing community, someone “religious enough to understand religious mind-
sets and political enough to understand issues.”1219 Fearing that religious leaders and groups 
had been “shut out” of the White House and believing that there was an urgent need to 
address the situation, he offered to take on the coordinating role himself.1220    
Accordingly, on December 3, 1976, Strickland sent Carter a memorandum suggesting 
concrete measures to strengthen relations with the religious community he considered vital to 
Carter’s success. These included immediate meetings with key religious leaders, formation of 
a standing advisory group on religious issues and the initiation of contacts with special 
interest groups, including civil rights campaigners and feminists.1221 In a subsequent 
memorandum, Strickland also included a list of such groups, noting that they would want to 
interact with Carter and that his success could depend on his relationship with them.1222 Two 
weeks later, Carter thanked Strickland for his “helpful” memos, but gave no indication that he 
intended to act on his suggestions.1223  Carter began his term as President with the religious 
liaison idea still under discussion by White House aides and in February 1977, Strickland 
once again stressed the importance of such a role and again offered to fill it.1224    
With the link-person issue still undecided, Carter received a request from an old 
acquaintance offering to work in the White House in the role Strickland had suggested for 
himself. This was the Rev. Robert (Bob) Maddox, a native of Georgia, and a minister of the 
evangelical Southern Baptist Church. Like Strickland, Maddox felt that Carter needed to 
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maintain a close relationship with the religious community for the success of his policies and 
for his chances of re-election in four years’ time.1225   
Religious pressures on the Carter team had become evident even earlier, in this case 
concerning the Cabinet. In the period between Carter’s victory and his move into the White 
House, the Rev. Pat Robertson and other prominent evangelicals drew up a list of twenty 
Christians as possible members of the President’s Cabinet; they then chartered a plane and 
delivered the list to Carter’s home in Plains, Georgia.1226 They felt fully entitled to make such 
a request since Carter had promised them top posts in his administration when he was 
interviewed on Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network during the 1976 campaign.1227  
Robertson gave his support to Carter on the basis of his promises during the interview.1228 
The speed and the organised nature of the religious requests so soon after Carter’s 
election pointed up the high expectations they had of him. However, Carter ignored their 
requests and recommendations, thus ensuring he got off to a bad start in this crucially 
important relationship. Indeed, it was a misstep from which he would never recover. When 
Carter announced his Cabinet, it contained none of Robertson’s suggested appointees, but 
included people the evangelicals considered to be godless and, as one said, unable to “speak 
the language of the Bible.”1229 Many right wing Christians concluded that Carter had used 
them to get himself elected, then ignored their wishes. As for his failure to appoint any of the 
twenty evangelicals on the list, this was something which Robertson would never forgive.1230 
When it came to the widely canvassed proposal for a religious liaison person first 
suggested by Strickland, Carter chose instead to create a new White House department, the 
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Office of Public Liaison, which would oversee both religious and non-religious matters. As 
Director of the new office, he appointed Costanza,1231 who was already persona non grata 
with the evangelicals because of her stance on gay rights, the ERA and abortion. That she 
would now be in charge of religious affairs further angered the evangelicals. 
Despite Carter’s coolness in the matter of his memo, Strickland continued to supply 
information and suggestions on religious issues to the new President, as did Bob Maddox. 
However, Carter appeared unable to respond to what was his most natural constituency, the 
evangelical Christians, causing a growing alienation.1232 Because evangelicals had enjoyed 
easy access to Presidents Johnson and Nixon, they assumed the door to Carter would be 
opened even wider. That is clear from a letter to Carter from Jack Harwell, editor of the 
Christian Index. Apparently assuming that Carter would invite leaders of the Southern 
Baptist Church to meet with him in the White House, Harwell expressed fears that Carter 
might be accused of “establishing some kind of Baptist Vatican on the Potomac.” 1233 Carter 
replied that any such meeting might be better held elsewhere than at the White House, but 
assured him that the Baptists had no need to be concerned about his actions.1234  
In the event, Carter did meet with leading Southern Baptists several times during his 
Presidency, including in the White House, but only with the moderates and on a personal 
rather than an official basis. Peter Bourne said in a personal interview that “Carter was very 
conscious of the separation of church and state in the US constitution and history. He did feel 
a close affinity with the progressive branch (the least fundamentalist) of the Southern Baptists 
and held several meetings at the White House with their representatives. However he was 
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careful to do so on a personal basis without involving any of his White House staff in the 
meetings. He did tell these groups that he felt he had a unique opportunity as president to 
spread the word of God with other world leaders and other groups he met with around the 
world. In this sense he was very much an evangelical.”1235 
However, the separation of church and state, so dear to Carter, was anathema to the 
evangelical right and Falwell once said, “The idea of separation of church and state was 
invented by the Devil to keep Christians from running their own country.”1236 Nevertheless, 
Carter continued to insist, throughout his Presidency, that the separation of church and state 
was important, and that one could believe this and still be a sincere and committed Christian. 
He said: “I believe as a Baptist that there should be a proper separation of the Church and 
State. This nation requires by law that the Church and State be separated, with the church not 
dominating the government, nor the government dominating the Church. At the same time, I 
do not believe that a human being can separate in one’s heart and mind the responsibilities in 
government and responsibilities to God. I have never let my beliefs interfere in my 
administration of the duties of President, yet I have never found any incompatibility in being 
President and a god-fearing person. I pray more than I did when I was not President and 
continue my commitment to Jesus Christ as before.”1237 
From the moment he assumed office in 1977, Carter refused requests to meet religious 
groups or attend their events and outraged evangelicals charged that gay rights activists 
seemed able to secure access to the President while they could not. Every year for three years 
Carter was invited to speak at the National Religious Broadcasters’ annual meeting in 
Washington, but declined each time. He only accepted the fourth invitation, in 1980, in the 
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run-up to the Presidential elections, and this was after Maddox convinced him that the 
previous three rejections were “serious tactical mistakes.”1238  
The above was not the only request Carter turned down. Back in 1977, Carter was 
invited to speak at the Southern Baptist Convention1239 and at the National Prayer 
Breakfast;1240 Campus Crusade, a ministry for college evangelism, asked him to appear in a 
film about prayer; 1241 Rita Warner, president of the Christian Civil Liberties Union, asked 
Carter to meet her about a White House rally planned for July 29, 1977 about “God and 
country”;1242 in May 1978, Pat Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network invited Carter to 
make an appearance in a TV programme, “It’s Time to Pray, America.”1243 Carter declined 
all these requests. 
Fundamentalist Christians expressed their frustrations at failing to meet with Carter in 
October 1977 when they demonstrated outside the White House against child abuse, sex 
textbooks in schools and pornography. They “demanded” to see Carter on grounds that they 
were “the President’s people.” They said they had been trying to meet with Midge Costanza 
for six months and felt she was giving them “the run-around.” The demonstrators told two of 
Carter’s aides, Jan Peterson and Ed Smith, “The gays can get into the White House, but we 
can’t. What kind of administration is this?”1244 
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For some Christians, Carter came to be seen not just as indifferent to their cause but 
as its enemy. With gay leaders increasingly visible and discussions on homosexuality gone 
mainstream, their bitterness led some zealots to denounce Carter as “the anti-Christ.”1245 Mel 
White, a long-standing member of the evangelical Protestant movement and the biographer of 
Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, Billy Graham and James Dobson, gave a personal interview to 
the author about those days. He said, “Generally, all these fundamentalist Christian leaders 
saw Carter as a traitor to the Christian cause for his progressive stance on so many issues, 
including homosexuality.”1246 At this time, the US media were dominated by the hostage 
crisis in Tehran. Some Christian conservatives claimed that the taking of American hostages 
in Iran was the result of moral degradation back home, part of which was the concern over 
issues such as gay rights.1247 
In addition, many Christians, especially those on the evangelical right, already felt 
that Carter had betrayed them: “… he served alcohol in the White House; he supported the 
ERA; whilst personally opposed to abortion, he had not taken a sufficiently activist position 
against it; he did not speak out for prayer in the schools; he allowed homosexuals to work in 
the White House; and he had not, as they claimed he had promised, hired evangelicals for his 
staff. ‘He surrounded himself with Godless people,” they claimed.1248  
The disappointment of the right wing Christians who had voted for Carter in such 
numbers are exemplified by his desertion by one-time evangelical supporters such as Pat 
Robertson1249 and in a Playboy interview with Anita Bryant: 
“Playboy: […] Do you have any heroes? 
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Bryant: I don’t have many. I don’t know if I have any. I think the reason I’m so disillusioned 
is because I really looked at Jimmy Carter as a hero, as one who had caught the eye and 
heartbeat of the grass roots of America. I really had great expectations of him, and I found 
that in life, when you put different individuals on a pedestal, God very carefully takes them 
off the pedestal and shows us that we’re to put no one there. 
“Playboy: Why did you sour on Carter? 
Bryant: Well, how can a born-again Christian who’s truly born-again not take a stand against 
the sin of homosexuality? He himself stated in the Playboy Interview [prior to the election in 
1976, discussed above], which my husband brought me to read, that he was against 
homosexuality, and yet he allows Midge Costanza to go down to Dade County and campaign 
for homosexuality. She was paid by our opposition to come down. I won’t say any further 
what I know about her, because that’s not important [presumably here Bryant is referring to 
the rumours of Costanza’s homosexuality, which were in fact true], but the thing is that she 
has an open door to the President of the United States, who claims to be a born-again 
Christian, when homosexuality is at the very core of what God is against. 
Playboy: You mean the Playboy Interview helped convince you to go for Carter? 
Bryant: I felt overall that it was not bad, except for some of the choice words he used, and I 
even understood why he felt compelled to use them. 
Playboy: And now you feel betrayed by him? 
Bryant: Well, we’re pretty much in touch with the heartbeat of the grassroots people and 
most of those people are totally dismayed and disillusioned by Carter… I wanted to support 
Carter because I wanted to believe that he was really a Christian, but his sister Gloria Spann 
said in an interview that she doesn’t even believe in hell... That’s hard to believe. I think I 
represent a lot of Christians. I would probably say the majority of Christians, and they’re 





believe that when a man is President, we have an obligation as Christians to pray for him, so 
I’m caught between a rock and a hard place, because I want to defend him, but yet I can’t 
discuss the straddling on the fence he’s done so far on all the important issues like ERA, 
homosexuality, the Panama Canal, etc.”1250 
According to Peter Bourne, another important reason for evangelicals’ unhappiness 
with Carter was race. He told the author that the opposition to Carter “that built up prior to 
the 1980 election was due to many things. Race may have been the most significant part. In 
1976, white southerners (including fundamentalists) were willing to overlook his pro-
integration statement as necessary rhetoric to appeal to the black vote and whites elsewhere in 
the country. They assumed that once elected he would return to traditional ‘southern’ values. 
When, as President, he began appointing African-Americans in large numbers to high level 
positions in government and clearly demonstrated his commitment to racial equality, they felt 
he had betrayed them. Having elected him in 1976 as the first southern president since 
Lyndon B. Johnson, this regional chauvinism did not apply to anywhere the same degree the 
second time around. In 1976 the alternative to Carter was Gerald Ford who held no particular 
appeal in the South.”1251  
The growing rift between Carter and the evangelicals sent danger signals to Maddox, 
and in September 1978, he suggested that Carter should appoint him to act as the White 
House’s official liaison with the Christians. 1252 Carter declined the suggestion,1253 but when 
Maddox continued to contribute memos and letters, he was eventually appointed to the 
President’s speech-writing team.1254 
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Evangelicals get Organised 
Anger, frustration and a bitter sense of betrayal felt by evangelicals towards Carter resulted in 
the widespread political mobilisation of conservative Christians between 1977 and 1980. In 
the evangelical Christians’ eyes, morally degenerative issues such as abortion, the ERA and 
gay rights had been allowed to flourish under Carter’s leadership. Colonel Donner, chief 
strategist of the Christian Voice, said, “It was a tremendous let-down, if not a betrayal, to 
have Carter stumping for the ERA, for not stopping federally paid abortions, for advocating 
homosexual rights.”1255 Between 1977 and 1980, no fewer than eight major new Christian 
groups were formed. They were:  
 Christian Voice, formed in 1978 by Reverends Dr. Robert Grant and Richard Zone by 
merging a number of other right wing Christian groups. 
 Concerned Women for America (1979). 
 Evangelicals for Social Action (1978). 
 Focus on the Family, founded in 1977 by psychologist James Dobson.  
 The Moral Majority, formed in 1979 by Jerry Falwell. 
 The National Christian Action Coalition, established in 1978 by Robert Billings, who left a 
year later to become the first executive director of the Moral Majority.  
 The Religious Roundtable, also founded in 1979, by Ed McAteer, and featuring Southern 
Baptist televangelist James Robinson and a number of conservative Jews and Catholics. 
 Save Our Children (1977).1256 
The aim of these new groups was to gather the support of all of the nation’s right-
wing Christians, estimated at seventy-five million and ranging from Mormons and Southern 
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Baptists to traditionalist Roman Catholics. Using mass mailing methods and television 
advertising, they began raising funds to support their lobbying efforts. These included such 
goals as tax breaks for church schools and campaigns against abortions and gay rights.1257 
The new organizations turned out to be very able campaigners, but they did not 
appear to feel the need to adopt new ways of communicating and protesting. Rather, they 
relied on well-established networks of conservative Christian churches and used old-style 
forms of communication such as newsletters to rally support for their cause.1258 As for results, 
Rev. Zone claimed that within months of Christian Voice’s formation, it had recruited more 
than 100,000 members and had amassed nearly $1 million to propagate its aims. New 
members, he said, included nearly 1.500 clergy, of whom some 300 were Catholic priests.1259  
Falwell’s fight message was that most Americans did not welcome the social changes 
they believed the left wing was imposing on them, that these changes were contrary to both 
God’s law and common sense, that they should be opposed, and that those who opposed them 
represented a potent element of the electorate that had the right to make demands and to be 
heard. “We believe that in the 1980s we can have an impact on re-creating a moral climate in 
this country that has disappeared. We want to reverse legislation that affects moral issues,” 
said Falwell.1260 Although Falwell tried to present the Moral Majority as ecumenical, it was 
largely composed of members of the evangelical right with shared views on a range of 
concerns, including anxiety about increasingly liberal views of homosexuality.1261 Summing 
up the strength of the evangelical movement in 1979, Christianity Today calculated that it 
owned more than 1,300 broadcast networks, which reached 130 million viewers and listeners 
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and brought in profits of several billions of dollars.1262 The political mobilisation of 
conservative Protestants, begun in 1977, started a wave of change which continues to this 
day.   
 
The Pressure from Right Wing Evangelicals Grows 
Keenly aware of the significant power of the evangelical right as a voting bloc, Falwell was 
working hard to assert the Moral Majority as a potent political force and focused a great deal 
of attention on ensuring that its supporters were registered to vote, and it made full use of its 
network. In his own church in Lynchburg, Falwell used an exercise every Sunday in which he 
asked the entire congregation to stand up, and then asked those who had been registered to sit 
down again. Then, “he lectured those who remained standing on their duty to get on the 
election rolls and warned that he would repeat the same procedure every Sunday until 
Election Day.”1263  
Similar procedures were carried out in fundamentalist churches all over the country 
and as the 1980 Presidential election approached, Falwell claimed to have registered four 
million new voters.1264 He gave specific instructions to pastors about how to recruit voters 
from their congregations and how they should persuade them to write to their representatives. 
On January 16, 1980, Falwell addressed a gathering of pastors in Orlando, Florida as follows: 
“What can you do from the pulpit? You can register people to vote. You can explain the 
issues to them. And you can endorse candidates, right there in church on Sunday morning… 
Here's what you do. You tell everybody in your congregation to bring two stamped envelopes 
to church on Sunday. And don't assume they know who their state representative is.... Make 
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them write those letters in church. It's all perfectly legal as long as you don't use the building 
for special meetings. Do it right during the service.”1265 
Under Falwell’s influence, a loose coalition of Christian leaders which came to be 
known as the New Right began to achieve impressive results, especially in targeting 
politicians it considered unacceptably liberal. Falwell described his own church as a 
“sleeping giant,” which he said was now “standing again across the nation.”1266 The New 
Right’s first success was to help block passage of the ERA in fifteen states, while the Moral 
Majority alone spent more than $3 million in two years opposing selected Senate candidates. 
Falwell warned office-holders with liberal records that they “would do well to examine their 
records and get in step with conservative values or be prepared to be unemployed.” He added, 
“The whole world knows there are several senators who have consistently stood on the wrong 
side of all the moral issues and ignored any attempt by others to redirect them.”1267  
Evangelicals then started crossing names from their hit list. In 1978, they helped to 
unseat two liberal senators, Dick Clark of Iowa and Thomas McIntyre of New Hampshire, 
and they were credited with helping to elect at least one governor, Fob James of Alabama. 
They failed to keep George H.W. Bush off the Republican ticket but its preferred candidates 
won against the odds in primaries for the Senate and the House in Alabama, Alaska and 
Iowa.1268  
The Moral Majority won a major victory in June 1979 when it seized control of 
Alaska’s Republican Party ensuring that their preferred Presidential candidate, Ronald 
Reagan, secured all of Alaska’s delegates to the party’s national convention in June. The anti-
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liberal rhetoric was unmistakeable. Dr. Jerry Prevo, pastor of the Anchorage Baptist Temple 
and leader of the Moral Majority in Alaska, declared that “Our country is rapidly turning into 
a 20th century Sodom and Gomorrah because we have permitted a few amoral humanists to 
take over the most influential positions in our nation.” A brochure prepared for the 
convention by Prevo read, “Advocates of abortion on demand, recognition of homosexuals as 
a bona fide minority, pornography, prostitution, gambling, free use of drugs and much, much 
more are destroying this country.”1269 When South Dakota’s Democratic Sen. George 
McGovern failed in his bid for a fourth term in 1980, he blamed the evangelicals and called 
for a new organization to battle what he characterised as “the new extremism” represented by 
such groups as the Moral Majority and Christian Voice.1270 
Belatedly realising that forces which formerly were his allies were now threatening 
his hold on office, Carter accepted Maddox’s long-standing offer and made him the 
responsible official for religious affairs in the Office of Public Liaison.1271 Reportedly, the 
appointment took place partly through the intervention of Rosalynn Carter, who could see 
how strongly the tide had turned against her husband.1272  
In a personal interview, Professor Randall Balmer recalled how Carter realised he was 
in trouble with the evangelicals: “I think it’s fair to say that he was blindsided by the 
Religious Right. When I asked him how he first became aware of politically conservative 
evangelicals mobilizing against him, he told me that his sister, Ruth Carter Stapleton, initially 
alerted him to the fact that Falwell had said all sorts of “nasty things” about him at a rally in 
Juneau, Alaska. Carter also told me that when he learned that conservatives had taken over 
his own denomination, the Southern Baptist Convention, in June 1979 he knew he was in 
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trouble. By then, arguably, it was already too late to reverse the damage, although he brought 
in Robert Maddox, a Southern Baptist minister, to try to stanch the bleeding.”1273 
It did not take long for Maddox to realise that Carter was in serious trouble with the 
evangelicals since even his own Southern Baptist church complained that they were blocked 
and that “they had no access to the White House … they couldn't find anybody to work with 
in the Carter administration.”1274 Maddox anticipated the challenge Carter would face in the 
upcoming presidential election from them, noting that, “[Carter’s] ‘born-again’ faith raises 
their expectations and makes him more vulnerable to their charges of inconsistency if he does 
not lift up selected issues.”1275  
In a memo dated July 27, 1979, Maddox urged Carter to establish constructive 
contacts with fundamentalist groups, noting that while their politics “tended to be very 
conservative, even rightist,” they represented “a 40 million constituency.” He said he was 
willing to travel throughout America, talk to believers, take part in their meetings and make 
personal contact with the leaders of conservative Christian groups with the aim of bringing 
Carter closer to the religious sector, in particular the right-wing evangelicals.1276 As far as I 
can establish, there was no response.  
In August 1979, Maddox told Carter that the religious conservatives were focussing 
strongly on family matters such as abortion, the ERA, and gay rights, and that two major 
groups were growing in strength, namely the Moral Majority and Christian Voice. He 
recommended strongly that Carter should meet with leaders like Falwell, Robertson, Dr. 
Adrian Rogers and Bob Jones III.”1277 Again Carter did nothing, as far as I can establish.  
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In September, 1979, the Moral Majority requested a meeting with Carter, a proposal 
which Maddox and Wexler urged Carter to accept, arguing that it gave him the chance to 
build bridges with the evangelicals. It never happened.1278 Then in a memo to Carter dated 
October 5, 1979, Maddox stressed that disenchanted conservative believers were “moving 
into the political arena” and were shaping up to be “a significant factor in the 1980 
election.”1279 Maddox and Wexler continued to pursue Carter and in another October 1979 
memo, warned that he was running out of time to mend relations with the evangelicals. They 
informed him that some religious leaders had begun talking to other presidential candidates, 
one of whom was Reagan.1280  
In November 1979, Maddox again asked Carter to speak at the January 1980 
convention of National Religious Broadcasters, something he had turned down in the 
previous three years.1281 This time, Carter agreed, though his address may not have gone a 
long way to building bridges since part of it was devoted to the need for humility by 
preachers and televangelists.1282  
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Evangelicals in the White House 
Aware that speaking at a convention carried considerably less weight than a face-to-face 
meeting, Maddox and Wexler renewed their campaign to get evangelicals into the White 
House. Finally Carter, after listening to arguments that right wing votes were steadily flowing 
away from him, agreed to a meeting.1283 In January 1980, Maddox arranged what he hoped 
would be a “cordial” White House breakfast for leading evangelicals1284 such as Jimmy 
Allen, Jim Bakker, Robert Dugan, Jerry Falwell, Brandt Gustavson, Rex Humbard, Howard 
Jones, James Kennedy, Tim LaHaye, Oral Roberts, Demos Shakarian, Dr. Morris Sheats, 
Ronald Sider, and Charles Stanley.1285 One invitee who did not attend was Pat Robertson.1286 
He had not forgotten that Carter failed to appoint even one of the evangelical Christian 
nominees from his proposed list of White House appointees.1287 
After three years of trying, the evangelicals got to talk to the President over breakfast 
in the White House on January 22, 1980. Carter had been banking on his religious faith 
standing him in good stead, but Maddox recognised that in some respects it was a liability, 
raising evangelicals’ expectations and the possibility that they would see Carter as 
“inconsistent” when he did not do what they wanted or expected.1288 Maddox asked the 
participants to express their major concerns. While there were some questions about matters 
not specifically of interest to evangelicals, most of the questions posed by the various pastors 
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were about matters of faith and morality, like abortion, homosexuals, the ERA, prayer in 
public schools, defence, no evangelicals in government and “that kind of stuff.” Carter 
responded in a very cordial fashion, indicating there were no bad feelings.1289  
Dr. Morris Sheats, pastor of a church of 6,000 members in Dallas, Texas, and a good 
friend of Maddox, was one of the invited. Asked why he thought he had been asked, Sheats 
responded in a personal interview that, “He (Carter) knew the election would be close. I was 
a friend of his speech writer, Bob Maddox.” Dr. Sheats asked Carter: “Mr. President, with 
conservative evangelical Christians increasing in numbers, and knowing of your own deep 
personal faith, many of us wonder why you have not placed an identifiably evangelical 
Christian either on your senior staff or in the cabinet?” Carter responded that his Vice-
President was a Methodist. Sheats said later, “We were surprised because generally among 
said group, the UMC was considered liberal, not evangelical. I was not satisfied with his 
answer. I do not know why he did not have evangelicals at his top positions… very few 
pastors were pleased with his answers.”1290 
Carter saw things differently. He stayed with the group for official photographs and 
left on what he thought were good terms.1291 He wrote in his diary after the meeting, “I had a 
breakfast with evangelical leaders. They’re really right wing: against ERA, for requiring 
prayer in school, against abortion (so am I), want publicly committed evangelicals in my cab-
inet, against the WHCF. In spite of all these negative opinions, they are basically supportive 
of what I’m trying to do.”1292  
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More realistically, Maddox knew that the meeting had not gone well for Carter. He 
later admitted that he had been sceptical about the chances of success, since several of the 
participants were “pretty much enemies of the President.” Falwell, Kennedy, LaHaye and 
Charles Stanley from Atlanta had already done a lot of talking against Carter. Maddox said, 
“We thought we might salvage them. I mean they indicated to me, you know, they had open 
minds and all that kind of thing …. and I learned from that that you don't really change an 
enemy, a political enemy particularly, with just a breakfast.1293 If some of the Christian 
leaders seemed appeased by the breakfast meeting, others like Falwell and LaHaye resumed 
their attacks on Carter almost immediately. Maddox said, “We went out of the meeting, and 
then three or four of them immediately began to distort the meeting – Falwell, Charles 
Stanley, Tim LaHaye, and James Kennedy. What they were doing, they were just kind of 
shading the meeting, distorting it, not lying about it, but distorting it.”1294 
After the meeting, Falwell brought up the gay rights issue, accusing Carter of trying to 
get homosexual voters on his side by approving of their “sinful” lifestyle.1295 When he later 
left the White House, Maddox looked back at this period and said of the breakfast meeting: 
“… by the time I got here, he (Carter) was in such deep trouble with the more conservative 
groups that I spent most of my time trying to put out the fires – unsuccessfully most of the 
time – put out the fires among the conservatives who were, by then, really deeply set against 
Jimmy Carter.”1296  
 
Evangelical Reaction to Gay Rights During Carter’s Presidency 
Conservative Christians and evangelical campaigners such as Falwell, Phyllis Schlafly and 
LaHaye who worried about the growing visibility of gay activists and advances towards gay 
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rights during Carter’s presidency, began making strong statements against homosexuality. 
These fed the anxiety of ordinary Americans who often felt that they did not know any 
homosexuals, and perceived homosexuality as a direct threat to their children, their families, 
and American society.  
Jimmy Creech, a former United Methodist minister and important LGBT activist, an 
expert on religiously based discrimination, spoke to the author about his opinion regarding 
the evangelical right’s aggression towards homosexuality and the reasons behind it, “There 
are a number of reasons for the evangelical right’s obsession with homosexuality. They have 
always been obsessed with sexuality and the role it plays in a patriarchal culture. Same-
gender loving relationships threaten the patriarchal social order it believes to be fundamental 
to God’s intended plan for society. In addition, any change to the conventional teaching that 
the Bible teaches that homosexuality is sinful/an abomination threatens all other fundamental 
beliefs defended by claims about what the Bible teaches. So, homosexuality threatens the 
patriarchal social order and biblical authority, which are of course related.”1297 
LaHaye and other strong critics gave greater impetus to the right wing movements 
agitating against change in this area. In Unhappy Gays, published in 1978, LaHaye claimed: 
“The homosexual community, by militancy and secret political manoeuvring, is designing a 
program to increase the tidal wave of homosexuality that will drown our children in a 
polluted sea of sexual perversion – and will eventually destroy America as it did Rome, 
Greece, Pompeii, and Sodom.”1298 LaHaye asserted that the antichrist would probably be a 
homosexual man, drawing his inference from the fact that growing visibility of 
homosexuals.1299 For people like LaHaye and his followers, fighting the cause of rights for 
homosexuals was a fight against evil itself.  
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In the anti-gay vanguard was Christian Voice, which issued a series of apocalyptic 
pronouncements, claiming, for example, that “homosexuals are rampant in our schools, in our 
government and even in many churches.” Highlighting gays, abortion, the ERA and 
pornography, leaders said, “We believe that America’s rapid decline as a world power is the 
direct result of these things.” Christian Voice’s activities were taken seriously by their 
opponents. Steve Endean, Gay Rights National Lobby representative, said, “This is probably 
the most significant threat to gay progress on issues before the Congress that we’ve faced.” 
He noted that “Christian Voice claims it will have a million members and five million letter 
writers within the year, and I believe they can do it. It is letters from congressional districts 
that really hit the Members (of Congress) when they vote.”1300 
Falwell, too, became increasingly anti-homosexual during Carter’s presidency and his 
organisation included some who even believed that homosexuals should be executed. Falwell 
often repeated that “God created Adam and Eve in that garden, not Adam and Steve.”1301 A 
1980 mailing by the Moral Majority sought funds to fight against a gay rights bill in 
Congress. It carried the slogan, “Let’s stop homosexuals once and for all.”1302 His rhetoric, 
while aimed at blocking any extension of gay rights, betrayed an apparent hatred and fear of 
homosexual persons. Moral Majority pastor, David Rhodenhizer, declared, “we love 
homosexuals, but we hate their sin.”1303  
However, Falwell wanted a world where a gay person was joke material not a threat 
to his conception of American life. In a sermon that he published in 1978, he wrote fondly of 
the past, when homosexuality was not an accepted topic of polite conversation, and also 
referred to his shock at just how substantial and organised the gay-rights movement was, 
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saying: “In my age, we laughed at queers, fairies and anyone who was thought to be a 
homosexual. It was a hideous thing and no one talked about it, much less ever confessed to 
being a homosexual. Now they are coming out of the closet… On June 26, 1977, on Fifth 
Avenue in New York, a demonstration for gay rights was held. The marchers in that 
demonstration formed a front, curb to curb, 28 blocks long, and included lesbian and 
homosexual groups from the surrounding area. It was called the longest parade for 
homosexual rights in New York’s history. That frightens me because when they come out of 
the closets, they are a much larger group than we expected.”1304 Falwell’s Moral Majority 
also encompassed some very aggressive views, including a campaign that stated its goal as 
having “the death penalty instituted as the standard punishment for being homosexual.”1305  
On November 27, 1978, Harvey Milk, the first openly gay person to be elected to 
public office in the United States, was shot dead in San Francisco. Falwell saw this as the 
judgement of God, saying, “Without question, San Francisco is undergoing a judgement from 
God today.”1306 This view was repeated throughout right-wing Christian circles. One of the 
jurors who had heard the case against Milk’s murderer stated his view that it was “God’s 
will.”1307 When indignant homosexual activists protested, many churches responded with a 
modified stance, which was that God did not hate homosexuals per se, but that they had been 
“blinded by Satan.” A growing numbers of churches established “counselling centres” 
intended to help homosexuals to recover from what was seen as an illness, and to repent of 
their sins.1308  
Even Falwell showed evidence of modifying his views. In August 1980 he said in an 
interview, “I think we can certainly be for the civil rights of homosexuals without condoning 
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their life style . . . I have no objection to a homosexual teaching in the public classroom as 
long as that homosexual is not flaunting his life style or soliciting students. I would say the 
same about a promiscuous heterosexual . . . .”1309 Nevertheless, Phyllis Schlafly maintained 
her position as a major political force against not only gay rights but feminism and almost 
any progressive movement. She believed that passage of the ERA would lead to abortions 
funded by the state, homosexual teachers in schools and women forced to join the 
military.1310 Very often she had attacked Carter’s liberal policies including those of gay 
rights.1311 In October 1979, she accused him of ignoring the anti-ERA movement in the belief 
that its inadequate media coverage reflected weakness. She said, “He has a no-talk policy, all 
the information (Carter) gets is pro-ERA.”1312 Like many religious right-wing activists, 
Schlafly tended to conflate feminism and homosexuality and present them as essentially the 
same thing.1313 
In a personal interview, Louie Crew recalled an occasion in 1977 when Anita Bryant 
was invited to speak by the local Lion’s Club, which was well-known for its anti-Semitic 
views. On this occasion, the local Jewish and gay communities got together to protest: “I 
remember when the local Rabbi in Macon, Georgia, called me and said, ‘I see that Anita is 
coming to speak in Macon, can you organize the gay community to join the Jewish 
community to protest and to picket and of course we carried that off with great panache.’ He 
pointed out that the Lion’s Club that chose Bryant to come and give her talk there was the 
most anti-Semitic of the organizations and quite a few people showed up to join our 
protest.”1314 
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Encouraged by their win in Dade County and by support from religious conservatives 
like Schlafly, Bryant, LaHaye and Falwell, anti-gay activists stepped up their fight, resulting 
in the passage of anti-gay initiatives in several states. For example, in Oklahoma and 
Arkansas, legislators banned gay men and lesbians from teaching in public schools.1315 
Steadily, the anti-gay movement acquired considerable expertise in direct democracy. The 
Reverend Robert Grant of the American Christian Cause used a mail-out to ask for money, 
conflating homosexuality, child pornography and abortion. He claimed, “These gays are 
trying to shove their perverted lifestyle down our throats, and when they don’t get their way, 
they lash out.”1316  
 
Other Religious Voices 
While virtually all of the anti-gay rights groups self-identified as religious, not all of the 
religious groups in the United States self-identified as being anti-gay. In fact, apart from the 
small number of specifically gay ministries, various churches stated their support for 
movements endorsing fair employment rights for homosexuals. These included the United 
Church of Christ, the Episcopal Church, the United Presbyterian Church, the Roman Catholic 
Maryknoll Order, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations and the Presbyterian 
Church in the United States.1317 At its General Synod, the United Church of Christ passed a 
resolution which rejected “the use of scripture to generate hatred and violation of civil rights 
of gay and bisexual persons.”1318 Furthermore, there were various supportive organisations 
such as Integrity, a gay and lesbian organisation for Episcopalians founded in 1975 that, 
while small, maintained an active voice and presence, with similar groups among “Lutherans, 
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Presbyterians, Quakers, American Baptists, Pentecostals, Unitarians, and members of the 
United Church of Christ.”1319 
Towards the end of his presidency, Carter received communications from various 
religious authorities who had read that he was considering proposing legislation that would 
ban discrimination against homosexuals in federal employment, following the presentation of 
a petition demanding such changes (discussed below) in December, 1979. For example, 
Edmond Browning, the Episcopal Bishop of Hawaii, wrote to state his support for such a 
change, pointing out that the Episcopal Church supported an end to all such 
discrimination.1320 These letters, part of a concerted Episcopal campaign, were copied to the 
NGTF, which had prompted the mail-out, and which answered each of them with a simple 
message of thanks.1321 To the delight of the NGTF, most bishops chose to write to Carter 
personally, rather than using the NGTF’s form letter.1322 In correspondence between John 
Lawrence, the President of Integrity, an organisation for gay Episcopalians, and Charles 
Brydon, they noted that many bishops, while disapproving of homosexuality on moral 
grounds, nonetheless supported the elimination of discrimination.1323 
While American Catholics were broadly opposed to homosexuality, they generally 
adopted a more compassionate stance than the evangelical right. In response to a letter from 
NGTF founder Bruce Voeller, Reverend Patrick O’Neill, a representative of the Campus and 
Young Adult Ministry, a Catholic organisation, wrote of his intention to communicate with 
the White House regarding his organisation’s commitment to young adults and their gay 
rights (without specifying what he considered those gay rights to be).1324 The Bishop of 
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Michigan, Reverend Coleman McGehee, wrote to Carter to indicate his approval of the 
President’s meetings with homosexual activists and the administration’s move towards 
amending policies that currently discriminated against homosexuals. Copies of the letter were 
sent to O’Leary and Voeller.1325 
Ironically, one of the effects of the uproar about granting rights to homosexuals, along 
with other liberalisations that occurred during Carter’s presidency, was to help to heal the 
historic rift between American Roman Catholics and the right wing evangelical faiths. 
Homosexuality – along with abortion and equal rights for women – finally offered some 
common ground.1326 However, not all Catholics sympathised with the evangelical right and 
its attempts to influence politics. Indeed, a number of Catholic leaders, along with their 
Jewish and Protestant counterparts, denounced these efforts.1327  
 
CONTINUED PRESSURE, SETBACKS AND SOME DISSATISFACTION FROM 
GAY RIGHTS ACTIVISTS 
Carter was no sooner in the White House than he came under pressure from evangelicals and 
gay activists alike to act for their respective causes. Vice-President Mondale, only three 
weeks into office, received an ardent letter from Robert Emmett Rygor of Gays for Carter 
urging him to ensure the President moved immediately to end discrimination against 
homosexuals.1328 It was a time when gay activism was growing, especially in large urban 
areas. Many homosexuals were encouraged by this and by signs that Carter was willing to 
listen to them. The NGTF was growing in strength and enjoyed moral support from a range 
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of bodies, including the American Association of Sex Educators, Counsellors and 
Therapists.1329  
In March 1977, shortly before the White House meeting with gay rights activists, the 
American Psychiatric Association advocated “the elimination of all discrimination against 
homosexual men and women that is based solely on the fact that they are homosexual,” and 
wrote to Carter pointing out that the Association had adopted a memorandum to that effect in 
1973, when homosexuality had been declassified as a psychiatric condition. Copies of the 
letter were sent to Bruce Voeller and Jean O’Leary of the NGTF.1330 The same month, the 
NGTF received a detailed letter from a Paul Gebhard of the Indiana Institute of Sex Research. 
Drawing on various sources, Gebhard asserted that about 9.13% of Americans were naturally 
predominantly homosexual in their affectional and sexual attractions, with the implication 
that they should be accommodated rather than discriminated against.1331 The message from 
the medical establishment, that they had been wrong before and that homosexuality was not a 
disease or disorder, was not one that most evangelical Christians, or indeed most ordinary 
Americans were ready to listen to.  
In June 1977, Mondale appeared at a reception for Democratic fundraisers in 
California to find it interrupted by activists demanding a firmer commitment to work for gay 
rights from the Carter administration. Mondale left the stage, drawing comparisons between 
the Carter/Mondale administration and the relatively more liberal Governor Brown of 
California.1332 The same day, Rosalynn Carter was questioned on her views on homosexuality 
at the President’s Commission on Mental Health in San Francisco. Repeating Carter’s view 
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that homosexuals should not be harassed, she deftly avoided making any clearer statement 
either in favour of or against increased rights for homosexuals.1333  
On June 18, 1977, some 5,000 homosexual men and women paraded through the 
streets of Boston to mark Gay Pride Day. That gay men and lesbians should be seen and 
recognised as such was of major importance for the gay community, as evidenced by a 
banner which proclaimed “Lesbian Visibility: Women Hold Up Half the Sky.” Also 
important for the parade was the participation of several gay religious organizations as well 
as non-gay organizations such as Heterosexuals for Gay Rights. Massachusetts Governor 
Michael Dukakis sent a telegram regretting he was unable to attend but offering his “best 
wishes for success.”1334  
At the same time, the success of the evangelicals in mobilizing conservative 
Christians was noted with alarm by gay leaders, who moved to improve their own campaign 
organisation. On July 11, 1977, Jean O’Leary and Bruce Voeller met with experienced 
activists from America’s civil liberties movement, including veterans of black and women’s 
rights campaigns. They asked for advice on how to co-operate and help one another to 
confront “common enemies.”1335 
Simultaneously, Carter and Costanza were receiving huge amounts of correspondence 
from ordinary gay men seeking reassurance that the President would act on his campaign 
promises.1336 For example, on September 17, 1977, Carter received a letter from David 
Kotara, who highlighted the inconsistencies in pursuing human rights policies abroad while 
ignoring the human rights of a substantial national minority.1337 In response to one such letter, 
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Tricia Seagall, Executive Director of the President’s Club in the White House, wrote to 
Thomas Hutchinson that: “While the President has not made gay rights legislation one of his 
top priorities, rest assured that he has not changed his commitment to help gay people. 
Although the party has not yet been able to reach an official position in support of gay rights, 
you may be sure that we are distinctly aware of the contributions that gay people are making 
to the Democratic cause every day.”1338 
By the end of 1977, the NGTF considered that the year had “witnessed many steps 
forward for the gay people of our county”1339 and was cautiously optimistic about what else 
the Carter administration would achieve for homosexuals in America. In an article for Trial 
Magazine, Jean O’Leary summarised the achievements of the gay rights movement, and 
expressed the hope and expectation that Carter’s administration would continue to make 
legislative changes in their favour, despite the increasing strength of the right-wing anti-gay 
activists.1340 
The furore over gay rights in America had meanwhile begun to attract considerable 
attention overseas. In January 8, 1978, a group of European countries took out a large 
advertisement in Time magazine stating that if Carter wanted to forge a foreign policy with 
human rights at the centre, he should start by denouncing agitators such as Bryant, who were 
actively campaigning to reduce human rights for homosexuals.1341 Gay rights activists were 
quick to respond. On January 16, 1978, the Dorian Group, “the State of Washington’s largest 
gay civil rights and public education organisation,” wrote to Carter saying: “we do not agree 
with the implication of the advertisement that you should not advocate human rights to our 
neighbours because homosexual persons are denied their rights throughout the United States. 
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We do agree with the signatories to the advertisement that something must be done now 
about the denial of civil and human rights for homosexual Americans…”1342 
The progress on gay rights achieved under Carter by mid-1978 was not enough to 
satisfy some members of the gay community. On May 5, 1978, Costanza received a letter 
from Kenneth Kimbro, who said there were “millions of homosexual men and women in 
America” looking to Carter for support. Expressing alarm at the Dade County defeat and 
fearing similar situations elsewhere, Kimbro even equated what he described as the 
“persecution” of homosexuals in the United States with the Holocaust. “Surely not since the 
persecution of millions of our Jewish brothers and sisters by Nazi Germany, have we 
witnessed such gross violations of individual human freedoms,” he wrote. “And, Ms. 
Costanza, like Nazi Germany, no voices are raised in protest… millions of gays and women 
in this great country are now beginning to question the sincerity of President Jimmy Carter’s 
campaign for human rights… we find that while the President talks about ‘human rights’ 
daily, his actions fall far short of his words.”1343  
Another correspondent, whose signature was indecipherable, wrote to complain that 
“progress was slow.” Costanza responded by highlighting all the meetings she had arranged 
with federal agencies and assuring him that things were moving. She conceded that “progress 
had been slow,” but assured the writer that “discriminatory practices will continue to be 
exposed and eliminated — and the effects will soon be felt by us all.”1344 
Another dissatisfied gay rights activist was Harvey Milk, who had gained the 
attention and support of Costanza.1345 In June 1978, Milk railed against the hypocrisy of anti-
gay rights campaigners such as Anita Bryant and addressed Carter directly, saying: “Jimmy 
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Carter: You talk about human rights a lot. In fact, you want to be the world’s leader for 
human rights. Well, damn it: lead. There are some 15-20 million lesbians and gay men in this 
nation listening and listening very carefully. Jimmy Carter, when are you going to talk about 
their rights? You talk a lot about the Bible but when are you going to talk about that most 
important part: Love thy neighbour? After all, she may be gay… Jimmy Carter, you have the 
choice: How many more years?”1346 
Milk called on lesbian and gay activists to rally behind the cause of gay rights and 
insist that Carter start to deliver on the human rights initiatives that they demanded, drawing 
direct parallels between the struggles of the homosexual community with those of African 
Americans, and between leaders such as Martin Luther King and himself.1347  
On November 27, 1978, Milk was murdered together with the sitting Mayor, Mike 
Moscone, by a former colleague, Dan White.1348 White’s controversial defence (predicated on 
the idea that his excessive consumption of junk food in the period prior to the murder had 
caused him to behave irrationally) led to his receiving a short sentence, which caused outrage 
among the gay community and elevated Milk to the status of martyr, while making the need 
for Carter to speak out more explicitly in favour of rights for homosexual Americans seem all 
the more urgent.1349  
Following the murders, Carter described Milk as a “hard-working and dedicated 
supervisor, a leader of San Francisco’s gay community who kept his promise to represent his 
constituents.”1350 He also stated that, “As supervisor, Milk had come to be widely regarded as 
a symbol of the aspirations of gay people to participate openly in mainstream politics and 
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society at large.”1351 Tom Hayden told the author that “the most important thing I remember 
during the Carter era was the assassination of Harvey Milk and Mayor Moscone in San 
Francisco. Harvey was a friend, an ally, and a teacher. His leadership, and his martyrdom, 
were turning points.”1352  
November 1978 was a busy and critical month for homosexuals. Gay rights initiatives 
were rejected in Florida (the Dade County case) and in Nevada (where the opposition was led 
by Mormon authorities and a Catholic bishop rather than the more usual evangelicals). 
However, the gay cause was bolstered in Seattle (which rejected an anti-gay rights initiative 
to repeal existing laws that banned discrimination against homosexuals in the areas of 
housing and employment) and in California, where the vote against the Briggs Initiative 
registered a margin of 60-40.1353  
 
Costanza’s Departure from the White House 
Costanza had been seen by gays as the person who could best advance their agenda because 
of the status of her office and her personal influence on Carter. She had not failed their 
expectations, working tirelessly to secure several notable advances for gay rights. Her efforts 
were recognised by the NGTF, which decided to honour her, along with the mayor of New 
York, Ed Koch, for their contributions to the gay struggle. On January 27, 1978, Jean 
O’Leary wrote to Carter’s son Chip, asking him to attend the ceremony. She stated that it 
would mean a lot to both the gay community and their many non-gay supporters if he 
came.1354 In June 1978, Costanza was given a special award by the NGTF for “outstanding 
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contributions to humankind” at a benefit dinner held at Les Mouches discotheque in New 
York.1355 Carter did not attend, but Chip did.1356 
In August 1978, an event took place that changed Carter’s relationship with the gay 
rights activists profoundly for the worse. This was Costanza’s resignation and departure from 
the White House.1357 In April 1978, Costanza’s desk near the Oval Office was relocated to 
the basement, her staff was reduced and so was her role in the administration.1358 In addition, 
she had had to carry all her paperwork and files to the cramped basement area by herself.1359  
A syndicated columnist wrote: “Since Carter is the great master of symbols, 
Costanza’s relocation could be interpreted as indication that women’s rights and domestic 
human rights have been diminished in importance.”1360 Costanza and Carter had clashed on 
various issues and she had even tried to influence his policy decisions in a way that must 
have been seen as her stepping outside the boundaries of her job; for instance, she had pushed 
him to take a less conservative stance on the matter of abortion.1361 However, what had 
angered Carter and those close to him was her rebelliousness; for instance, she had publicly 
criticised him for his stance on abortion, and for not giving as much attention to the ERA as 
he had to the Panama Canal.1362  
On April 19, 1978, soon after Costanza’s relocation, Wexler was given responsibility 
for some of Costanza’s duties.1363 White House officials termed Wexler “the most senior and 
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trusted” of the women advisers on Carter’s staff. 1364 Wexler did not share Costanza’s strong 
stance on gay rights issues, but she was very strong on women’s issues, and pressed hard for 
the inclusion of more women in important positions.1365 Further evidence of Costanza’s 
reduced status became clear some six weeks later when she was asked to stand down from a 
talk show to which she had been invited so that Stuart Eizenstat, Carter’s Chief Domestic 
Policy Adviser, would have more time to discuss serious political issues.1366  
Dismayed by her weakened role, Costanza resigned on August 1, 1978.1367 She was 
replaced by Anne Wexler.1368 Shortly after Costanza’s resignation, Marilyn Haft moved to 
the post of Deputy Counsel to Vice President Mondale in the White House.1369 Gay rights 
activists had lost another very important ally. 
In her resignation letter to Carter, Costanza wrote: “Although we share common goals 
and concerns, it has become clear that our approaches to fulfilling them are different. My 
own approach has been largely one of advocacy. I have sought to advise you on the concerns 
assigned to me and to present those interests and needs to you. There are those who suggest 
that I should have simply carried out your policies and not voiced my own opinions and ideas 
openly. But that was not my style, my experience or my interpretation of how I could best 
serve you and your constituents.”1370 Shortly after her resignation, Costanza told Helen 
Thomas of United Press International that she was “not sad. I’m not angry with anyone. No 
one asked me to go. In fact, the president asked me to stay. I have such confidence that what I 
have done is right. I still respect and love Jimmy Carter.”1371 
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Costanza had not just been a friend to gay rights activists; she had also been a strong 
feminist and a gateway for feminist activists to the White House.1372 With her resignation, 
Carter lost considerable support from feminist women voters,1373 despite his demonstrable 
commitment to women’s rights and representation in government. For those White House 
staffers who had wished that Costanza would disappear, this was a source of jubilation. Her 
resignation was met by the general view that she had been effectively fired in the wake of a 
furore around abortion and Carter’s views on the use of public funds for abortions for poor 
women. It took place just over four months after she had said that, “There are very few things 
[Carter] and I are not compatible about. Perhaps my commitment is a little deeper and 
stronger for gay rights… I have the greatest admiration for him. He is my friend and boss, 
and he has trusted me.”1374 In her letter of resignation, Costanza stated that she and Carter 
shared the same view on many issues, but that their approach to achieving their mutual goals 
was very different.1375 
Leaving the White House, Costanza was “furious” with Carter. Professor Mattingly 
told the author that Costanza “felt like she got sacrificed by the Carter administration, and 
they used her as a token, rather than advancing the issues. She felt like he kind of ruined her 
life.” However, Costanza never publically spoke ill of Carter and often defended his record 
on gay rights issues.1376 In Seattle during November 1978, just weeks after her resignation, 
she “pointed out that Carter accepted her efforts to arrange a meeting with the NGTF in the 
White House and to nominate the group’s leader, Jean O’Leary, to the International Women’s 
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Year Commission,” and that therefore, “he must have some compassion for the gays.” She 
also noted that Carter had come out against California’s Proposition 6.1377  
Years later, in 1994, Costanza was still defending Carter’s gay rights policies and 
reiterating the huge importance of the NGTF White House meeting. As for Carter, she said, 
“I had a very close relationship with Jimmy Carter. And while it had absolutely nothing to do 
with romance, I felt a closeness to him, a friendship, a kinship, in which I felt, while he had 
brought to me new experience and knowledge and information and challenge, that I had 
brought to him — I was different than anybody he’d ever had in his life, even with my 
humour, with my friendship with him — I absolutely adored Jimmy Carter. I loved him… I 
trusted him totally.”1378 She pointed out that Carter was constantly under pressure from the 
evangelical right and especially from his own Southern Baptist Church over her appointment 
and her involvement with gay rights, the ERA and abortion.1379 In 2015, Carter insisted that 
he was “in harmony” on the gay rights issue with Costanza.1380 Professor Doreen Mattingly, a 
close friend of Costanza and her biographer, told the author that Costanza would not have 
disagreed with Carter’s comment.1381 
For the NGTF, Costanza’s departure was a painful blow. The organization had lost an 
important ally in the White House and it was unlikely that she would be replaced by anyone 
with a similar degree of interest in their cause. They acknowledged that she had “delivered a 
lot more than they expected.”1382 The NGTF promptly wrote a letter to Carter stating their 
view that Costanza had been an exceptional public servant, their hope that her successor 
would continue her great work in the area of gay rights, and their sorrow at having lost her as 
a friend in the White House, concluding: “Millions of lesbians and gay men have been 
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heartened by Ms. Costanza’s sensitivity to the concerns of all Americans, including the gay 
community. We believe that her departure from her present White House position represents 
a great loss to our community, to your administration and to the people of this nation.”1383  
Officially, however, the NGTF remained bullish, stating in the press that they 
remained confident that the groundwork they had laid with Costanza was strong and that 
progress would continue. They cited the White House meeting as having “served as a prelude 
to considerable progress in ending anti-Gay discrimination at Federal level,”1384 Bruce 
Voeller was quoted saying that he had: “… talked extensively with Midge since her 
resignation, and she expressed her willingness to continue helping. She’s cultivated many 
friends and political contacts in her year and a half as Presidential aide.”1385 
Professor Charlotte Bunch recalled Costanza’s departure, saying in a personal 
interview:  
“It was definitely a slap in the face but I think it wasn’t a slap in the face only around 
the lesbian and gay issues. It was a kind of a sense of Midge had represented his opening out 
to new constituencies so, if anything, I think it was as much if not more a slap in the face to 
women and to a more feminist perspective, and to a woman who came to represent a much 
more feisty kind of voice than he wanted. I think that we expected the issue to move much 
faster and the opposition (the evangelical right) was growing much quicker than we realised 
and Carter’s own fears about his re-election, which were justified, he didn’t get re-elected. 
But this was not the only issue of course; when he finally fired Midge there was a sense of 
that this issue wasn’t going to go much further.”1386 
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Costanza’s resignation was certainly a setback for gay rights activists, who feared a 
loss of access to the White House. The Minnesota Committee for Gay Rights wrote to 
Costanza thanking her for her work and acknowledging that she had “played a significant role 
in correcting present injustices in the military, prisons, immigration, public health and other 
areas of national policy.”1387 Joan Nixon of the National Lesbian Feminist Organization 
wrote to Carter to complain that, “as a lesbian and as a feminist, I deplore the events and 
personal relationships that led to the resignation of Midge Costanza on Tuesday, August 1, 
1978. I feel that we in the women’s movement have totally lost our access to communicating 
our needs and just demands to your administration.”1388  
However, as it turned out and we have already seen, the White House maintained its 
open-door policy for gay rights activists and meetings between the two sides continued to 
take place after Costanza’s departure. Several important gay issues, like the Federal 
Employee issue, the Immigration issue and the Military issue, were dealt with successfully by 
Carter’s administration long after Costanza was gone. Wexler, who replaced Costanza kept 
the door open for the NGTF and met with them several times. She also personally addressed 
some of the gay community’s concern (for example the gay veteran’s request). Ginny 
Apuzzo, who was one of the executive directors of the NGTF, told the author that Wexler 
was “incredibly helpful” to her.1389 In February 1979, six months after Costanza’s departure, 
Charles Brydon confirmed continuation of the relationship with the White House as he 
explained to fellow NGTF members in a memorandum that  “the White House project” 
remains “the most important NGTF undertaking in terms of practical results benefiting 
lesbians and gay men.”1390 
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Furthermore, Carter continued appointing to his administration and governmental 
agencies persons who were friendly on gay rights or were gay themselves, for example Ginny 
Apuzzo and Jill Schropp. Therefore, although Costanza’s departure was a blow for gay rights 
insofar as change came more slowly, progress under Carter did continue after she was gone. 
The big difference was that there was no-one in the White House to go the “extra mile” in the 
way that Costanza had done.  
Professor Bunch told the author about Costanza’s departure from the White House: “I 
think it did make it hard for NGTF to continue the same kind of relationship with the 
administration because Midge had really gone out on a limb. Where there were people in the 
administration who believed in gay and lesbian rights and had started conversations on other 
things, I'm sure that continued. You know, if you were working with people in the housing 
and urban development area, I'm just using it as an example, and there was somebody open to 
those conversations it would continue. But at the more formal level it became very 
difficult.”1391 
 
More Pressure, More Setbacks and Some Dissatisfaction from Gay Rights Activists 
A new special assistant, Sarah Weddington, joined the White House in October, 1978, to take 
on that part of Costanza’s portfolio. She therefore had the task of dealing with interest 
groups, including the NGTF.1392 Weddington was widely known as a supporter of feminist 
causes and enjoyed a highly visible profile on account of her role as legal counsel to Jane Roe 
in the Roe v. Wade case.1393 Weddington reassured the NGTF that she would continue 
working with them, but she did not share Costanza’s verve and commitment to gay rights 1394 
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Weddington’s appointment was also seen as a blow to the evangelical right, as she was 
known, among other things, for her pro-abortion rights stance.1395 Whereas, under Costanza, 
the office of Public Liaison had had an “open door” policy but was seen as rarely following 
through, under Wexler the main goal was to build coalitions towards achieving Presidential 
ambitions.1396 This has been recognised as a significant shift in how the Carter administration 
dealt with special interest groups. From this point on, the staff of the White House had a new 
lobbying strategy for Carter’s important legislative initiatives, involving direct 
communication with members of Congress, and the promotion of active coalitions between 
organised interest bodies.1397 
At the same time, the NGTF continued to press hard for major reforms in the area of 
gay rights. Voeller and O’Leary spoke at venues all over the country to publicise their cause, 
but they were growing disillusioned with Carter. In December, 1978 they wrote to him, 
expressing their disappointment that, although they had been working closely with his 
assistants for two years, they had not been invited to participate in Carter’s conference on 
human rights in Washington.1398 At the same time, the White House prepared and distributed 
a document detailing Carter’s accomplishments to date. No issues specifically relating to 
rights for homosexuals were mentioned.1399 
Carter’s relationship with the NGTF and the women’s movement took a turn for the 
worse in January 1979. On January 12, 1979, Carter dismissed Abzug as chair of his 
Women’s Advisory Committee the day after she and the Committee had criticized his anti-
inflation programme, his proposed cutbacks in welfare programmes and increases in the 
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military budget, as well as other aspects of his administration policy. As result of Abzug’s 
dismissal, several members of the Committee resigned, including Jean O’Leary. They 
described the dismissal as “a terrible mistake.”1400 O’Leary said of Carter, “he will pay a 
heavy price for this injustice at the polls that he has not figured into his budget.”1401  
However, just four months later, Carter regained lost ground by appointing to the 
Women’s Committee, Jill Schropp, an open lesbian. The NGTF applauded the appointment 
and said it was “a most positive sign that President Carter has again appointed a member of 
America’s lesbian community to his Advisory Committee on Women.”1402 O’Leary said, “It 
is my understanding that the Committee has been restructured to reflect constituencies rather 
than organizational affiliations, and I am hopeful that in its new form, it will be an important 
and powerful voice within the Administration, to reflect the needs and concerns of American 
women.”1403    
In April 1979, Time magazine’s cover story was titled, “How Gay is Gay? 
Homosexuality in America.” The article acknowledged the progress achieved in the area of 
gay rights over the last few years and argued that “homosexual men and women are making 
progress towards equality.”1404 However, in September 1979, Carter upset the gay community 
by nominating former Florida Governor Reubin Askew to be special US trade negotiator. 
Askew had earned the wrath of the gay community when he informed the Senate Finance 
Committee that he would not permit homosexuals to work in the Office of the Special Trade 
Representative, a Cabinet-level agency. What is more, he made no secret of his support for 
Anita Bryant’s anti-gay campaign in Dade County in 1977. When his nomination was 
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suspended, Askew reversed his position. In a written statement, he pledged not to 
discriminate against any employee on the basis of sexual preference in both government and 
non-government protected positions. His appointment was then confirmed.1405 
On October 14, 1979, the first national lesbian and gay march on Washington took 
place. Citing reservations about the level and type of organisation behind the event, the 
NGTF did not initially endorse it,1406 but overcame its reservations by August to throw its 
support behind the initiative.1407 A crowd of 75,000 marched past the White House to the 
Washington Monument demanding a range of concessions for homosexual Americans, 
including an end to discrimination in employment and in the military and the repeal of all 
anti-homosexual laws. The first public protest of this sort had been held in 1965, with just a 
small number of participants. The size of the October 14 crowd testified to the mammoth 
efforts by gay activists to secure support, and, although they may not have recognised it at the 
time, to Carter’s input in legitimising gay rights. One after another, the speakers urged Carter 
to take a much stronger stance against anti-gay discrimination. It was clear that, for Carter, 
who was hoping to win the presidency in the upcoming re-election campaign, the position he 
took would have a huge impact on who would vote for him – and who would not.1408 
The religious right responded to the gay march by organising their own event, a 
“March for Jesus,” to be held in Washington on April 29, 1980. A week before the march, 
CBS television aired a documentary that claimed that homosexuals had “infiltrated” politics 
in San Francisco and other major cities and posed a risk to ordinary citizens.1409 The gay 
community reacted to the documentary with outrage, although some felt that its portrayal of 
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the homosexual community in San Francisco had been so ridiculous that its effect would be 
ultimately in their favour. Others stated that the electorate of San Francisco was too 
sophisticated to be taken in by what they saw as blatant false representation and knew that the 
gay community was a net contributor to San Francisco in many ways.1410 
In the see-saw of advances and reversals for the gay movement, a major setback came 
in July of 1980 when the House of Representatives barred the Legal Services Corporation 
from spending any money “promoting, defending or protecting homosexuality.” The House 
vote was on an amendment by Rep. Larry MacDonald to the Corporation’s proposed annual 
budget. Steve Endean blamed the gay rights movement’s own lack of professionalism, 
arguing that the New Right, as represented by groups such as the Moral Majority and 
Christian Voice, were out-organising gay activists. “Unless the members of the gay 
community are willing to support a strong, professional lobbying effort, we can expect to see 
more setbacks such as this one,” he predicted.1411 
 
CONCLUSION 
Carter actively sought support from homosexuals and evangelicals alike, causing both sides 
to believe that he accepted their views and intended to pursue their agendas. As noted above, 
Carter was honest when he told evangelicals that he considered homosexuality to be a sin, but 
he was equally honest in his belief that homosexuals should have the same rights as everyone 
else. These positions led to a no-win situation all round, with evangelicals particularly 
unhappy.  
Carter’s reluctance to meet the evangelical right while embracing “progressive” 
policies sympathetic to gay rights, the ERA and abortion, led to a steady deterioration in their 
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relationship. Worse, Carter had appointed admitted homosexuals to his administration while 
appointing no evangelicals. He consistently turned down their attempts to engage in dialogue 
and ignored invitations to attend their special events. Evangelicals felt particularly betrayed 
since he was a Baptist himself and thus, they had thought, one of them; he was the candidate 
to whom they had given all-out support in the 1976 elections. 
Disturbed by what seemed to be the growing visibility and acceptability of 
homosexuality and convinced that Carter’s policies were leading to the decay of moral values 
in American society, the religious right decided to mobilize their forces in a serious way. 
Although evangelicals had organised loosely for the 1976 elections, this time they undertook 
a professional approach which led to the formation of several conservative religious groups 
constituting the “New Right.” 
What might have surprised the New Right was that many gays were also unhappy 
with Carter. True, their leaders were promptly invited into the White House and Carter began 
to address almost all of their issues, but for some activists, this was too little and too slow. 
They lobbied the White House constantly, pressing for influence and advantage, as did the 
evangelical right. Although they lost Costanza on the inside, the records show that the door 
was left open to them and Carter did not abandon their issues.  
Ironically, both movements grew stronger during Carter’s Presidency on account of 
his policies and became progressively more focused and adept at resource mobilisation. 
However, their fundamental divide, one favouring change, the other the status quo, remained 
unbridgeable, as it remains today. The gay rights movement was a continuation and part of 
the civil rights movement and attempted to achieve social change. The evangelical right was 
a reaction to the gay rights movement, as well as to other forces of the 1970s such as the 
women’s movement and the campaign for abortion rights, and attempted to stop these 





Both movements were important to the development of the “culture wars” which exist 
in the United States to this day. Although almost fifty years have passed since gays and 
evangelicals battled over Proposition 6 in California and Dade County the warfare continues, 
with issues like abortion and gay rights constantly on the agenda of the evangelical right.  
Professor Byron Shafer told the author that Carter clearly played an important role in 
mobilising and shaping the gay rights and the evangelical right movement. He said that 
Carter “embodied some movements of the period, as with the drive toward deregulation, 
where he led the way. He was in real tension with some of the others, most especially in the 
realm of abortion policy, where he remained a traditionalist. So this picture has to be marked 




                                                          





CHAPTER EIGHT  
THE 1980 ELECTIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the 1980 US Presidential election campaign, including the primaries 
and the Democratic Convention. Although the role of the evangelical right and conservatives 
Christians in the elections has been examined, that of the gay rights activists and groups 
remains mostly unexplored. The primary purpose of the chapter is to scrutinise the role of gay 
voters, while also reassessing the participation of right-wing evangelicals, especially with 
regard to the pressures Carter faced from them over his gay rights policies.  
As we will see, in 1980 Carter actively sought both the gay and the evangelical vote, 
just as he had done in 1976. However, a lot of things had changed since then. Despite the fact 
that Carter had delivered more than activists had expected and even hoped, they were still not 
entirely satisfied with his progress on gay rights. On the other hand, the high expectations 
evangelicals had had for the President had turned to severe disappointment, and most of them 
were eager to vote him out of office. What was ironic was that one of the main reasons why 
evangelicals were so dissatisfied with Carter was his advancement of gay rights, and the 
increasing presence of homosexuals in public life with not only the tolerance of the President, 
but often with his encouragement.   
 
GENERAL DISSAPOINTMENT WITH CARTER 
By 1980, many Americans were disappointed with Carter. Although it is normal for 
Presidents to become less popular during the latter part of their tenure, in the case of Carter 
the turnaround seems to have been particularly dramatic.1413 The President was struggling to 
                                                          





deal with a range of issues, including a worsening economy, rampant inflation and high 
unemployment, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution and American 
hostage situation. Although he had inherited a difficult economic and political situation, 
Carter was blamed for many of the difficulties the American people continued to endure. 
Moreover, in the context of a culture in which “manliness” and “vigour” were often 
juxtaposed with what was perceived as the “weakness” and “effeminacy” of liberal 
Communism, some saw him as insufficiently manly; too conciliatory, too inclined to listen to 
the other side.1414 
Carter had reached out to Vietnam veterans, and had introduced Vietnam Veteran’s 
Week (to be observed in May and June that year), but for many Americans his failure to rally 
behind the idea that all of the returned veterans were “heroes” and, instead, to admit that 
some of the things Americans had done in Vietnam were wrong, outraged many on the 
religious right, who did not appreciate his tendency to try and see the situation’s moral 
complexity.1415 Wall Street Journal journalist John Mihalec would refer to Carter a few years 
later as the nation’s first “woman President” and said that he had a “true feminine spirit.”1416 
All of this contributed to a generally poor view of Carter as President in the media. 
The negative portrayal of Carter’s domestic policy leadership became overwhelming in 1979. 
Journalists assessed that Carter’s domestic agenda ran into difficulties in Congress because of 
Carter’s apolitical nature. In this view Carter did not know how to persuade, coerce, cajole, or 
“wheel and deal.” Journalists portrayed Carter as a problem solver, an “engineer President”, a 
“rationalistic” thinker but not an effective legislative or public opinion leader. In George 
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Will’s revealing phrase, Carter was not a “muscular politician” capable of leading a 
“muscular nation.”1417 
Something else that had changed dramatically following Carter’s election was the role 
of religion in US politics. Ironically, despite Carter’s insistence on the separation of church 
and state, the message that remained with any would-be political candidates was that it was 
important to court and rally the religious vote. Professor Mark J. Rozell told the author:  
“The trouble for Carter was that it was impossible to please these different groups 
while President. Groups on the Left became quickly disgruntled when his policies were not 
100% aligned with theirs. That was a constant complaint of those close to Carter who 
lamented that many of their natural constituencies insisted on getting everything they wanted 
right away or they would abandon supporting the President. And that largely did happen and 
led to the Ted Kennedy challenge in 1980. And for the evangelical right, discontent with 
Carter's administration set in quickly given his support for socially progressive policies and 
abortion rights. Social conservative groups formed during the Carter years in large part due to 
the discontent with his policies. Leaders in the so-called New Right movement of that era 
reached out to such persons as Falwell to create a new conservative alliance in US politics 
that would eventually shift the South to the Republican Party.”1418 
 
THE STANCE OF GAY RIGHTS ACTIVISTS DURING THE 1980 DEMOCRATIC 
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES 
Although significant progress had been made in the struggle for gay rights during the course 
of Carter’s presidency, by the time the 1980 election arrived there was a feeling among some 
activists that more could have been achieved. Their major disappointment was that Carter had 
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refused to issue an executive order banning sexual discrimination in security federal agencies 
such as the CIA and the FBI, although he had implemented the Civil Service Reform Act 
which prohibited sexual discrimination and protected homosexuals in 95% of all other federal 
agencies.1419  
On November 9, 1979, as the build-up to the 1980 elections gathered pace, the NGTF 
sent a questionnaire to all presidential candidates asking for their positions on gay rights 
issues. Of particular significance, they were asked if they would “continue the precedent 
established by President Carter of an open door to White House and Administration officials 
for lesbian and gay representatives?”1420 The question underlined the importance of White 
House access for the NGTF. In their letter to Carter, NGTF officials asked him to commit to 
securing real change for homosexual Americans, reminding him of the precedent he had 
established in opening the door of the White House to homosexual representatives. The 
questions posed to him were:  
 Would he continue to keep an “open door to the White House” for gay-rights activists, 
which they saw as one of his real achievements?  
 Would he appoint qualified gays and lesbians to his administration and would he support 
a gay rights plank at the 1980 National Democratic Convention?  
 Following the implementation of his Civil Service Reform Act, would he issue an 
executive order protecting gays and lesbians in federal security agencies that were 
excluded from the Act? 
 Would he support any gay rights bill?  
The letter stressed that while homosexuals represented a minority of the electorate, 
they tended to be politically active and his answers to their questionnaire would reach “about 
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two million readers.”1421 In his reply, Carter assured the NGTF that he would continue his 
open-door policy for gays and that he was open to appointing qualified lesbians and gays in 
his administration. However, he avoided taking a clear-cut stand on the gay rights plank, 
stating that a decision would be made “as the process evolves.” He also avoided committing 
himself on the executive order question. He said he would “continue to explore whether other 
action is necessary, but no decision has been made at this time.” Finally, he stated that he 
would generally support any legislation dealing with gay rights, but that he had “not yet 
committed his support to the details of any particular legislation dealing with this topic.”1422 
Also during November 1979, Carter discovered that a warning by Jean O’Leary that 
“he would pay a heavy price at the polls” for dismissing Abzug in January1423 was becoming 
a reality. On November 27, an event was held at a gay disco in Washington to raise funds to 
support and elect gay delegates to the next Democratic and Republican conventions. The 
event was organized by lawyer and gay rights activist Tom Bastow, founder of Gay Rights 
’80, whose aim was to get more gays involved in politics. The star speaker was Governor 
Jerry Brown of California, who was challenging Carter for the Democratic nomination. He 
told an audience of some six hundred gays that he would highlight gay rights on the 
Democratic agenda and if elected would promote the gay position in a far-reaching way. 
Carter chose not to appear in person, but sent Michael Chanin, a deputy presidential assistant 
and a close confidante, to represent him. Overshadowed by Brown’s physical presence, 
Chanin was booed by the crowd, which expected a top-level presidential aide. He struggled to 
make an impression, saying, “You have in the White House a President who is meeting with 
you, a President who respects you. I think we’ve made progress . . . we’ve begun to change 
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the attitudes of people.” Even so, a heckler yelled, “What happened to Bella Abzug? What 
happened to Midge Costanza?”1424      
To the gay community, it appeared that the Carter/Mondale campaign was not 
courting the gay vote with the same zeal it had done in 1976.1425 There was anxiety by 
Carter’s aides about meeting with gay activists at their invitation in Los Angeles for fear they 
would be hostile and would damage their campaign.1426 In this respect, the outcome for 
Carter among the gay electorate mirrored the disappointment and disillusionment of 
feminists. From great (and probably unrealistic) hopes had come even greater 
disappointment. In this context, tangible gains for homosexual Americans during the Carter 
presidency were easily overlooked.  
However, Carter believed he had a good record in the area of gay rights and moved to 
convince the NGTF that his achievements merited its renewed support. Writing to the 
organisation on March 3, 1980, Carter set out his successes and pledged to continue his 
administration’s muscular policy of anti-discrimination; he pointed out that 
 He was the first major Presidential contender “to openly discuss gay concerns.” 
 His changes in legislation now protected 95% of federal employees against anti-
homosexual discrimination.  
 Only three months “after the inception of this Administration, senior White House 
advisers met with representatives of the NGTF to discuss matters of concern to the NGTF 
… That meeting provided the basis for a series of discussions at all levels of the federal 
government … These experiences are examples of the President’s policy to expand the 
involvement of the American people, including the gay community, in government. For 
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too long, the doors of the federal government were closed to too many Americans. Jimmy 
Carter has opened these doors and he intends to see that they remain open.”  
 Carter was “committed to continuing his policy of appointing qualified individuals 
without discrimination based on race, colour, sex, religion, national origin, or sexual 
orientation.” 
 Gay organizations now qualified for both tax exempt and tax deductible status and those 
benefits were being used by groups throughout the country.” 
 Homosexuals were no longer barred from working with the Peace Corps or the Agency 
for International Development.1427  
Surprisingly, Carter’s letter did not list all of his achievements in the area of gay 
rights. One of the most important contributions, Carter’s Review Program of Dishonourable 
Discharges, which had benefited many homosexual soldiers, was absent, as was the fact that 
for the first time  the Civil Service Commission was considering harassment cases against 
gays, now considered within its jurisdiction. 
The NGTF’s reply acknowledged Carter’s achievements, but also declared itself 
“deeply disturbed and dismayed” by the slow progress of its requests.1428 In a press release on 
March 6, the NGTF published the contents of Carter’s letter for the public at large and 
declared that “No other President has shown the courage evidenced by this Administration on 
the gay rights issue. We commend the actions taken so far and look forward to continued 
cooperation and momentum.” However, the NGTF expressed disappointment over Carter’s 
unwillingness to issue an executive order banning discrimination in all areas of federal 
government, as well as the absence of a response on the issue of a Democratic Party platform 
plank on gay rights, which it described as “a major goal of gay activists.” The press statement 
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concluded that “these reservations aside, the Carter Administration can point to a solid track 
record. Of the candidates, only Governor Brown and Representative Anderson have records 
as office holders while former Governor Reagan has a record of actively defending gay 
teachers during the unsuccessful 1978 California anti-gay rights campaign (the Briggs 
initiative). We believe that it is in the interests of lesbians and gay men and our non-gay 
supporters everywhere to carefully evaluate the positions of all candidates and make a 
decision on the basis of both performance and rhetoric.”1429  
On March 18, 1980, the Illinois NGTF issued a press release purporting to outline the 
positions of each of the candidates for the 1980 Presidential elections on homosexuality 
issues. Its take on Carter was inaccurate and deeply flawed. It said Carter  
“promised that the federal government would reflect his commitment to end 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Since then, the White House staff has met 
with lesbian and gay leaders for the first time in our history. The IRS no longer denies tax-
exempt status to gay organizations. But Armed Forces regulations have become more anti-
gay since 1976. Lesbians and gay men are still harassed by immigration authorities and fired 
by federal agencies such as the FBI and CIA. In 1980, Carter has declined to support a gay 
rights plank in the Democratic platform, or to sign an executive order banning federal 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. No-one close to Carter has campaigned for 
gay votes this year. The Carter campaign has made no significant effort to involve gay 
people.”1430 
The release was wildly misinformed, offered an inaccurate and misleading picture of 
Carter and was entirely different in tone from that of the NGTF release just twelve days 
earlier. The fact that Carter’s Civil Service Reform protected homosexuals in 95% of the 
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federal sector is missing. Furthermore, Carter had made it clear in the 1976 campaign that he 
would attempt to end discrimination in all of the federal government, apart from the security 
agencies, since he believed that homosexuals could be vulnerable to blackmail which might 
threaten national security. However, change was taking place even in the security agencies 
because of Carter’s intervention and in 1980 Alan Campbell of the US Office of Personnel 
Management had issued a memorandum which declared that discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation was now a prohibited personnel practice, including in the security 
services.1431 
The greatest distortion and omission in the Illinois assessment, however, concerned 
the military and immigration. The authors of the Illinois press release seemed to be unaware 
that Carter had created a programme which reviewed all dishonourable discharges of 
homosexuals, turning several from dishonourable to honourable. What’s more, Carter’s 
administration went to great lengths to end the practice of excluding homosexuals from the 
United States. Carter organized several meetings between the NGTF and the Immigration 
authorities and supported a bill aimed at ending such exclusion while members of his 
administration held discussions with relevant authorities such as the Justice Department and 
the Immigration Agency to resolve the issue. When all of these efforts got nowhere, Carter 
issued a new policy directive whereby US authorities could no longer question immigrants 
about their sexuality, while such questions were removed from forms to be completed in 
order to enter the country.  
In reference to the other candidates, the Illinois press release showed a clear 
preference for Senator Edward Kennedy, who was seeking the Democratic nomination, 
saying he was the only candidate who had promised to issue an executive order banning 
sexual discrimination in all of the federal government, while he had also involved many 
                                                          





homosexuals in his campaign. Regarding Reagan, it said that he had made a strong public 
statement against California Proposition 6, but during the Primaries he avoided the issue of 
gay rights and his campaign had made “no significant outreach to gay people.” It said Reagan 
was the only candidate who failed to answer the NGTFs questionnaire on gay rights. It was 
clear from the statement, that Kennedy was the preferred choice of the Illinois NGTF.1432  
As early as December 1979, the NGTF had begun pressing Carter to include a gay 
rights plank in the 1980 Democratic National Convention. On December 31, 1979, Carter’s 
office made a series of detailed responses to a request from the NGTF that he commit himself 
to a gay rights platform. His responses itemised the many changes to the law with respect to 
gay rights that had been made during Carter’s presidency, and affirmed the White House’s 
view that Carter warranted the support of homosexuals in his pending bid for re-election.1433  
Doubtless aware of the damage his concessions to gay rights had done to his standing 
among evangelicals, Carter did not respond very positively, saying that to do so at this time 
“would be presumptuous on our part with the nominating process at an inconclusive 
stage.”1434 Despite pressure from gay rights activists and from his own party, Carter remained 
reluctant to come out strongly in favour of a gay plank. He tried instead to play the same 
game that had characterised his engagement with rights for homosexuals throughout his 
presidency, and essentially subsumed the issue into the broader issue of civil rights for all. 
Eizenstat declared that Carter was supportive of a civil rights plank that protected “all groups 
from discrimination based on race, colour, religion, national origin, sex, or sexual 
                                                          
1432 The Candidates on Gay Rights, Illinois NGTF, 18 March 1980. NGTF records, Box 141, Folder 14. CU.   
1433 Letter from the Campaign Committee to the NGTF, 3 March 1980, National Gay Task Force, (10/79-
3/24/80), 10/1979 - 03/24/1980. JCPL.  
1434 Letter from Martin Franks to C.R. Brydon and Lucia Valeska, 17 March 1980. Folder NGTF, (10/79-





orientation,”1435 and Carter’s campaign stated that “The President stands fully for civil and 
human rights for all Americans and I’m glad to say that includes homosexuals.”1436 
On May 23, 1980, Allison Thomas wrote a memo discussing ways in which Carter 
might be able to address the matter of the gay plank.1437 Carter was in a tricky situation 
because Kennedy had gone on record as saying that he would support such a plank. If Carter 
did not, there was a risk that gay and other liberal voters would reject him and vote for 
another candidate. John Anderson (another Democratic contender who had reached out to the 
gay community) had come out strongly in favour of granting full civil rights to homosexuals, 
whom he saw as just as deserving of them as other minorities, such as blacks or religious 
groups, although he rejected the accusation that he “approved of the homosexual 
lifestyle.”1438 Carter’s options, Thomas believed, were either issuing a “bland statement” in 
support of gay rights, or supporting a clearer statement, and leaking it to the gay 
community.1439   
However, in June 1980, shortly before the Convention, in a highly significant move 
for gay rights, Carter appointed Ginny Apuzzo, a lesbian community activist, to his party's 
Platform Committee. This made Apuzzo the first openly homosexual person to be appointed 
to the committee. Carter would then also agree to a plank calling for an end to discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation and Apuzzo would go on to co-author it. It was the first 
time in American history that a major national party had adopted such a plank.1440 Apuzzo 
would go on to play an important role in the Carter campaign’s attempts to appeal to gay 
voters. She told the author, “I campaigned for President Carter in key states having large 
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lesbian/gay community populations. I refused to accept payment from the Democratic Party 
and instead raised money within the community for travel and housing in such states as a 
Texas, Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania and California. Anne Wexler and Chip Carter 
appeared with me at least in one of these events to assist in this fundraising effort.”1441 
On June 12, 1980, The Advocate wrote a clear-headed assessment of Carter’s efforts 
in the area of gay rights, noting that “the federal government has indeed opened its doors to 
gays in significant ways.” The article also noted the great support the gay community was 
receiving in the areas of health; gay health clinics with a focus on reducing the incidence of 
sexually transmitted disease were now in receipt of public funding, coordinated by the 
Department of Health and Human Resources, which was also quietly ensuring forward 
movement in the area of supporting gay families (this despite considerable opposition from 
the religious right).1442 Another article in the same issue of The Advocate also praised 
Carter’s achievements in the area of gay rights, even admitting that his administration had 
“more done than said,” and acknowledging that the President had not gotten the credit he 
deserved for his efforts.1443 
After lengthy and tortuous deliberations, the 158-member Platform Committee, in 
agreement with the White House, voted on June 24, 1980 to include a statement that 
supported gay rights in the Democratic platform. Gay members of the committee welcomed 
the decision as a “clear victory” for their community, but indicated that the language was less 
bold than they wanted. However, when the Carter operatives warned that there would be 
“trouble” if the lobbyists pushed too hard on the language issue, they abandoned the fight. 
The decision not to carry the dispute to the floor of the convention was opposed by at least 
one of the six openly homosexual members of the committee, but more realistic heads 
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interpreted the “trouble” remark to suggest that Carter’s men might move to defeat the plank 
altogether if gay activists pressed their case. Gay leaders eventually decided a vaguely 
worded endorsement of gay rights would have to do.1444 After Carter’s insistence that the 
plank should not include the words “lesbian” or “gay,” it read: “we must affirm the dignity of 
all people and the right of each individual to have equal access to, and participation in the 
institutions and services of our society. All groups must be protected from discrimination 
based on race, color, religion, national origin, language, age, sex or sexual orientation.”1445 
Carter’s decision to go with a sexual preference plank at the convention did not sit 
well with conservative Christians, many of whom saw it as confirmation that their President 
was a “lackey of the gay rights lobby.”1446 Their dissatisfaction is evident in a letter sent to 
Carter by Pastor B. J Willhite:  
“It has recently been reported… that a representative of either your office or your 
election campaign… stated that there would be a ‘plank’ in your campaign [for the election in 
1980] supporting the ‘gay liberation’ movement and ‘gay rights.’ You should understand that 
this position is inconsistent with a Biblical understanding of homosexuality and inconsistent 
with a Christian perspective. The open support of such sin is consistent with conditions that 
existed in Sodom and Gomorrah, not a nation which claims Christianity… in the past I have 
supported you openly because of my belief that you were a committed Christian … I am 
sorry to say that I will no longer be able to do so.”1447 
Conservative Christians were not the only ones who were unhappy: the plank decision 
eventually led to a split within Carter’s backers, pitting gay rights activists against supporters 
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from the South. Rosemary Thomson, who helped lead the opposition to the WHCF and to the 
NWC, was one of the disappointed Democrats. She said, “The exciting thing about the 
Republican platform is that there is a place for pro-life, pro-family Democrats to go.”1448 
 
THE 1980 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION  
Carter vs. Kennedy 
The 1980 Democratic National Convention met at Madison Square Gardens in New York 
from August 11 to August 14. Unlike the 1976 convention, 1980 proved to be an ill-tempered 
affair, with flare-ups between Carter and his challenger Edward Kennedy, and complaints 
from feminist activists that Carter had not done enough for them, all this against a backdrop 
of disgust and fury from the evangelical right. The gay community was probably the most 
optimistic. That it boasted seventy-seven openly homosexual delegates, including twenty-two 
lesbians, compared to only three declared homosexuals at the 1976 convention,1449 was a 
vivid demonstration of the progress gays had made over the past four years. Hundreds more 
came to support the gay rights plank, further evidence of how the national discourse on gay 
rights had been changed by Carter’s actions.  
Tom Bastow of Gay Vote ’80, which led the gay delegates’ organisational effort, 
declared, “There’s never been a national gathering of popularly elected gay people. The 
caucus earlier this week was the first one. It was a tremendous emotional high for all of 
us.”1450 Further proof of Carter’s influence on the gay issue was that two delegates at the 
Republican convention a month before openly declared their homosexuality.1451 However, as 
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we have already seen, the progress that had been made over the previous four years had 
created even more demands and expectations on the part of gay rights activists, who kept on 
asking for more and more. At the time of the Convention, thousands of gay activists 
demonstrated outside the hall, warning Carter by means of a large banner: “No More Broken 
Promises”.1452 This was despite the fact that he had not broken any promises; in fact he had 
delivered more than he had promised, and more than anyone expected. 
Two intriguing factors concerned gay and female representation. For the first time, 
almost half the delegates were women, in sharp contrast to the 29% female count at the 
Republican Convention, and the Democratic Party had moved firmly behind issues of interest 
in particular to left-leaning women, including support for abortion rights and for the ERA.1453 
Prominent female Democrats had warned the party that, should it not support the issues listed 
above, victory for Reagan was inevitable.1454 At the same time, many women activists were 
deeply disappointed by Carter, and were not backing him for re-election, while Kennedy had 
been ardently courting the feminists and gay vote over the previous few years.1455  
Kennedy, who had come out strongest on gay issues, was in a number of areas ahead 
of Carter.1456 For instance, gay rights activists in Miami, the frontline of the battle against 
Bryant’s anti-gay campaign, now accused Carter of not doing enough to help them. Kennedy 
had committed to support the cause of gay rights, and won considerable support in 
Florida.1457 Carter, who was gearing up for his attempt at re-election, and Kennedy had 
dramatic conflicts.  
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Some commentators had noted that Carter appeared to be much more open and 
accessible to his supporters during this time than Kennedy, who mostly just asked them to 
“open their wallets.”1458 As it became increasingly apparent that the race was between Carter 
and Reagan, and that Kennedy and Anderson, were not likely to be nominated, gay Floridian 
voters, for example, grudgingly shifted their voting preference to Carter, feeling that Reagan 
was likely to roll back on the gains that had been made to date.1459  
Similarly, feminists could see that the Republican Party was moving steadily towards 
a “family values” platform that was hostile to many of the rights (abortion, the ERA) they 
had fought and/or were still fighting for. The Convention also attracted considerable numbers 
of protesters from everywhere on the political spectrum. Ordinary Americans were unhappy. 
It was a time of change and many challenges, both economic and social, and people’s 
patience was wearing thin.1460 
Fifty-four of the seventy-seven gay caucus members at the Convention supported 
Kennedy.1461 Nevertheless, he did not prevail. Carter received 50% of all the votes cast in the 
primaries, and Kennedy just 38%. Some who went with Carter said they did so for pragmatic 
reasons. “I made the assumption that Carter was going to win, and I thought there should be 
some of us working in that camp,” said Richard Kaplan, a Carter alternate.1462 Some were 
surprised that Carter had achieved the Democratic Party’s nomination. In fact, even after 
Carter’s nomination, it was painfully evident that the party was not united behind him. As for 
Kennedy, once defeated, he called for a more liberal party platform and arranged “a political 
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reconciliation to allow the Democratic Party to unite behind Carter’s candidacy.” He also 
appeared on the podium with the Carter family in a demonstration of Democratic unity.1463  
Carter, too, moved to mend fences. His clashes with Kennedy in the primaries had 
been extremely bitter, to the extent that some of the gay rights activists deplored his conduct 
and regretted his victory. Their views were expressed by Jim Foster, a gay leader and San 
Francisco political consultant who had worked full-time on the Kennedy campaign since 
November 1979.1464 Foster predicted that “Carter's whole effort at humiliating Ted Kennedy 
is going to cost him the election in the fall,”1465  
 
The Issue of Gay Rights 
With the gay rights plank secured, activists focussed on their other major goal: to make their 
presence felt, to become a recognisable entity nationwide and to bring their issues to the 
attention of the American people. Most importantly, they wanted to prove that they were 
accepted as a legitimate and respected political force by at least one of the two major political 
parties. Since the Gay Caucus (77 openly homosexual delegates, alternates and standing 
committee members) was the largest ever to attend a national political gathering, this should 
not have been a problem.  
However, despite their numbers, the homosexual activists failed initially to make a 
breakthrough into the public consciousness. Tom Bastow admitted, “So far, we're not having 
much of an impact. There are a lot of groups here competing for press attention. You’ve got 
to figure some kind of strong angle to get it.”1466 In desperation, the gay activists pondered 
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nominating a gay man for vice-president because candidates got fifteen minutes for speech-
making and thus national TV time. They realised this would be impossible when they learned 
that a recent rule change had upped the signatures needed for nomination from 50 to 333.1467 
Even so, they were reluctant to let the idea go and with support from other delegates, 
including the tiny Socialist Party, they found a candidate who was not only gay but black, and 
who had no chance of winning the contest. This was Melvin Boozer, president of the Gay 
Activist Alliance and sociology lecturer on the College Park campus. He was the nation’s 
first openly gay and first black candidate for the office of Vice President.1468 In publicity 
terms, nominating Boozer guaranteed fifteen minutes at the podium; two persons would be 
able to make seconding speeches, while Boozer would get to say a few words in declining the 
nomination.1469 
For a while, delegates were treated to the sight of gay rights activist carrying signs on 
the convention floor reading “Lesbians for Boozer”, “Boozer for President”, and “Carter and 
Boozer — a ticket for the 80’s.”1470 Inevitably, the nomination was unsuccessful and 
Mondale was selected to run as Carter’s Vice President. However, what disappointed gay 
rights activists and delegates was that the nominations received very little media coverage. 
Although D.C. newspapers such as the Washington Post and the Washington Star covered the 
event, the three major television networks largely ignored the nominations.1471  
It should also be noted here that during the 1980 Presidential elections, the Socialist 
Party of the USA chose David McReynolds, an openly gay white man and a prominent anti-
war activist, to run for President. Historically, he was the first openly gay candidate to do so, 
making the Socialist Party, the first American political party to nominate an openly 
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homosexual person for the highest office in the land. Sister Diane Drufenbock, a Franciscan 
nun was chosen to run as his Vice-President. McReynolds told the author that his nomination 
had nothing to do with gay rights or gay rights activists; he was nominated simply because he 
was a member of the Socialist Party, and his nomination did not receive any support from gay 
rights organizations. It received almost no coverage from the mainstream media of the time. 
“You won’t find anything in the newspapers,” he said. This was not because he was gay, but 
because the US Socialist Party, like the US Communist Party, was very small and generally 
ignored.1472  
 
Impact of the Convention 
The 1980 Democratic Convention was another example of Carter’s ability to render both the 
evangelical right and the gay activists dissatisfied. The gay rights plank dismayed its 
proponents because it lacked specific reference to gays and lesbians, while its mere existence 
angered evangelicals and other conservative Christians. Carter at heart was against a gay 
rights plank, correctly fearing an adverse reaction from the evangelical right, and he only 
agreed to it under pressure. However, despite his doubts, it was passed because he allowed it 
although he had the power to stop it. It would have been politically more beneficial for Carter 
to kill the plank. He was fully aware of the dissatisfaction that his gay rights policies had 
caused to his closest allies. By killing it, he would have lost the gay vote, but this was 
numerically small in comparison with the evangelical and Christian vote.  
Historically, and whatever his reservations, the fact is Carter allowed the introduction 
of the first gay rights plank in the platform of either of the two main American political 
parties. For gay right advocates, the plank was of major symbolic and practical importance. It 
offered the movement the two most important gains which activists were seeking from the 
                                                          





Convention, namely further legitimacy and wider visibility. Once again under Carter, gay 
rights issues were brought into the limelight and became a front-page story nationwide. 
Clearly, homosexuals were now accepted in the world of politics, which recognised their 
demands for equality and an end to discrimination as fair and just. Inevitably, it had the 
opposite effect on conservative Christians, who saw the plank as further proof of the moral 
decay of the nation under Carter. Some went so far as to denounce him as a “lackey” of 
homosexual activists.  
 
Evangelical reaction to the Democratic Convention 
Following the Convention, the evangelical right was aghast that “sexual orientation” had 
been accepted as a factor that should be relevant to discrimination cases, and saw this as 
proof that Carter supported homosexuals, and was in the pocket of the gay rights lobby.1473 
Kenneth Bowden, a Baptist pastor from Texas wrote to Maddox, the White House’s 
Religious Liaison, that he was “appalled at the fact that you, a Southern Baptist Minister, 
would condone the dreadful sin of sodomy by approving and encouraging others to approve 
the Gay rights plank.” The pastor told Maddox that he should work to “reverse” Carter’s 
position on homosexuals and told him that he was going to “encourage as many of the 
evangelicals that I come in contact with to vote for Governor Reagan,” because he wanted 
“no part of such a whitewash as you put on homosexuality.”1474 Many similar letters, 
denouncing homosexuality and demanding to know Carter’s position, flooded in.1475  
In 1981, Gary Jarmin, an important evangelical activist remembered this period as a 
major rallying point for anti-gay rights activists, saying: “We were working on school prayer, 
but then we found that almost everybody was unaware of Jimmy Carter’s support for the gay 
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rights plank. This is an issue which symbolized a drastic departure from Christian morality. 
Christians debate among themselves over school prayer, but when it comes to homosexuality, 
it is so clearly wrong that to find a born-again President supporting gay rights is a real eye-
opener. That’s when we really got the ‘ohs’ and ‘ahs’ and gasps.”1476 
 
THE1980 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
Gay Rights Activists’ Stance in the Election  
Faced with an onslaught from the evangelical right, gay rights activists were involved in 
ensuring that homosexual Americans got out and used their vote. Professor Amy Stone, 
author of the Gay Votes at the Ballot Box,1477 told the author that “some national LGBT 
groups did a gay ‘Get out the Vote’ campaign during the 1980 election.”1478 In November 
1980, shortly before the elections, a number of women wrote to the feminist newspaper Off 
Our Backs to explain why, despite various disappointments, they felt that voting for Carter 
was the best choice under the difficult circumstances,1479 while two out of three major gay 
rights organisations in Texas supported Carter’s re-election.1480 The NGTF and some smaller 
gay rights organizations also encouraged homosexuals to vote for Carter.1481 In addition, he 
received a boost when the National Coalition of Black Gays1482 formally endorsed his re-
election in its November 1980 newsletter, Habari-Habari.1483  
As Election Day neared, most gay voters seemed to conclude that Carter was their 
best option. Professor Charlotte Bunch, Louie Crew, Donald Hallman, David Mack 
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Henderson, Nancy Higgins, Jeffrey Montgomery, Eddie Sandifer, all told the author that they 
voted for Carter, as did most of the homosexuals they knew.1484 For many gay voters, like 
Sandifer, Hallman, Higgins and Crew, this was in acknowledgment of his contribution to gay 
rights.1485 Other homosexuals gave Carter their vote because they saw him as the “least bad” 
candidate and more likely to advance their agenda than Reagan. Professor Bunch told the 
author, “I do feel we also in 1980 voted for him because he was the lesser of two alternatives 
but there was a strong sense of disappointment that he hadn't done more.”1486 
That not all gays were happy with Carter was evidenced by a group named Gay 1980, 
which claimed that gay support for Carter had “eroded disastrously.”1487 Indeed, it is apparent 
that a substantial number of gays went for Reagan. Shortly before the election, Tom Bastow 
remarked that “gay people cover the spectrum of politics (and) I know a lot of conservative 
gays who support Ronald Reagan.”1488 Timothy Drake, the first openly homosexual delegate 
to a Republican national convention, said that Reagan “has the potential to generate goodwill 
in the gay community. He is not for gay rights, but he is opposed to all forms of 
discrimination, and that includes homosexuals.”1489 Finally, in the elections, Dade County, 
battleground for one of the most divisive conflicts over gay rights since the struggle began, 
voted for Reagan;1490 although gay voters in the city largely supported Carter, despite their 
protests against him during the campaign and the pro-gay messages coming from candidates 
Kennedy and Anderson.1491  
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Carter’s Late Attempt to Gain Back the Evangelical Right 
Approaching the end of his Presidential term, Carter and his advisors were keenly aware that 
he had damaged his standing with religious conservatives (although it is important to 
recognise that there was political diversity among conservative religionists, including the 
evangelical right) by refusing to put Christianity centre-stage, despite his own deep-rooted 
faith. This was particularly relevant in the context of a religious culture that was increasingly 
conservative and within which Southern Baptists were increasingly committed to biblical 
literalism.1492 Pre-election polls gave Carter low approval ratings among almost all 
demographic groups, but his aides expected him to maintain his popularity with southern 
evangelicals. True, some born-again preachers had become serious opponents, but the fact 
remained that Carter was, unchallengeably, a Southern Baptist from Georgia. On August 17, 
1980, six weeks before the election, Maddox predicted that Carter would do better with the 
evangelicals than many believed. This included the Southern Baptists, the largest of all 
Protestant denominations. He said, “President Carter will keep the Southern Baptists. I feel 
very strongly that he will do that.”1493 
At the Southern Baptist Convention in 1979, attendees were warned that, “we are 
about to lose our republic” due to liberalism in the churches and the tendencies toward 
communism and socialism in the federal government and in the larger American culture.1494 
The people involved in Carter’s campaign for re-election were keenly aware of how 
organised and hostile the evangelical right had become. In a memo, Strickland wrote: “… the 
climate of the religious community is changed. In the last four years the fundamentalist right-
wing elements of the church in America have become more organized, more vocal and much 
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more solvent. The number of dedicated extremists is small, but their appeals to fear and 
uncertainty are increasingly effective.”1495 
The memo went on to detail ways in which the campaign could reach out to religious 
leaders across the country in an attempt to garner support for Carter’s bid. The problem was 
that moderate Christians, unlike their fundamentalist counterparts, were not generally 
organised to the same degree as they had no goals to pursue, and, by definition, were less 
likely to become exercised about political issues. Under the subheading “suggestions for the 
fall of 1980,” the memo compared the religious right wing in America to conservative 
elements under the Shah in Iran, saying that there were religious forces behind Reagan “every 
bit as intolerant” and affirming that there were many religious Americans in the “middle 
ground” who would be receptive to Carter’s ethics and moral stand and who would listen 
when he explained the positions he took on controversial issues, including the ERA and 
homosexuality.1496  
Furthermore, even though Carter had consistently stated his personal view that 
homosexuality was sinful, his belief in human rights for all and the separation of church and 
state prompted some right wing evangelicals to portray him as an advocate for gay rights. In 
March 1980, during the build-up to the Presidential election, the right-wing evangelical 
pastor, Bob Jones, and other like-minded ministers visited the White House. They took with 
them a petition with 74,000 signatures which opposed extending the provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act to homosexuals. “If the President is against homosexuality, let’s see some 
evidence,” demanded the Rev. Jones. He called homosexuality a “perversion” and urged 
Carter to treat it as an “unlawful moral deviation” rather than a “protected minority normal 
lifestyle.” “We are here to tell the President that homosexuality must not become a protected 
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way of life, an alternate life style,” Jones said. He declared that Carter, “who claims to be a 
Bible-believing Christian,” was unfit to be President, and there was “no question that Ronald 
Reagan is the unanimous choice of Bible-believing people all over the country.” A fellow 
minister, Rev. Bob Billings, said there were fifty-one million fundamentalists in the USA and 
all who were entitled to vote would support Reagan. Carter ignored the petition.1497  
As the election neared, it became apparent that Christian broadcasting stations had 
become highly influential with evangelicals, and Carter’s staff decided that the campaign 
needed a religious strategy. Maddox and senior aides invited the popular televangelist Jim 
Bakker to travel with Carter during the campaign and Bakker agreed. 1498 The climax came on 
Bakker’s TV show when he played an interview he had conducted with Carter during their 
travels.1499   
On August 22, 1980, Maddox sent a memorandum to Rosalynn Carter restating his 
belief that her husband should do an interview with a Christian network. This would enable 
him to show the wider Christian community the sort of person he was and to explain “why he 
had taken certain positions.” 1500 Carter was reluctant, but on September 8, with the election 
just weeks away, Maddox and aides Powell and Wexler persuaded him to talk to Harald 
Bredesen, a Carter supporter and a respected minister in the charismatic movement. 
Questions about the President’s prayer life sought to establish Carter as a regular, practising 
Christian, and references to gay rights gave him the opportunity to explain the decisions he 
had taken in this controversial area. However, the broadcast did little to heal the wounds that 
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his policies had inflicted on the evangelical right during his presidency.1501 At the same time, 
Carter was not rejected by all evangelicals, with two of the most prominent preachers, Billy 
Graham and Oral Roberts, supporting him.1502 
  By late September 1980, Carter had given up any pretence of trying to court the right 
wing evangelicals. In response to Falwell’s constant needling, Carter eventually burst out, 
“Jerry Falwell can go straight to hell,” a sentiment that was hardly softened when he added 
rather unconvincingly, “and I mean that in a Christian way.”1503  
By October, Carter was not making any effort to disguise his exasperation with the 
extreme end of Christian conservatism, commenting that the Moral Majority “and others like 
them” had an excessively narrow definition of what it meant to be a Christian, and what it 
meant to be an acceptable politician and that he did not wish to see their views prevailing.1504 
Maddox asked ministers to back Carter and combat what he called a “fundamental threat” 
posed by the Moral Majority. “People are being duped,” Maddox told about seventy religious 
leaders on October 8, at a brunch in Kentucky, and added that though the Moral Majority 
may not formally endorse Reagan, it is “teetering on the brink” with stands against the ERA, 
abortion, and rights for homosexuals, and in favour of a stronger national defence.1505  
Carter also attacked Falwell in a radio commercial that was played by about 250 
stations in the Northeast. The commercial said: “God doesn’t hear the prayers of Jews. That's 
what Jerry Falwell, the leader of Moral Majority, backing Ronald Reagan, said recently in a 
rare moment of candour. Even after Falwell's comment Republican Ronald Reagan failed to 
reject the support of Falwell’s Moral Majority. Make no mistake about it, these right-wing 
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religious extremists are part of a nationwide movement counting on riding into the White 
House with Ronald Reagan where they can impose their morality on the rest of us. The aim 
of these right-wing extremists backing Reagan is to purify America. We’ve heard that one 
before. It's the same crowd that challenged John F. Kennedy’s right to be president because 
he was a Catholic. But we can stop them.” At that point in the commercial, Carter’s voice is 
heard saying: “I believe very deeply there ought to be a proper separation of the church and 
the state.”1506 
Falwell hit back by filing a $10 million libel suit against the Carter-Mondale 
Presidential Committee, charging that “the offending ad implicitly portrays Dr. Jerry Falwell 
as a religious bigot and has caused numerous listeners to perceive a thinly veiled comparison 
between Moral Majority and Nazism.” The Moral Majority objected to the use of “purify,” 
claiming it was a code word which “raises the spectre that the Moral Majority, like the Nazis, 
would persecute Jews if they were in a position of influence under a Reagan administration.” 
The makers of the commercial, Rafshoon Communications, denied that “purify” was a code 
word. Eventually, Carter withdrew the commercial and Falwell dropped the libel suit. 1507 
On October 30, 1980, just five days before the elections, Falwell told a rally of 1.500 
people in California’s Capitol: “People are saying, ‘You’re trying to get born-again 
Christians elected to office.’ That’s ridiculous. We’re trying to get rid of some.” He then told 
reporters that he would not vote for Carter, but he avoided endorsing Reagan. “I’m not 
endorsing or supporting any candidate,” he said.1508 
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The Stance of the Evangelical Right in the Election 
Faith continued to be a major electoral issue up to and beyond the 1980 Presidential election. 
According to polls taken at the time, religious observance had remained stable and had even 
increased during Carter’s presidency, despite considerable upheaval and the impression, 
widely held, that America was on a track towards secularisation and the removal of faith from 
public life.1509 At the same time, leaders in the Republican Party were treating Falwell “as an 
influential lobbyist and the leaders of an important swing constituency, rather than the small-
town Baptist preacher that he had been only a few years earlier.”1510  
While not everyone in the Republican Party embraced this close relationship with the 
evangelical right, in general the party line was to accept the growing association between 
evangelical religiosity and the Republican Party.1511 When Reagan visited Falwell’s Liberty 
Baptist College, he spoke the language of Falwell, supporting overt Christianity in public 
schools as a way to mitigate “the expulsion of God from the classroom.”1512 
By 1980, many of the conservative Christians who had voted for Carter in 1976 now 
said they felt “betrayed by the ‘culturally liberal’ policies of his administration.”1513 For many 
evangelicals, Carter’s refusal to state that America held a special position in the world may 
have signified their view that he rejected the evangelical right notion of the United States as a 
special place, anointed by God: “… as the 1980 election neared, Carter’s honesty and 
forthrightness [about America’s shortcomings] were popular with neither the public nor the 
press, and many evangelicals wanted someone to confirm and promote the significant status 
of the nation, rather than to criticize it as Carter had done.”1514 
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The concessions that Carter had made to homosexuals did not go as far as they 
wanted, but they had come with enormous cost to him as a politician and they had seriously 
dented his chances of re-election as conservative-leaning voters, including Democrats, 
worried about what they saw as a break-down in American society. Many conservative 
Christians had become increasingly political during Carter’s administration, and supported 
groups such as Falwell’s Moral Majority, which was increasingly intimate with Reagan, even 
after a flurry of outrage when Falwell stated that God did not listen to the prayers of Jews and 
other non-Christians and Reagan appeared to suggest that maybe Falwell had a point.1515 
The evangelical right and its allies were determined to play a leading role in the 1980 
elections. In June 1979, the Moral Majority held a rally on the steps of the US Capitol, and 
12,000 people attended to hear Falwell and a number of Republicans address the crowd, 
warning them to do all they could to fight back against the liberal forces in America. In 
September, the Religious Roundtable held a similar rally.1516 Increasingly, the evangelical 
right characterised the Carter administration, in Tim LaHaye’s words, as “un-Christian.”1517 
Pastor Bailey Smith, who had roundly endorsed Carter for the White House in 1976, now 
turned against him, and even begged him to “abandon secular humanism as your 
religion.”1518 
By March of 1980 the election campaign was gathering pace and Falwell urged his 
supporters to organise a wide-scale write-in campaign aimed at convincing Carter to back 
legislation for the restoration of school prayer.1519 A month later, evangelists Pat Robertson 
and Bill Bright organised a “Christian rally” in Washington, Washington for Jesus, at which 
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the widening gulf between the Carter administration and the interests of right wing 
evangelicals was addressed. At the rally, some of the speakers claimed that sinful behaviour, 
including homosexuality, was making the US very vulnerable to the wrath of God, which 
they felt was likely to come in the form of a Soviet attack. Carter had been invited to speak, 
but had declined to do so.1520 Robertson, who had initially been impressed by Carter and had 
supported him in the 1976 election1521 (although he later claimed to have voted for Ford) but 
who was by now deeply disillusioned, said that the rally was the beginning of a “spiritual 
revolution” that would hopefully “sweep the nation.”1522 
The voter turnout was expected to increase across the South, which had the highest 
evangelical population, while declining elsewhere.1523 Again, the religious right did not baulk 
at using the language of civil rights to make its point. “It’s like the blacks said in the 1960s,” 
Falwell said. “And this time, we’re going to win.”1524 Jerry Rafshoon, the White House 
Communications Director during Carter’s presidency, was now running his campaign for re-
election. Early in the campaign, aides felt reasonably confident about Carter’s chances in the 
South. However, soon things took a turn for the worse: “then one day early in the fall, 
Rafshoon received a disturbing call. A preacher named Jerry Falwell, with an outfit called the 
Moral Majority, had spent massive sums on anti-Carter radio ads in the South. They were 
saying that Jimmy Carter isn’t a Christian, and there are homosexuals in the Oval Office and 
all kinds of crap,” Rafshoon says. “Rosalynn went to church one time and came back in tears 
- a bunch of women were picketing her, saying your husband is not a Christian.”1525 
                                                          
1520 Turner, 2008: 191-3. 
1521 Letter from Pat Robertson to Jimmy Carter, 12 January 1976, Folder: Correspondence File 10/20/80-
10/31/80, Box 102, Office of Public Liaison Robert Maddox. JCPL. 
1522 Watson, 1997: 34, 195. 
1523 Diamond, 1998: 67; Neuhaus and Cromartie, 1987: 82.  
1524 Banwart, 2013: 148. 





The Moral Majority gave its backing to a group named Christians for Reagan, which 
solicited funds by direct mail, charging that Carter “supported the lesbian-backed, anti-family 
ERA and the goals of the Gay Militants - even opening the White House doors to them!”1526 
A fund-raising letter said that though Carter called himself a Christian, he did not act like 
one. Falwell contrived a stunt to highlight his opposition to sex education. He mailed out 
envelopes marked “ADULTS ONLY” which contained a textbook being used in school sex 
education classes. In an accompanying letter, he urged the recipients to look at the textbook 
then destroy it. Falwell sent one such packet to Maddox in the White House.1527  
Increasingly convinced that they had a friend in Reagan, members of the evangelical 
right, and especially those at the very highest levels, invested both materially and emotionally 
in Reagan’s election. They denounced Carter for failing to live up to their version of 
Christian ideals and, among other things, for “undue recognition to homosexuals, to a 
perverted lifestyle ... unreasonable privileges ... [and] popularizing the existence of this 
‘minority’.”1528  
Reagan’s campaign played an astute game. Commercials attacking Carter for his 
relatively liberal position on gay rights among other social issues aired frequently, but 
Reagan’s campaign could claim that they had no responsibility for the advertisements, which 
were funded by outside groups. Homosexuality was frequently depicted as one of the social 
ills that had been allowed to flourish under Carter’s leadership, with Carter being linked to 
the demands of homosexuals considered by the religious right wing to be “militant.” 
It was the Moral Majority and groups such as Christian Voice and Christians for 
Reagan that financed these television advertisements. They ran in the last weeks of the 
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campaign, mainly in the Southern states, pounding home their favourite message: Carter was 
soft on perverts and associated with militant homosexuals. The ads came in the form of two 
thirty-second spots, one portraying homosexuals as ridiculous and repulsive, and the other 
playing up the perceived normality of a Reagan-style American family. The first ad showed 
bizarrely costumed men at a carnival, some of them kissing in a park. A voiceover declared: 
“Militant homosexual’s parade in San Francisco, flaunting their life style. Flexing their 
political muscle, they elect a mayor . . . now the march has reached Washington. And 
President Carter’s platform carries his pledge to cater to homosexual demands. . . Carter 
advocates acceptance of homosexuality.  Ronald Reagan stands for the traditional American 
family.”1529  
In the second ad, a woman in a woollen cardigan sat on a lawn chair next to a wood 
frame house. Looking into the camera, she declared, “As a Christian mother, I want my 
children to be able to pray in school.  I don’t want them being taught that abortion and 
homosexuality are perfectly all right. I was very sorry to learn that President Carter disagrees 
with me on all of these issues. Because of this, I’m duty bound as a Christian and a mother to 
vote for Ronald Reagan, a man that will protect my family’s values.”1530 
Carter characterised the advertisements as “very vicious”1531 and accused Reagan of 
being responsible.1532 Gay leaders in Washington and New York expressed outrage,1533 and 
administration aides described the ads as “gross distortions that play on people’s fears.” 
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Carter’s assistant, Wexler, said, “They used an independent committee to sponsor the ads. It’s 
a fine device to keep their own hands clean while their supporters do unsavoury things.”1534  
Gary Jarmin, national director of Christians for Reagan, explained that target areas for 
the ads were certain key southern states and southern Ohio. They were not shown in the 
Washington area, although some clips appeared on national network news programmes. He 
said, “We decided it was necessary to run these ads because our information indicates that the 
vast majority of evangelical Christians are totally unaware of President Carter's support for 
homosexual rights. We believe that there is no issue which will cause evangelicals to defect 
from Carter more than this one.” 1535 In response to charges of Republican involvement in the 
ads, party spokesman John Roberts said the Reagan campaign had nothing to do with the ads 
or the groups that sponsored them, “We don’t take a position on what they do,” he said. 
“We’re completely separate and don’t have input with these people.”1536 
Carter tried to counter the evangelical right’s gains by running an advertisement that 
once more drew focus to his profound religious faith. The text ran: “though he clearly 
observes our historic separation of church and state, Jimmy Carter is a deeply and clearly 
religious man. He takes the time to pray privately with Rosalynn each day. Under the endless 
pressure of the presidency, where decisions change and directions change, and even the facts 
change, this man knows that one thing remains constant-his faith. President Carter.” Carter 
constantly made the point that “in our country, we ought to be able to separate church and 
state.”1537 However, he seemed to be missing the point. The evangelical right did not want a 
separation of church and state, even if it was “historical,” because that allowed the state to 
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permit its citizens to engage in behaviour (such as homosexuality) that they believed 
abhorrent and sinful.1538 
At the same time, an independent group known as People for the American Way felt 
disturbed by the tone of the evangelical adverts against Carter. The group consisted of Father 
Theodore Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame University; Martin Marty, a University of 
Chicago theologian; and former U.S. Rep. Barbara Jordan of Texas. Just two weeks before 
the election, this group ran a series of three sixty-second spots to counter Falwell and his 
associates.1539  
Even while gay rights activists were frustrated and angry with what they saw as 
Carter’s failure to adequately address their concerns during his first term, right wing activists 
such as Falwell made much of what they saw as Carter’s acceptance of gay rights and 
launched a publicity campaign that conflated homosexuality and its acceptance within 
American society with a whole range of social ills. A shock tactic employed by Falwell at his 
rallies was a ninety-minute video horror which beamed out repeated images of nuclear 
explosions, men kissing each other, discarded foetuses in hospital sluice pans, the face of 
Charles Manson and sex movie houses in New York’s Times Square. The video was titled, 
“America, You Are Too Young to Die!” 1540  
By the summer of 1980, the unity among the evangelical right that had seemed 
impossible to imagine only two years earlier had become a reality. Fundamentalists, 
charismatics, and evangelicals were working together in a political coalition to take the 
nation. They all believed that the federal government was hostile to them; that the 
government in general and Carter in particular fostered the cause of “secular humanism,” and 
that only a conservative political revolution could restore the country to morality. While some 
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evangelical leaders had made polarising statements about other religions, others, such as 
Falwell, worked on building bridges between evangelicals, non-evangelical Christians, and 
Jews, seeking to find common ground against a common enemy.1541 So far as the evangelical 
right was concerned, the right Presidential candidate would help them sweep to power.1542 
And the right candidate was not Carter.  
On successive weeks in August, the publication Moral Majority Report carried cover 
photos of Reagan and Carter designed to show Carter at a disadvantage. One displayed 
Reagan conferring with Falwell, the other pictured Carter alone in an unflattering pose.1543 As 
well as Carter, Falwell attacked Vice President Mondale as being a part of an “amoral 
minority.” He said “Mr. Mondale . . . himself acknowledges being a Universalist, and his 
family roots are humanism. Humanism, in my opinion, is glossed-over atheism.”1544 Today, 
we can see this period as a turning point, when white evangelicals in particular aligned 
themselves strongly with the Republican Party.  
In his determination to get Carter out of the White House, Falwell claimed that his 
Moral Majority had registered four million evangelicals who had not planned to vote at the 
election, and had mobilised a further ten million churchgoers who would not otherwise have 
been involved.1545 He then went to new lengths to discredit Carter by ascribing to the 
President a remark he had never made. In an extraordinary and blatant deception, he invented 
a conversation he said took place during the breakfast meeting they had at the White House in 
January 1980. Falwell claimed that he asked Carter, “Why do you have known practising 
homosexuals on your staff?” to which Carter supposedly answered, “Well, I’m President of 
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all the people.” Whereupon, Falwell claimed, he cleverly riposted: “Why don’t you have 
some murderers and burglars on your staff?” 1546   
When the White House challenged the alleged exchange, Falwell produced what he 
said was a transcript of a tape recording. He even said that this was Carter’s attempt “to 
discredit evangelical ministers who disagree with him on many social and political 
issues.”1547 However, on August 7, 1980, Maddox produced a recording of the breakfast 
meeting and made the tape available to the media. It was immediately clear that Falwell’s 
alleged transcript bore no resemblance to the authentic taped version of the conversation. The 
tape revealed that Falwell actually asked Carter, “Do I understand that your definition of the 
family precludes homosexual families?” Carter nodded and said, “Yes, I agree that my 
definition of a family does not include homosexual families.” Falwell then replied, “Thank 
you. Thank you very much.”1548 It was clear now that Falwell had lied, and that he lied not 
reflexively on the spur of the moment, but by concocting an elaborate deception that included 
the creation of a written fiction. Asked if he planned to apologise to Carter, he said, “I am 
doing it right now.” He then gave a rambling and confused explanation of his action, saying 
“I gave what I believed to be a parable of a president’s position on gay rights,” apparently 
suggesting that he was speaking metaphorically rather than literally.1549 
Perhaps the most astonishing aspects of this affair was that Falwell had taped the 
conversation with Carter on his own recorder. Falwell had received permission to tape-record 
the breakfast meeting, with the understanding that it was off the record, and had even sent 
Maddox a courtesy copy of the tape afterwards. The tape which Maddox released to the press 
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was actually Falwell’s own.1550 Falwell tried to back off and deny that he had lied, but faced 
with the evidence of his own tape, he eventually conceded that his version of Carter’s remark 
was “obviously a reckless statement.” 1551 
Fuelled by its self-image as a beleaguered minority in an immoral world, the 
evangelical right marked the final months of the campaign by staging rallies, workshops and 
seminars all around the country. The aim was to coach church ministers in the best methods 
of imparting moral beliefs among their congregations which would ensure they voted for the 
right, i.e. conservative, candidate at the election. Central to this effort was the Religious 
Roundtable supported by television evangelists, politicians and some wealthy business 
leaders.  
One such event, in Dallas on August 21, 1980, brought together a crowd of 22,000, 
plus Reagan. Carter declined an invitation to attend.  According to Richard Cohen of the 
Washington Post, this was either because Carter “was troubled” by the event’s “message” 
denouncing homosexuality, the school prayer ban, abortion, divorce, evolution, etc., or it was 
“simply because he was not particularly wanted.”1552 The predominantly white, middle-class 
crowd, including 7,000 ministers from forty-one states and 15,000 lay believers, shouted 
“Hallelujah” and “Praise the Lord,” as speaker after speaker attacked the usual targets of the 
Christian right, namely abortion, homosexuality and the ERA.1553 The Rev. W.A. Criswell, 
pastor of the First Baptist Church of Dallas, which boasted 20,000 members, denounced 
proposals to give rights to homosexuals, while the Rev. E.V. Hill, pastor of a Baptist church 
in Los Angeles, called for Christians to speak out against moral decay, evoking a roaring 
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response. Schlafly declared, that “the devil is using one word, sex, to take away the rights of 
wives and give them to homosexuals. The ERA doesn’t give women rights, it puts sex into 
the Constitution.”1554  
When Reagan spoke, he made no mention of homosexual rights, abortion or the ERA, 
but he told the crowd, “I understand this is a non-partisan conference and you can't give me 
your endorsement, so I give you mine.”1555 This was just one of the many cues that led the 
evangelical right to understand that Reagan was singing from the same hymn sheet. 
By the time of Carter’s second Presidential campaign, the religious right had 
developed a sense of “being an unpopular minority in an increasingly hostile society” and had 
become intensively defensive and political, frequently expressing its horror at social changes 
including, “the increased permissiveness of heterosexuals, the openness of gays and lesbians, 
the legalization of abortion and pornography, and challenges to the nuclear family,” as well 
as being “upset by a decreased respect for religious institutions and restrictions on religious 
expression in public life.”1556  
They felt that they alone were standing up for values and certainties that had once 
been taken for granted in America and they showed that they were not immune from using 
the language of the civil rights and gay rights movement in presenting themselves as a long-
ignored and even downtrodden group that was finally learning how to stand up for itself. 
Carter had presented America with a vision of a future involving humility and an acceptance 
of mistakes made in the past (such as the mistakes made in and around the Vietnam War) but 
right wing Americans, particularly the evangelical right, were not receptive to this message, 
preferring the bluster and certainty of people like Falwell.1557 Bruce Wilkinson, President of 
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Walk through the Bible Ministries, was quoted as saying: “Evangelicals in the past have been 
quiet, almost like an underground. I believe issues like homosexuality, abortion and military 
defence have become public issues and evangelicals have decided that it’s time to go public 
too.”1558 
Gay rights, together with issues including abortion and the ERA, were firmly in their 
sights, and Christian Voice focussed its efforts on gathering information about election 
candidates, creating lists that showed which were in favour and which were not, and raising 
funds to assist with the election campaigns of candidates they approved of.1559 By October of 
that year, Christian Voice had 200,000 members, including 37,000 pastors. It had also 
branched out from the main evangelical faiths to get on board with members of other 
Christian denominations, including conservative Catholics. Their fund-raising activities 
focused on fear-mongering. One letter posed the question, “How would you feel if tomorrow 
your child… was taught by a practising homosexual?”1560 In addition to supporting Reagan, 
Christian Voice would go on to take an active part in thirty-eight congressional races, 
supporting conservative candidates.1561 
The NGTF was not alone in sending Carter a questionnaire as to his position in 
various areas. A list of inquiries concerning social issues such as abortion, homosexuality, 
school prayer and ERA arrived at the White House on October 2, 1980, just a month before 
the election These demands came from the Rev. Pat Andrews, pastor of the Faith Baptist 
Church in Princeton, Texas, who asked Carter to reply with “yes” or “no” answers.1562 On 
October 27, Maddox replied that Carter could not give legitimate answers in a quick yes/no 
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format, but he assured the Rev. Andrews that the President was “a man of deep faith in Jesus 
Christ” and “profoundly concerned about the moral and spiritual welfare of the nation.”1563 
 
Carter vs. Reagan 
Having seen how Carter’s public displays of faith had helped him in 1976, Reagan also made 
frequent reference to religious faith.1564 By July 16, 1980, newspaper reports said that 
evangelicals “had a friend in Reagan” and could quote evangelical Christians who were 
disappointed with Carter’s stance on issues, including homosexuality, and their feeling that 
he had let them down by campaigning, in 1976, as a born-again Christian and then not living 
up to their expectations for him.1565 Some prominent members of the religious right wing, 
such as Viguerie, believed that Carter had not just ignored the evangelical right, but that his 
administration had actively set out to harm them.1566 Reagan, instead, said that as the Bible is 
against homosexuality he “guessed he was too.”1567  
At the same time, there was growing anxiety about Carter’s perceived liberalism on 
social issues, including in his native south. Reagan tapped into this by suggesting that Carter 
had betrayed his southern values.1568 One woman was quoted as saying that she was upset 
about Carter’s liberalism and support of the ERA, and feared that without a veer to the right 
American children would be taken from their parents to be “raised in communes.”1569 Many 
right wing evangelicals remained very angry about the IRS position on private schools and 
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activists on the religious right were largely successful at directing this anger towards 
Carter.1570 
Reagan was in tune with the highly politicised evangelical right.1571 He had shown 
himself willing to play the evangelical card to win the votes of these conservative members 
of the electorate. Reagan was soon meeting with important opinion-formers, including 
Falwell and televangelist Jim Bakker.1572 In July 1980 he gave his support to the Family 
Protection Act, a piece of legislation proposed by the co-chairman of his campaign, Senator 
Paul Laxalt. Among other things, the Act proposed denying legal services aid for cases 
involving gay rights and proposed denying federal funding to states that did not allow prayer 
to take place in public buildings.1573 
Reagan continued to follow a stridently anti-gay line, refusing to engage with gay 
activists at all on the basis that he was opposed to their cause on moral grounds.1574 This 
response would have been a calculated one. Reagan knew very well that many of his voters 
were members of the evangelical right, and he knew that this was exactly the response that 
they would have wished him to give to a group whose behaviour and aims they found 
abhorrent and sinful and considered a direct threat to the American way of life. For gay rights 
campaigners, the dawning awareness that Reagan was likely to be elected was difficult 
indeed. 
On October 23, 1980, just two weeks to the election, a back page ad for Reagan 
appeared in the South Boston Marshall. It urged voters, “Don’t let the Boston Globe make up 
your mind. The liberal newspapers are in bed with Carter and his ‘progressive’ record on 
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busing, gay rights, affirmative action and prayer in the public schools.” The advertisement 
compared the positions of Carter and Reagan on eight issues, the sixth being gay rights. Here, 
it said, Reagan “opposed special treatment” for gays while Carter “supports it.”1575 
While Carter was being presented to the Christian right as a friend of the homosexuals 
who were so regularly decried as a serious threat to the American family, Reagan was doing a 
fantastic job of communicating with the evangelical right in their language. At a meeting 
between evangelical leaders and Reagan at the Capitol Hilton hotel in Washington, Reagan 
was asked what, if he died the following day, he could say to God to persuade him to let him 
into heaven. Reagan looked at the ground and said, “I wouldn’t give God any reason for 
letting me in. I’d just ask for mercy, because of what Jesus Christ did for me at Calvary.”1576 
This was music to the evangelicals’ ears. More than aware of how evangelicals felt 
about homosexuals, Reagan said that if the Holy Bible was against homosexuality then he 
was too, while his running mate, George Bush, took a slightly less hostile line stating that 
while he was opposed to gay rights, he did not think that homosexuals should be harassed.1577 
Reagan also referred to homosexuality as an “abomination in the eyes of the Lord.”1578 At the 
same time, Carter was failing to disguise his personal dislike of Reagan, and had made a 
number of scathing verbal attacks that did not reflect particularly well on him.1579  
It quickly became apparent that Reagan was the favourite to win; despite the fact that 
some polls showed that Carter still had more support from evangelicals.1580 The conservative 
Republicans could see – along with everyone else – how disillusioned many evangelicals had 
become with Carter and his progressive views on women and his relatively progressive views 
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on touchstone issues such as abortion and rights for homosexuals. Instead, Reagan was more 
than happy to meet with leading conservative figures such as Falwell and Schlafly, to stress 
his anti-abortion message,1581 and to pander to, if not directly inflate, the anti-gay rhetoric.  
With the election due in under a month, a sense of frustration pervaded the Carter 
campaign, which was now effectively stalled, unable to find a way of putting Reagan on the 
defensive. The candidates’ public attitudes reflected their respective situations: Carter 
reaching for ever more extravagant rhetoric to attack his opponent; Reagan relaxed, 
shrugging off Carter’s assaults as the desperate ploy of a defeated politician.1582 
 
Carter Loses to Reagan 
Despite the fact that a Gallup poll had predicted that the 1980 Presidential election would be 
close, and the shift of many minority voters from Reagan to Carter during the final days of 
the campaign,1583 Reagan won decisively; an event that seemed to the religious right 
confirmation that they had been wise to become politically active.1584  
On November 4, 1980, Reagan won a landslide victory, with 50.7% of the vote to 
Carter’s 41%.1585 56% of evangelical Christians had voted for Reagan as opposed to 34% for 
Carter, and one poll revealed that 61% of those self-identifying as “born-again white 
Christians” voted for Reagan. White, fundamentalist voters are calculated as representing two 
thirds of Reagan’s lead over Carter.1586 White, married, middle-class women tended to vote 
for Reagan because they felt he was stronger on “family values”, while single women, and 
ERA supporters generally, tended to vote for Carter.1587  
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The belief that the evangelical wing had contributed hugely to getting conservatives to 
vote, and to vote for Reagan was, “borne out by an ABC-News/Lou Harris survey that 
concluded that the Moral Majority had played a large part in getting conservatives to the polls 
and in helping swing the South from Carter’s column to Reagan’s.”1588 In fact, supporters of 
the Moral Majority were much more likely than non-supporters to have switched their vote 
from Carter to Reagan, showing that the interest group had had a dramatic effect on how 
votes were cast.1589 
Reagan’s election was greeted joyfully by the evangelical groups and their leaders 
moved quickly to seize a share of credit for the success. Falwell said, “There’s no question 
that Moral Majority and other religious right organizations turned out multiple millions of 
voters.”1590 He characterised the result as “the greatest day for the cause of conservatism and 
American morality in my adult life.”1591 The Christian Voice claimed that it counted victories 
in 25 of 38 congressional races in which it had been active, and Gary Jarmin, political 
director of the same organization, happily announced that “we did much better than we 
expected.”1592 In Time magazine, statisticians calculated that two-thirds of Reagan’s ten-point 
win came from evangelicals.1593 However, the vice-president elect, George Bush, poured cold 
water on the evangelicals’ self-congratulations, arguing that no single group was responsible 
for Reagan’s victory. This was widely seen by Republicans as a snub to the Moral 
Majority.1594  
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Reagan had polled as the least popular Presidential candidate to win since Truman, 
but that still trumped Carter, who had polled as America’s least popular President during the 
same period.1595 One onlooker considered the result of the election, “a tremendous example 
of the volatility of public opinion, and the start of a period in which elections were candidate 
– rather than policy-driven.1596 Carter ultimately lost to Reagan for many reasons, and one of 
them was the perception of evangelicals that he was “soft on” homosexuals and in favour of 
granting them rights that they did not warrant. Of course, this was only one of the reasons for 
the Carter defeat. Michael Dukakis told the author that “1980 saw many of the same forces in 
play in the Kennedy-Carter contest and Reagan’s subsequent victory. On the other hand, the 
reasons for Carter’s defeat were largely economic. The oil embargo, raging inflation and 
other economic factors played by far the biggest role in his defeat.”1597  
In a personal interview, Charlotte Bunch stated her view that Carter’s innate 
“decency” played a role in his defeat, “… the politics of decency is at such a contradiction to 
this kind of right wing ruthlessness and I think Carter was very much a victim of that. And 
every time he tried to stand up for principles he was made to seem weak.”1598 
Pat Robertson used his first broadcast after the election to claim proudly that the votes 
of conservative Christians had been the decisive factor in bringing Reagan to victory. 
Robertson went on to itemise problems he had had with a number of White House staffers 
under Carter, and referred to Costanza as having been “repugnant to Christians” for having 
advocated gay rights.1599 Over the years that followed Reagan’s election, Robertson became 
ever more entrenched in his right wing position, culminating, in 1991, in his publication of A 
New World Order, a book dedicated to the conspiracy theory that various American 
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Presidents, including Carter and Wilson, were “unknowingly and unwittingly carrying out a 
mission and mouthing the phrases of a tightly knit cabal whose goal is nothing less than a 
new order for the human race under the domination of Lucifer and his followers.”1600 
Robertson suggested that while they were not themselves “evil”, Carter and Wilson were 
being guided by Satan.1601 It seems a great irony that many of the same people who helped 
propel Carter to the presidency in 1976 turned so rabidly against him four years later. 
However, not all evangelicals were so critical of Carter or dismissive of his efforts. 
Looking back from 2014, Dr. Morris Sheats recalled in a personal interview, “I believe 
President Carter is a Christian who did his best. He served during very hard times. I believe 
he has accomplished much more through The Carter Center than as President. I highly 
respect him and believe his efforts in the Middle East will be historically significant. Was he 
a Christian Politician or a Political Christian? On a personal note [speaking about the White 
House breakfast meeting with the evangelical leaders, discussed above]... each man present 
was taken into the oval office for a picture with the President - a great honour. While there 
(about two minutes) I asked Mr Carter to teach me one thing he did daily that might not be 
known by the public. He shared that he wrote two people each day a “thank you” note who 
had helped him in some way. That “tip for living” has been a great asset in my life, I am 
grateful for that moment and workable idea. President Carter is an honourable man, and I 
believe a Christian man.”1602 
 
CARTER’S CONTRIBUTION TO GAY RIGHTS DURING THE 1980 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
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Carter did not seek the gay vote in the 1980 contest as vigorously as he had done in 1976, 
being painfully aware of the damage his sympathetic policies had done to his relationship 
with the evangelicals, assumed to be his closest allies. Nevertheless, the 1980 Presidential 
elections were important to the development of the gay community and contributed a series 
of significant landmarks to its fight for nationwide recognition. For example, seventy-seven 
openly homosexual delegates attended the 1980 Democratic Convention compared to three at 
the Convention in 1976. In addition, for the first time, there were openly homosexual 
delegates, if only two, at the Republican Convention. It was also during the 1980 Democratic 
Convention that a homosexual (Mel Boozer) was nominated to run for vice president by one 
of the two major political parties. Furthermore, an admitted homosexual (David McReynolds) 
set a precedent when he accepted nomination and ran for President, albeit at the behest of the 
tiny Socialist Party.  
Although Carter was not directly involved in any of these developments, it is 
indisputable that they took place during his tenure. That homosexuals felt emboldened to 
declare their identities to the nation and to seek office at the highest levels clearly owed much 
to the atmosphere of tolerance and respect engendered by the Carter administration. It seems 
highly unlikely that such advances would have occurred if Carter had not publicly and 
consistently demonstrated his willingness to listen to and co-operate with legitimate gay 
rights causes. Michael Chanin was expressing an evident truth when he told gay activists that 
Carter had “begun to change the attitudes of people.”1603  
Carter had indeed done that, legitimising the gay rights movement with a series of 
decisions and policies. He had brought the issue of gay rights into the White House itself for 
the first time; he had appointed homosexual men and women to positions in his 
administration and in public service; he had permitted the participation of declared 
                                                          





homosexuals at the NWC and then in his own WHCF; and he had facilitated official meetings 
between the NGTF and federal agencies. Developments such as these were key to the sight 
(an extraordinary one for most Americans) of scores of openly homosexual delegates turning 
up for the Democratic convention. David Mack Henderson told the author that Carter’s 
legitimisation of the movement, and his positive attitude towards gay rights in general, were 
critical in enabling all these changes. He said, “I am sure of it. Carter changed the perception 
of how we were seen and therefore how we were treated. Carter removed what was seen as 
the stigma of being a homosexual. A lot of homosexuals I knew came out during Carter’s 
time. They were not embarrassed to admit they were homosexual anymore. This, for me, was 
his (Carter’s) major achievement: getting rid of the stigma of being a homosexual.”1604 
No less significant to the 1980 election story was that the Democratic convention 
ratified a gay rights plank for the first time. It is a fact that Carter opposed it and insisted on 
excluding the words gay and lesbian, aware of the negative reaction this would bring from his 
evangelical supporters. However, he could have avoided such a reaction altogether by vetoing 
the plank, and the temptation to do so must have been strong. Nevertheless, he decided to 
accept gay activists’ appeals and allow what became the first ever gay rights plank.  
Ginny Apuzzo, who co-authored the plank, was a prominent lesbian activist and 
executive director of the NGTF. When Carter appointed her to his platform committee, she 
became the first openly homosexual person ever named to the committee of one of the two 
major parties. Her appointment further demonstrated Carter’s opposition to sexual 
discrimination, while offering recognition and visibility to the gay community. At one stroke, 
the highest authority in the nation signalled that homosexuals were to be treated as equal 
members of society and legitimate players on the political scene.  
 
                                                          






The 1980 Presidential election was very different for Carter from 1976, not only because of 
the result. The major change was the shift of the bulk of the evangelical vote from Carter to 
Reagan. As for the gay vote, Carter did not cultivate it as assiduously as he had in 1976, but 
he was still backed by most gay organisations and individuals because of his contributions to 
gay causes over the preceding four years. That said, there were gay supporters who voted for 
him only because they saw him as the better of two bad choices.  
The single most notable aspect of the 1980 elections was the mobilization of the 
evangelical right. Although evangelicals had got together to support Carter in 1976, the 
extent of the 1980 exercise was beyond comparison, and to date has never been equalled. 
What contributed especially to the 1980 drive was the formation far ahead of the elections of 
several evangelical organizations sharing the same ethos and ambitions.  
The role of the evangelical right in the 1980 elections has been widely discussed and 
the consensus is that it was instrumental in Reagan’s victory. Professor Randall Balmer told 
the author: “I think the religious right had a profound influence on American elections 
beginning in 1980 and for nearly three decades thereafter. In terms of policy, however, the 
religious right has had relatively little influence, except for the appointment of hard-right 
conservatives to the judiciary.”1605 
Where the 1980 election were of major importance was in the matter of gay rights. 
Carter sent an emissary to a fundraising event for gay convention delegates and he contacted 
the NGTF directly, asking or its support. That the NGTF agreed to back him was in itself a 
recognition of his contribution to gay rights. Several landmarks for gay rights took place 
during the 1980 Presidential election. They included:  
                                                          





 Seventy-seven openly homosexual delegates participated in the Democratic Convention, 
compared to only three in 1976.  
 Mel Boozer became the first acknowledged homosexual to be nominated as Vice 
President by the Democratic Party.  
 David McReynolds was the first open homosexual to run for President 
 Two openly homosexual delegates participated for the first time at a Republic convention 
in 1980.  
 For the first time, a gay rights plank was included in the Democratic Convention. 
 Ginny Apuzzo was the first ever homosexual person appointed to the Democratic Party’s 
platform committee, and she was appointed by Carter himself. 
 These developments in 1980 were the fruit of four years of Carter’s sympathetic 
policies towards the gay rights movement. His policies and decisions over that period 
changed the public discourse about gay rights. No longer was homosexuality seen by most 
Americans as something sinful or negative; now men and women who professed to be gay 
began to be accepted as part of society. Carter’s appointments of homosexuals in public 
service, the White House meetings and his gay rights policies all helped to make it easier for 
people to acknowledge their homosexuality and for heterosexuals to accept them as equal 
members of society. 
Ultimately, the division of America into two very different cultural camps (a situation 
that largely prevails even today) made Reagan’s victory a relatively easy one to secure. While 
it would be an error to claim that the battle between pro- and anti-gay rights activists was the 
major social issue of the election – abortion, for example, was a decisive factor, among 
others1606 – the perception that Carter was “soft on gays and perverts” made many on the 
evangelical right feel that they simply could not work with him.  
                                                          

















In order fully to understand Carter’s contribution towards gay rights, it is important to 
consider the evolution of the struggle after Reagan’s 1980 victory, and to take into 
consideration the environment and climate of the time. Therefore, this chapter will examine 
developments in gay rights from 1981 to 2017, set against the events of Carter’s time. I am 
not trying to give a survey of subsequent history for its own sake, but to establish a historical 
benchmark against which to judge the Carter presidency. This chapter also examines the 
opinions of several prominent gay rights activists who were active in the 1970s regarding 
Carter’s overall contribution to their struggle.  
 
THE REAGAN BACKLASH 
With Reagan’s accession, open access by the gay community to the administration came to 
an abrupt end. A December 1981 letter from the NGTF leadership to its members gave a 
clear picture of the situation which gay rights activists would face throughout the 1980s. It 
said, “We have been shunned by the White House… our contacts at the numerous agencies of 
the federal government have been cut off or severely restricted.”1607 It was the religious right 
which now enjoyed this access.  
Reagan had been an unexpected opponent of the Briggs Initiative on libertarian 
grounds, but he was no friend to the gay rights movement, having already cast his lot with the 
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most conservative elements of the Christian right wing. At least in the very early years of 
Reagan’s presidency, the religious right, “gained unprecedented access to the inner circles of 
power” and was apparently part of the “power elite.”1608 When Senator Roger Jepson 
introduced the Family Protection Act in 1981, which would prevent homosexuals from 
receiving Social Security, and veteran or welfare benefits, Reagan endorsed this legislation. 
That same year, fundamental Christians hailed as another victory the passage of a law 
prohibiting the Legal Services Corporation from accepting discrimination cases from 
homosexuals.1609  
In 1981, under the Reagan administration, the House of Representatives passed the 
McDonald Amendment, which eliminated free legal services to gay people on low incomes. 
Also in 1981, at a time when the House of Representatives had a Democratic majority, while 
the Republicans had gained control of the Senate (the first time that Republicans gained 
control of any chamber of Congress since 19531610), Congress blocked repeal of the District 
of Columbia’s sodomy law.”1611  
For gay rights activists, the 1980s were a difficult time, mostly because of the AIDS 
epidemic, during which public attitudes towards homosexuality became more aggressive, 
apparently undoing a lot of the gains made in the second half of the 1970s.1612 Many 
prominent figures on the religious right, such as Falwell, declared the AIDS epidemic a sign 
of God’s anger with homosexuals and their supporters.1613 Pat Buchanan said in 1983: “The 
poor homosexuals, they have declared war on Nature and now Nature is exacting an awful 
retribution.”1614  
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Other prominent religious right wing activists proposed that homosexuals should be 
quarantined, and even hinted that it would be even better if they were executed or at least 
castrated.1615 Reagan, who had depended heavily on votes from the Christian right wing to 
secure election in 1980 and re-election in 1984, displayed little interest in the AIDS epidemic, 
and launched no federal programmes to investigate the disease, about which little was known 
in the early 1980s. As a result of the AIDS catastrophe, gay rights organisations were 
distracted throughout the 1980s and 1990s from their quest for greater civil rights, focusing 
instead on the urgent need for research into the disease, and on the need for the sick to 
receive the care they needed.1616 
 
BILL CLINTON AND GEORGE W. BUSH 
Although gay rights had retreated somewhat as an important issue for Presidential candidates 
during the 1980s, by the early 1990s, they were back on the agenda.1617 The election of 
Clinton in 1992 appeared to offer the chance to extend gay rights and in fact Clinton had 
promised to end formal discrimination against gays.1618 Since 1992, the Democratic Party had 
actively sought the votes of gays and lesbians.1619 In a very real sense, in this Clinton was 
following in Carter’s footsteps, even if he did not explicitly say so.  
Despite the fact that Clinton had promised to extend greater rights to homosexuals, 
and despite his clever use of family values in a campaign that made it clear that family values 
could be inclusive and liberal,1620 Clinton disappointed gays in that regard. This was 
particularly so in his support of the “Defence of Marriage Act” (DOMA), which allowed 
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states not to recognise same-sex unions legitimized in other states.1621 After the passage of 
the Act, in 1996, nearly forty US states went on to pass their own DOMA, effectively 
prohibiting same-sex marriage at state level, although a much smaller number of states did 
facilitate civil partnerships, and even same-sex marriage, during the same time frame. Clinton 
also fudged the issue of homosexuals serving in the US military with his “Don’t Ask Don’t 
Tell” (DADT) ruling, which prohibited asking candidates or military employees about their 
sexuality, while retaining the possibility of firing them if they did not remain discreetly in the 
closet.1622  
By the early 2000s, positive movement towards greater rights for gay citizens had 
occurred. In May 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that the 
constitution of the state guaranteed marriage rights for same-sex couples. In June 2003, the 
Lawrence v. Texas ruling saw anti-sodomy laws invalidated in all those states that still had 
them on the books, following a lengthy legal struggle after the arrest of two men for engaging 
in intercourse;1623 in 2005 the Supreme Court of California accepted a new law that put in 
place a domestic partners’ registry for homosexual couples and later the same year officially 
recognised the co-parenting rights of gay couples. Also in 2005, the Supreme Court of Alaska 
ruled that both state and local governments must offer the same benefits to the partners of 
homosexual employees as to spouses in heterosexual marriages.1624  
While religious right and anti-gay activists continue to bemoan what they see as the 
increasing liberalisation of the United States, it would be a big mistake to suppose that they 
have lost their power as a political force; in fact, they have tended to be increasingly political 
with the passage of time.1625 On November 4, 2008, even as America’s first mixed-race 
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president took office, in California Proposition 8, an amendment to the state constitution that 
banned same-sex marriage was passed despite the huge effort that had been expended by gay 
rights activists (although it was eventually declared unconstitutional). Consistently, the 
evangelical right has shown itself to be an astute political force that is very good at 
motivating voters by channelling and activating anti-gay sentiments prevalent among the 
general population. While the gay rights movement has made significant gains in the areas of 
law and legislation, it has generally been less effective than its rivals at whipping up 
grassroots sentiment;1626 something that it has done without substantially changing the 
approach that was honed under Carter’s presidency.  
While the issue of gay rights remains highly politicised and activists have won 
considerable ground, the evangelical right is still a force to be reckoned with, with well-
developed resources and networks and a sophisticated understanding of the political machine 
and the plethora of media available to campaigners today. Writing in 2007, in the final years 
of the presidency of George W. Bush, Wald and Calhoun-Brown stated that, “… 
homosexuals… face expulsion from the military, an inability to marry, the denial of partner 
health, tax and insurance benefits, increased scrutiny or outright bans on adoption, ambiguous 
parent rights for both non-biological and biological parents, and many other forms of 
differential treatment based on their sexual orientation.”1627 
 
BARACK OBAMA AND GAY RIGHTS 
Obama ran for election in 2008 telling America that, while he supported gay rights in general, 
he did not support gay marriage, and felt that civil unions represented the best way forward 
for homosexual couples. His position on gay rights, and the steady evolution of the US 
                                                          
1626 Stone, 2012: xv. 





towards a more gay-friendly position on issues including marriage, have not developed in a 
vacuum, but in the context of the growing sense of gay rights as an important issue, starting 
before the Carter Presidency, gaining impetus under Carter, and following a rocky and often 
uncertain path towards the current status quo, with future gains in this area appearing to be a 
certainty.  
In 2008, Obama presented the most ambitious and aggressive gay rights platform 
ever, in the context of an appeal to Americans generally to subscribe to values and ideals held 
by all Americans.1628 Obama also appealed directly to gay voters in a document called 
Obama Pride, in which he vowed to work hard to put into place the Matthew Shepard Act to 
outlaw all hate crimes, and also to pass an inclusive employment non-discrimination act that 
would make any discrimination against gay employees illegal. This was greeted warmly by 
gay rights activists, including those who had backed Hillary Clinton prior to her withdrawal 
from the race, many of whom now pledged to give Obama’s campaign their full support. In 
fact, the director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, David Noble, left that position 
to join Obama’s campaign as the gay vote director.  
In 2009, the Matthew Shepard Act was passed, adding the words “sexual orientation” 
and “gender identity or expression” to laws against hate crimes. Shepard, a student at the 
University of Wyoming, was murdered in 1998 apparently because he was a homosexual. 
The intense public outrage at his brutal murder prompted many to demand that the 
government make these changes. However, despite various efforts (legislation passed in the 
Senate in 2007, but President George W. Bush indicated that he would veto it if it reached his 
desk, and the Democratic leadership dropped it), the Act did not pass until 2009, more than 
ten years after Shepard’s death, and in the first year of Obama’s new presidency.1629  
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In 2010, Obama’s administration extended Family and Medical Leave (FMLA) rights 
to same-sex and other parents who do not necessarily have a biological link with their 
children.1630 The same year, Obama requested legislation that ensured that Medicaid and 
Medicare hospitals would respect the rights of patients to decide who should visit them; 
previously, in states that did not have gay marriage, same-sex spouses could be, and often 
were, prevented from seeing their partners in hospital, as there was no recognition of their 
marriage in the state in which the hospital was located. His request was met with a degree of 
resistance from many hospitals, and the legislation would have applied only to 
Medicaid/Medicare hospitals, and not all hospitals (although most were included).  
In December 2010, the DADT legislation was finally repealed,1631 and the changes 
went into effect on September 20, 2011. This was hailed as a victory by gay rights activists, 
the Democratic Party, and by Obama himself, as removing the last remaining obstacle 
between homosexual Americans and parity of rights in the area of employment. DOMA law 
had been interpreted under George W. Bush as negating the need to even count how many 
American same-sex couples had been married in states or foreign countries permitting gay 
marriage. By 2010, the Obama administration had reversed that decision and announced that 
the US census would record and tabulate the number of gay marriages that had been carried 
out. In February 2011, the President and Attorney General announced that the Department of 
Justice would no longer defend Section 3 of DOMA against equal protection constitutional 
challenges brought by same-sex couples married under state law, although the administration 
would continue to “enforce” it.1632  
In July 2011, the White House announced the President’s support of the Respect for 
Marriage Act, introduced by Senator Dianne Feinstein and Congressman Jerrold Nadler, 
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which would repeal DOMA on the grounds that it was unconstitutional and uphold the 
principle that gay and lesbian couples should receive the same Federal rights and legal 
protections as straight couples. Leaders in the Republican Party were not pleased by this 
change, and pledged to launch a legal challenge to it. By this stage, Obama had started to 
make much stronger statements in favour of gay rights than before, presumably because it 
was becoming apparent that public support for such measures had increased, and he declared: 
“Every single American – gay, straight, lesbian, bisexual, transgender – every single 
American deserves to be treated equally in the eyes of the law and in the eyes of our society. 
It’s a pretty simple proposition.”1633 
Moreover, when Obama won the presidency for the second time in 2012, he became 
the first sitting President to endorse same-sex marriage, and even mentioned homosexuals in 
his acceptance speech; something that would have been unthinkable during Carter’s time, and 
might be even today were it not for the considerable strides that were taken in the area of gay 
rights during Carter’s presidency. Obama’s support of gay marriage came with a caveat; he 
felt that it should be dealt with on a state-by-state basis, rather than at federal level.1634  
In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down DOMA; since then all the federal circuit 
courts have ruled in favour of same-sex marriage. From 2014, it was no longer legal for 
insurance companies to treat gay people and their families differently, including with respect 
to health insurance. This means that health benefits are now guaranteed to be extended to 
domestic partners or same-sex spouses. Also, measures to prevent and prosecute domestic 
violence were extended more completely to same-sex couples.1635 
On June 16, 2014, Jon Carson, Executive Director of Organizing for Action, wrote to 
the White House to ask about current policy and action on the issue of gay rights, and 
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received the following email the next day in response: “President Obama just took a huge 
step forward in the fight for LGBT equality. Yesterday, he proposed an executive action that 
would prohibit companies that receive federal contracts from discriminating based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity. That’s because it’s unthinkable that – in 2014 – someone could 
be fired for who they are or whom they love… In just a few years, we’ve repealed “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell,” the Defence of Marriage Act has been struck down, and nearly half of all 
Americans live in states where same-sex couples can now get married. That’s progress, and 
it’s happening whether the opposition likes it or not. We’re winning, because there are 
millions of people like you who are out there fighting for it… In 2014, discrimination against 
LGBT Americans shouldn’t be legal anywhere – President Obama and a bipartisan majority 
in the U.S. Senate have stood up and said that.”1636 
On 26 June, 2015, the US Supreme Court ruled that the US Constitution guarantees 
same sex couples the right to marry, a massive landmark in the battle for gay rights. Gay 
rights activists have applauded the changes that came at an accelerated rate under Obama’s 
presidency. In a personal interview, Professor Bunch stated her view that Obama had learned 
from “the mistakes of Carter” and that he is “much more modern,” and “much better.” She 
also feels very positive about Obama’s performance in the area of gay rights, “While Obama 
has been disappointing in some areas relating to human rights… nobody could suggest that he 
has not pushed out the boat for gay rights. Even though public opinion about homosexuality 
has changed dramatically in the years since Carter, Obama has shown himself prepared to 
take risks to support the human rights and journey towards equality of this element of the 
American public. There genuinely has been a sea change in the area of equality for gay 
Americans, and this is a legacy of which Obama can feel justifiably proud.”1637  
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Eric Marcus1638 described to the author Obama’s role in developing gay rights as 
“dramatic” and “transformative,” and compared him favourably to Clinton, who is often 
remembered as a friend of gay rights although he also signed two very retrogressive pieces of 
legislation, DOMA and DADT.  
At the same time, the religious right wing continues to exert huge pressure on 
American political life, and the Republican and Democratic parties have tended to take 
increasingly polarised stances around social issues.1639 The evangelical right continues, in the 
main, to take a strong negative stance on gay rights, and to see homosexuality as unnatural, 
sinful and damaging not just to the individuals in question, but to society as a whole. One 
item of propaganda, distributed in schools by a conservative right wing organisation, claimed 
that the ultimate aim of the gay rights movement is to abolish a legal age of consent and 
consider paedophiles as prophets in a new sexual order.1640 Dobson, still a prominent right 
wing evangelical and anti-gay rights campaigner, has compared those who support gay 
marriage to “the Nazis.”1641  
Until the end of his presidency Obama remained a strong advocate of gay marriage, 
and his administration became incrementally more supportive of the extension of full equality 
for gay Americans, against a backdrop of rapid cultural change in this area, and the steady 
growth of support even in elements of the government that are typically socially conservative. 
However, gay rights activists in the US, and elsewhere, continue to fight against a range of 
problems, including stigma, victimisation and care programmes that are not suited to their 
needs. Although the US has improved hugely in the area of gay rights, it is not the most 
progressive country by a long way and young people in particular sometimes experience 
inadequacies in social care, education, and other elements of state infrastructure, such as 
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school,1642 programmes for the homeless1643 and more in ways that are contrary to the UN’s 
Convention on the Rights of the Child,1644 which remains unratified.1645 Gay Americans still 
often experience abuse of various kinds,1646 while transsexuals, particularly the young, can 
experience being denied hormone treatments.1647  
In an interview, Professor John d’Emilio commented about gay rights today: 
“Although some victories, like passage of a national non-discrimination law, proved elusive 
because of the power of Republicans in Congress, much change has occurred – from the end 
of the military exclusion policy to the refusal of the Justice Department to support the 
Defence of Marriage Act to Obama’s executive order prohibiting discrimination against 
transgender federal employees. And, all of these changes at the national level have helped 
keep LGBT issues in the public eye in a way that has steadily moved public opinion in the 
direction of supporting formal legal equality.”1648 
 
COMPARISONS 
That it took almost thirty years after Carter left office for homosexuals to make any 
significant gains testifies to the difficulties the President had faced. The long hiatus of the 
Reagan years shows that Carter was far ahead of his time. It also proved that the changes 
under Carter did not happen simply as a result of current changes in society, but were solely 
due to Carter’s initiatives and his willingness to improve the lives of gay American men and 
women. Ford, Carter’s predecessor as President, and Reagan, after him, both lived in the 
same environment as Carter and experienced the same social conditions, but no significant 
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change took place during their terms. That is hardly surprising given their attitudes towards 
gays.  
Reagan’s election was a serious obstacle to the pursuit of gay rights. By severing 
communication with the NGTF and closing the doors of the White House and the federal 
agencies, Reagan effectively returned homosexuals in the USA to where they were before 
Carter became president. It would be another twelve years, with the election of Clinton, 
before the administration doors were open again to gay rights activists. A serious blow for the 
gay community, coinciding with Reagan’s election, was the emergence in 1981 of the AIDS 
epidemic, for which homosexual men were widely blamed and the community stigmatised. 
Reagan, supported by the evangelical right, remained mostly indifferent, offering nothing 
significant in the way of medical assistance or research programmes or any moderation of 
public discourse. We can only speculate as to how Carter would have reacted to this situation, 
but we can assume that he would at least have kept an open door for gay activists, as he had 
promised during his 1980 Presidential campaign. 
A great many gay rights activists were dismayed by Carter’s defeat, and in retrospect 
most of them are now certain that a second term for Carter would have been far better than 
the Reagan presidency for the gay community. Ginny Apuzzo told the author, “the evolution 
of President Carter's consciousness was slow but deep and I believe sincere. I never doubted 
that had President Carter prevailed in the 1980 election, the course of the AIDS epidemic 
would have been significantly different.”1649  
Nancy Higgins told the author, “I can’t be sure what would have happened if Ford had 
won, but I very much doubt that he would have been as open and willing as Carter. He 
certainly was not friendly towards gays in the time he was President, so why would he have 
changed afterwards? And then we all felt what Reagan was about. Reagan not only stopped 
                                                          





the progress that Carter had started, but he took us one step further back to where we were 
before Carter.”1650   Jeffrey Montgomery stated in a personal interview, “Certainly Carter’s 
efforts and attitude legitimised our struggle and our movement, and changed public discourse 
about our rights. I strongly believe that things for homosexuals would have advanced further 
had he (Carter) beaten Reagan. He was certainly more humane and I believe he would have 
reacted very differently to the AIDS epidemic.”1651  
Eddie Sandifer told the author, “Talking to Reagan was like talking to the door. He 
did not want to hear and he did not want to know; he wanted nothing to do with homosexuals. 
I am sure Carter would not have been like this. I can’t tell what else he would have done, but 
I am positive that he would been a million times better for gay rights than Reagan was.”1652 
David Mack Henderson characterised Reagan’s election to the author as a “major backlash” 
for gay rights. “We were back again in the Stone Age. It was not just Reagan, everything 
went wrong in the eighties. It was really a tragedy. Would things had been better for gay 
rights if Carter had defeated Reagan? That is unquestionable.”1653  
Professor Charlotte Bunch said in a personal interview: “If Carter had been re-elected 
would he have done more for gay rights? … yes, I think Carter would have done much more 
in a second term, but he didn’t get a second term.”1654 Louie Crewe and Donald Hallman also 
told the author they believed the gay rights suggestions would have been better if Carter had 
been re-elected.1655   
Real progress for their cause did not arrive until Obama’s election in 2008. However, 
even then, it was possible for people to be fired because of their sexuality. As we have seen, 
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Carter protected homosexuals in 95% of federal employment, basically everywhere but the 
security services and the military. That 5% remained outstanding and Carter declined to issue 
an executive order to cover this sector was a matter of much dissatisfaction among gay 
activists throughout his presidency. Significantly, the situation would remain exactly as 
Carter left it for the next almost thirty years. It was the same for military service. That Carter 
upgraded several dishonourable discharges of homosexuals to honourable was the best thing 
that any president did for gay soldiers until Obama permanently removed sexual 
discrimination from the military.   
Without downgrading Obama’s achievements, it was easier for him to support gay 
rights than it was for Carter during the second part of the 1970s. By 2008, the public attitude 
towards homosexuals had changed markedly. However, this change started with Carter’s 
presidency and was the result of his policies and decisions. The meaningful steps that 
occurred during the Carter presidency contributed substantially to the changes that we have 
seen over the decades up to the present. If some of Carter’s achievements appear unimportant 
today, when same-sex marriages are legal, it is important to remember that he acted at a time 
when homosexuality was considered by many Americans to be a disease which could be 
cured by treatment. In a personal interview, Eddie Sandifer said that if someone had told him 
in the 1970s that there would be a time in the USA when gay men would be allowed to marry 
each other and even adopt children, he “would have thought that this man is insane. Right 
away. No further discussion.”1656 In judging Carter’s achievements in this field, it is essential 
to set his actions against the environment and attitudes of his time, not the way things are 
today. 
                                                          






GAY RIGHTS ACTIVISTS’ OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE CARTER 
PRESIDENCY 
Although Carter’s role in advancing gay rights has been underestimated and little publicized, 
it has not gone entirely unrecognised. Gay rights activists who were active in the 1970s do 
recognise Carter’s role in advancing their cause and this is very important as they are the ones 
who experienced Carter’s efforts. Costanza said that Carter’s administration had “done more 
to insure gay rights and the elimination of harassment and discrimination against gay people 
than any administration in American history.”1657 Elaine Noble, quoted above, pointed out 
that the gay rights movement at the time was surprised that Carter’s administration opened as 
many doors as it did.   
Louie Crew reflected in 2014 in a personal interview that “… I think Mr Carter 
himself would probably… reflect that no, he wasn’t as bold as he might have been, but I 
think that’s more from the point of view of what came later. He certainly has been a major 
advocate for example in his retirement for marriage equality. I thought he had done a 
marvellous thing in Georgia and I thought and I still think that he was one of the brightest 
Presidents we ever had… I think the reforms were highly significant. They set a model for 
the country and I think they opened the country’s experience.” Crew believes that Carter 
legitimised the gay rights movement and changed public discourse about gay rights. He also 
stated that as President, Carter “humanised” gay activists.1658  
Professor Charlotte Bunch said in a personal interview “Movement realignments were 
starting to happen and I think Carter… because of his commitment to human rights he 
probably did better than some of them might have.”1659 Tom Hayden told the author that, “… 
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generally, Carter’s administration created an era in which the movement for LGBT rights 
began to impact the political and policy processes. It took three or four decades before the 
seeds really began to grow in the present. It is important to recall the hard times.”1660  
Professor Doreen Mattingly told the author that Carter “certainly contributed to 
changing policy, and also the way that they were emboldened through contact with his 
administration helped to bring gay rights into the Democratic Party, and into the platform, 
and to the realm of what the Democratic Party stands for.”1661 Jeffrey Montgomery stated in a 
personal interview that, “there can be no doubt that all these efforts by President Carter were 
of the utmost importance for us and that really made a difference to the improvement of our 
lives.”1662  
David Mack Henderson told the author that Carter’s reforms and efforts 
“unquestionably positively affected a lot of homosexuals. By looking back now after so many 
years, it seems incredible that Carter did all this. I don’t think anyone who was not gay and 
lived at the time in the USA is in a position to understand and appreciate how important all 
these reforms were. Most homosexuals at the time were at the fringes of society, life was very 
difficult for many of us, and Carter tried and I would say he succeeded, at least to some 
extent, to not just bring hope, but make a real change to our lives… he really helped to drag 
gay people out of the pariah class and into the mainstream.”1663 
David McReynolds told the author that he considered Carter to be “the best ex-
President” in terms of contributing to gay rights.1664 Eddie Sandifer, in his personal interview, 
said also that, “I have personally always credited Carter for a lot of things that have been 
happening now. It was him who started the ball rolling and I strongly believe that things for 
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homosexuals would have advanced further had he beaten Reagan.”1665 Nancy Higgins told 
the author, “I have always said that Carter was the best President for gay rights after Obama. 
What he did was enormous, especially considering the frame of time. It is a shame he did not 
get the recognition he deserved, but I think we are partly to blame. It is often in human nature 
when someone gives you something to keep on asking for more and more and then when 
once he tells you no, you forget all the previous good things he did for you. This is what we 
did at the time with Carter…”1666  
Richard Socarides told the author regarding Carter’s achievement with regards to gay 
rights, “I think it’s clear that there were a number of actions taken at a staff level which 
helped set the stage for progress later.”1667  Donald Hallman told the author that “Carter’s 
contribution in advancing gay rights is for me unquestionable and I am actually surprised that 
it is not very hyped. He was the one who set the wheels in motion in the 1970s in a very 
difficult period for us. I think he was a very brave president who did the right thing and what 
his conscience told him to do, but as it often happens it was not appreciated at the time. For 
me, after Obama, Carter is by far the most gay-friendly President we had.”1668 
 
CARTER’S VIEWS ON GAY RIGHTS AFTER HIS TERM AS PRESIDENT 
As for Carter, after leaving the Presidency, he continued to be deeply involved in matters 
concerning human rights, among them rights for homosexuals, as indicated by his public 
support for civil unions for homosexuals.1669 In fact, Carter appears to have felt released from 
the many constraints that were placed on him by the office of president and to have grown 
progressively more open-minded about “lifestyles” that once made him uncomfortable. In his 
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memoir Living Faith, published in 2001, Carter points out that the Jesus portrayed in the 
Bible never so much as mentions homosexuality, and adds: “It is much easier and more 
convenient for heterosexual Christians to attack homosexuals, based primarily on selected 
verses in the Old Testament.”1670 
 
CONCLUSION 
Carter’s defeat led to a severe backlash against gay rights. Reagan’s refusal to meet with gay 
rights activists, the no-longer-open doors of federal agencies, and the AIDS epidemic, were 
all major setbacks for the gay community. Within a few years all the progress that had been 
made under Carter had gone down the drain, and the situation for homosexual Americans was 
even worse than it had been before 1976. The fact that it took another thirty years of 
continual struggle for gay rights activists to achieve any significant gains clearly shows the 
monumental difficulties Carter had to face. Therefore, by looking at Carter’s policies and 
decisions from a historical perspective, we can now clearly see how important and ahead of 
their time they were. This is confirmed by the views of prominent gay rights campaigners 
who were active in the 1970s.  
  
                                                          










This thesis has examined Carter’s role in advancing gay rights during his presidency, as well 
as his relationship with gay rights activists. In addition, it also explored his attitude to 
activists on the evangelical right and their attempts to influence his policies. Perhaps because 
of his decision not to highlight the issue of gay rights as such but to subsume it into the more 
general area of human rights, Carter’s low-key but important, contribution to gay rights has 
been little researched, and he has not received the credit he deserves for his efforts in this 
area. The thesis argued that Carter contributed much more than has been acknowledged to the 
development and advance of gay rights in the United States. The thesis highlighted Carter’s 
contributions in three specific areas, arguing that he contributed to gay rights through his 
policies; that he legitimised the gay rights movement and offered it unprecedented visibility; 
and that he enabled the gay community to become more aware of its capacity as a social 
movement and of its ability to create legal and political change by becoming organised as 
such. 
 
CARTER’S CONTRIBUTION TO GAY RIGHTS THROUGH HIS POLICIES 
Despite the difficult cultural environment during his term as President, Carter made 
significant contributions to gay rights which, though not widely recognised, were hugely 
important in the march towards dignity and acceptance for homosexual Americans. Carter 
had very little leeway to introduce new laws with respect to gay rights. However, where and 





example, in the subtle but far-reaching changes to the Immigration Act. In addition, whenever 
possible he used the White House’s influence and power to enable significant positive 
changes and the record shows that Carter’s term in office saw considerable practical gains for 
homosexuals.  
Employment: Carter’s Civil Service reform meant that homosexual workers were 
protected in 95% of the federal sector. While gay rights activists continued to work to remove 
all discrimination against gays, including in the military and the security services, this was a 
very significant improvement. It meant that American citizens hired to work in federal 
positions no longer had to hide their sexuality.  
Gay rights activists wanted Carter to go a step further and issue an executive order to 
protect gay employees in the remaining 5% of the sector. Carter declined and the fact that the 
situation remained exactly the same thirty years later shows how difficult it would have been 
for him to accept the activists’ demand. We should also remember that Carter had made his 
position clear before his election in 1976 when he stated that while he was against sexual 
discrimination, he believed that homosexuals should not be appointed in state security sectors 
because they were vulnerable to blackmail.    
Carter also created a Task Force on Sex Discrimination and ordered its members “to 
take the personal responsibility to examine their own attitudes, policies, and directives” with 
regard to homosexual employees. Through his efforts, the Civil Service Commission began 
hearing harassment cases against gays, while homosexuals were no longer barred from 
working with the Peace Corps or the Agency for International Development. The 
Commission on Civil Rights also for the first time began investigating allegations of 
harassment against homosexuals. 
Immigration Reform: Whereas, prior to Carter, even the suspicion that someone 





entering the United States, now the authorities were forbidden to ask about an applicant’s 
sexuality or to draw inferences from factors such as mannerisms or dress. The change to the 
law permitted entry not just to the “Marielitos” from Cuba, but also to all gay travellers and 
immigrants, including those travelling for reasons associated with activism. Carter was not 
able to change the law regarding homosexual immigrants, but he ordered removal of the 
sexuality question from the questionnaire which people were required to complete upon 
seeking entry to the USA. This small change meant that gays were now allowed to enter the 
country. 
Military Reform: In the 1970s, anyone in the military who was revealed as being a 
homosexual was subjected to a dishonourable discharge. As well as reinforcing the idea that 
homosexuality itself was aberrant, immoral and shameful, there were serious repercussions 
for gay veterans in terms of access to pensions and other rights. Carter’s Review Programme 
for Dishonourable Discharges looked at thousands of cases of gay veterans who were 
dishonourably discharged and changed their discharges to honourable. This entitled them to 
the same pension rights and other benefits as anyone else. Despite persistent pressure from 
gay rights activists, Carter did not end discrimination against gays in the military. However, 
the fact that this did not end for some thirty more years demonstrates that it was an almost 
impossible task for him.  
Prison Reform: Before Carter’s Presidency, gay prisoners were routinely subjected 
to degrading treatment, and were denied access to gay-interest literature, including material 
of a non-erotic nature, and to the services of a chaplain who accepted them and did not 
consider them to be immoral or sinful. In addition, sexual crimes were often reported as 
“homosexual rape” – giving the impression that the assailant was homosexual whereas the 
assailants were mostly identified as heterosexuals. As a result of the White House’s 





very clear to the prison authorities that they were obliged to treat gay prisoners no differently 
than any others. Gay prisoners won the right to access non-pornographic material of 
homosexual interest and to meet with chaplains, while the word “homosexual” was removed 
when reporting a sexual crime.  
Tax Reform: Under Carter, gay rights organisations now qualified for tax deductible 
and tax exempt status, just like churches or any other charitable organisation. The additional 
funds were a substantial resource enabling them to mobilise more effectively and reach out to 
a larger number of activists. In a wider way, it offered the gay rights movement recognition 
and legitimisation and played a role in changing public discourse regarding concerns about 
their rights (this issue will be discussed further below). The changed financial status of the 
gay rights organisations, as well as their enhanced status in American society, constituted a 
significant resource that they were able to bring to the fray. However, this reform angered the 
evangelical right, especially since the new financial status of gay rights organisations 
coincided with the removal of tax-exempt status from denominational schools which had 
failed to integrate. The outrage felt by evangelicals spurred them to mobilise further in their 
struggle against the gay rights movement.  
Social and Legislative Reform: Under Carter, various legislative changes 
contributed in a range of ways to improving the situation for gay right in America, including 
the removal of archaic anti-gay laws and references in official literature (for example, a 
reference to homosexual arsonists in the Fire Department manual, which was removed by the 
National Fire Prevention and Control Administration), and the growing visibility of gays in 
public life, as well as in the media. For Americans, hetero- and homosexual alike, seeing gays 
represented in the media, and not just as criminals or figures of fun, meant that they could 





All of the above changes, made while the United States was engaged in a cultural war 
involving society’s self-perception, significantly improved the lives of many homosexuals. 
Some gay rights activists believed Carter could have gone even further, but the fact that 
homosexuals did not make any practical gains for another thirty years underlines the 
importance and bravery of Carter’s decisions and the unrealistic nature of those expectations.  
 
LEGITIMISING AND GIVING VISIBILITY TO THE GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT  
One of the main issues for gay rights activists during the 1970s concerned the visibility and 
what they saw as the legitimacy of their movement. At the time, they enjoyed neither. Gay 
Americans and their activities were ignored by the government and by federal agencies, while 
coverage by mainstream media was mostly negative. The only way homosexual activists 
could make their views known was through gay publications, of which the general public was 
largely ignorant. 
In offering legitimacy and visibility to the gay community and its concerns, Carter 
made probably his biggest contribution to gay rights. This was a time when homosexuals 
were seen as “abnormal” by a large number of Americans, leading to their marginalisation by 
mainstream society. Carter was the first American president to recognise the need of 
homosexual people to be treated as legitimate, visible and equal. Louie Crew told this study 
that before Carter, the only official body to show any interest in homosexuals was the police, 
and that was only in order to arrest them.1671  
When addressing America at large, Carter became the first presidential nominee to 
speak publicly about gay rights. Although he believed homosexuality to be sinful, he declared 
publicly that homosexuals should not be harassed or subjected to discrimination, but should 
                                                          





enjoy the same rights as other Americans. Carter’s actions played a major role in offering 
visibility, respect and legitimisation to the gay rights issue.  
  
Paving the Way for Open Dialogue between Administration and Gay Rights Groups  
One of Carter’s greatest achievements was to put the issue of gay rights and engagement with 
gay rights activists on the table for future Presidents. At the same time, Carter contributed 
uniquely to the legitimisation of the gay rights movement by holding meetings with activists 
in the White House itself. That the NGTF and like-minded groups could take their concerns 
directly to the highest authority in the country in the White House was of tremendous 
symbolic significance, demonstrating how the President of the USA recognised the existence 
of homosexuals, listened to their needs and sought to address their issues. In addition to the 
White House meetings, and of equal importance, Carter opened the way for gay rights 
activists to engage in dialogue with federal agencies, hitherto a bastion of resistance. This 
access enabled activists to speak directly to the people they needed to address, while further 
legitimising the status of the movement as a whole. Many of the advances during Carter’s 
presidency were achieved by the NGTF talking to the federal agencies. However, even then, 
such changes would have been unachievable without the influence of Carter’s White House, 
as exemplified by the Bureau of Prisons.  
How important access to the White House and the federal agencies was for gay 
activists is evident in a letter from the NGTF leadership to its members less than a year after 
Reagan became President, which expressed its despair at the new situation. It said in part, 
“We have been shunned by the White House … our contacts at the numerous agencies of the 
federal government have been cut off or severely restricted.”1672  
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Appointments of Openly Acknowledged Homosexuals 
Carter’s appointment policies also contributed to the legitimisation of the gay community. He 
appointed several homosexuals to his Cabinet and to public positions, such as four prominent 
lesbian activists, Jill Schropp, Ginny Apuzzo, Ruth Abram and Jean O’Leary. More 
important was the appointment of Midge Costanza, an ardent feminist and outspoken gay 
rights activist, who would become the driving force behind all the positive changes for 
homosexuals that occurred up to 1978, when she left the White House.  
Carter demonstrated particular courage in making such appointments, aware of the 
anger, dissatisfaction and likely loss of support they would cause among conservative 
Christians, especially since he did not appoint any evangelicals to his administration, as they 
had confidently expected. The appointments brought homosexual Americans to the front line 
of politics, allowing them to demonstrate that they could occupy high office in government 
and the public sector like anyone else.  
The effect of appointing homosexuals or gay friendly people to important positions 
became evident following the changes Carter made to the Women’s National Committee. The 
President accepted Costanza’s recommendations and replaced all the conservative members, 
who had been appointed by Ford, with feminists and two acknowledged lesbians, O’Leary 
and Abram. The new Committee played an instrumental role at the NWC in Houston in 1977, 
a ground-breaking event for American lesbians. The NWC helped lesbian activists to achieve 
their goals of visibility and legitimacy. For the first time, lesbian activists were given a forum 
at a major event to talk, argue and express their views at the national level. Never before had 
Americans switched on their TV sets to see and hear talk of lesbian rights – and this at an 





The NWC also offered legitimacy to lesbian activists when their sexual preference 
plank was passed as one of the Conference’s resolutions, and their need for equal rights and 
struggle against sexual discrimination were recognised by an official governmental body, 
Carter’s Women’s Committee. None of this would have happened if Carter had not made the 
changes to the Committee which Costanza had recommended.  
 
1980 
The results of Carter’s positive contribution to the legitimisation and discourse around 
homosexuality can be seen in events which took place in 1980. At the 1976 Republican 
Convention, none of the delegates was openly homosexual, while at the Democratic 
Convention there were just three. Four years later, there were seventy-seven openly 
homosexual delegates to the Democratic Convention and two at the Republican, the first time 
acknowledged homosexuals participated at the latter event. At the 1980 Presidential 
elections, Mel Boozer became the first openly declared homosexual to run for the Vice 
Presidency, while David McReynolds, also gay and “out,” became the first such to run for 
President.  
Also before the 1980 elections, the NGTF sent a questionnaire to all the nominees for 
president and vice president asking them to state their position on gay rights. This was 
something which had never been done before and was a clear sign of how things had 
progressed during the four years of Carter’s term. Another indicator of gay activists’ growing 
self-confidence took place at the 1980 elections when they organised a fundraiser to support 
the openly homosexual delegates at the two big parties’ conventions. It was another “first.” 
The difference between 1976 and 1980 is inescapable evidence of Carter’s contribution to the 
gay rights’ cause and the support he received from most gay voters in 1980 signalled their 











Carter’s Other Contributions to the Legitimisation of the Gay Community 
The WHCF, which was organised by Carter himself, made a massive contribution towards 
legitimising the gay community. Not only did Carter approve the participation of 
acknowledged homosexuals, on the vexed questions of relationships, he conceded that there 
could be such entities as homosexual families. Like the NWC, the WHCF gave gay rights 
activists the opportunity to speak on national television and talk to quality newspapers about 
their cause, a visibility they had never experienced.  
In the wake of the NWC, this was the turn of gay men to expound upon their needs 
and what they believed to be their rights. An unexpected side-effect was that several 
participants declared themselves homosexual in front of the television cameras. Finally, the 
conference passed a resolution calling for an end to discrimination on the basis of sexual 
preference. All of these developments showed how much things had changed in four years 
under Carter, changes which ironically became visible at a conference intended to strengthen 
the American family and which was organised by the President of the USA himself. In all, an 
enormous contribution to the legitimization of homosexuality in the United States.  
Carter also contributed to the legitimisation of the gay community via the following 
actions:  
 In 1980, after intervention from the White House, gay veterans were allowed to 
participate in a ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier to honour gay soldiers 
who died in battle. This was a highly controversial decision and particularly angered the 
evangelical right. However, for the gay community, this was the Army and the 
Government recognising that there were gay soldiers in the American Army, one of the 
most sacred institutions in the United States.  
 He publicly opposed Proposition 6. That made him the first American president to make a 





 He sent an aide to attend a fundraising event organised by gay rights activists. 
 He repeatedly stated in public that he was against sexual discrimination and the 
harassment of homosexuals. 
 He gave writer Tennessee Williams, an acknowledged homosexual, the Medal of 
Freedom. 
 Midge Costanza’s appearance in Dade County was perceived by both gay rights and the 
evangelical right as a sign of Carter’s endorsement of homosexuality since Costanza was 
his assistant. 
 He allowed a gay rights plank at the 1980 Democratic Convention.  
 
Cultural Framing 
Carter’s policies and decisions contributed significantly towards framing gay rights as a 
normal, legitimate concern, and activists in this area as legitimate political actors with the 
right to be listened to. He achieved this by:  
 engaging directly with gay rights organisations;  
 being the first sitting president to make a public statement in favour of a gay rights ruling;  
 implementing legislation that had a direct, positive impact on gay rights;  
 appointing open homosexuals to his Cabinet and to federal positions;  
 facilitating meetings between federal agencies and the NGTF;  
 generally treating gay rights activists and gay citizens and immigrants with respect.  
As Robert Malson, Carter’s associate director of the White House domestic policy 
staff, said in 1980, “Gay people are being drawn into the everyday routine decisions of staff 
and are being accepted as part of the political community. At the White House gay issues are 









There can be no doubt that Carter legitimised gay rights in the United States. It is an 
achievement which resists mathematical calculation but which can be measured against the 
circumstances of the time. One measure would be the gulf between the gay experience in 
1976 when Carter became President and how gays stood when he left office four years later. 
The New York Post’s headline on the March 1977 White House meeting, “From Closet to 
Street to Respect,”1674 and Costanza’s comment that “the gay movement was finally 
legitimized,”1675 are proof of the legitimisation and respect the movement gained under 
Carter. All seventeen gay rights activists interviewed for this study agreed that Carter showed 
respect to them personally and to their movement, and that he legitimised their struggle.  
 
ENABLING THE GAY COMMUNITY TO BECOME AWARE OF ITS OWN 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
In the mid-1970s, few homosexuals were active in the cause of gay rights. The NGTF, the 
largest organization of this type, was formed only in October 1973 and was taking its first, 
mostly unsuccessful, steps. It was unable to establish any communication with the 
Government or federal agencies. Most homosexuals could not see any reason to become 
active in the struggle as there was no end product, and many gay organisations were more 
like social clubs than special interest groups. All this changed during Carter’s presidency. His 
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invitation to activists to meet in the White House and his continuing engagement in dialogue 
with them had a profound effect on the homosexual community. The growing legitimisation 
and visibility of the movement, along with the fast-changing public discourse on 
homosexuality, prompted numbers of gays to organise seriously.  
The White House meeting in particular was a catalyst for the enlargement and 
strengthening of the NGTF and the movement as a whole. For the first time, activists realised 
that they could get results by organising and lobbying. This meeting was followed by other 
encounters with the Carter administration but also with federal agencies, leading to important 
policy changes. These early successes by the NGTF were hugely important and persuaded 
many homosexuals to join the struggle for their rights, convinced that at last they could be 
heard and could influence policy.  
It should also be noted that another reason that contributed to the enlargement and 
strengthening of the NGTF and other gay rights organizations was the IRS’s decision to grant 
them tax-exemption status. Tax-exemption meant that these organisations had now 
considerably more funds and, in some cases, could afford to hire and pay professionals rather 
than relying on volunteers. They also had more money to spend on advertising, enabling them 
to reach out to the dispersed homosexual community and grow their membership. Overall, 
having a larger budget at their disposal meant that gay-rights organisations could become 
better organised, more highly functioning, bigger, stronger and more influential.  
 
THE EVANGELICAL RIGHT AND THE GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT DURING 
CARTER’S PRESIDENCY 
Carter’s presidency had a big effect on both the gay rights and evangelical movements. 
During the 1976 campaign, evangelicals were Carter’s closest allies, but he courted and 





rights movement that included feminists and activists for abortion rights and which grew out 
of the drive for civil rights. The evangelical right, on the other hand, was a reaction against 
the gay rights and feminist and abortion rights groups of the 1970s. Both gays and 
evangelicals were very important in the development of America’s culture wars, which 
continue to this day. The two movements were alike in that they tried to attract as many 
members as possible, mobilize their support during elections and tell them who to vote for. 
The major difference was that gay rights activists were seeking to bring about social change, 
while the evangelicals fought to block it and preserve the status quo. 
Carter seemed to have a remarkable ability to upset both sides, despite their different 
agendas. For gay rights activists, what he did was never enough and they constantly asked for 
more. Ironically, the victories he did achieve for homosexuals, no matter how trivial, were 
important enough to annoy the evangelicals. For example, Carter’s Civil Service Reform Act 
protected homosexuals from discrimination in 95% of the federal agencies, but gay rights 
activists were unhappy that the security services (the outstanding 5%) were not covered and 
pressed Carter for an executive order banning discrimination in these agencies, too. This was 
despite the fact that Carter had made it clear during his election campaign that he supported 
an end to sexual discrimination in all federal agencies except the security services.  
Naturally, the Civil Service Reform Act angered the evangelical right anyway. 
Another example of upsetting both sides concerned the tax exemption that was given to all 
gay organizations. The evangelical right was unhappy, especially since its tax exception 
status was revoked. On the other hand, gay rights activists were not entirely happy either 
because they wanted gay families to have the right to file joint tax returns, declaring 







The Gay Rights Movement 
The gay rights movement was in existence long before the Carter Presidency; but it was then 
that it first came to prominence and achieved its biggest victories. This was mostly because 
he was the first sitting American president to deal directly with gay rights activists and to 
attempt to address their grievances, thus legitimising the movement. Carter legitimised the 
movement not only at the political level, but in the eyes of the nation, so that the push for gay 
rights expanded in the second half of the 1970s.  
Gay voters were mobilized for the first time in the 1976 elections after Carter publicly 
courted their vote, and when he secured office, they joined the struggle for gay rights, 
believing they could now make a difference. The newfound legitimacy and visibility 
provided by Carter’s decisions and policies helped the movement reach new heights. It grew 
in numbers as more homosexuals became convinced that they could achieve real change by 
getting organized and joining the struggle. More significantly, it also grew in influence as it 
suddenly found itself for the first time in direct dialogue with the Government and Federal 
agencies. However, it was not Carter’s policies alone that strengthened the movement but 
also the mobilization of the evangelical right. Sensing danger from a well-organised and 
hostile evangelical right, homosexuals lined up to join the battle.  
 
The Evangelical Right Movement  
Evangelicals supported Carter in 1976, because he was seen as “one of them,” even though 
he was more liberal than most in his religious beliefs. However, their relationship got off on 
the wrong foot when Carter failed to appoint any evangelicals to his staff as had been 
expected. Relations were never the same after this. As much as Carter’s actions led to 
changes for the gay rights movement, so did they affect the evangelical right, but for exactly 





abortion, the ERA, homosexuality) and Carter’s liberal policies (as they saw them) towards 
homosexuals, angered the believers, provoking them into energetic counter-reaction. 
Perceiving what they believed was a threat to the American family and the country’s 
traditional way of life, prominent leaders such as Jerry Falwell got busy organising special 
interest groups to fight the threat of moral decay and fight to preserve traditional American 
values. These groups, functioning as a clear counter-movement to the gay rights movement, 
were also able to galvanise growing numbers of Americans, both to passively support their 
cause and to actively engage with it. The evangelical right perceived the growing access to 
the echelons of power by gay rights activists as an existential threat, and acted quickly to 
mobilise its members in activism against gay rights and other progressive issues.  
The heightened emotions experienced by members of this group in response to 
Carter’s decisions helped to motivate many of them to become even more vociferous and 
organised against what they saw as the progressive threat, and specifically against any gains 
made in favour of gay rights. Gay rights were experienced as a very emotive issue, and anti-
gay rights activists focussed on arousing negative sentiments among Americans. Carter, the 
born-again Christian, paid dearly in terms of losing evangelical support for his decision to 
legitimise gay rights, and grant gay rights activists’ unprecedented access to the highest 
echelons of power. 
It would be justifiable to argue that by virtue of his policies and decisions, Carter 
unintentionally gave birth to the evangelical right, which quickly became a prominent force 
in national politics and remains as such today. As they organised, evangelicals achieved 
several of their immediate goals, including defeating a number of liberal politicians. Their 
number one target was Carter himself and they succeeded with him, too, in the 1980 







During Carter’s presidency, interest groups increasingly emerged as energetic, focused 
political players. Both anti- and pro-gay rights groups became increasingly politically agile as 
his presidency progressed. To the present, interest group politics have become an 
incrementally more important aspect of the US political scene. Today, any President or 
Presidential candidate is likely to be assailed on all sides by a wide range of interest groups, 
each of which is seeking for its particular issue to be addressed. Throughout this period 
(1976-1980), interest groups became incrementally more important, contributing both to 
decisions taken by him and to his defeat in his second Presidential election. Since then, 
interest groups have grown to become almost an industry in their own right.  
Here we have explored the role of gay rights interest groups (especially the NGTF) 
and evangelical right groups. With their intense grassroots activities and political lobbying, 
both can be seen as pioneers in the area of modern direct representation to government. 
Almost forty years later, the two sides are still fighting each other, with issues like abortion 
and gay rights constantly on the agenda of the evangelical right. Each side has had notable 
successes, although the evangelical right, while still an important player in American politics, 
has not been able to halt growing liberalism in regard to homosexuality. However, it has 
succeeded in delaying progress in the area of gay rights and by securing a central role for 
religion in government by means of specific appointments. As for the gay rights movement, it 
has obtained significant advances for homosexuals, including, just recently, marriage 
between people of the same sex.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Today, the issue of gay rights is a normal part of policy discussion in the US, and substantial 





“ideological heritage”1676 that was framed in the 1970s. The issue benefited considerably 
from the legitimacy it won from Carter and his contribution to the framing of gay activism as 
an ordinary, legitimate element of the liberal agenda. Despite subsequent backlash against 
gay rights, the movement was enabled to build upon tangible gains made during Carter’s 
presidency by levering its newfound legitimacy to make its voice heard throughout society.  
However, Carter’s contribution to gay rights has not won the recognition it deserves 
and remains a largely unexplored aspect of his presidency even today. In his time, gay rights 
activists recognised and acknowledged his efforts, but these advances seem subsequently to 
have been forgotten or less appreciated. If some of Carter’s achievements appear 
unimportant today, when same-sex marriages are legal, it is important to remember 
that he acted at a time when homosexuality was considered by many Americans to be 
a disease which could be cured by treatment.  
Although Carter’s role in advancing gay rights has been underestimated and little 
publicized, it has not gone entirely unrecognised. Gay rights activists who were active in the 
1970s do recognise Carter’s role in advancing their cause and this is very important as they 
are the ones who experienced Carter’s efforts. The advancements in gay rights that we 
witness today owe a great deal to Carter’s input in this area. It is this author’s contention that 
the efforts made by the Carter administration should be recognised as the catalyst for 
dramatic change that, in fact, they were. Carter left a very important, even a transformative 
legacy in the area of gay rights. 
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founding member of the North Carolina Religious Coalition for Marriage Equality and 
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Louie Crew: Gay activist, National Gay Task Force board of directors 1976-1978. 
Professor John d’Emilio: Professor of history, women and gender studies at University of 
Illinois at Chicago and former Director of the Policy Institute of the National Gay Task 
Force.  
Michael Dukakis: 1988 Democratic nominee for US President, former Governor of 
Massachusetts and currently Professor of Public Policy in UCLA. 
James Fallows: Carter’s speech-writer and journalist. 
Marilyn Haft: She served the Carter Administration as Associate Director of the Office of 
Public Liaison in the White House (Costanza’s assistant), where she was the liaison to 
organized interest groups in the areas of human rights, business and the arts. She was later 
appointed Deputy Counsel to Vice President Walter Mondale in the White House and then 
ran the New York City campaign for the re-election of President Carter. 
Donald Hallman: Gay veteran who had been dishonourably discharged from the US Army on 
grounds of his homosexuality in the 1950s. 
Tom Hayden: Anti-war and civil rights activist, politician, author and director of the Peace 
and Justice Resource Centre in Culver City, California. 
David Mack Henderson: Gay rights activist and founder of the Fairness Fort Worth. 
Nancy Higgins: Lesbian rights activist and former member of the NGTF. 
Lisa Keen: Blade journalist.  
Lucy Komisar: Investigative journalist who attended the National Women’s Conference in 
Houston. 





David Lovelock: Evangelical pastor. 
Eric Marcus: Researcher, writer and analyst, primarily on LGBT matters. 
Professor Doreen Mattingly: Professor of Women's Studies at the San Diego University and 
Midge Costanza’s biographer. 
Danny Meyer: Public Affairs Officer for the American Veterans for Equal Rights 
Jeffrey Montgomery: LGBT activist and the founding executive director of Triangle 
Foundation, a gay and civil rights organization in Michigan. 
Professor Mark J Rozell: Acting Dean and professor of public policy at George Mason 
University, author of nine books and editor of twenty books on various topics in U.S. 
government and politics including the presidency, religion and politics, media and politics, 
and interest groups in elections. 
Eddie Sandifer: Gay veteran, member of the Mattachine Society and founder of the 
Mississippi Gay Alliance 
Professor Byron E. Shafer: Hawkins Chair of Political Science in the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, author of the Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party 
and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics. 
Dr. Morris Sheats: Senior Pastor, founder of the Trinity Church in Lubbock, Texas, of the 
Leadership Institute and of the Heritage Church of Dallas. 
Richard Socarides: President Bill Clinton’s White House adviser on gay and lesbian rights 
issues, writer and commentator in The New Yorker, the Wall Street Journal and the 
Washington Post.   
Professor Amy L. Stone: Professor of Sociology at the Trinity University, author of Gay 
Rights at the Ballot-Box. 






Professor Clyde Wilcox: Professor in the Government Department at Georgetown, author of 
many books about interest groups and the Christian Right.  
Mel White: Author, member of the Evangelical Protestant movement through the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s, also biographer of Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, Billy Graham and James 
Dobson.  
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